Navigate / search

Home > Blog > 2008 > December

>International Organization for Migration’s Year End Report On Displaced Iraqis In Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala Provinces

>In early December 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its end of the year reports on Iraq’s displaced. The first was on Anbar, Baghdad and Diyala, the three provinces that have seen the largest number of refugees and returns in the country. The IOM’s report contained extensive polling data on the needs of this population, top among them being food and shelter. The IOM report also documented the flow of Iraqis returning to their homes. While still at a small percentage, more are coming back than before. The IOM also found that few displaced receive basic services or any type of assistance, governmental or other. Many live in squalid conditions, and their overall situation is getting no better.

State Of The Displaced In Iraq

There were displaced Iraqis before the U.S. invasion. Saddam Hussein carried out policies against Shiites and Kurds that forced many from their homes. The Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars also led to Iraqi refugees. After the 2003 U.S. invasion, Coalition and Iraqi military operations led to around 200,000 Iraqis being displaced. The real catastrophe started after the Samarra shrine was bombed in February 2006, which started the sectarian war between the Shiites and Sunnis. After that attack approximately 1.6 million fled.

Shiites are the majority in the country, and are a majority of the displaced. Most were forced out because of direct threats to their lives. Almost two-thirds of them want to go back to their homes. Until then, most are renting a place, while others have turned to squatting. Many are afraid of evictions.

Because of their status, access to jobs, services, food, electricity, fuel, and schools are difficult. In a survey conducted by the IOM, 11% said they had no access to health care, 65.2% had no one in their family working, 36.7% received no aid from any group or government agency, 48% said they didn’t receive a steady supply of rations from the government, and 42% only had access to 3 hour or less of electricity per day.

These troubling situations along with the improved security situation have led a small, but growing number of Iraqis to try to return to their homes. As of November 2008, the IOM had found that 38,404 families, approximately 230,424 people had returned. 93% of those were internally displaced, and only 7% international refugees. The vast majority went back to Baghdad, which was the source for most of the country’s displaced.

Statistics On Displaced In Iraq

Displaced By Sect:
57.0% Shiite Arab
30.8% Sunni Arab
3.7% Sunni Kurd
1.9% Christian Chaldean
1.2% Shiite Turkomen
1.0% Sunni Turkomen
0.6% Shiite Kurd

Reasons For Displacement:
49.7% Direct Threats On Life
44.7% General Violence
35.2% Left Out Of Fear
29.6% Forced Out
20.8% Armed Conflict

Reasons For Being Targeted:
84.8% Sect
10.9% Don’t Think Targeted
5.1% Political Opinion
4.8% Ethnic Group
1.3% Social Group

Intentions:
61.3% Want To Return To Their Original Home
Approx 15% Want To Resettle In Third Location
20% Want To Integrate Into Current Location

Security Questions:
25.9% Death Or Injury In Family
17.6% Checkpoints Near Home
8.8% Need Permission To Move
6.6% Missing Family Member
4.0% Other Restrictions On Movement

Type Of Housing:
63.7% Rent
14.8% Live With Relatives Or Friends
10.0% Other
6.0% Collective Settlement
4.2% Public Housing
0.4% Former Military Camp

Access To Food Rations:
20.1% Not At All
46.2% Sometimes
33.6% Always

Reasons For Non-Access To Food Rations:
32.5% Insecure Shipping Route
15.0% Delay Transferring To New Location
6.5% Lack Transportation To Food Supplies
2.5% Other
2.5% No Food To Distribute
1.9% No Documents Or Ration Cards
1.3% Don’t Know

Food Aid Sources:
56.2% None
19.8% Religious Group
19.4% Humanitarian Group
10.6% Other
9.4% Other Federal Government Agency
6.3% Regional Government Agency

Water Sources:
88.8% Municipal Water
26.1% Water Tanks/Trucks
12.5% Rivers and Lakes
12.1% Open/Broken Pipe
11.3% Wells
3.4% Other

Electricity Supply:
4.8% None
31.2% 1-3 Hours Per Day
63.2% Four Or More Hours Per Day

Fuel Access:
61.0% Propane
43.8% Benzene
32.7% No Access
21.3% Kerosene
13.5% Diesel
2.6% Other

Visited By Health Worker In Past 30 Days?
56.2% Yes
41.3% No

Employment:
34.8% At Least One Family Member Working
65.2% No One Working

Status Of Property Left Behind:
27.67% Occupied By Others
17.93% Destroyed
16.46% Accessible
40.95% Don’t Know
1.11% Used By Military
0.44% Controlled By Government

Sources Of Assistance:
36.7% None
26.5% Relatives
26.5% Host Community
26.3% Ministry of Displacement and Migration
24.1% Religious Group
23.4% Iraqi Red Crescent
20.6% Humanitarian Group
4.2% Other Government Agency
1.8% Other

Numbers Of Returnees:
38,404 Families
Approximately 230,424 people
93% Internally Displaced
7% International Refugees

State Of The Displaced In Anbar, Baghdad and Diyala

The majority of those displaced in Anbar, Baghdad and Diyala provinces fled because of the sectarian war of 2006. Because of the fighting, there are a high number of female-headed households, which causes problems with jobs, poverty, and acquiring food and housing. These three provinces are also seeing evictions over squatting or not paying rent. Anbar was the highest at 8%, followed by Diyala at 5%. Access to services and schooling were also difficult. In the three provinces for example, only 17% of families interviewed had female children going to school compared to the national average of 22.5%, and only 29.5% had their male kids attending compared to the national average of 32%.

The Displaced In Anbar

Anbar is Iraq’s largest province, but it lacks resources. On September 1, 2008 it was turned over to Iraqi control. That was a positive step, but there are still attacks in the province. IEDs and suicide bombings continue with the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah still being the most violent. There are also extensive checkpoints throughout the province.

The governorate is also almost entirely Sunni, which has led many of that sect to flee there from other parts of the country. 77% of the displaced there came from Baghdad. There were also a large number of internally displaced Anbaris, because of the military operations there in 2004 and 2005 in places like Ramadi and Fallujah. More than 12,000 left for Baghdad. In the last year many of these have gone back to their homes. In the northern section of the province there are also about 600 Kurdish families that are displaced, but intend to stay in Anbar.

Anbar has been generally open to the displaced. It has no restrictions on their movement. In order to receive food rations they need to register and have their IDs. Many that went there came from the same tribes and families, and were given aid by locals. Now that is beginning to change as prices, especially rents, are going up.

Access to housing and services varies across the province for the displaced. They are three times as likely to live in public housing as the national average. Water supply differs from district to district. Tamem, Jughyfi, Askari, Thubbat, and Shurate sub-districts don’t have enough water, while Rawa, Rutba, Saqlawiya, and Khalidiya sub-districts have no sewage system. The Rutba desert area is also suffering from drought, which has forced some displaced to leave there for Fallujah. Overall, Anbar is known for having the worst water network in the country. Many pipes are damaged or breaking down. The water system usually runs on electricity, which is also spotty in the province. Fallujah and Ramadi average 2-3 hours of power a day, Heet and Karma 3-4 hours per day, and Rutba, Qaim and Hadith 5-6 hours per day. The improved security in Anbar has allowed the health sector to be rebuilt, but the centers usually lack supplies and staff. 50.5% of the displaced there say they have no access to medications. The schools in the province also need to be fixed, with some made out of mud. There is also extensive unemployment throughout the governorate.

After Baghdad, Anbar has seen the most returns. The IOM counted 3,101 families, or approximately 18,606 people have come back. Many of those said they did so because they felt pressured to leave by the provinces they were in or because they were running out of money.

Statistics On Displaced In Anbar

Overall
Population: 1,485,985
Displaced Before Feb. 06: 1,025 families, approximately 6,150 people
Displaced After Feb. 06: 9,179 families, approximately 55,716 people
Number Of Displaced Surveyed By IOM: 9,431 families, approximately 56,586 people
Number Of Returns: 3,101 families, approximately 18,606 people
Sect Of Displaced: 0.9% Shiite Arab, 98.6% Sunni Arab
Origin Of Displaced: 77.64% Baghdad, 14.59% Anbar, 6.18% Basra, 0.71% Ninewa,
0.66% Diyala, 0.12% Babil, 0.06% Salahaddin, 0.03% Wasit, 0.01% Dhi Qar

Reasons For Displacement:
46.6% General Violence
40.5% Direct Threat On Life
28.1% Forced Out
14.2% Armed Conflict
8.5% Left Out Of Fear

Reasons For Being Targeted:
80.1% Sect
19.7% Don’t Think Targeted
5.9% Ethnic Group
0.6% Political Opinion
0.2% Social Group

Displacement Rate
February 2006 began increasing to 500 a month
July 2006 dropped
Rose to peak at October 2006 at 1,500 that month
Declined to nearly 0 since then

Intentions:
83.4% Return To Original Home
15% Resettle In Current Location

Returns:
3,101 families, approximately 18,606 people to 99 locations

Internally Displaced vs. Refugees Amongst Returns:
2,123 displaced families, 888 refugee families

Security Situation:
61.1% Checkpoints Near Home
21.1% Other Restrictions
17.0% Death Or Injury In Family
7.3% Need Permission To Move
0.8% Missing Family Member

Type Of Housing:
61.5% Rent
18.8% Live With Relatives Or Friends
11.8% Public Housing
7.6% Collective Settlement
3.0% Other
0.9% Former Military Camp

Access To Food Rations:
61.7% Sometimes
22.5% Always
15.6% Not At All

Reasons For Non-Access To Food Rations:
20.1% Delay Transferring To new Location
14.5% Insecure Shipping Route
8.1% Lack Transportation For Food
5.4% Other
1.4% Families Lack Documentation Or Ration Cards
0.5% Don’t Know
0.1% No Food To Distribute

Food Aid Sources:
53.6% Humanitarian Group
45.3% Religious Group
27.6% None
8.9% Other
8.6% Other Federal Government Agency
2.6% regional Government Agency

Water Sources:
96.8% Municipal Water
56.7% Water Tanks/Trucks
36.1% Public Wells
19.0% Rivers And Lakes
2.2% Other
0.2% Open/Broken Pipes

Electricity Supply
11.9% None
39.8% 1-3 Hours Per Day
41.8% Four Or More Hours Per Day

Fuel Access:
55.1% No Access
29.5% Benzene
28.6% Propane
13.1% Other
12.3% Diesel
11.5% Kerosene

Visited By Health Workers In Past 30 Days?
33.7% Yes
62.5% No

Employment:
77.9% None Working
22.1% At Least One Family Member Working

Status Of Property Left Behind:
41.88% Don’t Know
20.71% Accessible
17.63% Occupied By Others
4.07% Destroyed
1.25% Used By Military
0.22% Controlled By Government

Source Of Assistance:
55.6% Humanitarian Group
49.0% Host Community
41.4% Religious Group
26.9% Iraqi Red Crescent
17.1% Relatives
8.6% Ministry Of Displacement and Migration
7.8% None
0.8% Other
0.4% Other Government Agency

Needs:
94% Food
71% Shelter
63% Work
40% Water
17% School
11% Health
3% Other
1% Hygiene
0% No Answer
0% Sanitation
0% Legal Help

The Displaced In Baghdad

Baghdad was the scene of the greatest displacement in Iraq. When the sectarian war began, the capital was ground zero. 90,731 families, approximately 550,099 fled the fighting. 48.7% said they were forced out, with 39.6% saying they faced direct threats on their life. 65% of the country’s displaced come from there as a result. Most usually simply moved to a different section of the city with 82.54% of the displaced within the city coming from Baghdad itself. As a result the capital has been largely segregated into a Shiite east and Sunni west. Many also fled to Baghdad from neighboring Anbar, 1.56% of the displaced in the city, and Diyala, 14.32%.

Before 2006, the city had very few internal refugees. During the U.S. invasion, some residents were forced out, but they moved south to where the fighting was already over. The October 2004 offensive in Fallujah led to 12,000 Anbaris moving to Baghdad, but most have moved back since then. Many of these new arrivals were not welcomed in the capital. Lots of them were from the country and were not familiar with city life. The displaced during the sectarian war were treated much differently. Many settled in areas with their own sect and/or family, and usually received local aid.

With security improving, Baghdad has seen the largest number of returns in the country. The IOM counted 26,347 families coming back, equaling about 158,082 people. The vast majority, 25,178 families were internally displaced. A major reason for them coming back was the lack of services in their current locations. Refugees from other countries also cited a lack of money and visa restrictions.

The local and federal government have been promoting these returns. The city council has given out cash to help. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also issued Order 101 in August 2008 ordering all squatters in Baghdad to leave their residences in one month. This was meant to help returns to the capital where many displaced said their houses were occupied. The Council of Ministers also announced Order 262, which offered all squatters evicted 300,000 dinars per family for six months as compensation. Evictions are happening as a result, but no squatters have received any money yet. The IOM doesn’t believe the government has any real plan to help the squatters they are kicking out. That means their situation is worsening. In the Al Batool Complex of Khadamiya 659 families got eviction notices, but had nowhere to go, and security forces bulldozed part of their community. The displaced in the Al Imam al-Hassan complex in Hurriya in Khadimiya are also facing evictions since they live in an ex-Army base.

For those that have gone back, some of their experiences have not been positive either. 59.39% of displaced families polled said their houses were occupied and 32.43% said their places had been destroyed. Iraqis that returned to the Al Salam sub-district for example, found their houses wrecked and looted by local militias.

The situation of those still displaced is very difficult as well. 60.1% of families polled had no one in their group working. In the Al Yousifiya sub-district of Mahmoudiy and Al Sikillat of Husseiniya in the Istiqlal district there are large numbers of widows and orphans amongst the displaced and returning families. The area also lacks any water supply or sewage system. In the Karkh district, many displaced children do not go to school because they are working to help with their families. There are 206 families in the Beer Alewi complex in Karkh that live in mud houses, and acquire their power illegally. Food rations also differ from neighborhood to neighborhood. In Al Yousifiya sub-district the displaced receive their rations, but with their usual shortcomings of late delivery and missing items. In contrast, families in Al Ma’amil of Rusafa do not receive any government food and suffer from malnutrition as a result. The displaced in Mariam al-Adhra complex have not transferred their rations because they are afraid of being tracked down by the government and being evicted as a result. There is little to no help for these families. 49.6% say they have received no assistance.

Statistics On Displaced In Baghdad

Overall
Population: 7,145,470
Displaced Before Feb. 06: 3,867 families, approximately 23,202 people
Displaced After Feb. 06: 90,731 families, approximately 550,099 people
Number Of Displaced Surveyed By IOM: 60,724 families, approximately 364,344 people
Number Of Returns: 26,347 families, approximately 158,082 people
Sect Of Displaced: 70.6% Shiite Arab, 29.2% Sunni Arab, 0.1% Christian Chaldean
Origin Of Displaced: 82.54% Baghdad, 14.32% Diyala, 1.56% Anbar, 0.82% Salahaddin,
0.28% Tamim, 0.22% Ninewa, 0.14% Babil, 0.04% Wasit, 0.03% Basra, 0.01% Karbala, 0.01% Maysan

Reasons For Displacement:
48.7% Forced Out
39.6% Direct Threat On Life
37.6% Armed Conflict
30.1% General Violence
29.2% Left Out Of Fear

Reasons For Being Targeted:
94.4% Sect
6.5% Don’t Think Targeted
1.8% Political Opinion
0.3% Social Group
0.1% Ethnic Group

Displacement Rate
February 2006 only 50 displaced
March 2006 had increased to 3,600
April 2006 up to almost 4,000
Dropped in May 2006 to 2,500
Increased again in June 06
Highest point was December 2006 at 7,000
Declined since then to almost 0 by June 2007

Intentions:
80.3% Return To Original Home
Approximately 10% Resettle In 3rd Location
5% Integrate Into Current Location

Returns:
26,347 families, approximately 158,082 people to 144 locations

Internally Displaced vs. Refugees Amongst Returns:
25,178 displaced families, 1,169 refugee families

Security Situation:
43.5% Death Or Injury In Family
3.4% Need Permission To Move
2.6% Missing Family Member
1.1% Other Restrictions
0.1% Checkpoints Near Home

Type Of Housing:
72.8% Rent
12.5% Live With Relatives Or Friends
8.2% Other
4.6% Collective Settlement
1.5% Public Housing
0.0% Former Military Camp

Access To Food Rations:
51.7% Sometimes
42.9% Always
5.4% Not At All

Reasons For Non-Access To Food Rations:
17.3% Delay Transferring To new Location
12.4% Insecure Shipping Route
3.3% Other
2.4% Families Lack Documentation Or Ration Cards
1.9% Don’t Know
0.2% Lack Transportation For Food
0.2% No Food To Distribute

Food Aid Sources:
60.3% None
25.3% Religious Group
11.5% Other
10.0% Humanitarian Group
8.9% Other Federal Government Agency
2.7% regional Government Agency

Water Sources:
96.2% Municipal Water
7.5% Water Tanks/Trucks
7.6% Open/Broken Pipes
1.8% Rivers And Lakes
1.1% Public Wells
0.0% Other

Electricity Supply
0.9% None
40.7% 1-3 Hours Per Day
58.3% Four Or More Hours Per Day

Fuel Access:
82.8% Propane
72.3% Benzene
33.5% Kerosene
13.3% No Access
7.1% Diesel
0.2% Other

Visited By Health Workers In Past 30 Days?
82.8% Yes
13.4% No

Employment:
60.1% None Working
39.9% At Least One Family Member Working

Status Of Property Left Behind:
7.66% Don’t Know
59.39% Occupied By Others
32.43% Destroyed
26.72% Accessible
1.15% Used By Military
0.41% Controlled By Government

Source Of Assistance:
49.6% None
28.9% Religious Group
36.2% Relatives
17.2% Humanitarian Group
16.0% Host Community
10.9% Iraqi Red Crescent
7.3% Ministry Of Displacement and Migration
1.8% Other Government Agency
0.2% Other

Needs:
97.4% Food
55.4% Legal Help
41.5% Shelter
34.7% Work
30.6% Water
19.4% Other
17.4% Health
0.6% Hygiene
0.4% School
0.2% No Answer
0% Sanitation

The Displaced In Diyala

Security is still an issue in Diyala. In July 2008 Iraqi forces launched their latest offensive in the province. That improved things a little, but there are still attacks, especially from female suicide bombers. Baquba is the most volatile area. Conflict between Baghdad and the Kurds over the disputed territory of Khanaqin has also increased tensions. Overall, the security situation is worse according to the IOM. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration however, recently claimed that things were going so well that the government will no longer register internal refugees in Diyala anymore.

Diyala has no restrictions on the movement or the entrance of the displaced. The province has the second most refugees after Baghdad. 80% of them come from the province itself, with 16% coming from the capital. Before 2006 most of the displaced were fleeing the U.S. invasion. They consisted of both Arabs and Kurds. Many lived in squalid conditions, squatting, or living in mud or wooden huts. In 2005 many families returned to their homes. Displaced from other provinces also began leaving Diyala as violence increased there. Overall, refugee families were generally welcomed because they came from the same sect or family.

After the July 2008 military offensive, almost 3,000 displaced families returned to their homes. Some have been attacked however. The security forces have responded, and are trying to ensure their safety.

Life continues to be difficult for those still displaced in Diyala. Many are led by women as their husbands have been killed during the sectarian fighting. In Baquba, there are many displaced women doing hard labor, others have no jobs in the area. There are 100 displaced families in the Khan Beni Sa’ad sub-district, and 89 families in Salam sub-district of Khalis living in tents. In Hatim al-Jamil there is no sewage, and the displaced drink from rivers.

Statistics On Displaced In Baghdad

Overall
Population: 1,560,621
Displaced Before Feb. 06: 9,100 families, approximately 54,600 people
Displaced After Feb. 06: 22.784 families, approximately 136,891 people
Number Of Returns: 6,216 families, approximately 37,296 people
Sect Of Displaced: 57.6% Sunni Arab, 33.3% Shiite Arab, 6.3% Shiite Kurd, 1.8% Sunni
Kurd, 0.6% Shiite Turkomen, 0.5% Sunni Turkomen
Origin Of Displaced: 82.8% Diyala, 16.51% Baghdad, 0.24% Anbar, 0.16% Tamim,
0.12% Babil, 0.12% Salahaddin, 0.04% Basra, 0.01% Ninewa

Reasons For Displacement:
60.3% General Violence
45.5% Forced Out
44.2% Direct Threat On Life
32.2% Left Out Of Fear
22.8% Armed Conflict

Reasons For Being Targeted:
80.1% Sect
10.3% Don’t Think Targeted
30.0% Political Opinion
5.5% Social Group
1.4% Ethnic Group

Displacement Rate
Peaked in July 2006 at 1,750
Slow decline until November 2007 to almost 0
Has been flat since then

Intentions:
87.8% Return To Original Home
Approximately 5% Resettle In 3rd Location
Approximately 3% Integrate Into Current Location

Returns:
6,216 families, approximately 37,296 people to 63 locations

Internally Displaced vs. Refugees Amongst Returns:
6,168 displaced families, 48 refugee families

Security Situation:
60.2% Checkpoints Near Home
49.3% Death Or Injury In Family
17.9% Missing Family Member
9.2% Other Restrictions
7.0% Need Permission To Move

Type Of Housing:
50.1% Rent
21.7% Live With Relatives Or Friends
12.0% Other
8.1% Public Housing
3.2% Collective Settlement
2.9% Former Military Camp

Access To Food Rations:
60.6% Sometimes
23.1% Always
16.4% Not At All

Reasons For Non-Access To Food Rations:
4.6% Delay Transferring To new Location
39.7% Insecure Shipping Route
24.7% Lack Transportation For Food
14.8% No Food To Distribute
1.3% Families Lack Documentation Or Ration Cards
1.2% Don’t Know
1.0% Other

Food Aid Sources:
56.3% None
24.1% Humanitarian Group
13.1% Other Federal Government Agency
11.5% Other
6.4% Religious Group
0.9% regional Government Agency

Water Sources:
86.3% Municipal Water
71.8% Water Tanks/Trucks
45.7% Rivers And Lakes
42.0% Public Wells
20.2% Open/Broken Pipes
1.6% Other

Fuel Access:
51.6% No Access
44.2% Propane
20.7% Kerosene
13.4% Benzene
8.3% Other
3.9% Diesel

Visited By Health Workers In Past 30 Days?
39.7% Yes
59.4% No

Employment:
59.4% None Working
40.6% At Least One Family Member Working

Status Of Property Left Behind:
51.08% Don’t Know
26.62% Destroyed
19.30% Accessible
17.77% Occupied By Others
3.98% Used By Military
2.54% Controlled By Government

Source Of Assistance:
53.2% Host Community
32.7% Iraqi Red Crescent
39.3% Relatives
26.8% Humanitarian Group
20.8% Ministry Of Displacement and Migration
18.9% None
12.8% Religious Group
2.6% Other
1.8% Other Government Agency

Needs:
86.4% Shelter
78.0% Food
76.1% Work
24.4% Other
11.7% Sanitation
4.2% Water
2.8% Legal Help
1.2% Health
1.2% School
0.7% No Answer
0.6% Hygiene

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008

>Iran’s Dual Policy At Work

>In October 2008, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point issued a report on Iran’s policy towards Iraq since the 1980s. Their main argument was that Tehran follows a multi-faceted policy towards Iraq not aimed at taking over the country, but rather to garner influence so that they can play a role in the country no matter what the situation. That has led Iran to back various political parties, armed groups, and building up economic and cultural ties, even if they contradict each other. For example, Iran supports both the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, while undermining it by backing Special Groups. Recent events over the last two months highlight this strategy of building up economic and cultural relations, while supporting violence, and undermining the political system.

Economic Influence Increases

Today Iran stands as one of the closest economic partners Iraq has. During the Saddam years Iran’s economic connections with Iraq were negligible because of the rivalry between the two countries. In the mid-1990s there was a slight thawing of relations that allowed a limited amount of trade, consisting mostly of Iranian plastics and appliances being imported. Since the U.S. invasion however, Iran has moved into the Iraqi market with a vengeance. Iraq has few to no tariffs, and Iraqi businesses have been crippled because of the violence, closings, and electricity and fuel shortages, all of which have allowed a flood of Iranian goods to enter. Iran now exports food, consumer goods, building materials, clothing, medicine, and medical equipment to name a few, becoming one of Iraq’s largest trading partners. The flow is completely one sided as Iraq hardly sends anything to Iran.

The Kurds receive the majority of Iranian goods. Since the beginning of this year, they have imported $1.2 billion in Iranian products. The Kurdish Regional Government and Tehran have signed a number of memorandums of understanding on trade, roads, energy, and other issues. A new border trading post is going to be opened in Kurdistan soon to add to the two existing ones as both sides want to increase commerce. As a sign of these growing ties, Iranian businesses dominated a trade fair in Dohuk, while Sulamaniyah had an expo of Iranian goods this November. The Kurds are also hoping for more Iranian companies to invest in the KRG. They currently have the most business in the region.

The rest of Iraq has also developed strong economic connections with Iran. In November, the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture signed a memorandum of understanding with its Iranian counterpart for training and investment in joint ventures in the field. Baghdad also hosted a trade fair of Iranian goods in November to coincide with the Kurdish one.

These close ties are exactly what Tehran has wanted since the toppling of Saddam. Iran now has a large stake in the Iraqi economy, and provides everything from consumer goods, to food, to fuel. Iraqi leaders regularly call on Iran to invest in Iraq and increase trade. This can be a positive influence as the Iraqi economy is plagued by systemic problems. At the same time it increases Iran’s means of leverage over Baghdad.

Cultural Ties

The cultural and religious ties between the two countries have also increased since the invasion. Iran is the largest source of tourism for Iraq. In 2007, Iran signed an agreement with Iraq to allow 1,500 religious pilgrims into the country each day. To increase this flow the Najaf International Airport opened in November 2008. It plans on offering flights to five airports in Iran, with the first in mid-December. While the airport will offer service to a number of other countries in the region, Iranians will be far and away the largest customers. Local markets in Najaf are already full of Iranian imports, the garbage trucks in the city were donated by Iran, a local hospital was built by Iranian contractors, while the tourists provide up to $20 million a year in business. This is reciprocated by up to 1 million Iraqis going to Iran each year to visit holy sites, vacation, and get medical treatment. Like trade, these ties were severely restricted under Saddam’s regime, but now the doors are open. There is a huge exchange of money and people between the two countries because of their proximity and shared Shiite religion, concentrated in southern Iraq. Not all of this is positive, as there are various reports of Iran using this flow of people to infiltrate spies and agents into Iraq. At the same time, it does build up closer relations between the two countries, and has created a whole industry of Iraqi businesses to serve the Iranian travelers.

Political Manipulation and Security Threats

Much of this benign influence is overlooked in the West, with most reports focusing upon Tehran’s attempts to undermine Iraq. Iran has both supported and manipulated Iraq’s political system to prop up parties it supports, while backing militant Shiite groups that it can use to apply pressure on either the Americans or Baghdad. For example, on November 22 a fuel truck was stopped in Wasit that was transferring an Iranian agent across the border. The Iranian carried fake Iraqi IDs. An Iraqi source told Aswat al-Iraq that the identity cards were probably going to be used to falsify votes in the upcoming provincial elections. Iran stood by Iraq’s 2005 elections because they allowed Iran’s allies, the Dawa Party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Sadrists to all gain seats on provincial councils and in parliament, as well as pass a constitution that set up a federal system that weakened the power of the central government. According to the Combating Terrorism Center’s report, this was Iran’s key goal, to place its friends in power and keep the Iraqi state weak so that it would not be a threat. Iran can be expected to support the upcoming provincial and parliamentary elections as well to make sure that their allies stay in office.

A small example of how these ties can benefit Iran was when an alleged Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force officer named Nader Qorbani was arrested at the Baghdad airport on November 18, 2008. The U.S. claimed that he was involved in smuggling weapons to Special Groups through an Iranian construction company. A few days later Qorbani was released. An Iraqi official said that Qorbani was legitimately in the country, while an Iranian newspaper claimed Tehran had him freed. Reuters reported that the Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister intervened with the Americans to facilitate Qorbani’s release. The U.S. often warns about Iran’s nefarious role in Iraq and its support of violence, but in this case, Qorbani was in and out of the news in a flash. This was all the more surprising as Iraq had captured 10 other Iranian agents and killed one during the previous month trying to infiltrate the border. In this case it seemed, Iran’s allies in Baghdad wanted to get this incident over as quickly as possible to limit whatever negative press might result from it.

Conclusion

As reported earlier, Iran has largely achieved its goals in Iraq. It has close ties to the ruling coalition behind Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government. Iran provides many basic necessities, goods, and services to Iraq. Thousands of Iranians travel to Iraq each day to increase religious and cultural bonds. At the same time, it continues to arm and train Shiite militants who can be used to attack Americans or Baghdad when it serves Tehran’s purposes. As the Combating Terrorism Center report notes, Iran hopes to be able to influence Iraq no matter what the situation is through all of these connections. Much of this has largely gone unnoticed, as the Americans have focused almost solely upon Iran’s military policy. As the American role decreases with troop withdrawals planned, it’s hard to see them being able to counter Tehran’s reach. The one caveat is Maliki’s increasing nationalism that could prove to be a damper on Iran. Even the Prime Minister however, sees nothing wrong with Iran’s economic and religious ties, which means Teheran will probably be able to maintain its strong position in Iraq into the near future.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iran’s influence? You can heart it on Iraqi streets,” Reuters, 9/30/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “Barzani says we will never allow any action against Iran from Iraq,” 10/23/08
- “Iran to activate border trade with Iraq’s Kurdistan-governor,” 10/29/08
- “Iranian with forged Iraqi IDs arrested in Wassit,” 11/22/08
- “MoU with Iranian Agriculture Ministry,” 11/11/08

Azzaman, “Iran exports $2 billion worth of goods to Iraq,” 11/24/08

Elkhamri, Mounir, “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq,” Jamestown Foundation, January 2007

Fadhel, Mohammed, “Iranians urged to increase investments in Iraq,” Azzaman, 11/20/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

FNA, “Iran Sends 160 Fuel Trucks to Iraq Everyday,” 10/1/08

Al-Jaberi, Sadoun, “Iranian pilgrims to fly direct to Najaf for first time,” Azzaman, 11/15/08’

Oghlo, Maher, “Border point with Iran turned into international crossing,” Azzaman, 4/17/08

Roggio, Bill, “US forces detain senior Iranian Qods Force officer in Baghdad,” Long War Journal.org, 11/18/08

Al-Sadawi, Ahmad, “Iranian products win the market,” Niqash, 6/13/08

Saidazimova, Gulnoza, “Iran/Iraq: Trade Flow Increases, But Mostly From Tehran To Baghdad,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3/4/08

Sly, Liz, “Iranian influence soaring in Iraq,” Chicago Tribune, 3/8/07

Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: The Iranian that got away,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 11/25/08
- “Release of Iranian raises questions in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 11/25/08

White, Jeffrey, “Fighting Iran in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2/14/07

Wong, Edward, “Iran Is Playing a Growing Role in Iraq Economy,” New York Times, 3/17/07

Yacoub, Sameer, “Iraq: Iranian detained by US has been released,” Associated Press, 11/22/08

Zaibari, Abdulkarim, “Dahouk to host Iranian trade fair,” Azzaman, 11/8/08

>Missteps by Iraqi Spokesman and Commanding U.S. General On SOFA

>On December 14 President Bush on his last trip to Iraq as leader of the United States met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). As reported earlier, after the SOFA goes into affect on January 1, 2009, there will be a referendum on it in July of that year. That means the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to prove their sincerity in limiting the role of American forces in the country to the Iraqi public so that they will confirm it. Recent statements by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh and the U.S. commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno have already jeopardized this public diplomacy effort.

First, while on a trip to the United States, Maliki’s spokesman al-Dabbagh gave a speech at the Pentagon on December 11 where he said U.S. forces might stay in Iraq for ten years. That was obviously past the 2011 withdrawal date set by the SOFA. Dabbagh believed that the Iraqi forces would not be ready in the three years set by the agreement, and would therefore need a continued U.S. military presence. This was especially true of the Iraqi forces’ logistics, air force, and navy. The Prime Minister quickly rejected his own spokesman’s comments. That didn’t stop political parties that had questions about the agreement from jumping on Dabbagh’s statements as proof that neither side believes in sticking to the SOFA’s timelines.

A few days later on December 13, commander General Ray Odierno made a similar statement contradicting the SOFA. He told the press that U.S. troops would stay in Iraq’s cities as advisors past the summer 2009 deadline set by the SOFA. He said that would mean that U.S. forces would stay in most of the security stations that are now being turned over to the Iraqis. Part of the reason why General Odierno wanted to keep these soldiers in Iraq was to help secure the upcoming Iraqi elections.

Together, in the span of just three days, a major Iraqi official and the commander of U.S. forces might have threatened passage of the SOFA in the July referendum. That doesn’t mean what they said wasn’t true. Iraqi forces probably won’t be ready in just six months to fully patrol all of the country’s cities, nor be ready for full independence three years later either. As military analysts such as Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies have often pointed out, the Iraqi armed forces and police still face major obstacles before they are truly capable of defending their country on their own. These limitations were probably known by the Iraqis and Americans who worked on the SOFA, but the agreement was as much a symbolic one about Iraq’s sovereignty as anything else. Maliki was especially satisfied with the conclusion of the negotiations because it boosted his nationalist standing. He can now claim that he set the date for the U.S. to leave Iraq before the provincial elections in 2009. Dabbagh’s and Odierno’s statements pierce this newly created façade, and may set an early tone with the Iraqi public who have given little credit to the U.S. for the improved security situation, and only went from a negative to a positive view of the SOFA after Maliki was able to get major concessions from the United States. If statements continue like those of Dabbagh and Odierno, they could turn Iraqis against the agreement once again, which would mean a no vote during the referendum.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Bush, Maliki sign SOFA,” 12/14/08

Baldor, Lolita, “Commander: Troops to stay in cities past deadline,” Associated Press, 12/13/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and Conditions-Based US Withdrawals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12/1/08

Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008

Reid, Robert, “US troops to stay in Iraqi cities after June,” Boston Globe, 12/13/08

Reuters, “Iraq may need U.S. troops for decade: Iraqi official,” 12/11/08

Al-Sabah, “Poll: 46% of Iraqis Support Security Agreement,” 11/23/08

>International Organization for Migration’s Numbers On Refugee Returns

>The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released reports on Iraq’s eighteen provinces. They included statistics on the number of Iraqis that have returned to their homes. As reported earlier, since this summer Baghdad has been calling for Iraq’s displaced to come back. It has offered a number of cash incentives, housing, schooling, and ordered squatters to vacate their premises as well. A European official however, recently told Abu Dhabi’s The National that Iraq has no real plan or process in place to pay, assist or integrate returnees. The IOM found that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has only provided aid to 26.3% of internal refugees. A September 2008 joint survey by the Displacement Ministry and the IOM of 2,102 returning families found that only around half of them, 1,043 had even applied for the government’s offer of money, and of those, 732 had received nothing compared to 311 who had.

Despite this, Iraqis have started to go back, mostly to Baghdad, which saw the greatest displacement, and then Diyala and Anbar. The vast majority are internally displaced, with only a trickle of international refugees. Many sited the improved security, but also the bad living conditions they were in as factors. For refugees, a lack of money and visa restrictions by host countries were major issues.

Statistics

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees there are 4.4 million displaced Iraqis. 2.4 million are within the country and 2 million outside Iraq.

Here are the IOM’s numbers on returnees:

Anbar: 3,101 families, approx. 18,606 people
Babil: 125 families, approx. 750 people
Baghdad: 26,347 families, approx. 158,082 people
Basra: 465 families, approx. 2,790 people
Dhi Qar: 86 families, approx. 516 people
Diyala: 6,216 families, approx. 37,296 people
Karbala: 297 families, approx. 1,782 people
Maysan: 626 families, approx. 3,756 people
Muthanna: 26 families, approx 156 people
Najaf: 102 families, approx. 612 people
Ninewa: 605 families, approx. 3,630 people
Qadisiyah: 24 families, approx. 144 people
Salahaddin: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Tamim: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Wasit: 120 families, approx. 720 people
TOTAL: 38,401 families, approx. 230,406 people, 5% of total number of refugees

There were no returnees to the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

CNN, “UN Gears Up for Return of Displaced Iraqis,” 12/4/08

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Sands, Phil, “Displaced Iraqis at point of no return,” The National, 12/2/08

International Organization for Migration’s Numbers On Refugee Returns

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released reports on Iraq’s eighteen provinces. They included statistics on the number of Iraqis that have returned to their homes. As reported earlier, since this summer Baghdad has been calling for Iraq’s displaced to come back. It has offered a number of cash incentives, housing, schooling, and ordered squatters to vacate their premises as well. A European official however, recently told Abu Dhabi’s The National that Iraq has no real plan or process in place to pay, assist or integrate returnees. The IOM found that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has only provided aid to 26.3% of internal refugees. A September 2008 joint survey by the Displacement Ministry and the IOM of 2,102 returning families found that only around half of them, 1,043 had even applied for the government’s offer of money, and of those, 732 had received nothing compared to 311 who had.

Despite this, Iraqis have started to go back, mostly to Baghdad, which saw the greatest displacement, and then Diyala and Anbar. The vast majority are internally displaced, with only a trickle of international refugees. Many sited the improved security, but also the bad living conditions they were in as factors. For refugees, a lack of money and visa restrictions by host countries were major issues.

Statistics

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees there are 4.4 million displaced Iraqis. 2.4 million are within the country and 2 million outside Iraq.

Here are the IOM’s numbers on returnees:

Anbar: 3,101 families, approx. 18,606 people
Babil: 125 families, approx. 750 people
Baghdad: 26,347 families, approx. 158,082 people
Basra: 465 families, approx. 2,790 people
Dhi Qar: 86 families, approx. 516 people
Diyala: 6,216 families, approx. 37,296 people
Karbala: 297 families, approx. 1,782 people
Maysan: 626 families, approx. 3,756 people
Muthanna: 26 families, approx 156 people
Najaf: 102 families, approx. 612 people
Ninewa: 605 families, approx. 3,630 people
Qadisiyah: 24 families, approx. 144 people
Salahaddin: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Tamim: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Wasit: 120 families, approx. 720 people
TOTAL: 38,401 families, approx. 230,406 people, 5% of total number of refugees

There were no returnees to the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

CNN, “UN Gears Up for Return of Displaced Iraqis,” 12/4/08

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Sands, Phil, “Displaced Iraqis at point of no return,” The National, 12/2/08

>Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From November 3 to November 23, 2008

>The Pew Research Center runs the Project of Excellence in Journalism (PEJ). The PEJ’s News Index covers all stories in the U.S. press from print journalism to TV to radio to the internet. From November 3 to November 23, 2008 they found that Iraq was in the top 10 news stories two of the three weeks. Perhaps because of the Thanksgiving holiday they did not cover the last part of the month.

For the first full week of November Iraq was not in the top 10. The U.S. elections and economic crisis dominated the media landscape, accounting for six of the top 10 stories. From November 10-16 however, the war reached number 7 with 2% of the overall coverage. Most of the reporting was on violence in Iraq, such as an Iraqi soldier who killed two American G.I.s. In the next week, November 17-23, Iraq dropped one to number 8, but stayed at 2%. The major story was Iraq’s parliament passing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will determine the future military and diplomatic relations between the two countries.

November’s coverage of Iraq was on par with the previous reporting from September 29 to November 2. During that time period the war was in the top ten four out of five weeks. This was an increase from the rest of the year when Iraq made it into the top stories on average two out of every four weeks. With the recession getting worse and the new Obama administration planning on putting more emphasis upon the war in Afghanistan, it is probably unlikely that Iraq reporting will go up anytime soon unless something dramatic happens there.

For more on U.S. press coverage of Iraq see:

The Decline of Reporting on Iraq

Iraq News Coverage Update I

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From June 2 to July 9, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From July 7 to August 3

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From July 28 to August 31, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From September 1 to September 28, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From September 29 to November 2, 2008

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “Iraqi Soldier Reportedly Kills 2 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 11/12/08

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 3-9, 2008, In Election Week, Media Pivots From Race To Rahm,” 11/10/08
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 10-16, 2008, Post-Election Narrative, A Tale Of Two Women,” 11/17/08
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 17-23, 2008, Cars And Appointments Dominate The News,” 11/24/08

Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Pact, Approved in Iraq, Sets Time for U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 11/16/08

>Are Budget Cuts Ahead For Iraq?

>Iraq’s financial woes seem to only be beginning. A member of the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee said that the country’s 2009 budget would have a 23% deficit, that could increase to 50% if oil prices keep on dropping. The budget was based upon a $62 a barrel price of oil, which was a conservative estimate at the time when oil was at over $100 a barrel. The problem stems from the fact that on December 8, oil was selling at $45 a barrel. The politician criticized the government saying that other countries in the region had planned budgets based upon a $40 a barrel price. As reported earlier, Iraq is far more dependent upon oil revenues that its Arab neighbors.

The budget problems are going to have a negative affect upon government services. Finance Minister Bayan Baqir Jabor has already called on ministries, government offices, and the provinces to cut spending. A financial expert from the Central Bank of Iraq told Aswat al-Iraq that austerity measures were probably in order to balance Iraq’s budget. He said Baghdad could cut spending by 20 trillion dinars. Otherwise the advisor suggested Iraq could issue bonds or seek international loans, but he discouraged that last one. Iraq is still struggling to come out from under Saddam era debts.

When the price of oil dropped a few observers noted this would have a dire affect upon Iraq. Calls for reducing spending and austerity measures are probably only the beginning of an approaching budget crisis. Reconstruction and programs for the needy could be the targets of cuts as most of the budget goes towards salaries, pensions, and paying operating costs. This would adversely affect the populace, up to 60% of which lives below the international poverty line. The fact that the economy was under sanctions for years, mismanaged by the Americans, flooded with cheap imports, and been underdeveloped by the current government will all mean that Iraq will continue to be dependent upon world oil markets for revenue, something they have no real control over.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Austerity could save 20 trillion dinars for 2009 budget – expert,” 12/9/08
- “Deficit in 2009 budget may reach 50% – MP,” 12/9/08
- “Finance ministry urges expenditure cuts,” 12/7/08

Bruno, Greg, “Transparency and Surpluses in Iraq’s Oil-Dependent Budget,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10/28/08

Chon, Gina, “As Crude Falls, Iraqi Leaders Scramble to Plan Budget,” Wall Street Journal, 10/22/08

IRIN, “Iraq: Low oil prices could affect government aid to IDPs,” 12/11/08

Sachet, Khalid Hantoush, “Results of the Field Survey For Needs and Opinions of The Poor in Iraq,” Iraqi Al Amal Association, University of Baghdad, September 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

>United Nations’ Dec. 08 Human Rights Report On Iraq

>In the beginning of December 2008 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its human rights report covering the first six months of the year. The paper documented the continuing violence and casualties in Iraq, as well as the situation of women, minorities, the press, the internally displaced, and detainees. The U.N found that there are still mass casualty attacks in Iraq, although not at previous levels. Women are also targeted, especially in Kurdistan in honor killings, minorities continue to be threatened, the press, especially in Kurdistan continues to be limited, and the situation of the country’s internally displaced is deteriorating. Iraq’s prisons are also overcrowded with reports of torture and abuse, as the legal system is overloaded. Overall, while security is improving in Iraq, the U.N. agency noted that there are still widespread abuses and human rights concerns.

Violence

Violence is down, but not over in Iraq. On January 23, 2008, for example, there was a bombing in Mosul that killed 15 and wounded 132. There continue to be attacks on civilians, security forces, government officials, politicians, educators, professionals, members of the judicial system, and the press. The U.N. no longer reports on total casualties for the country however. In its January 2007 Human Rights report, the U.N. recorded almost three times as many deaths as the Iraqi government. Baghdad then stopped issuing official death counts claiming that it couldn’t accurately keep track of deaths, but also to conceal the increasing killings due to the sectarian war that was taking off at that time.

Instead of total deaths, the report covered mass casualty attacks. The U.N. found that these declined from January to June 2008. There were eight such attacks in January compared to only 4 in June, while the number of killed and wounded went down from 330 to 206 for those same months. From March to June however, the total number of casualties actually increased going from 161 to 206.

Large Scale Attacks
January – 8 attacks resulting in 330 casualties
February – 6 attacks resulting in 253 casualties
March – 5 attacks resulting in 161 casualties
April – 6 attacks resulting in 177 casualties
May – 3 attacks resulting in 205 casualties
June – 4 attacks resulting in 206 casualties

Government employees, religious figures, activists, judges, lawyers, professionals, and academics all continue to be targeted. Attacks on security forces not only resulted in they being wounded and killed, but civilians as well. There were 11 such incidents resulting in 274 civilian casualties from January to June 2008. There were 22 attacks on government officials, politicians and civil servants. In June for example, two members of the Sadr City Council were killed and ten wounded in a bombing of the council building. Kidnappings are also common, especially in Diyala province. Large numbers of unidentified bodies were found in Diyala, Ninewa, Anbar, Qadisiyah, but mainly in Baghdad. Mass graves have also been found, particularly after insurgents have been cleared from an area.

Deaths due to foreigners were also a concern. There were two high-profile cases of Iraqis being wounded and killed by security contractors in the first six months of 2008. In January 5 a car fleeing an attack hit five students, aged 6-10. In February Blackwater contractors trying to clear traffic killed one civilian. There were also six Coalition air strikes that resulted in civilian casualties.

Women

The U.N. received many complaints about the rights of women being limited by conservatives in their neighborhoods, in the government, and in schools. The Major concern was in Kurdistan where there were reports of honor killings. A women’s group in Irbil found 145 cases of violence against women in just the first two months of 2008. In May, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister held a meeting on violence against women promising action on this issue. England’s Guardian also just reported on honor killings in Basra where authorities were turning a blind eye.

Minorities

Iraq’s minorities, consisting of Shabaks, Yezidis, Christians, and Turkomen in Ninewa and Tamim continue to worry the U.N. There were 17 reported kidnappings of Christians in those two provinces, along with nine attacks on Shabaks, mostly in Mosul, 2 Turkomen leaders were killed in that city in June, and Sabean Mandeans were threatened.

Press

Journalists continue to be attacked in Iraq. The Kurds were singled out in the report for their restrictions on the press as well. Many reporters and editors have been arrested in Kurdistan, with the Committee to Protect Journalists issuing a report in May calling for the end of their persecution. The KRG claims that they are only going after those that are guilty of libel and lack professionalism, but UNAMI doubts these claims. The results have been that many papers are intimidated by the regional government, and practice self-censorship.

Internally Displaced

The U.N. counts 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis. 1.2 million were forced out of their homes before 2006, and 1.6 million afterwards. Displacement has slowed in 2008, and over 100,000 Iraqis have returned to their homes since 2007. There were new displacements in the Dora, Jamia, Sulaik, Adhamiya and Karkh districts of Baghdad however. The U.N. is also concerned about the fact that eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have restricted the movement of refugees into their areas. Overall, the internally displaced suffer from a lack of services and jobs, resulting in deteriorating living conditions.

Prisons

The plight of Iraqi detainees was a major concern. At the end of June 2008 there were a total of 50,595 prisoners. The highest number was in March when there were 56,320.

Detainees – 2008
January: 23,800 held by Coalition, 26,676 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,476
February: 23,862 held by Coalition, 26,854 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,791
March: 23,862 held by Coalition, 32,458 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 56,320
April: 23,862 held by Coalition, 28,283 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 52,145
May: 23,229 held by Coalition, 28,028 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 51,257
June: 23,229 held by Coalition, 27,366 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,595

The jump in numbers in March coincided with the security operation in Basra

These numbers revealed two things. First, the February 2008 Amnesty Law has had no real affect on prisoners. Most of those affected by the act were actually people on wanted lists or on bail with only 2,000 detainees and convicts let go. Second, the U.S. setup a new program in its prison facilities during the Surge, aimed at increasing the number of those released. They claimed that they were discharging more prisoners than taking in new ones, but for the first six months of 2008 there as no real change in Iraqis held by the Americans. A May 19, 2008 report by the USA Today quoted U.S. military officials who said that the number of detainees they were holding dropped from 26,000 in 2007 to around 22,000 in May. UNAMI’s numbers show only a slight decline from 23,800 in January 2008 to 23,229 in May, only a 571 decrease. This brings into question the U.S. claims of successful rehabilitation and increased releases of Iraqis.

The major problem with the U.S. and Iraqi systems has been overcrowding and a lack of capacity by Iraq’s courts. Most prisoners are held for months, sometimes years, before they are ever charged, receive legal aid, or go before a judge. The courts simply cannot handle the number of prisoners. The detainees are therefore overcrowded with horrible conditions. Reports of abuse and torture are also common. Kurdistan is no better than the rest of Iraq. There are reports of secret detention facilities there, and the Kurdish Regional Government often moves prisoners when U.N. officials come to inspect sites.

Recommendations

The United Nations Mission had several recommendations for the Iraqi government. First, the Health Ministry needs to release official numbers of casualties in Iraq. Reports today are based upon leaks from various ministries and officials or the U.S. military. The government also has to protect vulnerable groups like minorities and the displaced, and investigate attacks on women. The legal system needs to deal with the large number of detainees, who are usually held without ever being processed, and address torture. That would begin to alleviate some of the problems in the overcrowded detention facilities. The U.N. also wants Iraq’s parliament to pass a human rights law to give legal standing to protecting against some of these abuses.

SOURCES

Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: U.N.’s Iraq report still missing casualty count,” Los Angeles Times, 12/3/08

Michaels, Jim, “Military retools detainee releases,” USA Today, 5/19/08

Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

>EPIC’s 2nd Annual Benefit for Humanitarian Action in Iraq

>

On December 4, our friends at the Pomegranate Gallery hosted EPIC’s 2nd Annual Benefit for Humanitarian Action in Iraq, bringing together EPIC supporters new and old. Among many notable attendees, we were joined by an Iraqi refugee who successfully made it to the U.S. less than 48 hours earlier and Iraq War Veteran Kevin Murphy.

EPIC Board President Nathaniel Hurd, a Government Relations Officer with the International Rescue Committee (IRC), shared firsthand accounts of EPIC’s vital leadership in the humanitarian community. He explains: “Thanks to effective advocacy over the past year, we have seen U.S. humanitarian spending for vulnerable Iraqis more than double; Iraqi refugee admissions jump from 1,600 to more than 12,000, and the most important legislation to date, Senator Kennedy’s ‘Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act,’ pass into law.”

Award-winning NPR Foreign Correspondent Debora Amos spoke candidly about the deepening crisis facing displaced Iraqis. She stated that five and a half years after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. and the Iraqi government claim the country is a safer place. But for Iraqi refugees in Syria, the upbeat assessments don’t count for much. In cities like Damascus, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees are running through the last of their savings and becoming increasingly desperate. With all the talk in Washington about the “success of the surge” and Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s public assurances that Iraq is now safe, why aren’t more displaced Iraqi returning to their homes? No matter the Iraqi government’s sunny assessments, the opinions that count are the reports family members – a mother – who warns – “it’s still not safe to return.”

Inside Iraq, more than 2.7 million Iraqis are displaced. Millions more are extremely vulnerable due to ongoing instability, poverty, and limited access to clean water and other essential services. Yet despite the deepening crisis for these vulnerable and displaced Iraqi families, the U.S., the Iraqi government and the international community is only reaching a fraction of those in need.

In many cases, militias and other armed groups have seized properties. As a result, many returnees are finding their homes occupied by others. In addition, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) reports: “…there were several episodes of violence targeting Baghdad returnees during the past month, including murders of entire returnee families. Some families were forced back into displacement out of fear.”

Amos explains that there are still substantial exile communities in Jordan and Egypt and Lebanon. While there was some progress in the treatment of exiles in Lebanon in that the government policy has returned to what it was a year ago, if an Iraqi is caught without legal papers they are sent to jail. The only way out is to take a one way ticket to Baghdad. The difficulty for NGO’s caring for this displaced population, Amos says, is that the exiles are drawn from Iraqi’s commercial and professional class as well as Christian minorities. They may be able to support themselves in the first few years of exile, but most are sliding into destitution.

The UN warned in its latest report that without immediate prospect of Iraqi refugees massively returning to Iraq and the rising cost of living in Syria, pressure is mounting to cope with growing needs. Amos describes that since this crisis began, most of the media attention has been on resettlement, especially in 2007 when the U.S. settlement numbers were dismally low. After a barrage of criticism by the media, humanitarian groups, and more quietly by the U.S. military, the number of resettlements is rising. There is a working system in place. The U.S. State Department exceeded the goal of 12,000 Iraqi resettlements in 2008 and is expected to resettle more than 17,000 in fiscal year 2009. But even at this pace, the back log of cases will take at least twenty years.

Amos interviewed many Iraqi refugees in a two week trip to the region in October. She met Khadim al Zawi at a coffee shop in Damascus. Sixty years old, al Zawi, a charming retiree from Iraqi’s oil ministry, told her he had fled Iraq in 2006 and despite the hard life in Syria, he has no plans to return home. His cars have been stolen; his farm outside of Baghdad was occupied by another displaced family who refused to leave. When Amos asked him about his Baghdad neighborhood, he said it was still a battle ground between the Shiite militias and al Qaeda.

Amos explains that the Iraqi government has a return program in which Iraqi’s are given a free bus ticket and about 800 dollars to get their lives started again. But the program fails in one fundamental way. Not only were some Iraqi’s threatened with death when they left the country, but somebody else was moved into their houses and a militia was then in charge of collecting the rent. Amos explains that in the Arab world, your home is the most valuable thing you own. If you

EPIC Vice President Selma Turgut, an RN at New York Presbyterian Hospital, presented a powerful clip from Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy’s documentary “The Lost Generation” about Iraqis who have taken refuge in Syria and Jordan. In late 2007, Selma visited Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. She spoke passionately about the families she met and what it’s like for them to run out of options. One particularly unsettling scene showed a woman in the crowded basement of a Christian church, which had been converted into a soup kitchen. Collecting soup for her family, she explained how back in Iraq, she did have a job. I noticed the expressions on viewer’s faces. They identified with the Iraqis in the film, the key difference being that the Iraqis were impacted by a war that may never allow them to recover. EPIC board member Rebeen Pasha, a refugee himself from Sulaymaniyah in Northern Iraq, appealed to attendees by explaining the plight of Iraqi refugees. He emphasized that Iraqi families simply cannot move forward without our help.

Throughout the night, I found the music captivating. Legendary singer and oud master Rachid Halihal and drummer Najib Bahri (Darabuka) warmed the room with soulful Iraqi music. Attendees were treated to a traditional Iraqi maqam, a 400 year old genre of music, and the contemporary music of Kazem Al Saher who is known as the “Elvis of the Middle East”.

On this unforgettable night, we raised over $5,000 – and a generous EPIC supporter has agreed to match this number. These generous contributions will support our work to reverse the war and end the humanitarian crisis in Iraq.

You can also support a more prosperous future for Iraqis.

>Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq

>In October 2008 the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released a report, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” that covered Iran’s role in Iraq from the time of the Iranian Revolution to the present. The study found that Iran uses all kinds of tools to influence Iraq. It backs both the government as well as Shiite militants, and has extensive economic ties. This seems at odds because Tehran supports Iraq, while undermining its stability at the same time with militias. In fact, this is part of Iran’s strategy to keep the country divided. Tehran’s main goals are to limit the U.S. so that it doesn’t intimidate Iran, make sure Iraq is not a threat, and influence the rest of the region. The 1980s Iran-Iraq War largely shaped these objectives when Saddam Hussein’s regime was Iran’s major threat, and the U.S. tilted towards him. Since the U.S. invasion, the instability in the country has meant the Americans are tied up in Iraq, and can’t seriously think about a major military operation against Iran. Its political allies are in the government, and the Iraqi constitution created a federal system that keeps Iraq weak. It is hard to argue then that Iran has not achieved many of its goals.

Iranian Policy

At the heart of the Combating Terrorism Center’s report is the study of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. U.S. strategy in Iraq is based upon achieving specific goals such as a democratic government that is an ally in the war on terror. Iran on the other hand, thinks in terms of a process. They don’t want a specific end state, but rather the influence to shape events within Iraq no matter who is power. That’s why they support a variety of groups from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), to the Dawa Party to Moqtada al-Sadr to Special Groups even though they are opposed to each other. Iran supported the Americans at first as well, because the creation of a new political system was the vehicle for Iran’s allies to gain power in the new government. At the same time, Iran began reaching out to Sadr and Shiite militants. With connections to all these parties, it is trying to ensure that no matter what happens in the country they will be able to play a role. Tehran can change tactics therefore, but its policy won’t. This is a much more dynamic policy than the U.S. one, and the authors fear this could cost the Americans in the long run.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been the main tool Tehran has used to exert influence within Iraq. In the 1990s the Revolutionary Guards created the Qods Force to run its foreign policy that runs parallel to Iran’s foreign policy establishment. In 1998 General Qassem Suleimani took over the Qods Force, and is still the current commander. The Qods Force is divided into four corps, the first of which is known as the Ramazan Corps. It was created in the mid-1990s and is responsible for Iraqi affairs. The Ramazan Corps is in charge of funding Iraqi politicians and delivering economic aid. It also maintains contacts with Shiite militias, and runs three camps along the Iraqi border to train them. The commander of the northern camp in Nasr, Mahmoud Farhadi was actually captured in Iraq by the Americans in September 2007. He is probably one of the highest ranking Iranian officers in custody.

Early Ties To Shiite Parties

It was during the Iran-Iraq War that Iran through the Qods Force began funding Iraqi Shiite groups. Iran originally helped form the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and supported the Dawa party to oppose Saddam. Later it courted Sadr and Special Groups after the U.S. invasion. The diversity of groups that Tehran supports shows that they are only a means to an end of achieving wide-ranging influence throughout Iraq. Iran hopes to sway the government when they want, and also raise the violence level on the streets if need be to achieve its goals.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) has historically been the party closest to Iran. In the 1980s Tehran helped form the SIIC, which was led by Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim. At the time, Iraqi Shiites were divided between Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, the uncle of Moqtada, and Ayatollah Hakim. In 1980 Saddam had Sadr murdered, and Hakim fled to Iran fearing assassination as well. When the Iran-Iraq War started, Hakim’s followers began organizing both inside and outside of Iraq. Hakim agreed to follow Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and later his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in return for help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The Iranians ended up forming the Badr Brigade, the SIIC’s armed wing, which became a formal part of the Qods Force and took orders directly from Tehran. During the Iran-Iraq War, Badr fought alongside the Iranians, and felt betrayed afterwards when Khomeini signed a peace agreement with Saddam. After the Gulf War in 1991, Badr was also sent into the south to try to organize and take over the Shiite uprising. Up to 2001, the militia received up to $20 million a year from Iran. Badr also had contacts with Hezbollah, which provided aid and training.

Later, when the SIIC began cooperating with the U.S. in the run up to the invasion, some senior Badr members left the organization. Many of these still operate out of Iran as suppliers to Iraq’s Special Groups, such as Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. He was the former head of Badr operations in Baghdad in the 1990s, and now runs a smuggling network that is believed to have introduced the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) to Iraq from Iran.

Meanwhile, within Iraq, many Shiites continued to follow the Sadr family. Many of those joined the Dawa party. Iran began funding them as well, even though the organization was divided over this alliance. The Sadr family had always been opposed to Iran and Khomeini’s ideology of a theocratic state ruled by clerics. One faction headed by current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was more open to the Iranians, while another, led by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, was opposed.

Iran Makes Its Move After The U.S. Invasion

After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 and deposed Saddam Hussein, Iran supported the American efforts to create a new political system, while at the same time building up its military capacity within Iraq. On the one hand, Tehran believed that elections would allow its allies to gain power. The SIIC and Dawa had already positioned themselves before the invasion as exile groups willing to work with the U.S. At the same time, Iran began a dual track policy of infiltrating thousands of Badr Brigade fighters into Iraq, supported by the Qods Force. They also had Hezbollah send some operatives to work within the country. They eliminated opponents of Iran and set up operations against the U.S.

Iran’s next major move was to reach out to Moqtada al-Sadr. He was an enticing figure as he had strong support amongst the Shiite poor, was anti-American, and had his family’s name. On the other hand, Moqtada had little religious training, and couldn’t compete directly with the top Iraqi ayatollah’s such as Hakim, Ali al-Sistani and Abdel Majid al-Khoei. This power struggle allowed Iran to gain influence with Sadr. On April 7, 2003 Kadhem al-Huseini al-Haeri, a student of Sadr’s uncle Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, who lived in Qom, Iran, named Moqtada as his deputy in Iraq. In April 2004, Sadr launched an uprising against the Untied States that sputtered on for months. Iran eventually convinced him to cease his hostilities so that the 2005 elections could take place.

The 2005 Iraqi elections were a turning point for Iran’s policy. All three of Iran’s allies, the SIIC, Dawa, and Sadr participated. The SIIC gained the most as it had the largest amount of money, was better organized, and had religious authority. In the provincial elections, it took over most of the south, while all three parties gained seats in the parliamentary balloting. Iran also supported the Iraqi constitution, which set up a federal system that would weaken the authority of the central government. Iran’s Shiite allies were the main writers of the document. Iran also ensured its passage by stuffing the ballot boxes. A major goal of Iran’s policy was thus achieved as it successfully positioned its friends in the new Iraqi government.

Sadr’s Tribulations Are Iran’s Gain

The 2005 elections caused a major dilemma for Sadr, which turned out to be to the advantage of Iran. Sadr was divided between being a militia leader and a politician. As he began to move towards politics he lost standing amongst his followers who were opposed to the Iraqi government. That led to a fracturing of his movement, and Iran was all too happy to pick up the pieces.

The Mahdi Army was always a loosely organized, grassroots movement with Sadr as its titular head. Local chiefs got weapons and funding on their own, and carried out independent policies. Revenge, crime, and an anti-U.S. stance were what drove most of them. After the 2004 uprising, many commanders continued to carry out attacks on Americans. The U.S. began calling these Special Groups. Some started looking towards Qais Khazali, who broke away from the Mahdi Army, for leadership rather than Sadr. In turn, Khazali began receiving support form Iran and Hezbollah. Frustrated by these defections, Sadr kicked out 40 militia leaders in October 2006 to try to assert his control. The problem was Sadr had no real authority over these 40 commanders who continued to run their own forces. This was an important symbolic move as Sadr was trying to control what violence had his name on it. The threat of his militia after all was what Sadr’s power was based upon. He would threaten attacks if he didn’t have his say in national politics. The creation of these new Special Groups undermined Sadr’s position as they broke off followers and undermined Sadr’s command over violence.

The fracturing of the Sadr Trend suited Iran. They disliked Sadr’s political moves because he continued to be a nationalist and anti-Iranian, and was a wild card. He could stop or start military actions when Iran didn’t want him to, which would harm Tehran’s larger political policy. The Special Groups on the other hand, were committed to fighting the occupation using violence, so Iran began moving towards them. They could be regulated by the amount of lethal aid Iran provided them. That didn’t mean the Mahdi Arm was cut off. As Iran had done before, it continued to back all variety of Shiite groups.

At the same time, the SIIC and Dawa began turning on Sadr. In Late 2006, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made his move to kick Sadr out of his ruling coalition. The SIIC, which had a long-time rivalry with the Sadr family, wanted to force Moqtada to pick between politics or violence. Sadr couldn’t make the choice because he relied upon the Mahdi Army to give him standing. At the same time, he was losing face as he was blamed for Special Group attacks and the increasing criminal activity of his militiamen. This growing conflict amongst Iraq’s ruling parties also served Iran as it divided the majority Shiites.

In 2007, Sadr ended up moving away from both his militia and the political system. As early as February, he moved to Qom, Iran to undergo religious training. There are some reports that he is being held by Iran, and has restrictions on his activities. His militia also came under increasing pressure from the Americans as the Surge took off. In April Sadr withdrew his ministers from Maliki’s cabinet. In August he declared a cease-fire. These were all a sign of weakness as he was forfeiting his two main means of influence within the country, his say in the government and his militia, while giving in to more Iranian influence.

In the spring of 2008, Maliki’s government moved against Sadr. Maliki launched operations against the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. Sadr’s followers, Special Groups, and local militias and gangs were scattered as a result. What many claimed was a defeat for Iran, actually highlighted their role in Iraq as the head of the Revolutionary Guards General Suleimani brokered the Basra and Sadr City cease-fires. This brings to fore Iran’s multi-faceted policy in Iraq. It both armed the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, while supporting the government that improved its standing afterwards. Thousands of Iraqi militants also fled to Iran for more training and reorganization. Again, it wasn’t that Iran wanted one group to come out on top, it just wanted to make sure that it had influence over events.

Status Of Forces Agreement and Prime Minister Maliki

The recently passed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that set military and diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States, was the most recent focus of Tehran. At first, Iran seemed to oppose the deal, but Prime Minister Maliki’s new standing after his security operations allowed him to negotiate a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. Iran then seemed to shift its stance, seeing the SOFA as the easiest way to get the U.S. out of Iraq. The Combating Terrorism Center said a sign that Iran was in fact standing behind the SOFA was the limited activity by Special Groups during the negotiations. Iran has often turned the violence off and on within the country to suit its political purposes.

On the other hand, Maliki’s new power could pose a long-term problem for Iran. Tehran’s dual military and political strategy has angered the Prime Minister. As he has grown as a leader he has found fewer reasons to listen to Iran as he has to think about the Iraqi public more, especially with elections forthcoming. Iran still has many other political allies within Iraq, which include the Kurds, who were not mentioned at all in the Combating Terrorism Center’s paper. Tehran also continues to back Special Groups, which can be used to harass the U.S., or turned on the Iraqi government or politicians if it wants. Iran’s economic role was also only given short thrift in the report, even though it has become one of Iraq’s main trade partners, and provides energy, and reconstruction funds.

Recommendations

The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) concluded its study with some suggestions for U.S. policy. First it noted the limitations of current U.S. strategy, namely that it focuses almost exclusive on Iran’s military support for Shiites, which obscures Iran’s more important political moves. In fact, Iran has achieved most of its goals without using violence, but rather through supporting the U.S. effort to create a new political order and carry out elections. This the authors warn, could be the downfall of the U.S. as it believes Iran could end up having more influence in Iraq in 5-10 years unless the U.S. develops a multi-faceted stance to match Tehran’s. The CTC writers believe that the U.S. should support Maliki’s nationalism, because he is souring on Iran’s role in his country. The Americans should also push for open list voting, which would make Iraqi politicians more answerable to the public rather than Iran. Next they suggest that the U.S. co-opt Sadr. He still has a nationalist, anti-Iranian stance, and if the U.S. can work with former insurgents, why not with Sadr. Giving Sadr a chance to participate in the government again could be the means to do this. The U.S. could also create a Sons of Iraq program aimed specifically at Shiites to deal with the local militia commanders and Special Groups. Calling for more transparency could also expose Iran’s funding for Iraqi politicians that would turn the public against them. There are two major problems with these suggestions however. First, the U.S. is losing influence in Iraq as it is drawing down forces, and agreed to a withdrawal date in the SOFA. This means it has fewer options and less ability to shape events. Maliki’s nationalism also cuts both ways. He is just as likely to deny U.S. demands as Iranian ones. Maliki is unlikely to make any changes to Iraq’s voting system or financing as a result. Maliki, the Dawa Party, and the SIIC are also grave rivals of Sadr and would reject working with him. Finally, some members of the SIIC and Dawa will always be close to Iran due to their years of cooperation, and see no reason to limit its influence within Iraq. Iraqi politicians can also play the two sides off of each other to their advantage. For all of these reasons, Iran will probably continue to play a large role in Iraq no matter what the U.S. does.

SOURCES

Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatcy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Aswat al-Iraq, “Mahdi Army weaker in Sadr City-U.S. commander,” 11/17/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Filkins, Dexter, “Police Seize Forged Ballots Headed to Iraq From Iran,” New York Times, 12/14/05

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Rashimi, Babak, “The Mumahidun: Muqtada Al-Sadr’s New Militia,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 9/4/08

Ridolfo, Kathleen, “Iraq: Al-Sadr Refuses to Meet Baghdad Delegation In Iran,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5/4/08

Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, “Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04