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>Anbar Sheikhs Reach Out To Shiites

>The dispute over naming the Anbar governor reported here before has ended. Muhammad Qassem, the candidate nominated by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha of the Awakening of Iraq and Independents List was finally elected governor. After being criticized by other tribes, Qassem was reportedly elected by all the major blocs in the province. Now that that dispute has been resolved, the two main Awakening leaders from Anbar Sheikh Abu Risha and Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes are apparently positioning themselves for the parliamentary elections planned for the end of 2009 by reaching to Shiite parties.

On April 9, followers of Moqtada al-Sadr led a protest to mark the fall of Baghdad and to call for the U.S. to withdraw. While Sadr wanted one million to show up, only about 30,000 actually participated. One of those was Sheikh Hameed al-Hayes. Hayes told McClatchy Newspapers that Sadr had a clear vision for Iraq, and that the government should release his followers. Hayes went on to say that he agreed with Sadr that the U.S. should leave the country, and blamed them for creating sectarianism. This was a clear move by Hayes to reach out to the Sadr Trend.

At the same time Sheikh Abu Risha said that he was open to an alliance with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list before the parliamentary elections. Abu Risha said that he and Maliki had the same vision of a unified Iraq of both Shiites and Sunnis working together.

Both Hayes and Abu Risha appear to be angling to become the leading voice of Iraq’s Sunnis. In 2005 the Sunnis largely boycotted the provincial elections, allowing the Iraqi Islamic Party to get most of the votes from Sunnis that did participate. Later in the parliamentary elections, the Islamic Party led Accordance Front won the most votes of the Sunni parties, and went on to become part of Maliki’s ruling coalition. Since then, the Accordance Front has broken apart. The Prime Minister has been working to get Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi National Dialogue Front to join him as a new Sunni partner. This fragmentation of the Sunnis, who have never really had strong leadership since the fall of Saddam, allows room for the Anbar sheikhs to maneuver. Both Hayes and Abu Risha are willing to do just about anything to gain power. Hayes has been known for threatening violence to get his way, while Abu Risha has formed alliances and then broken them to further his cause. That should make Sadr and Maliki weary of joining alliances with either one of them, but with Iraqi politics now in flux after the January 2009 provincial elections, anything seems possible.

SOURCES

Abbas, Mohammed, “Iraq Sunni anti-Qaeda leader eyes Shi’ite alliance,” Reuters, 4/12/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09

Fadel, Leila, “Volatile Anbar province a test of Iraq’s future,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/17/09

Al-Hafoth, Wail, “Thousands march in Baghdad against US presence,” Times of London, 4/9/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Lawrence, Quil, “Political Rift In Iraq’s Anbar Province,” Morning Edition, NPR, 4/8/09

Reilly, Corinne and Issa, Sahar, “Celebrating freedom: Thousands of Iraqis rally against U.S.,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/9/09

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

>Refugees International Report On Iraq’s Refugees and Displaced

>In early April 2009, Refugees International released its latest position paper on Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced entitled, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return.” There are still several million Iraqis that have lost their homes. Many do not want to go back yet because they have concerns about security, and the lack of services provided by the government. Most will have to return at some point so the government, the U.S., and the U.N. need to work together to ensure that they can, and will want to come back. That means Baghdad needs to improve health care, education, and jobs. The U.S., U.N., and international community also need to step up their assistance and funding for humanitarian programs to help out this population. Overall, Refugees International does not believe that the time is right for Iraqis to return since there is little aid to accommodate them, and that Baghdad is doing a disservice by asking them to come back.

Since late 2007, Baghdad has been encouraging refugees to return. This came in two waves. First, in November 2007 the government set up special buses from Syria for Iraqis to come back, and offered each family $800 if they did. Then in the summer of 2008 Iraq began offering plane rides to refugees in Egypt. Baghdad didn’t consider the conditions in Iraq when they began asking Iraqis to come back. It even went as far as to ask Syria to close its borders to Iraqis in late 2007. Instead, Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s government felt that large numbers of returns would make Baghdad look better and increase international and domestic support. Refugees International believes that this policy was a political move meant to improve the image of the government, rather than actually help people.

In fact, Baghdad has shown little sympathy for Iraq’s refugees. Syria and Jordan claim that they are home to almost 2 million Iraqis, but Baghdad says there are only 400,000 there. A U.N. diplomat told Refugees International that Maliki thinks the refugees are traitors, filled with Baathists, who don’t want to help Iraq. Refugee International believes that this bias is largely due to the fact that most of the refugees are Sunnis.

The government has also been offering cash rewards to internally displaced families that return. Refugees International found fault with this program as well. First the payment was only offered to those that lost their homes between January 2006 and December 2007. That favors Shiites who were mostly displaced during the sectarian war. According to the International Organization for Migration’s April 2009 report, 56.8% of Iraq’s displaced are Shiites, compared to 30.8% who are Sunnis. Refugees International ignores the fact that more than 50% of Iraq’s displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, which set off the civil war.

Refugees International also talked with Iraqi officials who say they want the whole issue of refugees and the displaced to be over with by the end of 2009. The government officers claimed that there are no more reasons for Iraqis to be displaced. The February 2009 U.N. Humanitarian Report even said that some officials claimed that most of the displaced had gone home. Because of this, the government has stopped registering internal refugees, which is a prerequisite to receive assistance. Refugees International believes that the combination of encouraging refugees and the displaced to come back without providing adequate support for them will only lead to more problems. In fact, the government is making things worse because they are more concerned about making themselves look better than actually dealing with the causes and consequences of the country’s refugee crisis.

The fact that the majority of Iraq’s displaced have not gone back puts the lie to the officials’ claims. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only around 50,000 families, approximately 250,000 individuals, have gone back. Most are internal refugees. Only 8% have been refugees from other countries. According to IOM surveys, 61% of Iraq’s displaced want to return, but don’t think they can yet. 39% said they want to stay where they are or be resettled somewhere else. Refugees International is concerned that if these families don’t return, it will solidify the ethnic cleansing that occurred from 2006-2007.

Baghdad needs to improve services, aid, and rule of law before there is a safe and stable environment for Iraq’s refugees and displaced to come back according to Refugees International. The improved security situation has not led to better services. The government needs to provide health care, education, and jobs, as well as offer more aid to those that are coming back. Right now Baghdad doesn’t have this capacity, nor any laws or regulations to deal with property disputes, which could take years to resolve. There is still the issue of sectarian biases within the administration. The government has set up assistance centers in the capital, and Maliki has ordered the security forces to deal with squatters, but the amount of money offered isn’t large enough, and the expulsion of squatters has just added more displaced. Iraq’s budget problems probably mean that these aid programs are in jeopardy. There are also stories of returnees being attacked and intimidated, and many have not been able to go back to their original homes. Refugees International warns that the potential for renewed violence still exists.

Refugees International has four recommendations on how to move forward on Iraq’s refugee crisis. First the U.N. should provide more aid to Iraq to help the displaced and its causes. The U.N. has had a limited presence in Iraq since its compound was bombed in 2003. Refugees International believes that improved security should allow the U.N. to create offices in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Right now few displaced in Iraq receive any aid from the government or non-governmental organizations. Second, the U.S. should pay for 50% of the U.N.’s programs. Third, the government, with the assistance of the U.S. and U.N., needs to improve services and provide jobs. That is something that may prove impossible however as American and international reconstruction aid is coming to an end. Iraq has already received $125 billion, and services are still largely below pre-invasion levels. Fourth the U.S. should work with countries where Iraqi refugees are residing. That includes providing money, and helping those Iraqis that don’t wish to return.

This report by Refugee International is an important advocacy paper for Iraq’s refugees. They provide a good overview of some of the problems facing the country’s displaced, and why it’s still not the right time for them to return. The major issue now is that international assistance to Iraq is winding down, and Baghdad is facing a budget crisis so there is little hope that more money will be spent on Iraq’s refugees. That will probably mean that Iraq’s displaced will have to exist off of the meager help provided by non-government organizations and the U.N., and act on their own. Ironically, that may mean that Baghdad’s wish to put the refugee crisis behind them may come true as no new effort on their behalf can be expected in the immediate future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, “There’s No Place Like … Iraq?” Newsweek, 11/24/07

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

>Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production

>

Iraq is facing the worst of two worlds. The price for Iraqi oil has dropped dramatically, while it has not become a steady producer. The Oil Ministry recently announced that oil revenues were down over 50% in the first three months of 2009 compared to the same time period in 2008. At the same time petroleum production and exports have continued to fluctuate up and down.

At the beginning of April 2009 the Oil Ministry announced a dramatic drop in oil profits. In the first three months of 2009 it made $6.57 billion. That was a 57.6% decrease from the same period in 2008 when the country earned $15.49 billion. Iraq did make more in March than it did the previous months. In January 2009 Iraq made $2.15 billion, followed by $1.7 billion in February, and $2.5 billion in March. The average price of Iraqi crude has also inched up from $34.57 in December 2008 to $38.06 in February. That’s still far from the highest price of $113.81 reached in July 2008, and not even up to the November 2008 price of $43.54.

Iraq Oil Revenues

March 09

$2.5 bil

Feb. 09

$1.7 bil

Jan. 09

$2.15

Dec. 08

$1.9 bil

Nov. 08

$2.2 bil

Oct. 08

$3.11 bil

An additional problem is that Iraq is still not a consistent oil producer or exporter. While yearly averages of production and exports have grown since 2005, the monthly numbers are still up and down. In January 2009 for example, Iraq produced an average of 2.15 million barrels per day (mbd) and exported 1.89 mbd. The next month production went up to 2.32 mbd, but exports dropped to 1.69 mpd. In March production, 2.38 mbd, and exports, 1.93 mbd, increased. In comparison, Iraq exported 1.93 mbd for the first three months of 2008, and went as high as 1.96 mpd in May and June of that year. The other months’ exports were lower. Production and exports have stayed within the same range since the fall of 2007. These fluctuations have contributed to the changing revenues.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Jan.

2.44/1.537

2.1/1.367

1.73/1.05

1.66/1.3

2.24/1.93

2.15/1.89

Feb.

2.276/1.382

2.1/1.431

1.83/1.47

2.08/1.5

2.39/1.93

2.32/1.69

March

2.435/1.825

2.09/1.394

2.1/1.32

2.08/1.58

2.38/1.93

2.38/1.93

April

2.384/1.804

2.14/1.398

2.14/1.6

2.14/1.5

2.4/1.88

May

0.3/0.0

1.887/1.38

2.1/1.308

2.13/1.51

2.03/1.64

2.6/1.96

June

0.675/0.2

2.295/1.1488

2.17/1.377

2.3/1.67

2.0/1.47

2.52/1.96

July

0.925/0.322

2.2/1.406

2.17/1.55

2.22/1.68

2.07/1.71

2.54/1.85

Aug.

1.445/0.646

2.122/1.114

2.16/1.504

2.24/1.68

1.91/1.69

2.5/1.7

Sep.

1.722/0.983

2.514/1.703

2.11/1.6

2.234/1.65

2.3/1.9

2.37/1.65

Oct.

2.055/1.149

2.45/1.542

1.91/1.239

2.26/1.55

2.34/1.91

2.37/1.69

Nov.

2.1/1.524

1.95/1.32

1.98/1.168

2.1/1.44

2.38/1.88

2.4/1.88

Dec.

2.3/1.541

2.16/1.52

1.92/1.071

2.15/1.45

2.42/1.93

2.35/1.73

Yr. Avg.

1.44/0.795

2.25/1.47

2.079/1.36

2.11/1.5

2.11/1.66

2.42/1.84

2.28/1.83

As reported before, the Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production to keep money flowing. This includes issuing tenders for 100 new wells and installations. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani is hoping those will increase output by 300,000-500,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. At the same time, the Ministry is moving ahead with its long-term contracts as well. That still would not bring Iraq up to pre-invasion levels. In 2001 Iraq was producing 2.6 million barrels a day. Production at the North Oil Company is about 600,000 barrels per day, 2/3 of the production before 2003, while the South Oil Company’s output has declined by around 200,000 barrels per day over the last several months.

Iraq’s budget and ministries are feeling the immediate effects of both declining oil prices and inconsistent production. The Electricity Ministry asked for $1 billion in the 2009 budget, but only got $400 million. As a result its had to cut $600 million in contracts with General Electric, France’s Alstom, Germany’s MAN AG, and South Korea’s Hyndai. It had plans to boost power production by 2,000 megawatts this year, but that has been drawn back to only 600 megawatts. Iraq’s cities were due to get $5 billion for development, but that has been cut 60%. Baghdad was going to get $600 million for that, but now will only get $340 million. It had planned two sewage projects in 2009 and two in 2010, but now is only going to go through with one this year, and two next. The Water Ministry is also canceling work to dredge canals. All government ministries are having a hiring freeze. The Interior Ministry stopped adding new police in December 2008. That’s put a halt to integrating the Sons of Iraq. The Defense Ministry will also not be able to buy new weapons systems and other equipment.

From 2007-2008 Iraq was flowing in oil money. Those huge profits have now largely disappeared. The country’s growing, but still inconsistent exports is now a larger issue, as every barrel is needed to keep up revenues. The Oil Ministry wants to boost exports to 2 million barrels a day this year, but has not been able to achieve that since 2005. With better security that might now be a possibility, but that still won’t bring in enough to meet the government’s needs with crude prices still low. That puts Baghdad in a precarious situation as it has rising expectations, especially after the January 2009 provincial elections, but will have to now cut some services.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq Reports Increase in Oil Exports in December, but Revenues Drop,” 1/26/09

- “Iraq’s oil revenues fall 25%,” 12/23/08

Ali Fathi, Saadallah, “Major bottlenecks in Iraq’s oil refinery sector,” Gulf News, 4/5/09

Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09

Kamal, Fatima, “Nine foreign firms win service contracts to develop 11 oil fields in Iraq,” Azzaman, 4/7/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports drop in February,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 4/2/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Water Projects Affected By Budget Cuts,” 4/2/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Faltering Oil Revenues Hurt Public Services,” 3/31/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “OIl Ministry: Iraq’s oil revenues drop,” Associated Press, 4/5/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

>Are Iraqi Forces Ready?

>

The Obama administration has committed itself to a timetable for withdrawal. Following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between the Bush White House and Baghdad, American combat troops are to be out of the country’s cities by June 2009, and then be completely withdrawn by the end of 2011. The question then is whether the Iraqi forces are up to the job of taking over security. There is little reporting on specific operations by Iraqi units, but the anecdotal stories that are available show a mixed bag.

In November 2008 the U.S. signed the SOFA with the government of Iraq. Under this agreement U.S. combat troops are to withdraw from major cities and towns to their bases by June 30, 2009. U.S. soldiers responsible for training Iraqis would remain, and American troops will still carry out operations within Iraq. There is some talk about Iraqis asking U.S. forces to stay in certain unstable areas such as Baquba in Diyala province and Mosul in Ninewa, in addition to Basra beyond the June deadline. American troop levels are also expected to drop from around 140,000 in March 2009 to approximately 128,000 by September. They would stay at that level until after the Iraqi parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for December. After the balloting is over and confirmed troops levels are supposed to drop to around 35,000-50,000 by August 2010, and then be completely out by December 31, 2011.

If this arrangement is followed through with, Iraqi forces will have primary responsibility for most of Iraq by this summer. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has repeatedly said that his forces are up to the challenge. The size of the Iraqi security forces has almost doubled from around 320,000 in January 2007 to 637,495 by December 31, 2008.

According to the Pentagon’s quarterly reports to Congress the number of National Police battalions operating went from 27 to 34 from January 2007 to October 2008. The National Police are a paramilitary force that supports the military in counterinsurgency operations. In January 2007 23 battalions were partially capable of conducting operations in coordination with Coalition forces, and four could plan and carry out operations with U.S. support. None were considered independent yet. By October 2008 that had grown to 1 battalion being formed, 15 that were partially ready to operate with U.S. forces, 16 that could operate with U.S. support, and two that could work independently. That showed that during the process of expansion the National Police had been able to keep up with its training and readiness with the percentage of units capable of operating with some support going from 14.8% in January 2007 to 47% in October 2008, and the number of independent battalions going from zero to two.

From the beginning of 2007 to late 2008 the number of Army battalions went from 112 to 175. In January 2007 five were being formed and couldn’t operate yet, 17 were dependent upon U.S. forces, 78 could operate but with Coalition support, and 12 were considered independent. By October 2008 five battalions were being formed, 54 were incapable of working without U.S. forces, 99 were semi-dependent, and 17 were considered independent. By December the Pentagon reported that 165 of 185 Iraqi battalions were in the lead or independent. The Army has gone through the most growth so its capabilities have been harder to keep up with. In October 2008 15.1% of the force were partially capable and in January 2009 that had increased to 30.8%. The number of battalions capable of operating with some Coalition support went down from 69.6% to 56.5%, while those considered independent dropped from 10.7% to 9.7%. What these numbers actually mean is still up to debate as Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies has often pointed out.

Status Of Iraqi Forces

Incapable of Operating

Partially Capable

Capable With Coalition Support

Independent

Totals

National Police Battalions

Jan 2007

0/0%

23/85.1%

4/14.8%

0/0%

27/100%

Oct 2008

1/2.9%

15/44.1%

16/47%

2/5.8%

34/100%

Iraqi Army Battalions

Jan 2007

5/4.4%

17/15.1%

78/69.6%

12/10.7%

112/100%

Oct 2008

5/2.8%

54/30.8%

99/56.5%

17/9.7%

175/100%

The Iraqi Army is considered farther along than the police. U.S. officers often say that their Iraqi counterparts are more capable of carrying out operations, however their quality still varies. An American commander told the Stars and Stripes in February 2009 that they still don’t trust Iraqis with advance information on operations. The U.S. believes many Iraqi units are infiltrated with insurgents and militiamen. A U.S. commander found an Iraqi officer in southern Baghdad who was tipping off Shiite militias before raids for example. Rather than being fired or punished he was simply transferred to a Sunni area. U.S. soldiers and contractors are supposed to be partnered with all new Iraqi Army units. A U.S. officer that ran one of these Military Transition Teams meant to train Iraqis said there weren’t enough Americans to advise all the Iraqi units so most of them have been okayed to operate whether they are ready or not. Another issue is the motivation of Iraqi troops. After the SOFA was passed all U.S. operations are supposed to be carried out jointly with Iraqi forces, although this does not always happen. There have been several stories that in practice, it is usually the Americans that initiate and lead patrols. The same Stars and Stripes article followed one patrol in Diyala that had the Americans doing all the work. A U.S. unit showed up and told the Iraqis that they were going on a mission. The Americans ended up arresting a suspected insurgent. The event was recorded as an Iraqi led patrol and nabbing. It’s also still common for large numbers of Iraqi soldiers to be on leave at any given time.

The Iraqi police still have far more problems. Iraqi soldiers are drawn from across the country and are usually rotated. Police on the other hand, are locally recruited and serve in those same areas. That means they are more open to influence by political parties, militias, and others. There is also the issue of infiltration. On February 24, 2009 an Iraqi policeman shot and killed a U.S. soldier, an interpreter and two Iraqi policemen in Mosul. Three American soldiers and another interpreter were also wounded in the attack. In another incident in that city, a U.S. patrol was attacked with two grenades with Iraqi police looking on who did nothing. Abuse is often common in Iraqi jails as the judicial system relies upon confessions rather than evidence. A review of the Interior Ministry by the William and Mary College however said that the leadership is developing, and progress is being made fighting corruption and sectarianism. The Interior Minister claimed in March 2009 that he had fired 62,000 members of the Ministry since he took office in 2006 in an attempt to clean it up. The major problem the William and Mary researchers found was that the police and Interior were not institutions yet that followed rules and regulations, but were mainly driven by individuals. The National Police are the elite of the Interior Ministry, and have been largely cleaned up of militias, and are doing much better.

Does this mixed bag of reports make for a competent security force that is ready to protect the country? A phrase “Iraqi good enough” has often been mentioned as a response. Iraqi forces are not up to the quality or standards of American forces, but Iraq is not the United States. There will still be problems with outside influences, corruption, and abuses, but Iraq’s police and army for the most part are probably competent enough to hold areas and fight insurgents or militiamen when confronted. They also have until 2011 to develop with American assistance. That may be good enough for Iraq.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “US general: American forces may not leave key Iraqi cities,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/27/09

Associated Press, “Iraqis fear U.S. pullout of volatile Mosul,” 3/9/09
- “U.S. troops to remain active in Iraq after pullback,” 3/15/09

Cordesman Anthony, “The Changing Situation In Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09
- “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development And ‘Conditions-Based’ US Withdrawals, Final Pre-Publication Draft,” 2/17/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

DeYoung, Karen and Kornblut, Anne, “Obama to Announce U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/27/09

Druzin, Heath, “Coalition forces fight in insurgent stronghold while residents urge U.S. troops to leave Mosul,” Stars and Stripes, 3/8/09
- “Iraqis taking the lead? Yes and no,” Stars and Stripes, 2/22/09
- “Shooting of four U.S. troops highlights trust issues between two forces,” Stars and Stripes, 2/27/09

Engle, Richard, “The sixth war in Iraq,” NBC News, 3/20/09

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Kaplow, Larry, “The Last Day of the Iraq War,” Newsweek, 1/12/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Iraqi security leader wants ‘war of intelligence,’” Associated Press, 3/14/09

Sherman, Matt and Carstens, Roger, “Cooling the Streets: Institutional Reforms in Iraq’s Ministry of Interior,” Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations at The College of William and Mary, 11/14/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009

>Iraq’s GDP

>Iraq has the third largest oil reserves in the world. It has an estimated 115 billion barrels, placing it only behind Saudi Arabia and Iran. Petroleum accounts for 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Iraq has also been the recipient of $125 billion in reconstruction aid, along with reducing half of its debt. With all this potential wealth the country should be well off. Instead, it finds itself near the median point when comparing GDPs to other countries in the region, and almost at the bottom in per capita GDP in the Middle East.

In the 1980s Iraq was a growing middle class country, but fell into disrepair in the proceeding decades. After the 1991 Gulf War the economy collapsed under international sanctions. It became poor and underdeveloped on par with countries in Africa. 60% of the population for example was dependent upon the state-run food ration system, and there was widespread malnutrition. In 2002 the GDP was at $20.5 billion, and per capita GDP stood at $802. That was a 7.8% decrease from the previous year. The 2003 U.S. invasion was another setback, dropping GDP to $13.6 billion, and per capita GDP to $518. Since then Iraq has had steady growth, largely due to the increase in the price of oil, which accounts for 90% of revenues and 65% of the GDP. By 2008 GDP was at an estimated $84.7 billion, and per capita GDP at $3,100. That was a $29.3 billion increase from the previous year.

Iraq’s GDP/Per Capita GDP
2002 $20.5 billion/$802
2003 $13.6 billion/$518
2004 $25.7 billion/$949
2005 $34.5 billion/$1,237
2006 $48.5 billion/$1,687
2007 $55.4 billion/$1,978
2008 $84.7 billion/$3,100

Breakdown of Iraq’s GDP – est. 2008
65% Oil
13% Services
7% Transportation/Communication
6% Wholesale, Retail, Hotels
5% Farming
2% Manufacturing
1% Finance/Banking
1% Construction

In early 2009 Iraq’s Planning Ministry expected the GDP to continue to grow by 10.9%, but that’s hard to believe with the collapse of the petroleum market. The Pentagon predicts that there could still be positive growth in 2009 due to government spending, but even that is going to be constrained with the budget cuts.

Despite the expansion of the economy after the U.S. invasion, Iraq has not regained the standard of living that it had in the 1980s. When comparing GDPs in the region Iraq ranked 9th out of seventeen countries in 2008. Saudi Arabia at $468.1 billion, Iran at $319 billion, and the United Arab Emirates with $240.3 billion were at the top, while Bahrain at $18.6 billion, Jordan at $20.1 billion, and Yemen at $22.3 billion were the bottom three. When broken down by per capita the comparison was even more stark. Iraq was second to last with only Yemen below it. Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were the richest in the region.

Comparison Of Iraq’s GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Saudi Arabia $468.1 billion
Iran $319 billion
United Arab Emirates $240.3 billion
Egypt $159.2 billion
Algeria $152.3 billion
Kuwait $148.4 billion
Qatar $95.8 billion
Morocco $87 billion
Iraq $84.7 billion
Libya $67.9 billion
Syria $50 billion
Oman $46.4 billion
Tunisia $38.9 billion
Lebanon $28.02 billion
Yemen $22.3 billion
Jordan $20.1 billion
Bahrain $18.6 billion

Comparison Of Iraq’s Per Capita GDP With Other Countries In The Region
Qatar $58,004
Kuwait $40,826
United Arab Emirates $29,063
Saudi Arabia $23,928
Bahrain $23,702
Oman $23,654
Libya $16,431
Iran $11,748
Lebanon $10,742
Algeria $8,344
Tunisia $7,894
Egypt $5,689
Jordan $5,051
Syria $4,763
Morocco $4,405
Iraq $3,880
Yemen $2,290

Iraq has had steady economic growth and a huge increase in its GDP since the 2003 invasion. Those aggregate numbers however don’t reveal the myriad problems that the country is facing. Almost all of that expansion was due to oil. In February 2009 a barrel of Iraqi crude sold at $38, down from its peak of $113.81 in July 2008. (NOTE: Iraqi oil sells below the world average, which went from $147 per barrel in July 2008 to around $50 currently.) The government dominates the economy, which is corrupt and inefficient. Investment is up, but it is caught in a bureaucratic maze that slows its impact. U.S. reconstruction funding is also coming to an end, and Baghdad has been unable to spend most of its capital budget that goes towards infrastructure. More importantly, the benefits of the development of Iraq have not trickled down much as there is still high unemployment, especially amongst the young, and high rates of poverty.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Asia Companies The New Players In Iraq’s Oil Industry,” 4/9/09

Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Iraq investors bemoan red tape and lack of credit,” Reuters, 3/29/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “GDP higher by 10.9 % in 2008,” 2/11/09
- “Oil ministry says Iraq’s exports hit $1.9b in Feb.,” 3/28/09

Baker, Luke, “Investors ready for Iraq invasion as troops pull out,” Reuters, 12/22/08

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Glanz, James, “In Report to Congress, Oversight Officials Say Iraqi Rebuilding Falls Short of Goals,” New York Times, 10/31/07

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Iraq Labour Force Analysis 2003-2008,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, January 2009

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports drop in February,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 2/26/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

UPI, “Iraqi Red Crescent predicts continued need,” 10/30/08

World Food Programme, “Comprehensive Food Security And Vulnerability Analysis In Iraq,” November 2008

>April 2009 International Organization for Migration Report on Iraq’s Displaced

>The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier non-governmental organization working with Iraq’s displaced. They cooperate with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration to provide aid, and have the most extensive polling and up to date information on the plight of internal refugees. They recently released their April report.

Most of Iraq’s displacement happened after the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Salahaddin in February 2006. Approximately 1.6 million Iraqis lost their homes as a result. Displacement is still happening in the country, but at much lower rates. The majority of displaced are from Baghdad, 63.1% of the total, and are Shiite Arabs, 56.8%. The humanitarian situation of those displaced is getting worse. They lack jobs, housing, and basic services. 66.1% of displaced families have no family member working. In Qadisiyah province 99.0% of the internal refugees there are unemployed. The threat of eviction is another growing issue as many families are squatting.

Some Iraqis are also returning. IOM has counted 49,603 families that have come back by the end of March 2009. Many have found their houses destroyed and little aid to reintegrate into their communities. A few have been threatened and forced to flee again. The government has also stopped registering the displaced. This is important because to receive assistance they need to sign up with the authorities. There are reports that a few provinces are still registering refugees however. The future of all of Iraq’s internal refugees is unclear.

Statistics On Iraq’s Displaced

Origins
Baghdad 63.1%
Diyala 18.6%
Ninewa 6.1%
Salahddin 3.3%
Tamim 3.0%
Anbar 2.7%
Basra 1.6%
Babil 1.0%
Wasit 0.2%
Irbil 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 56.8%
Arab Sunni 30.8%
Kurd Sunni 4.1%
Assyrian Christian 2.9%
Chaldean Christian 1.8%
Turkmen Shiite 1.2%
Turkmen Sunni 0l9%
Kurd Shiite 0.6%
Armenian Christian 0.1%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%
Kurd Yazidi 0.1%

Unemployment – No Family Member Working
Total 66.1%
Qadisiyah 99.0%
Tamim 98.6%
Basra 89.9%
Wasit 89.7%
Babil 83.3%
Ninewa 79.5%
Dhi Qar 79.0%
Anbar 77.7%
Salahaddin 77.2%
Maysan 71.5%
Muthanna 69.9%
Dohuk 64.6%
Karbala 62.7%
Najaf 56.8%
Baghdad 58.5%
Diyala 58.3%
Irbil 32.6%
Sulaymaniya 30.1%

Issues Facing The Displaced

Security

Security is good across most of the country with central and northern Iraq still having issues. In Babil, Basra, Dhi Qar, Dohuk, Irbil, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna Qadisiyah, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, and Wasit things are stable. Violence has gone up however in Baghdad, especially with car bombs. This has led to more checkpoints and restrictions on movement. In the Karkh district of the capitol, four hundred families live in an area that has often been hit by rockets. Security in Ninewa has also regressed with Mosul being the center of violence. Gun and rocket attacks are common, as well as operations against American and Iraqi forces. This has resulted in many civilian casualties. Security is also bad in Diyala, although it varies from district to district. There has been an increase in bombings in the capitol Baquba. The situation in Anbar has improved, although there are still roadside bombings in Karma and Fallujah. That last city still has insurgents as well. The Highway to Jordan and Kuwait are regularly open however, but there are still curfews in certain cities. The ethnic divisions in Tamim have also led to attacks in Kirkuk. The Haweeja district there also has issues. Displaced in Kirkuk have been accused of stealing and other crimes, resulting in arrests.

Returns

IOM has recorded quite a few returns during this last reporting period. 45 families in Tamim, 24 in Irbil, 75 in Ninewa, 83 in Sulaymniya, and 135 people in Diyala have all gone back to their homes. Those in Ninewa were Christians who fled in October 2008 after they were attacked. Not everything has gone well however. A returning family in Diyala was threatened by militias, while two other families were attacked that led to two deaths. They returned to Tamim as a result. 17 displaced families in the Khalis district of Diyala have also decided to permanently settle there since their kids are enrolled in the local schools, and they have transferred their food rations there.

Evictions and Squatting

The lack of housing has led to dozens of displaced families to squat illegally on government or privately owned land. Increasing these Iraqis are facing the threat of eviction. Five families in Fallujah, Anbar, 70 in the Resafa district of Baghdad, 46 families in Najaf, and 321 individuals in Wasit have all been given orders to leave or are afraid they will get notices to do so soon. Some have not been able to pay their rents.

Health

Iraq’s health care system has deteriorated since the U.S. invasion. The displaced obviously face a tougher situation finding care. Health facilities in Anbar are poor overall. They lack trained staff and equipment. A hospital in Heet for example has a CT scanner and blood testing equipment, but no one knows how to use them. In Babil children have high rates of anemia, diarrhea, and malnutrition. A few cases of typhoid have also been found in Dohuk. In the village of Saida in Tamim there have been a high number of birth defects amongst displaced women. Three women in that village have committed suicide due to stress. Families in Sulaymaniya and Dhi Qar also lack access to health facilities.

Water

Iraq’s water infrastructure is also in a state of disrepair. The water system in Anbar relies upon electricity to operate, but supply is inconsistent. In Qaim, there is only 2-3 hours of water available per day. In Ramadi and Fallujah there is no potable water. In the Shakha community in Babil, displaced families are getting their water from a local river. Three neighborhoods in Babil also lack a sewage system. Displaced families in Kirkuk have been breaking into water pipes. Twelve families in Basra, 336 families in Muthanna, and 54 families in Najaf have no access at all. There are also limited water supplies in Qadisiyah and Salahaddin, along with the on-going drought.

Education

Few displaced families in Babil are attending school. The ones in Dohuk are old and overcrowded. Many Christians that fled Mosul in October 2008 have not enrolled their children because they did not bring the necessary documents with them.

Jobs

Next to housing, jobs is the most pressing issue for the displaced. Unemployment is high for them in every province except for the three in Kurdistan. Female-headed households have it even harder finding employment. Families in Mosul have been reduced to begging and selling cigarettes to support their families. Adhamiya district in Baghdad, Chibayish in Dhi Qar, Khidhir in Muthanna, Sinjar and Baaj in Ninewa, Diwaniya, Hamza, and Shamiya in Ninewa, Daquq and Kirkuk in Tamim, Namaniya, Suwaira, Badra, and Kut in Wasit all have 90% or more unemployment. The worse situations are in Afaq district in Ninewa and Hawiga in Tamim with 100% lacking jobs.

Statistics On Iraq’s Displaced By Province

Anbar

Origins
Baghdad 77.3%
Anbar 12.3%
Basra 6.4%
Ninewa 1.9%
Salahaddin 0.8%
Diyala 0.8%
Babil 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Irbil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 98.6%
Arab Shiite 0.9%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 77.7%
Fallujah 81.2%
Kaim 81.0%
Heet 78.1%
Ramadi 77.0%
Rutba 76.5%
Haditha 74.9%
Ana 70.1%

Babil

Origins
Baghdad 81.1%
Babil 6.4%
Diyala 6.1%
Salahaddin 2.3%
Anbar 2.0%
Wasit 1.0%
Tamim 0.95
Ninewa 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 94.5%
Arab Sunni 5.2%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%
Kurdish Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 83.3%
Hashimiya 88.2%
Musayab 84.3%
Mahawil 82.9%
Hila 80.7%

Baghdad

Origins
Baghdad 83.7%
Diyala 13.2%
Anbar 1.5%
Salahaddin 0.8%
Tamim 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 71.3%
Arab Sunni 28.4%
Chaldean Christian 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 58.3%
Adhamiya 92.8%
Resafa 68.5%
Karkh 54.5%
Mahmoudiya 46.5%

Basra

Origins
Baghdad 52.2%
Salahaddin 25.7%
Anbar 8.2%
Diyala 6.4%
Tamim 4.0%
Babil 2.2%
Basra 0.7%
Wasit 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.7%
Arab Sunni 0.1%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 89.9%
Abu Khaseeb 92.5%
Zubair 95.1%
Basra 89.0%
Shaat Al-Arab 83.4%

Dhi Qar

Origins
Baghdad 66.3%
Salahaddin 14.3%
Diyala 7.7%
Babil 3.6%
Anbar 3.6%
Tamim 2.6%
Wasit 1.3%
Ninewa 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.4%
Arab Yazidi 0.2%
Arab Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total: 79.0%
Chibayish 95.3%
Rifai 77.0%
Nassirya 74.9%
Suq al-Shoyokh 72.3%
Shatra 71.8%

Dohuk

Origins
Baghdad 51.5%
Ninewa 47.0%
Tamim 0.6%
Basra 0.4%
Anbar 0.3%

Ethnicity/Religion
Sunni Kurds 40.6%
Christian Chaldean 28.9%
Christian Assyrian 19.0%
Christian Armenian 3.2%
Yazidi Kurd 2.1%
Sunni Arab 2.0%
Shiite Arab 1.8%
Shiite Turkmen 0.6%
Shiite Kurd 0.3%
Sunni Turkmen 0.3%
Christian Kurd 0.2%

Families No Members Working
Total 64.6%
Dohuk 67.4%
Zakho 61.7%
Sumel 61.6%
Amedia 33.0%

Diyala

Origins
Diyala 82.85
Baghdad 16.2%
Anbar 0.5%
Tamim 0.2%
Salahaddin 0.2%
Basra 0.1%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 58.3%
Arab Shiite 31.2%
Kurd Shiite 6.9%
Kurd Sunni 2.5%
Turkmen Shiite 0.6%
Turkmen Sunni 0.5%

Families With No Members Working
Total 58.3%
Khalis 82.5%
Muqdadiya 68.2%
Baladrooz 57.6%
Baquba 55.3%
Khanaqin 20.9%
Kifri 10.3%

Irbil

Origins
Baghdad 49.9%
Ninewa 43.4%
Tamim 2.0%
Diyala 1.7%
Anbar 0.9%
Salahaddin 0.5%
Irbil 0.3%
Basra 0.2%
Babil 0.2%
Qadisiyah 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Kurd Sunni 39.7%
Arab Sunni 34.2%
Chaldean Christian 15.4%
Assyrian Christian 4.1%
Arab Shiite 1.1%
Armenian Christian 0.7%
Turkmen Sunni 0.4%
Arab Christian 0.1%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%
Kurd Christian 0.1%
Kurd Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 32.6%
Irbil 33.1%
Makhmur 32.6%
Soran 32.1%
Koisnjaq 31.6%
Mergasur 30.6%
Shaqlawa 24.6%
Choman 20.4%

Karbala

Origins
Baghdad 56.8%
Diyala 28.0%
Anbar 6.8%
Ninewa 2.8%
Babil 2.45
Tamim 1.65
Salahaddin 1.5%
Karbala 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 98.6%
Turkmen Shiite 1.0%
Arab Yazidi 0.3%

Families With No Members Working
Total 62.7%
Ain al-Tamur 75.0%
Karbala 63.1%
Hindiya 52.9%

Maysan

Origins
Baghdad 83.4%
Diyala 8.0%
Salahaddin 5.0%
Tamim 1.3%
Anbar 0.9%
Wasit 0.6%
Babil 0.3%
Ninewa 0.2%
Basra 0.2%
Maysan 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.9%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 71.5%
Ali Gharbi 75.5%
Amara 74.8%
Qalat Saleh 72.9%
Mejar al-Kabi 70.7%
Maimouna 64.5%
Kahla 64.4%

Muthanna

Origins
Baghdad 69.7%
Diyala 13.3%
Anbar 7.3%
Salahaddin 3.2%
Babil 2.5%
Wasit 1.9%
Ninewa 1.5%
Qadisiyah 0.5%
Irbil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.1%
Arab Sunni 0.5%

Families With No Members Working
Total 69.9%
Khidhir 90.0%
Rumaitha 70.7%
Samawa 68.2%

Najaf

Origins
Baghdad 84.7%
Diyala 7.2%
Ninewa 2.7%
Anbar 2.1%
Tamim 1.3%
Salahaddin 1.3%
Babil 0.8%
Dohuk 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 97.7%
Turkmen Shiite 1.4%
Arab Christian 0.7%
Kurd Shiite 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 56.8%
Kufa 20.5%
Najaf 74.2%

Ninewa

Origins
Baghdad 47.5%
Ninewa 42.6%
Basra 6.0%
Diyala 1.1%
Tamim 0.9%
Salahaddin 0.6%
Anbar 0.5%
Babil 0.4%
Wasit 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Qadisiyah 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Assyrian Christian 40.0%
Arab Sunni 24.7%
Chaldean Christian 12.2%
Turkmen Sunni 11.8%
Kurd Sunni 4.2%
Turkmen Shiite 2.1%
Arab Shiite 0.9%
Arab Yazidi 0.3%
Armenian Christian 0.2%
Turkmen Christian 0.2%
Kurd Yazidi 0.2%

Families With No Members Working
Total 79.5%
Sinjar 91.5%
Baaj 90.0%
Hamdaniya 87.3%
Mosul 86.1%
Telafar 85.9%
Shekhan 73.7%
Akre 73.2%
Tilkaif 68.2%
Shikhan 67.4%

Qadisiyah

Origins
Baghdad 76.9%
Diyala 11.3%
Anbar 4.3%
Salahaddin 3.0%
Tamim 2.6%
Babil 1.5%
Wasit 0.3%
Ninewa 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.7%
Arab Sunni 0.2%

Families With No Members Working
Total 99.0%
Afaq 100.0%
Diwaniya 99.3%
Hamza 99.3%
Shamiya 95.0%

Salahaddin

Origins
Baghdad 50.0%
Tamim 14.7%
Basra 12.0%
Diyala 10.6%
Salahaddin 4.9%
Anbar 2.1%
Ninewa 2.0%
Irbil 1.7%
Wasit 0.7%
Dhi Qar 0.6%
Babil 0.6%
Qadisiyah 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 96.7%
Arab Shiite 2.0%
Turkmen Shiite 0.7%
Kurd Sunni 0.4%
Turkmen Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 77.2%
Tooz 82.9%
Shirqat 82.4%
Tikrit 81.1%
Baiji 74.2%
Daur 69.5%
Samarra 59.3%

Sulaymaniya

Origins
Baghdad 47.1%
Diyala 44.7%
Anbar 3.1%
Ninewa 1.8%
Salahaddin 1.1%
Tamim 0.6%
Basra 0.5%
Babil 0.4%
Wasit 0.2%
Dhi Qar 0.1%
Sulaymniya 0.1%
Muthanna 0.1%
Karbala 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 60.2%
Kurd Sunni 24.8%
Arab Shiite 10.2%
Kurd Shiite 2.85
Kurd Yazidi 0.3%
Chaldean Christian 0.3%
Arab Sabean Mandean 0.3%
Turkmen Sunni 0.3%
Assyrian Christian 0.1%
Arab Christian 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 30.1%
Halabja 41.7%
Kalar 25.8%
Sharbazher 0.0%
Sulaymniya 29.3%

Tamim

Origins
Diyala 25.6%
Tamim 22.6%
Salahaddin 15.7%
Ninewa 15.2%
Baghdad 15.1%
Anbar 4.1%
Irbil 1.2%
Basra 0.3%
Sulaymaniya 0.1%
Babil 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Sunni 52.2%
Kurd Sunni 20.0%
Turkmen Shiite 16.5%
Arab Shiite 3.3%
Turkmen Sunni 3.0%
Assyrian Christian 1.8%
Kurd Shiite 1.2%
Chaldean Christian 0.9%
Armenian Christian 0.2%
Arab Yazidi 0.1%

Families With No Members Working
Total 98.6%
Hawiga 100%
Daquq 97.9%
Kirkuk 98.6%

Wasit

Origins
Baghdad 63.8%
Diyala 33.4%
Babil 0.9%
Anbar 0.8%
Tamim 0.6%
Salahaddin 04%
Basra 0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion
Arab Shiite 99.5%
Kurd Shiite 0.2%
Arab Sunni 0.1%

Families With No Member Working
Total 89.7%
Namaniya 93.4%
Suwaira 90.0%
Badra 90.0%
Kut 90.0%
Hai 88.4%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

>New And Old Provincial Councils in Diyala Embroiled In Controversy

>April 6, 2009 was supposed to be the date that the new provincial council in Diyala was to be seated. That was prevented when police raided the council building in Diyala’s capital Baquba. According to authorities and council members, the out going provincial chief, as well as three new members all have arrest warrants for them.

The out-going Diyala provincial council was elected in January 2005. Despite 52% of the population being Sunni, a coalition of the Shiite Islamic Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council won 20 of the 41 provincial seats. This was due to the Sunni boycott that was only half adhered to in Diyala as the Iraqi Islamic Party came in second with 14 seats. The Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition won the remaining seven positions.

As this council was about to step down an arrest warrant was issued for the provincial chief Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan. Bajilan, a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, was accused of stealing $130 million from the provincial government. Bajilan claimed that he was the one that called the police on the matter, and that the authorities were looking for someone else with the same name. A council member from the Islamic Party however, said that Bajilan was asked to reimburse the money he stole. He refused and an arrest warrant was put out for him as a result.

At the same time there are other warrants for three incoming members of the provincial council. In the January 2009 election the Sunni Accordance Front won nine of twenty-nine seats, followed by the Iraqi National Project of parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq with six, the Kurdish Alliance with six, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List with three, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list with two, the Supreme Council with two, and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s National Reform Party with one. On the day that these new members were supposed to take office the police raided the provincial council building in Baquba, the capital. No names or parties were mentioned, but the provincial police chief said three were wanted for connections to the insurgency. They were not arrested, and no other details were given.

These series of warrants are not the first time the Diyala provincial council has been embroiled in controversy. In April 2009 it was announced that government officials, employees, contractors, and companies in the province had diverted 40% of Diyala’s investment money to insurgents to protect against attacks. IraqSlogger also reported that most of the police positions in Diyala were given out through secret deals between the police chief and tribes. The head of the agriculture committee in the council also said that $2.6 million had disappeared from the farming department. He continued by claiming prices for farm projects were being exaggerated to scam money.

Corruption is a major problem throughout the Iraqi government. It denies services and infrastructure to the people, and undermines their support for the authorities. Many Sunni politicians have also been accused of having ties to the insurgency. Rival groups have used this against them, while usually overlooking the Shiite and Kurdish militias that were integral parts to most of their own major parties. Whether these warrants will be followed through with, and anyone punished for their alleged crimes is unknown. Very few high officials have ever been prosecuted, so it’s unlikely that anything will happen to these members of the Diyala council.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Outgoing Provincial Chief Suspected Of Embezzling $130 Million,” 4/6/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “$2.6 million disappears in Diala,” 11/6/08
- “Police prevent Diala council from holding first session,” 4/6/09

IraqSlogger.com, “Official: Illicit ‘Deals’ in Police Hiring,” 11/13/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Al-Sabah, “Iraq: Funds Invested in the Rehabilitation of the Diala Province Went to Terrorists,” MEMRI Blog, 4/4/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08

>Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” – Chapter 2 The Agencies Engage

>The second chapter of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of America’s rebuilding project in Iraq focuses upon the pre-war planning. Most of it centers upon the work of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). That agency was given the largest responsibility of any in the U.S. government even though it didn’t have the capacity to do all that was asked of it. It was also one of the only that understood the task ahead of it. It thought of how much it would cost to rebuild Iraq, and came up with a plan to integrate that task with building a democracy in Iraq. The White House and the Pentagon wanted the latter, while largely rejecting the former, which highlighted the faulty strategy created before the war.

The USAID was included in the post-war planning in August 2002. The National Security Council (NSC) believed that the agency had experience with disasters beforehand that would allow it to handle any problems that might occur in Iraq. The USAID was made part of the NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group, and took over all of the humanitarian and much of the reconstruction planning. By October most of the agency’s personnel had been tasked with working on Iraq. They proved to have a much richer and realistic view of what lay ahead. They saw rebuilding as only a small part of a much longer process to transform the country into a democracy. In a policy paper released in October it said that the job could take years. The White House and Pentagon thought that the U.S. would only be involved for a few months.

The USAID’s main task was dealing with any humanitarian contingencies that might emerge after the invasion, and then rebuilding Iraq. Their major fear was that Saddam might destroy much of the country during the fighting. After those problems were dealt with the agency would then move to reconstruction. That task was thought of as mostly repairing war damage. The NSC’s Humanitarian Working Group broke up this job amongst different parts of the U.S. government. USAID was given health, water, sanitation, electricity, education, transportation, telecommunications, farming, and rural development. The State Department had governance, Treasury had finance and the economy, while the Pentagon had oil and overall control of the country.

The USAID was given the most responsibility. They came up with a series of benchmarks to meet within a year of the invasion. These included providing dependable water to all cities, basic health services to all Iraqis, reconstructing and improving transportation, raising electricity to 75% of pre-Gulf War levels, privatizing state run businesses, and open private banks. Those later two were part of a plan to promote business and capitalism, since Iraq was mostly a state-run socialist country. It’s telling that few of these have been met six years after the invasion.

The USAID was also supposed to help the State Department. It never came up with a detailed plan however, so the USAID was left to its own devices. It planned to decentralize power away from Baghdad down to the local governments to break the tradition of a centralized state that Saddam had imposed. The general idea was that each neighborhood would elect councils that would then be in charge of jobs and local reconstruction, while teachers and other civil servants would go back to work to keep institutions going. All of this was part of the USAID’s larger plan to build a democracy in Iraq.

When the NSC Humanitarian Group heard about the USAID’s plans they were opposed. The White House didn’t believe in large-scale reconstruction or nation building. Following this, the co-chair of the group only wanted the U.S. to focus upon repairing war damage. The task of rebuilding would be the responsibility of the new Iraqi government, which would pay for it using oil money. This led to statements like those by Vice President Dick Cheney when he said that Iraq was a rich country, with vast resources, that could pay for much of its own reconstruction when he was on NBC’s Meet The Press in March 2003 shortly before the war started.

The problem was that the U.S. knew very little about the state of Iraq’s oil industry. The 1991 Gulf War had damaged much of the country’s infrastructure. The United Nation’s sanctions that followed caused a shortage of spare parts, and a subsequent lack of maintenance. These problems could be seen in 1998 when the U.N. authorized Baghdad to double its crude sales under the oil for food program, but couldn’t.

Even if the Americans did know about these problems it didn’t have the personnel to repair them. This led the government to contract out the work. This job was given to Kellogg Brown and Root (KBR), which became the most well-known and controversial deal. The company already had an agreement to provide basic services to the U.S. Army. Giving such a deal to KBR was a problem because Vice President Cheney was the former CEO of its parent company Halliburton. The contract was looked at by a series of lawyers in the government, but the Pentagon went ahead anyway saying that necessity and the coming war overrode any public relations fallout that might occur later. As a result KBR was given a $7 billion contract to repair Iraq’s oil infrastructure. This was the largest amount given during the war. A subsequent review by the Government Accountability Office said that KBR should have never been given the task.

USAID also contracted out much of its own work. After the Cold War, 37% of the government’s staff was cut. That led the USAID to largely rely upon NGOs and private companies to do its work. Following this, the United Nations’ World Food Program was given a $200 million contract to provide aid to Iraqis after the invasion. USAID also gave out $41 million in deals to groups like Mercy Corps and Save The Children to meet the humanitarian disasters they were planning for. From February to May 2003 it gave another $1.3 billion in contracts. Bechtel International for example was added in April 2003 to do $680 million in work on Iraq’s infrastructure. This deal was eventually enlarged to $1.03 billion, the largest amount USAID had ever given.

Overall, USAID’s experience showed the contradictions in America’s pre-war stance. The administration was prepared for the worst-case humanitarian crisis, but the best-case reconstruction situation. The humanitarian planning went ahead smoothly because it had the full backing of President Bush. USAID could call upon any government agency to help with this task. Its work on rebuilding however was much more complicated. The White House did not want the U.S. to be responsible for Iraq beyond a few months. It did not believe in nation building. It also saw no connection between rebuilding Iraq and creating a democracy, something that USAID believed were integral. The USAID was also the only part of the government that believed that reconstruction would be a huge task. In 2002 it predicted that it would cost the U.S. up to $90 billion over three to five years. The rest of the administration argued that Iraq would be doing the work and paying for it. In fact, if the rest of Washington knew what the USAID was thinking it would’ve rejected it. Yet, it was the only agency that had a realistic view of what Iraq was going to be like.

SOURCES

Meet The Press, “Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney,” NBC, 3/16/03

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

>Criticism of Iraq’s Oil Policy

>Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani has been thoroughly criticized for his policies. Oil production has gone up and down since the U.S. invasion, but it has never met the goal of 2 million barrels of oil per day in exports, or come close to the pre-war high of 2.5 million barrels per day. There is now added pressure to boost production as the price of crude has plummeted. The Oil Ministry and the Kurds have also had a running battle over who has the authority to sign contracts with international oil companies, and how the profits are to be distributed. Shahristani has also largely failed to sign major oil deals to bring the capital and know how necessary to boost production. There is now a move afoot to create a Federal Oil and Gas Council and an Iraqi National Oil Company to manage the industry. This would allow for political influence over oil, and could strip Shahristani of much of his authority.

In February 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh, a Kurd, held a meeting in Baghdad to come up with some recommendations for a new oil policy. The conference said that Iraq was faced with low oil production, and the global financial crisis that has decreased prices. In response, Iraq needed to boost production as soon as possible. The meeting members felt that the current oil policy was failing to achieve this, and recommended that the Oil Ministry be reformed. The two major changes the group called for were the creation of a Federal Oil and Gas Council that would manage the oil system, and be appointed by parliament, and the revival of the Iraqi National Oil Company that would handle production. This would come under the authority of the legislature as well. If implemented, those two institutions would strip Minister Shahristani of much of his power. The Oil Ministry would be left to regulate production, and come up with how to implement plans created by the Oil and Gas Council. Deputy Prime Minister Saleh also said that Iraq should enter into production sharing agreement with oil companies. These are the preferred contracts by international firms because they allow the corporations to claim the oil fields they are working on in their books and boost their stock prices. Iraq’s unions, civil servants, and some politicians are against these types of deals because they are afraid that they give too much power to the companies. Shahristani has only offered technical service agreements so far. These deals pay firms a set fee for their work. With oil companies unwilling to sign these contracts with Baghdad, Minister Shahristani recently hinted in March 2009 that he might be open to production sharing agreements on newer and riskier fields.

There are several problems with the suggestions of the conference. First, it called for experts, rather than political appointees to be in charge of the oil industry, but an Oil and Gas Council and a National Oil Company would both have to go through parliament to be created, and none of Iraq’s political parties have passed on the chance to place their followers in Iraq’s government institutions. Another major problem is that Iraq has had a massive brain drain since the invasion, and may not have the personnel to staff the Council and Company. Third, Arabs may also see the plan as an attempt by Deputy Prime Minister Saleh to help out his fellow Kurds that have criticized the Oil Ministry, called for production sharing agreements, and want to export oil from fields in Kurdistan.

Oil Minister Shahristani is in a weak position to fend off these critiques. As reported before, the Minister has largely made deals on the fly. In 2008 he was going to open up a series of short-term oil contracts, but when the negotiations fell apart, and the parliament criticized his work, he cancelled all of the talks, and turned around to sign a contract with a Chinese company that had never even been part of the discussion. Shahristani then had two rounds of bids for long-term, joint venture technical service deals, but the oil companies have been standoffish. In the meantime, Iraq is offering deals on some of the same fields it is putting up for bidding. His running battle with the Kurds has also gone nowhere. On the positive side for Shahristani is that he ran as part of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list in the January 2009 provincial elections, which may give him sway with the PM to continue on with his plans.

With so many different voices, and arguments going on, it is unlikely that there will be any major change in oil policy in the short-term. That will give Minister Shahristani more time to follow his haphazard deals that have failed to raise production or lead to major oil contracts. It would probably take the political intervention of Maliki or the parliament to pass legislation to strip the Oil Ministry of much of its authority to make any real difference. The legislature has been deadlocked over other oil laws however, so even that is questionable.

SOURCES

Ciszuk, Samuel, “Government hopes two-pronged oil strategy will not discourage IOC investment in Iraq,” UPI, 3/5/09
- “KRG-Baghdad still at odds over IOC pay,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Lando, Ben, “Iraqi oil meetings to start crucial, difficult year as ministry faces variety of critics,” UPI, 2/10/09
- “The Politics of Iraqi Oil,” Iraq Oil Report Blog, 3/22/09

Nordland, Rod and Nouawad, Jad, “Iraq Considers Giving Foreign Oil Investors Better Terms,” New York Times, 3/19/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 11/20/08

Robertson, Campbell, “Iraq Poised to Revive Oil Contract With China,” New York Times, 8/20/08

Walt, Vivienne, “What Oil Companies Will Get in Iraq,” Time, 6/20/08

>New Challenges To Sadr’s Leadership

>Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement has faced an increasing number of splits. After his August 2004 uprising some of his militia commanders began leaving the fold. Many of these went on to form Special Groups. One was Qais Khazali who created Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the League of the Righteous. He moved in and out of the Sadr Trend, but eventually turned to Iran and Hezbollah for aid, and was arrested by the Americans in March 2007. Within days Khazali’s followers responded by kidnapping five Britons. London is now in negotiations to release them in return for Khazali’s freedom. At the same time, moderate members of the Sadr movement have left and formed a new group because they fear leaders like Khazali are undermining their good work. This will add new challengers to Sadr’s leadership.

Qais Khazali was a student of Moqtada’s father Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr. When he was assassinated by Saddam in 1999, Qais and a small group of other followers kept the movement alive by going underground. When Moqtada took over the group in April 2003 Khazali became one of his main supporters. After the second Sadr uprising that ended in September 2004 with a cease-fire, Khazali went back to Sadr City in Baghdad and continued attacking the American forces. By October 2004 Khazali had created his own independent group that would later be known as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, League of the Righteous. By March 2005 Khazali had been convinced to rejoin the Sadr movement, but he still carried out his own activities as well. In June 2006 Khazali left again, and was chosen to lead the Special Groups, the breakaway militia groups that had become disillusioned with Sadr and were receiving increasing funding and weapons from Iran. Many of these fighters began traveling to Iran for training and also received aid from Hezbollah. Those activities were coordinated through Hezbollah commander Ali Musa Daqduq who was operating in Iraq. On January 20, 2007 Asaib Ahl al-Haq carried out their most brazen attack when they raided a command center in Karbala dressed as U.S. soldiers, and killed five Americans and wounded three others. That eventually led to Khazali, his brother Laith, and Daqduq’s arrest on March 20. Akram al-Kabi took over the leadership of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

In response to the capture of Khazali, Asaib Ahl al-Haq raided the Finance Ministry building in Baghdad on March 29. They kidnapped Peter Moore, a British computer consultant who was working for a U.S. company Bearing Point that was providing financial training to the Iraqi government. Moore’s two guards, and two others were taken as well. They worked for the Canadian security company Garda World. Two of them were Scottish, and the other two were from Wales. The British Foreign Ministry has been trying to negotiate their release ever since.

With the English stepping up their withdrawal from southern Iraq, pressure is increasing to gain Moore’s release. That began at the beginning of March 2009 when the British announced that they were opening ties with Hezbollah. The Lebanese group is acting as middleman between the British and Asaib Ahl al-Haq. Later in the month the Iraqi group sent a video of Moore to the British Embassy in Baghdad. It was shown on TV, which is supposedly part of the deal to release the hostages. Next ten members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, including Laith Khazali are to be released for one of the British security guards. If that is successful more will follow with the final trade being Peter Moore for Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali.

If the Khazali brothers are released it could re-invigorate Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and complicate Sadr’s leadership. Khazali claims that he is the rightful heir to the elder Sadr’s movement. While they have been solely a military group committed to attacking the Coalition forces, in February 2009 they announced that they wanted to run in the parliamentary elections planned for December. Asaib Ahl al-Haq have said they want an Iranian style religious state. A move towards politics could be encouraged by Baghdad, as the government has been giving amnesty to some Special Group members in return for them giving up their weapons. Sadr is aware of this challenge, and has asked Special Group members to return to his group, but he hasn’t been successful.

Of more immediate concern to Sadr is the defection of moderate members of the Sadrist Trend. On March 21, 2009 a group of former Sadrists met in Baghdad to announce a new group, the Clerics Advisory, Shura al-Ullama. They claim to have 200 followers. The group has been formed because they fear that the Sadr movement is being taken over by militants backed by Iran. Shura al-Ullama will run social programs like the original Sadr movement, and is also hoping to set up offices across the country to run in the parliamentary elections. The government supports this group as well. The head of Iraq’s Reconciliation Committee Zuhair Chalabi attended their opening meeting.

As reported before, Sadr has faced a series of defections over the years. Many militia members have left his group, while others have been rounded up after the government’s crackdown in 2008. In June of that year he disbanded his Mahdi Army, and formed a new organization, Mumahidoon, Those Who Pave The Way, which is an unarmed, cultural and religious group. In the January 2009 provincial elections, he backed two independent lists to mixed results. He lost control of Maysan and reportedly Sadr City, but gained seats in more provinces than he did in the last vote in 2005. Now he is facing more problems. Khazali is a rival for the loyalty of many militia members who are dissatisfied with Sadr’s move away from armed struggle. The Clerics Advisory could draw away those more moderate members who are opposed to continuing fighting. Either way it could be another break for an already fractious movement.

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Anti-US Iraqi cleric facing leadership challenge,” Associated Press, 2/20/09
- “Report: Deal close to free Britons seized in Iraq,” Associated Press, 3/29/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Hopes Grow on Split in Sadr Body, Amnesties,” Wall Street Journal, 3/30/09

Chulov, Martin, “UK begins Iraq farewell by saying: so long, and thanks for the fish,” Guardian, 3/30/09

Cochrane, Marisa, “Asaib Ahl al-Haq and the Khazali Special Groups network,” Institute for the Study of War,” 1/13/08
- “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Colvin, Marie, “Families told release of UK hostages not a done deal,” Times of London, 3/29/09

Haynes, Deborah, “Peter Moore footage keeps hope alive for five ‘forgotten’ hostages,” Times of London, 3/23/09

Al-Kaabi, Qassim, “Inside Al-Sadr’s Al-Mumahhidun Project,” Asharq Alawsat, 1/8/09

Landler, Mark, “Britain’s Contacts With Hezbollah Vex U.S.,” New York Times, 3/13/09

Rubin, Alissa and Dagher, Sam, “Sadr, Insurgency Icon, Is Silent, but Backers Work Behind Scenes,” New York Times, 1/31/09