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October 09 Deaths Continue Up And Down Pattern

Since April 2009 monthly death counts for Iraq have fluctuated up and down. October was no different as it was higher than the previous month. Iraq’s ministries for example, reported 410 deaths in October, compared to 203 in September and 456 in August. They also recorded 1,275 wounded in October, and 711 in September.

Around half of last month’s casualties came from large bombings, most notably the October 25 Baghdad bombings, which killed 155 and wounded 520. In total, there were 22 mass casualty bombings in October resulting in 241 deaths and 887 wounded. In September, there were only 13 leading to 70 deaths and 263 wounded.

Baghdad remains the most violent city in Iraq. There were 53 attacks and incidents last month with 201 deaths and 703 wounded. That was followed by Mosul in Ninewa province with 66 attacks/incidents, 60 deaths and 82 wounded. After those two, Anbar was third with 29 attacks/incidents, 56 deaths, and 175 wounded, and Diyala was fourth with 21 attacks/incidents, 20 deaths, and 46 wounded. Southern Iraq remains the second least violent area with only 21 attacks/incidents overall with 9 deaths and 93 wounded. Babil is still troubled with insurgent and militia activity however. Special Groups are still active in the south as well carrying out six attacks on U.S. bases and patrols. Kurdistan was the least violent area of the country.

Overall, deaths are still down to their lowest levels since the 2003 invasion. According to Iraq’s ministries there were an average of 276.5 deaths in the first six months of 2009 compared to 385.0 in the last six months of 2008. The major reason is that many Sunnis, including insurgents, have decided to get involved in the political process, resulting in a steady decline in the number of attacks across the country since the January 2009 provincial elections.

Iraqi Deaths

Brookings Institution

Iraq Body Count

icasualties

Iraqi Ministries

Associated Press

2008

July

500

584

419

465

510

Aug.

450

592

311

431

475

Sep.

400

535

366

440

503

Oct.

350

528

288

318

446

Nov.

270

473

317

340

360

Dec.

350

522

320

316

393

2009

Jan.

270

276

187

191

242

Feb.

230

343

202

258

288

March

260

416

278

252

335

April

340

484

347

355

371

May

240

332

188

165

225

June

320

488

367

438

447

July

220

395

240

275

309

Aug.

300

493

439

456

425

Sep.

N/A

296

158

203

238

Oct.

N/A

439

320

410

364

Averages

3rd Qtr. 2008

450.0

570.3

365.3

446.3

496.0

4th Qtr.

2008

323.3

507.6

308.3

324.6

379.6

1st Qtr.

2009

253.3

345.0

222.3

233.6

288.3

2nd Qtr. 2009

300.0

434.6

300.6

319.3

347.6

3rd Qtr. 2009

N/A

394.6

279.0

311.3

324.0

Last 6 months of 2008

386.6

539.0

336.8

385.0

447.8

First 6 months of 2009

276.6

389.8

261.0

276.5

317.5

Number of Bombings and Casualty Statistics – April to October 2009

April 2009
Bombings: 21
Deaths: 198 + 32 Iranians
Wounded: 497 + 105 Iranians + 10 Americans

May 2009
Bombings: 9
Deaths: 111
Wounded: 262

June 2009
Bombings: 14
Deaths: 174
Wounded: 517

July 2009
Bombings: 35
Deaths: 180
Wounded: 655

August 2009
Bombings: 44
Deaths: 359
Wounded: 2,252

September 2009
Bombings: 13
Deaths: 70
Wounded: 263

October 2009
Bombings: 22
Deaths: 241
Wounded: 887

Attacks and Casualties By Province October 2008

Baghdad: 53 attacks/incidents
Dead: 201
Wounded: 703

Ninewa: 77 attacks/incidents
Deaths: 75
Wounded: 129

Anbar: 29 attacks/incidents
Deaths: 56
Wounded: 175

Diyala: 21 attacks/incidents
Deaths: 20
Wounded: 46

Tamim: 22 attacks/incidents
Deaths: 9
Wounded: 14

Salahaddin: 6 attacks/incidents
Deaths: 4
Wounded: 25

Southern Iraq: 21 attacks/incidents
Babil: 6
Karbala: 6
Dhi Qar: 5
Wasit: 2
Basra: 1
Qadisiyah: 1
Deaths: 9
Wounded: 93

Special Group attacks in southern Iraq
Mortar attack on U.S. base in Dhi Qar
Rocket attack on U.S. base in Dhi Qar
IED attack on U.S. patrol in Dhi Qar
Attack on U.S. base in Basra
Rocket attack on U.S. base in Kut
2 U.S. vehicles damaged in roadside bombing in Wasit

SOURCES

Al-Anbari, Bassim, “Triple attacks kill 19 in western Iraqi city,” 10/12/09

Agence France Presse, “Iraq death toll falls by half in September: officials,” 10/1/09

Associated Press, “Police: Suicide bomber kills 11 at mosque in Iraq,” 10/16/09
- “Suicide bomb kills 6 at funeral in Iraq,” 10/6/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 bombs defused in Mosul,” 10/26/09
- “2 bombs found in Huweija,” 10/7/09
- “2 civilians killed in Mosul,” 10/21/09
- “2 civilians wounded by bomb explosion in Baghdad,” 10/22/09
- “2 civilians wounded in 2 separate incidents in Mosul,” 10/5/09
- “2 civilians wounded in armed attack in Baaquba,” 10/8/09
- “2 civilians wounded in Thi-Qar blasts,” 10/4/09
- “2 civilians wounded, suspect arrested in Khanaqin,” 10/23/09
- “2 cops wounded in Mosul blast,” 10/5/09
- “2 gunmen arrested in Kirkuk while planting bomb,” 10/11/09
- “2 killed in separate incidents in Mosul,” 10/3/09
- “2 missiles land on U.S. base in Kut,” 10/23/09
- “2 policemen wounded in IED blast in Jalawlaa,” 10/28/09
- “2 unknown bodies found in Mosul,” 10/20/09
- “3 civilians wounded in Babel blast,” 10/10/09
- “3 cops killed, wounded in Falluja blast,” 10/17/09
- “3 IEDs defused in Amara,” 10/28/09
- “3 killed, 5 wounded in bombing in Mosul,” 10/28/09
- “3 people injured by sticky bomb in Talafar,”10/30/09
- “3 policemen killed, officer wounded in Mosul attack,” 10/29/09
- “4 cops killed, injured in Babel,” 10/20/09
- “4 cops wounded by IED in Kirkuk,” 10/15/09
- “5 killed, wounded in Falluja blast,’ 10/5/09
- “10 civilians wounded in Babel blast,” 10/4/09
- “Basra airport comes under Katyusha attack,” 10/12/09
- “Blast in Baghdad leaves 6 injuries,” 10/28/09
- “Blast in Falluja leaves no casualties,” 10/27/09
- “Blast in Ninewa wounds cement company chief,” 10/18/09
- “Blast kills 1, wounds 9 north of Hilla,” 10/18/09
- “Blast kills 2, wounds 9 north of Hilla,” 10/18/09
- “Blast kills civilian, injures 3 northeastern Baghdad,” 10/15/09
- “Body found, suspected gunman arrested in Kirkuk,” 10/25/09
- “Body of kidnapped Christian found in Kirkuk,” 10/5/09
- “Bomb explodes in Kirkuk without casualties,” 10/29/09
- “Bomb wounds 2 in Mosul,” 10/6/09
- “Bomber killed in northern Talafar,” 10/29/09
- “Children, mother wounded in Mosul blast,” 10/12/09
- “Civilian body found in eastern Kut,” 10/21/09
- “Civilian killed in Kirkuk,” 10/21/09
- “Civilian killed in tribal clashes in Mosul,” 10/12/09
- “Civilian wounded in Baghdad armed attack,” 10/12/09
- “Civilian wounded in IED blast in Ramadi,” 10/29/09
- “Civilian wounded in IED blast near Mosul,” 10/26/09
- “Contractor gunned down in Mosul,” 10/12/09
- “Cop, civilians injured in Baghdad bombing,” 10/5/09
- “Cop killed by gunmen in Talafar,” 10/1/09
- “Cop wounded in Falluja blast,” 10/11/09
- “Death toll from Baghdad blasts up to 155,” 10/26/09
- “District chief escapes attempt on his life in Mosul,” 10/19/09
- “Guided missiles seized in Basra,” 10/26/09
- “Guard killed in crowded souk in Mosul,” 10/23/09
- “Gunmen assassinate tribal affairs office chief in Ninewa,” 10/19/09
- “Gunmen blow up house of officer in Anbar,” 10/17/09
- “Gunmen storm building in Mosul, kill two civilians,” 10/26/09
- “Gunman kidnap 2 students in Kirkuk,” 10/20/09
- “Gunman killed while trying to plant bomb,” 10/6/09
- “Gunmen kill cop south of Falluja,” 10/21/09
- “Hand grenade injures 4 in Mosul,” 10/31/09
- “IED blast in Kirkuk, no casualties reported,” 10/24/09
- “IED blast kills 2 Iraqi soldiers, wounds 4 in Kirkuk,” 10/13/09
- “IED blast kills 3, wounds 4 in eastern Baghdad,” 10/28/09
- “IED blast near Mosul leaves no casualties,” 10/3/09
- “IED blast targets MNF patrol in Kirkuk,” 10/25/09
- “IED defused in Ramadi,” 10/26/09
- “IED defused in western Mosul,” 10/12/09
- “IED explodes in Nassiriya, no casualties reported,” 10/4/09
- “IED explodes in Talafar,” 10/6/09
- “IED explodes near officer’s house in southern Kirkuk,” 10/5/09
- “IED explodes near police patrol in Kirkuk,” 10/23/09
- “IED hits U.S. convoy in Baghdad,” 10/31/09
- “IED injures 6 in central Baghdad,” 10/1/09
- “Iraq army kills gunman in Mosul,” 10/19/09
- “Iraqi forces clash with smugglers on Syrian borders,” 10/16/09
- “Iraqi soldier killed, 2 wounded in Mosul,” 10/23/09
- “Katyusha rocket lands near Iraqi military post in Diwaniya,” 10/13/09
- “Local official in Falluja assassinated,” 10/23/09
- “Mayor, sons killed, wounded in Diala bombing,” 10/12/09
- “Missile defused in Kirkuk,” 10/9/09
- “Mortars wound civilians in Baghdad,” 10/31/09
- “Police defuse 7 rockets in eastern Wassit,” 10/5/09
- “Police defuse bomb in central Falluja,” 10/12/09
- “Police kill gunman in northeastern Mosul,” 10/2/09
- “Police seize ready-to-launch rockets in Basra,” 10/20/09
- “Policeman killed, 3 civilians wounded separately in Mosul,” 10/22/09
- “Policeman, gunman killed in Mosul,” 10/22/09
- “Policeman survives IED blast near his vehicle,” 10/18/09
- “Policeman wounded in Mosul blast,” 10/13/09
- “Pre. Student kidnapped in Kirkuk,” 10/26/09
- “Real-estate office owner killed in Mosul,” 10/25/09
- “Roadside bomb exploded, another dismantled in Kirkuk,” 10/14/09
- “Rocket lands in south Kirkuk,” 10/29/09
- “Rockets, launching pads seized in Falluja,” 10/6/09
- “Rockets left minor damage at base – U.S. forces in Thi-Qar,” 10/21/09
- “Sahwa official wounded in Diala,” 10/22/09
- “Samarra sahwa official survives attempt on his life,” 10/28/09
- “Sticky bomb defused at official building in Ninewa,” 10/28/09
- “Sticky bomb kills 2 women, injures 12 persons in Babel,” 10/21/09
- “Sticky bomb kills, wounds 5 family members,” 10/7/09
- “Sticky bomb wounds 4 people in Baghdad,” 10/22/09
- “Sticky bomb wounds 5 in Mosul,” 10/31/09
- “Suicide attack leaves 16 casualties in Diala,” 10/13/09
- “Suicide bomber kills 1, wounds 9 in Tikrit,” 10/24/09
- “Suspected bomber kills policeman, guard during interrogation,” 10/31/09
- “Two blasts hit U.S. patrol in Thi-Qar,” 10/14/09
- “Two gunmen killed while planting roadside bomb in Kirkuk,” 10/17/09
- “U.S. base in Nassiriya mortared,” 10/21/09
- “U.S. forces kill civilian, arrest 4 brothers,” 10/27/09
- “U.S. vehicle damaged in explosion in Wassit,” 10/25/09
- “Umm al-Nakhl sahwa chief assassinated,” 10/28/09
- “Unidentified body of woman found west of Makhmour,” 10/24/09
- “Vendor, child killed in northern Mosul,” 10/21/09
- “Woman killed, 2 civilians wounded by police mistake fire in Mosul,” 10/16/09
- “Woman killed, kidnapped person freed in Baghdad,” 10/20/09
- “Woman’s head found in Mosul,” 10/3/09

Bernama, “Civilian Killed, 10 Injured In Bomb Attack In Baghdad Snack Restaurant,” 10/19/09

DPA, “Four killed, three injured in attacks in Mosul,” 10/21/09
- “Four killed, two injured in two separate attacks in Iraq,” 10/1/09
- “Four policemen killed in Iraq,” 10/17/09

Al-Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday October 5 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Saturday October 24, 2009
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday October 5, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/5/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday October 11, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/11/09

Hammoudi, Laith, “Round-up of daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 26 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/26/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Sunday 18 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/18/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 20 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/29/09
- “Round-up of daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 29 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/29/09
- “Round-up of daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 6 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/6/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 13 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/13/09
- “Round-up of daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 18 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/18/09
- “Round-up of daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 14 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/14/09

Hussein, Jenan, “Round-up f daily Violence in Iraq – Tuesday 20 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/20/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 28 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/28/09

Icasualties.org

Iraq Body Count

Issa, Sahar, “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 2 October, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Friday 9 October, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/9/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Monday 19 October, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/19/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 1 October, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/1/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Thursday 8 October, 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/8/09
- “Round-up of Daily Violence in Iraq – Wednesday 7 October 2009,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/7/09

ITN, “Clear up after Iraq minibus bombing,” 10/7/09

Karim, Ammar, “UN envoy probes Baghdad security as death toll doubles,” Agence France Presse, 11/2/09

Kimball, Jack, “Attacks kill 11, wound over 50 people,” 10/14/09

Leland, John, “Scattering of Attacks in Iraq,” New York Times, 11/1/09

McClatchy Newspapers, “Car bombs explode in Baghdad, killing at least 135 people,” 10/25/09

Multi-National Corps – Iraq, “MND-B, ISF detain five suspects after grenade attack,” 10/12/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” 9/22/09

Press TV, “Seven killed in Baghdad mortar attack,” 10/14/09

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 3,” 10/3/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 9,” 10/9/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 11,” 10/11/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 12,” 10/12/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 14,” 10/14/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 15,” 10/15/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 17,” 10/17/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 18,” 10/18/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 19,” 10/19/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 20,” 10/20/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 21,” 10/21/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 26,” 10/26/09
- “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, Oct 30,” 10/30/09
- “Iraq oil pipeline to Turkey sabotaged-engineer,” 10/28/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Roadside bomb in Baghdad targets Iraqi security forces, kills 1 soldier,” 10/15/09

Santana, Rebecca, “85,000 Iraqis killed in almost 5 years of war,” Associated Press, 10/14/09

Surk, Barbara, “Bombs kill 6 around Iraq,” Associated Press, 10/20/09
- “Half Iraqis killed in October died in one attack,” Associated Press, 11/2/09
- “Truck bomb destroys key bridge in western Iraq,” Associated Press, 10/17/09

UNN, “Iraq: Two explosion, 3 killed & 9 injured,” 10/19/09

Xinhua, “2 killed, 13 wounded in Baghdad bomb attacks,” 10/18/09
- “5 injured in fuel tanker truck bombing outside Baghdad airport,” 10/4/09
- “12 people wounded in bomb explosion in south Baghdad,” 10/21/09
- “At least one killed in suicide car bombing in Diyala,” 10/29/09
- “Bomb explosion kills 3 south of Baghdad,” 10/8/09
- “Civilian killed in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 10/5/09
- “Insurgent killed, 6 injured in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 10/12/09
- “Iraqi journalist killed in bomb attack in N Kirkuk,” 10/21/09
- “Iraqi parliament evacuated after bomb discovery: lawmakers,” 10/3/09
- “Seven people wounded in Iraq’s Diyala violence,” 10/22/09
- “Two policemen killed in Baghdad violence,” 10/5/09

Mid-2009 Weekly Security Statistics For Iraq

Despite the recent October 2009 Baghdad bombing, and the previous one in August, attacks in Iraq are at their lowest level since the 2003 invasion. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction recorded drops in weekly attacks in eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces from May to October 2009. The three governorates in Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya had the least amount of incidents at 0.5 or less for the last six months, followed by the southern provinces of Karbala, Qadisiyah, Najaf, and Muthanna that also saw fewer than one attack per week from August to October. Babil was the one exception in that region, as it had in increase in attacks going from 3.9 in the 2nd quarter of 2009 to 5.1 in the third. Much of that is due to sticky and roadside bombs planted by a mix of Sunni and Shiite militants, and gangs.

The five most violent areas were Diyala, Tamim, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Baghdad in that order. Out of those however, only Salahaddin saw a very small increase from the second quarter of 2009 to the third, going from 25.2 per week to 25.8. Those provinces along with Anbar however, hold roughly 70% of Iraq’s population. All remain violent because Baghdad is the seat of power, while Diyala, Tamim, Salahaddin, and Ninewa are at the center of the ethnosectarian struggle in the country.

These numbers, along with the fluctuating monthly death counts show that Iraq is a much changed place. Violence is still at unacceptable levels, but the number of attacks and casualties have seen a steady decline over the last two years. Not only that, but the nature of the conflict has drastically changed. Almost all of the incidents consist of bombings, mortar and rocket attacks, and assassinations. There are hardly any armed clashes between militants and the security forces anymore. This is due to the fact that Sunnis are attempting to join the political process, and the Shiite Special Groups and militias are hardly active anymore. This is not captured in the media, which hardly mentions Iraq anymore, and when it does, it’s almost always about violence. That creates a distorted picture of the situation there, and makes Iraq seem like it is in a perpetual state of chaos, when in fact, many there are attempting to return to their normal lives.

Weekly Average Attack Statistics In Iraq – May to October 2009

Province

May-July 09

Aug.-Oct. 09

% Change

Baghdad

74.8

63.1

-16%

Ninewa

65.5

53.1

-19%

Salahaddin

25.2

25.8

+3%

Tamim

20.9

19.8

-5%

Diyala

24.7

17.8

-28%

Anbar

14.9

9.2

-37%

Babil

3.9

5.1

+29%

Basra

5.2

4.1

-21%

Maysan

3.4

2.4

-30%

Dhi Qar

1.6

1.6

0%

Wasit

1.5

1.1

-32%

Qadisiyah

0.4

0.9

+128%

Najaf

1.2

0.4

-70%

Karbala

0.3

0.4

+14%

Muthanna

0.3

0.4

+14%

Irbil

0.2

0.4

+90%

Dohuk

0.5

0.2

-68%

Sulaymaniya

0.3

0.0

-100%

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “12 civilians wounded by roadside bomb blast in Babel,” 10/21/09
- “Sticky bomb kills 2 women, injures 12 persons in Babel,” 10/21/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “Recent Trends in the Iraq War: Maps and Graphs,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/1/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

Iraq’s Provincial Budget Expenditures – 2009

One of the major problems with the Iraqi government is its inability to spend its budget effectively. The country’s eighteen provinces do much worse than the central government in Baghdad. The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s quarterly report to Congress has the latest numbers on how Iraq’s governorates have done up to October 13, 2009.

Ninewa has spent none of its $236 million budget, probably due to the political disputes between the ruling Al-Hadbaa party and the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List, that are boycotting the provincial council. Anbar did the best, spending 70% of its $112 million budget. The new local government there, led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening of Iraq party and Governor Qasim Abed al-Fahadawi, has focused upon developing Anbar and investing in its future.

As reported before, these aggregate numbers show only part of the picture. Almost all of these expenditures are going towards old projects initiated by the previous governments, before the 2009 elections when Iraq was flush with money. Almost every province, has reported a budget deficit this year as a result. Some councils have also not been good at spending their money, such as Maysan that expended 79% its money in 2008, but which went to only 41 of 241 projects. With security improving, Iraqis are increasingly calling for better services, which require that the governorates do a much better job with their finances. A top down, Soviet style management system, a paper based bureaucracy, corruption, and other factors are all reasons why the provinces have not been able to do a better job so far.

Provincial Budgets/% Expended
Anbar $112 mil/70%
Tamim $99 mil/55%
Qadisiyah $86 mil/54%
Dhi Qar $143 mil/48%
Babil $134 mil/41%
Wasit $91 mil/40%
Maysan $80 mil/37%
Baghdad $551 mil/33%
Najaf $93 mil/32%
Karbala $78 mil/29%
Muthanna $56 mil/28%
Basra $201 mil/25%
Diyala $104 mil/23%
Salahaddin $97 mil/17%
Ninewa $236 mil/0%
Kurdistan N/A/N/A

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “In Anbar Province, New Leadership, but Old Problems Persist,” New York Times, 9/13/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09

>Iraq’s 2009 Drought

>Iraq is facing a drought again. Officially, it has been going on for the last two years. Unofficially

Farmland Affected
Affected farmland 36,919 square kilometers
Total farmland 96,706 square kilometers
% of affected farmland 38.7%
Babil, Irbil, Ninewa, Salahaddin, Tamim, – 46-56%
Dhi Qar, Diyala, Maysan – 31-45%
Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah – 26-30%
Anbar, Basra, Muthanna, Wasit – 6-25%
Sulaymaniya – 4-5%
Dohuk – 0%

SOURCES

Blua, Antoine, “Iraq Tussles With Neighbors Over Water,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 9/13/09

Chulov, Martin, “Water shortage threatens two million people in southern Iraq,” Guardian, 8/26/09

DiPaola, Anthony and Alexander, Caroline, “Iraq Drought Cuts Harvest, Boosts Imports as Oil Cash Slips,” Bloomberg, 8/5/09

Hope, Bradley, “Iraq digs in to rebuild agricultural sector,” The National, 8/30/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “The Humanitarian Situation In Iraq, Inter-Agency Fact Sheet,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, August 2009

IRIN, “IRAQ: Drought hits rice, wheat staples,” 8/31/09b

Kamal, Adel, “desertification destroys ninawa villages,” Niqash, 7/17/09

Raphaeli, Dr. Nimrod, “Water Crisis in Iraq: The Growing Danger of Desertification,” The Middle East Media Institute, 7/23/09

Sly, Liz, “Iraq in throes of environmental catastrophe, experts say,” Los Angeles Times, 7/30/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Tharp, Mike, “Once world’s bread basket, Iraq now a farming basket case,” McClatchy Newspapers, 7/17/09

Williams, Timothy, “Idle Iraqi Date Farm Show Decline of Economy,” New York Times, 8/15/09

>Latest Return Statistics For Iraqi Refugees/Displaced

>

The latest report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced that have returned is now available. Like the last report, 2009 has continued to see a number of Iraqis come back, but varying by month. In June, 2009 14,750 displaced and 3,490 refugees for a total of 18,410 Iraqis made the trip back. That compared to a total of 15,330 in May. March saw the largest number of returns this year with 26,540. Since 2005 displaced returns, 61% of the total, have far outweighed the refugees coming back, 39%. In the first six months of 2009 roughly 101,490 Iraqis have returned. That would put this year roughly on track to match last year’s total of 221,260. 2004 has seen the most returns since the U.S. invasion with 291,997 making the trip. That year 193,997 were refugees coming back to see the new Iraq. In total, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,195,899 lost their homes, and about 1,075,986, 33.6%, have returned so far. The number of displaced and the percent that have returned is definitely incomplete because the UNHCR counts no refugees before 2006 when there were tens of thousands of them under Saddam.

Total displaced

Time

Displaced

Refugees

Total

Pre-2006

1,212,108

1,212,108

After 2006

1,695,899

1,500,000

3,195,899

Number of Returns 2003-June 2009

Time

Displaced

Refugees

Total

2003

0

55,429

55,429

2004

98,000

193,997

291,997

2005

98,000

56,155

154,155

2006

150,000

20.235

170,235

2008

195,890

25,370

221,260

Jan. 09

6,390

1,130

7,520

Feb. 09

15,810

2,970

18,780

Mar. 09

20,690

4,860

26,540

Apr. 09

11,020

3,890

14,910

May 09

10,540

2,990

15,330

Jun. 09

14,750

3,490

18,410

2009

79,200

18,970

101,490

Total

657,090

183,727

1,075,986

61%

39%

100%

The vast majority of Iraqis are going back to six of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting since the U.S. invasion, so it should be no surprise then that the capital has seen the most displaced, and the most returns. 54% of the displaced and 52% of refugees have gone back to that province. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the premier aid group working with Iraq’s displaced, has extensively surveyed this community and found that 26.6% were forced from their property in Baghdad, 20.6% did so because of the fighting, 20.1% because of direct threats to their life, 15.8% fled the general violence, and 15.7% left out of fear. Those figures are signs of the death and destruction that were wrought in the capital, especially after the 2006 Amarra bombing when the Shiites began ethnically cleansing Sunnis. Overall, the major reason why the displaced have come back is the improved security according to the IOM, followed by a mix of better security and difficulties in their current locals. Those are probably the same reasons for refugees, although far fewer of them, 12.2% of the total, have come back so far.

Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Sulaymaniya

140

0%

Muthanna

180

0%

Irbil

190

0%

Salahaddin

440

0%

Dhi Qar

440

0%

Dohuk

510

1%

Qadisiyah

510

1%

Maysan

510

1%

Anbar

520

1%

Tamim

740

1%

Basra

1,250

1%

Wasit

1,130

1%

Karbala

1,350

1%

Babil

1,680

2%

Najaf

2,170

2%

Ninewa

2,920

3%

Diyala

31,770

31%

Baghdad

55,040

54%

TOTAL

101,490

100%

Refugee Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Ninewa

20

0%

Anbar

60

0%

Sulaymaniya

140

1%

Irbil

160

1%

Salahaddin

160

1%

Muthanna

180

1%

Dhi Qar

430

2%

Maysan

440

2%

Wasit

450

2%

Dohuk

510

2%

Qadisiyah

510

2%

Basra

680

3%

Tamim

690

3%

Babil

1,030

5%

Karbala

1,320

6%

Diyala

1,660

7%

Najaf

2,170

10%

Baghdad

11,680

52%

TOTAL

22,290

100%

Displaced Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Dohuk

0

0%

Qadisiyah

0

0%

Muthanna

0

0%

Najaf

0

0%

Sulaymaniya

0

0%

Dhi Qar

10

0%

Irbil

30

0%

Karbala

30

0%

Tamim

50

0%

Maysan

70

0%

Salahaddin

280

0%

Anbar

460

1%

Basra

570

1%

Babil

650

1%

Wasit

680

1%

Ninewa

2,900

4%

Diyala

30,110

38%

Baghdad

43,360

55%

TOTAL

79,200

100%

The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is still encouraging the return of Iraq’s displaced. The UNHCR does not think it’s time, and the latest Pentagon report to Congress on Iraq said Baghdad has no serious plan to assist the process. The new plan is to try to get them to come back to violent areas in Abu Ghraib outside of Baghdad and Diyala. The authorities have plans to move in 3,000 mostly Shiite families into Abu Ghraib, and to begin evictions of squatters in Diyala. The governor of that province also hopes that families will come back, and has set up six committees in various regions of Diyala to look into damages and pay compensation to returning families. The displaced are worried about insurgent attacks.

Baghdad is trying to close the refugee file this year in an attempt to improve the image of the country, and to help Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Already, in February 2009 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration ordered a stop to registering new displaced claiming that most families have gone back to their homes. This is an important development because not only is the claim not true, but no Iraqis can receive government aid without registering. The authorities have also promised rewards for those that go back to Baghdad, but very few have received any payments.

The process of return has begun, but the majority of Iraq’s refugees are still without their homes. The displaced are coming back in much larger numbers than refugees, mostly because of the improved security situation in the country. The major concern is what they will find when they come home. The government has promised help, but it has not come through in many cases. Prime Minister Maliki seems more concerned about the reports on returns to improve his standing, than actually bettering conditions for when families come back. International organizations have only been able to assist a small fraction of this community, which means many are likely to have to fend for themselves whether they decide to go back or stay where they are.

SOURCES


Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced fear new al-qaeda violence,” Niqash, 6/24/09

Alsumaria, “UNHCR: Iraq not prepared for refugees return,” 6/3/09

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq’s Government Orders Barriers Removed,” New York Times, 8/6/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

International Organization for Migration, “Baghdad Governorate Profile July 2009 IOM IDP and Returnee Assessment,” July 2009
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments Assessment of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Nespapers, 5/22/09

UNHCR, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – June 2009,” 8/3/09

>Governors, Heads of Councils, and Ruling Coalitions In Iraq’s Provinces

>More information is now available on the ruling coalitions that took power after the 2009 provincial elections. Here’s a rundown of governors and heads of councils, (and where possible their deputies), the parties that are now in control of the fourteen provinces that held balloting in January 2009, and the election results. After each is a short note about the motivations behind the coalitions. At the end is a comparison with the 2005 balloting. The three provinces of Kurdistan will not have provincial voting until the new Kurdish parliament drafts their own election law, while balloting in Tamim is indefinitely postponed because of political disputes.

The 2009 voting dramatically changed the face of provincial politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List displaced the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council across most of southern Iraq and Baghdad. New parties also emerged such as the Awakening of Iraq and Independents led by Sheikh Abu Risha in Anbar and the Al-Hadbaa List in Ninewa. They represented the return of Sunnis to local politics after they largely boycotted the 2005 elections. Despite the fact that nationalist and local parties did better than those based upon ethnosectarian identity/politics, Shiites still largely voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. The 2009 results are also setting the stage for the 2010 parliamentary balloting as everyone is strategizing in relation to Maliki, the big winner. Some want to run with him to ride his coattails into power, while others are hoping to unseat him.

The numbers before each province refer to the numbers on the map above

13. Anbar
Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent – Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha
Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq
Ruling Coalition
Awakening of Iraq and Independents
Iraqi National Project
4 other parties
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 6 seats
4. National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli: 3 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National Unity: 2 seats
Notes: Formed to kick the Iraqi Islamic Party out of office

10. Babil
Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists
1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List
2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Head of Council Kadum Majid Tuman – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Civil Society List
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Iraqi National List
National Reform Party
Election Results – 30 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
3. Civil Society List: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Independent Justice Association: 3 seats
8. Independent Ansar List: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

1. Baghdad
Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi – State of Law
Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law
Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 57 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 28 seats
2. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
5. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 4 seats
6. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 3 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
8. Mandeans: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

6. Basra
Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Nizar al-Jabiri – State of Law
Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Election Results – 35 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 20 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
7. Fadhila Party: 1 seat
8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners

7. Dhi Qar
Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law- Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan – ?
Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – National Reform Trend – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
National Reform Trend
Election Results – 31 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
3. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats
4. National Reform Trend: Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

3. Diyala
Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition – SIIC
Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Kurdish Alliance
Diyala Coalition
Election Results – 29 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 9 seats
2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats
2. Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK: 6 seats
4. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2 seats
7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Notes: Puts together coalition partners from parliament that shut out State of Law

11. Karbala
Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawai – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists
Deputy Governor Youssef Majid al-Habboubi –Independent
Head of Council Hamid al-Musawi – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Hope of Rafidain
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi
Election Results – 27 seats
1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent: 1 seat
2. Hope of Rafidain – Parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna – Christians: 9 seats
2. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 9 seats
4. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 4 seats
4. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 4 seats
Notes: Habboubi won the most votes in the election, but because he ran independently and not part of a list, he only got 1 seat on the council. Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

5. Maysan
Governor Muhammed al-Sudani – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Hashim al-Shawki – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 27 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8 seats
3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats
4. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Notes: State of Law could’ve formed another anti-SIIC coalition here but instead decided to join with them

8. Muthanna
Governor Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC
Head of Council Abd al-Latyif Abbas al-Hasani – Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Local lists
Election Results – 26 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 5 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. The People’s List: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2 seats
4. Independent National List: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2 seats
4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2 seats
Notes: Muthanna’s council was split between the State of Law and the SIIC, but Dawa member Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali switched sides at the last minute to give the Al-Mihrab Marty List the majority. Al-Mayali became governor as a result, and State of Law walked out on the council

12. Najaf
Governor Adnan al-Zurfi – Independent – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Fayad al-Shamari – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Locals
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 7 seats
1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 6 seats
4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4 seats
5. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 2 seats
5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2 seats
Notes: State of Law dropped possible coalitions with the Sadrists and SIIC and joined with local lists to take this council. The Supreme Council and Sadrists sued in response

14. Ninewa
Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al-Hadbaa List
2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent – Al-Hadbaa List
Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List
Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List
Ruling Coalition
Al-Hadbaa List
Iraqi Islamic Party
Election Results – 37 seats
1. Al-Hadbaa List: 19 seats
2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – PUK-KDP: 12 seats
3. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 3 seats
4. Shabaks: 1 seat – through quota
4. Christians: 1 seat – through quota
4. Yazidis: 1 seat – through quota
Notes: Al-Hadbaa is a new Sunni party that emerged in the voting, running on Iraqi nationalism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. The Kurdish parties are boycotting the council as a result

9. Qadisiyah
Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki
Head of Council Jubeir al-Juburi – State of Law
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 11 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats
5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2 seats
5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law

2. Salahaddin
Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi
Head of Council ? – Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi
Ruling Coalition
Iraqi Accordance Front
Iraqi National List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 5 seats
1. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats
3. Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 3 seats
3. National Project of Iraq: 3 seats
5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2 seats
5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: 2 seats
5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2 seats
5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2 seats
5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2 seats
5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats
Notes: Province went to Sunnis after the Kurds ran it before because of the 2005 boycott, and shut out State of Law

4. Wasit
Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent
Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC
Ruling Coalition
State of Law
Al-Mihrab Martyr List
Election Results – 28 seats
1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats
2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6 seats
3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats
3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
3. Iraqi Constitutional Party – Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani
Notes: Another province where State of Law gave up an anti-SIIC coalition to work with them

2009 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin (tied)
Iraqi National List (Allawi) – Salahaddin (tied)
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List - Ninewa
Youssef Majid al-Habboubi - Karbala

2009 Governors By Parties – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Muthanna
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil
Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2009 Heads of Councils By Parties – Provinces
State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit
Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil, Karbala
Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK) – Diyala
National Reform Trend (Jaafari) – Dhi Qar
Iraqi National List (Allaqi) – Salahaddin
Iraqi National Project (Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq) – Anbar
Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa

2005 1st Place Finishes – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar (tied), Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Ninewa, Salahaddin
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council & Dawa – Diyala
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Sulaymaniya
Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit
Fadhila Party – Dhi Qar (tied)
Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) – Anbar

2005 Governors By Parties – Provinces
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah
Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish President Barzani) – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (President Talabani) – Sulaymaniya
Kurdish Alliance (Barzani and Talabani) – Salahaddin
Independent (Backed by Kurdish Alliance) – Ninewa
Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit
Iraqi Islamic Party (Vice President Hashemi) – Anbar
Fadhila Party – Basra

2005 Provincial Election Results

Anbar – 41 seats
Governor Mamoun Sami Rashi al-Awani – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi
Iraqi Islamic Party: 29 seats
Independent Iraqi Group: 8 seats
Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 4 seats

Babil – 41 seats
Governor Salim al-Mesalmaoui – SIIC
Faithful Iraqis Association – SIIC: 25 seats
Al-Rasul Association: 6 seats
Imam Ali Society: 6 seats
Security & Reconstruction: 2 seats
Babil Independent Association: 2 seats

Baghdad – 51 seats
Governor Hussein al-Tahan – SIIC
Baghdad Nation – SIIC: 28 seats
Baghdad Peace – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
National Democratic Alliance: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
National Independent Cadres and Elites – Sadrists: 1 seat
Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 1 seat

Basra – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad al-Waili – Fadhila Party
Islamic Basra – SIIC: 20 seats
Fadhila Party: 12 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 4 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi Independent List: 2 seats

Dhi Qar – 41 seats
Governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 11 seats
Fadhila Party: 11 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 10 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats
Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 2 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Iraqi Independent Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 1 seat

Diyala – 41 seats
Governor Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi – SIIC
Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala – SIIC & Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 20 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 14 seats
Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate – KDP-PUK: 7 seats

Dohuk – 41 seats
Governor Tamar Ramadan – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Kurdistan Democratic Party: 33 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 4 seats

Irbil – 41 seats
Governor Ali Nikzad – Kurdistan Democratic Party
Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List – KDP: 23 seats
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 16 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1 seat
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 1 seat

Karbala – 41 seats
Governor Uqeil al-Khazaali – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 21 seats
Fadhila Party: 5 seats
Shiite Political Council: 2 seats
Democratic Progressive Gathering: 2 seats
Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 2 seats
Iraqi Democratic Current: 2 seats
Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats
Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 2 seats
Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 1 seat

Maysan – 41 seats
Governor Adil Mahwadar Radi – Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists
Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists: 15 seats
Islamic Unified Front – SIIC: 6 seats
Dawa – Iraq Organization: 5 seats
Fadhila Party: 4 seats
Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 3 seats
Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 2 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 2 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat
Maysan Democratic Coalition: 1 seat
Shiite Political Council: 1 seat
Independent National Islamic Congregation: 1 seat

Muthanna – 41 seats
Governor Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Ahmad Marzouq Salal – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 8 seats
Fadhila Party: 6 seats
Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 6 seats
Islamic Independent Society: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats
Gathering for al-Muthanna: 4 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats

Najaf – 41 seats
Governor Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie – SIIC
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 19 seats
Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 9 seats
Banner of the Independents: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 2 seats
Allegiance Coalition: 2 seats
Iraq Future Gathering: 2 seats

Ninewa – 41 seats
Governor Usama Yousif Kashmula – Independent – Killed July 2004
Governor Duraid Kashmoula – Independent
Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan – KDP-PUK: 31 seats
Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 5 seats
Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats
Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 2 seats

Qadisiyah – 41 seats
Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza – SIIC – Killed August 2007
Governor Hamid al-Khodari – SIIC
Martyr Of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim – SIIC: 20 seats
Shiite Political Council: 5 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Fadhila Party: 3 seats
Independent Brotherhood – Sadrists: 3 seats
Dawa – Islamic Organization: 2 seats
Loyalty to Iraq Coalition – Sadrists: 2 seats

Salahaddin – 41 seats
Governor Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi – List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK
List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK: 8 seats
Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 6 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 5 seats
Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 5 seats
Unified List: 4 seats
Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats
Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats
National Iraqi Gathering: 3 seats
National al-Resalyoon List – pro-Sadrist: 2 seats
Gathering of Independents in Salahaddin: 2 seats

Sulaymaniya – 41 seats
Governor Dana Ahmed Majid – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 28 seats
Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats
Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 5 seats
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 3 seats

Tamim – 41 seats
Governor Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah – Kurdistan Democratic Party
List of Kurdistan Brotherhood – KDP: 26 seats
Iraqi Turkmen Front: 8 seats
Iraqi Republican Group: 5 seats
Islamic Turkmen Coalition: 1 seat
National Iraq Union: 1 seat

Wasit – 41 seats
Governor Latif Hamid Turfa – Sadrists
Iraqi Elites Gathering – Sadrists: 31 seats
Shiite Political Council – SIIC-Dawa: 4 seats
Gathering of the Independent in Wasit: 3 seats
Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Democratic Iraq Gathering: 1 seat

SOURCES

Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09

Associated Press, “Iraqi provincial election results,” 2/19/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “4 blocs to contest the results of Diala council votes,” 4/12/09
- “Atheel Nejefi elected as Ninewa governor,” 4/12/09
- “Babel council elects independent engineer as governor,” 4/18/09
- “Baghdad’s second deputy governor elected,” 4/20/09
- “KA, IAF agree to share leading posts in Diala,” 2/24/09
- “Karbala governor assumes duty after republican decree issued,” 4/19/09
- “New Baghdad governor elected,” 4/12/09
- “New Diala governor elected,” 4/11/09
- “New governor picked for Anbar,” 4/11/09
- “New provincial council’s head, deputy selected in Thi-Qar,” 4/16/09
- “Presidential decrees to appoint governors of Thi-Qar, Babel,” 4/22/09
- “Wassit governor, provincial council chief elected,” 4/15/09
- “Zaydi unanimously elected to chair Baghdad provincial council,” 4/8/09

Barzanji, Yahya, “New candidate emerges among Iraq’s Kurds,” Associated Press, 5/2/09

Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Meyerson, Thomas, “Provincial Governments in Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/28/09

Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09

Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09

Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09

Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08
- “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09
- “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09
- “Mixed Outcome for Maliki as Muthanna and Najaf Elect New Governors,” Historiae.org, 5/1/09

Argument For Maliki Being Iraq’s Next Strongman

Reports that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may be becoming a strongman have become part and parcel of Iraq reporting today. In the Spring 2009 edition of World Policy Journal Los Angeles Times’ reporter Ned Parker laid out a good argument for this in an article entitled “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia.” Parker’s position is that Maliki has successfully used a divide and conquer and carrot and stick approach with various groups across the country that is a move towards authoritarian government. The Prime Minister has also promised security and stability for a population that has been traumatized by the invasion and civil war. This has them looking towards a leader, Maliki, rather than institutions or democracy to provide a normal life, allowing the Prime Minister to become an autocrat.

This change in Iraq began with the end of the sectarian war in 2007. The Shiites won, and the Sunnis were defeated. This was shown when the majority of the insurgency switched sides to the Americans to escape the pressure from the Surge, Iraqi forces, Shiite militias, and Al Qaeda in Iraq. With the threat of the insurgency largely contained, Maliki was freed to move against his former supporter Moqtada al-Sadr. In 2008 Maliki sent the Iraqi army and police to crush the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan. By mid-2008 the government was now free of two of its largest threats. In turn, this changed Maliki’s image from a weak and feckless leader to a nationalist one willing to impose order from the chaos that was engulfing Iraq.

Parker provides three examples of how Maliki has used his newfound power and position since then. First, the Prime Minister built up his own independent base by forming Tribal Support Councils across southern Iraq. These became a huge patronage system for Maliki, which helped his State of Law list win a majority in Basra, and pluralities in the rest of the south in the 2009 provincial elections. In Diyala, the Prime Minister used force to try to break the alliance between the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Sons of Iraq. In July 2008 and May 2009, he used the security forces to arrest and intimidate Sunni leaders, while trying to peel others away to join his Tribal Support Councils. Finally, in the Saydiya district of Baghdad, Maliki convinced the local Sunnis there that he was the center of power. At first, they felt intimidated into electing a Shiite from the SIIC’s Badr Brigade to head the local council, but later when that same official was arrested, the Sunnis took it to be a sign that Maliki had turned against the Shiite militia, and that he was becoming a fair and just ruler. All of these moves are examples of the carrot and stick, divide and conquer strategy Maliki has employed since 2008. He has wooed both Sunnis and Shiites to his side, while threatening others with the security forces and the threat of arrests. It shows that the new status quo in Iraq is not based upon the rule of law or institutions, but rather the relationship between individuals and groups to the Prime Minister. He is now the center of Iraqi politics, able to wield his power to give some jobs and position, or to send others to jail.

Parker believes that the new Iraq that has emerged from the sectarian war is actually a return to its autocratic tradition. After the bloody years of the past, the most important thing to Iraqis is stability so that they can return to their normal lives. This is what Maliki has offered them. He has crushed or wooed his opponents including the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq, while offering protection, jobs and patronage to those that side with him such as Iraq’s tribes. It’s one man, Maliki that the people now look to. He represents the Iraqi state, much as Saddam or other past Iraqi leaders did. This is what makes “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia” one of the better arguments for the strongman theory that is becoming popular in analyses of Iraq. It is still up to debate however, whether Maliki is really moving in this direction. Many of the powers he is assuming are those that the government should have, but that it was not able to exert since it was so weak after the U.S. invasion. A regular government for example, should have a monopoly on force, so Baghdad should’ve cracked down on the Shiite militias. At the same time, Maliki has built up organizations like the Tribal Support Councils, which are outside the authority of the government, and used the security forces to take care of his opponents. Iraq seems to have gone from one extreme where the state had no real authority to where Maliki is using it everywhere for his own ends. Now however, the new speaker of the parliament is trying to strengthen the legislature to provide a check on Maliki’s power. This will be the real test as to whether the Prime Minister can become an autocrat. If he can shape the parliament after the 2010 elections then there will be no others in the country that can limit him.

SOURCES

Nordland, Rod and Santora, Marc, “Iraq Leader Omits a Bit in Lauding U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 6/11/09

Parker, Ned, “Machiavelli in Mesopotamia,” World Policy Journal, Spring 2009
- “U.S. prepares to withdraw, Iraqi resistance prepares for battle,” Los Angeles Times, 5/25/09

Rosen, Nir, “The big sleep,” The National, 4/24/09

Russo, Claire, “Countdown To Diyala’s Provincial Election: Maliki & The IIP,” Institute for the Study of War, 1/30/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Shadid, Anthony, “In Iraq, a Different Struggle for Power,” Washington Post, 6/25/09

Wiseman, Paul, “U.S.-supported Iraqi militias clash with government,” USA Today, 5/27/09

>Open Season On Out-Going Provincial Officials

>In January 2009 Iraq conducted its second provincial elections since the U.S. invasion. All of the new provincial councils and governors have been named. As national leaders in Baghdad have been caught up in an anti-corruption fury, so too have these new local politicians. Several have gone after their outgoing peers, but for much different reasons than their counterparts in the capital.

In early June 2009 the new Diyala council issued arrest warrants for the two former deputy governors Razzaq al-Khalisi and Aouf Rahoumi. Both were accused of stealing money. Rahoumi, who belonged to the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Germany as soon as he found out about the charges. Khalisi, an independent Shiites, escaped to Kurdistan. The Public Integrity Committee, the main anti-corruption agency in Iraq, believes that the two were involved in stealing up to $130 million from the province. In April the former head of the Diyala council Ibrahim Hassan Bajilan of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan also had a warrant put out for him. He is allegedly involved with embezzling up to $128 million. The former provincial council was ruled by the Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala, an alliance of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and the Dawa Party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala, made up of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

At the same time Salahaddin went after its health director, while the former head of the Karbala council was arrested. On June 8, Salahaddin fired the provincial director of the health department Hassan Zein al-Abedeen Naqi. He was accused of signing fake contracts, making illegal deals over medicine purchases, and housing relatives in Health Ministry buildings. The council said that his case was being sent to the Integrity Committee. On June 1, police arrested the outgoing head of the Karbala provincial council Abdulaal al-Yasseri for corruption as well. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council controlled the governorate after the 2005 elections.

Baghdad is currently embroiled in corruption investigations as well. In May 2009 the Trade Minister Abdulfalah al-Sudani was forced to resign, and later arrested. Sudani and his two brothers were accused of misappropriating money meant for the country’s food ration system, the largest in the world. Parliament, and its new speaker Ayad al-Samarraie of the Iraqi Islamic Party forced Sudani’s resignation. Samarraie is intent on increasing the power of the legislature to provide a check on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s power. Sudani was a member of Maliki’s Dawa Party and reportedly close to the Prime Minister. In response, Maliki has promised a crackdown on corruption as well. It’s likely that he will use this against his opponents in retaliation for Sudani’s arrest.

National and local leaders appear to have different intentions when it comes to corruption. The leaders of the main political parties in Baghdad seem most concerned about obtaining power at each other’s expense. The main struggle now appears to be between Maliki and the Iraqi Islamic Party, which has become the Prime Minister’s main critic. At the provincial level, many politicians are more concerned about getting their governments working. In Diyala for example, the three major parties that ruled the province after 2005 still rule it today. That didn’t stop them from going after some of their own. Politics are so divided in Iraq that it’s likely this difference will continue for quite some time.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Former Iraqi officials accused of corruption flee to Germany via Kurdistan,” 6/10/09

Alsumaria, “Diyala former governor deputies to be held,” 6/10/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Ex-trade minister appears before Samawa court on corruption charges,” 6/1/09
- “Former deputy governor escapes to Germany following corruption charges,” 6/8/09
- “Karbala provincial council ex-chairman arrested,” 6/1/09
- “Salah el-Din council sacks health official over financial corruption,” 6/8/09

Bakri, Nada, “Iraqi Leader Sees Fraud as a Top Worry,” Washington Post, 5/10/09

Chon, Gina, “Graft Case Against Ex-Minister Splits Iraq Parties,” Wall Street Journal, 6/1/09

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Sly, Liz, “Ex-trade minister arrested after attempting to flee Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 5/31/09

>Intentions Of Iraq’s Displaced

>

On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq’s internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq’s displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.

The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.

Date of Displacement

Province

Before 2006

2006

2007

2008

Iraq

4.5%

67.8%

25.6%

2.0%

Anbar

0.5%

87.2%

9.9%

1.9%

Babil

7.4%

85.0%

7.3%

0.3%

Baghdad

1.4%

75.4%

22.5%

0.7%

Basra

1.1%

70.9%

27.9%

0.0%

Diyala

1.9%

54.1%

42.7%

1.1%

Dohuk

5.5%

53.5%

35.4%

5.7%

Dhi Qar

2.1%

90.6%

6.7%

0.1%

Irbil

9.3%

49.0%

39.8%

1.3%

Karbala

0%

85.2%

14.5%

0.0%

Maysan

1.0%

94.8%

4.0%

0.1%

Muthanna

19.5%

46.3%

33.8%

0.1%

Najaf

23.0%

63.1%

13.9%

0%

Ninewa

1.0%

67.5%

23.7%

7.7%

Qadisiyah

1.6%

92.9%

5.6%

0%

Salahaddin

18.2%

56.0%

25.6%

0.1%

Sulaymaniya

4.5%

41.7%

50.1%

3.2%

Tamim

8.6%

22.9%

49.3%

19.2%

Wasit

1.3%

50.5%

48.1%

0.1%

63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.

Origins of Displacement By Province

Baghdad

63.2%

Diyala

18.7%

Ninewa

6.0%

Salahaddin

3.3%

Tamim

3.0%

Anbar

2.6%

Basra

1.6%

Babil

1.0%

Irbil

0.2%

Wasit

0.2%

Dhi Qar

0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced

Shiite Arab

56.8%

Sunni Arab

30.8%

Sunni Kurd

4.1%

Assyrian Christian

2.9%

Chaldean Christian

1.8%

Shiite Turkmen

1.2%

Sunni Turkmen

0.9%

Shiite Kurd

0.6%

Armenian Christian

0.1%

Arab Yazidi

0.1%

Kurd Yazidi

0.1%

Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq’s internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk’s displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites

Babil

94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad

Baghdad

72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad

Basra

99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin

Dhi Qar

99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin

Karbala

98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala

Maysan

99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad

Muthanna

99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala

Najaf

97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad

Qadisiyah

99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad

Wasit

98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis

Anbar

98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad

Irbil

39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa

Salahaddin

96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala

Sulaymaniya

60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala

Tamim

53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations

Diyala

57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad

Dohuk

39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa

Ninewa

40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa

The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq’s displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn’t know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.

Intentions Of The Displaced

Province

Integrate into Location of Displacement

Settle in New Location

Return to Place of Origin

Waiting to Make Decision

Iraq

21.4%

19.1%

58.0%

1.4%

Anbar

2.3%

13.8%

81.3%

2.0%

Babil

26.2%

28.6%

44.5%

0.6%

Baghdad

8.2%

11.3%

79.1%

1.2%

Basra

82.9%

11.1%

5.5%

0.3%

Dhi Qar

57.6%

11.3%

30.7%

0.2%

Diyala

7.3%

10.9%

81.7%

0.0%

Dohuk

57.0%

23.1%

19.7%

0.2%

Irbil

18.3%

13.5%

67.4%

0.1%

Karbala

26.3%

26.6%

46.4%

0.6%

Maysan

28.1%

28.0%

40.7%

3.1%

Muthanna

34.8%

18.1%

45.1%

1.9%

Najaf

4.5%

0.1%

94.1%

1.0%

Ninewa

7.0%

33.0%

59.2%

0.7%

Qadisiyah

40.9%

35.3%

23.7%

0.1%

Salahaddin

12.5%

39.0%

43.5%

4.7%

Sulaymaniya

27.1%

8.3%

64.4%

0.2%

Tamim

22.2%

3.5%

71.3%

3.0%

Wasit

54.4%

37.8%

5.8%

2.0%

While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations’ latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq’s displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq’s refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report,” 6/1/09

- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009,” UNHCR, March 2009