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>Latest United Nations Numbers on Returns To Iraq

>In April 2009 the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) released its latest statistics on displaced and refugee returns to Iraq. Currently Iraq has one of the largest refugee problems in the world. The common figure quoted is that 4.8 million Iraqis have lost their homes. Around two million are believed to have left the country, while the rest are internally displaced. The UNHCR counts fewer with 2 million refugees and 1.6 million displaced. From the U.S. invasion to March 2009 the U.N. estimates that just over 1 million Iraqis have returned. This includes displaced from both before and after 2003. The UNHCR report shows that this process has happened in fits and spurts.

The process of returning began just after the invasion ended. In 2003 9,237 refugee families, or 55,429 people, came back to the country. In 2004 internally displaced families began returning, and twice as many refugees. From 2005 to the present however the number of refugees coming back has seen a sharp decline that is only just starting to come back up this year. Returning refugees went from 193,997 in 2004 to 56,155 in 2005 to 20,235 in 2006, a slight increase to 45,420 in 2007, and then down to 25,370 in 2008, and 8,790 through the first three months of 2009. The same pattern happened with the displaced going from 150,000 in 2006, down to 36,000 in 2007, and then back up to 195,890 in 2008. So far 22,940 have come back from January to March 2009 according to the U.N. The numbers show two divergent trends. For the displaced, returns went up from 2004 to 2006, but then took a dramatic drop in 2007 probably because of the sectarian war where thousands were losing their homes. In 2008 a record number came back as the security situation improved. In 2009 each month saw more displaced come back as well. Refugees however saw the largest number coming back in 2004 and then going down until 2007. Perhaps they were testing the waters after the Surge improved security, but then their numbers went back down in 2008. Like the displaced however, each month in 2009 has seen an increase in returns. A possible explanation is that living in another country gives them relative safety, which they are not willing to give up right now to return to a country that still sees violence. Another reason could be that most of the Iraqis living abroad are Sunnis, and don’t feel comfortable yet returning to a country that is run by Shiites and Kurds, and where their neighborhoods may have been taken over by another sect.

Estimated Returns of Displaced Iraqis
2003 0
2004 98,000
2005 98,000
2006 150,000
2007 36,000
2008 195,890
Jan. to March 2009 22,940
TOTAL: 600,830, 60% of all returns

Estimated Returns of Iraqi Refugees
2003 55,429
2004 193,997
2005 56,155
2006 20,235
2007 45,420
2008 25,370
Jan. to March 2009 8,790
TOTAL: 405,396, 40% of all returns

Total Returns
2003 55,429
2004 291,997
2005 154,155
2006 170,235
2007 81,420
2008 221,260
Jan. to March 2009 31,730
TOTAL: 1,006,226

Total Returns From October 2008 to March 2009
Oct. 08 14,840
Nov. 08 11,260
Dec. 08 11,910
Jan. 09 4,600
Feb. 09 10,170
March 09 16,960

Total Returns of Refugees October 2008 to March 2009
Oct. 08 2,540
Nov. 08 3,640
Dec. 08 2,090
Jan. 09 1,010
Feb. 09 2,630
March 09 5,150

Total Returns of Displaced October 2008 to March 2009
Oct. 08 12,300
Nov. 08 7,620
Dec. 08 9,820
Jan. 09 3,590
Feb. 09 7,540
March 09 11,810

At the provincial level the U.N.’s figures show that Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa have had the most returns, while Kurdistan and half of the south have had the least. Baghdad remains the center of violence in the country. For that reason it has seen both the most displaced and the greatest number of those coming back. In 2008 118,330 Iraqis went back to that province, 53% of the total. Next was Diyala with 67,150 returns, 30% of the total, and Ninewa with 15,960 coming back, or 7% of the total. That compared to Qadisiyah with 30 people, Muthann with 50, Dhi Qar with 100, and Sulaymaniya with 180. In 2009 70% of returns have gone to Baghdad, followed by Ninewa 8%, and Diyala 5%. For refugees, Tamim, Najaf and Baghdad were the three main destinations in 2008 in that ascending order. The next year that slightly changed to Babil, Najaf and Baghdad. For the first three months of this year, there have also been three provinces, Anbar, Ninewa, and Sulaymaniya that have seen absolutely no refugees coming back. Displaced returnees were concentrated in Ninewa, Diyala, and Baghdad, and similarly few went back to the south or far north.

Total Returns By Province 2008
Qadisiyah 30
Muthanna 50
Dhi Qar 100
Sulaymaniya 180
Salahaddin 690
Irbil 700
Karbala 910
Dohuk 990
Wasit 1,410
Maysan 1,710
Babil 2,010
Najaf 2,170
Anbar 2,540
Basra 2,920
Tamim 3,410
Ninewa 15,960
Diyala 67,150
Baghdad 21,710

Total Returns By Province 2009
Sulaymaniya 0
Anbar 40
Dohuk 40
Salahaddin 90
Irbil 90
Muthanna 130
Maysan 180
Dhi Qar 230
Qadisiyah 340
Karbala 410
Tamim 410
Babil 860
Wasit 880
Basra 920
Najaf 1,000
Diyala 1,470
Ninewa 2,420
Baghdad 22,220

Refugee Returns 2008 By Province
Qadisiyah 10
Muthanna 50
Ninewa 50
Sulamaniya 80
Dhi Qar 80
Salahaddin 400
Maysan 620
Wasit 630
Babil 650
Irbil 700
Karbala 910
Dohuk 960
Anbar 1,150
Basra 1,180
Diyala 1,290
Tamim 2,060
Najaf 2,090
Baghdad 12,460

Refugee Returns 2009 By Province
Anbar 0
Ninewa 0
Sulaymaniyah 0
Dohuk 40
Salahaddin 40
Irbil 70
Diyala 120
Muthanna 130
Maysan 150
Dhi Qar 220
Wasit 230
Qadisiyah 340
Karbala 410
Basra 450
Babil 520
Najaf 1,000
Baghdad 4,670

Displaced Returns 2008 By Province
Irbil 0
Karbala 0
Muthanna 0
Qadisiyah 20
Dhi Qar 20
Dohuk 30
Najaf 80
Sulaymaniya 100
Salahaddin 290
Wasit 780
Maysan 1,090
Tamim 1,350
Babil 1,360
Anbar 1,390
Basra 1,740
Ninewa 15,910
Diyala 65,860
Baghdad 105,870

Displaced Returns 2009 By Province
Dohuk 0
Qadisiyah 0
Karbala 0
Muthanna 0
Najaf 0
Sulaymaniya 0
Tamim 10
Dhi Qar 10
Irbil 20
Maysan 30
Anbar 40
Salahaddin 50
Babil 340
Basra 470
Wasit 650
Diyala 1,350
Ninewa 2,420
Baghdad 17,550

Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting in Iraq since 2003, so it has seen the most displacement and returns. The numbers coming back have gone up and down like the rest of the country. From October 2008 to January 2009 the numbers followed a downward trend, but then hit a high in March. Around 50% of the returnees have gone back to the Western district of Karkh along the Tigris River. That use to be a largely mixed Sunni-Shiite area of the capital.

Total Returns To Baghdad October 2008 to March 2009
Oct. 08 6,940
Nov. 08 4,970
Dec. 08 3,830
Jan. 09 2,000
Feb. 09 7,550
March 09 12,670
2008 48% went to Karkh, 36% went to unknown, 8% went to Resafa
2009 57% went to Karkh, 14% went to Khadimiya, 9% went to unknown

The UNHCR is one of the most comprehensive reports on returns to Iraq. Other organizations such as the International Organization for Migration concentrate on the displaced since the U.S. invasion, and specifically those that left after the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. Other groups like Refugees International, in their latest papers have just written about those coming back in the last 1-2 years. The U.N. provides a much more comprehensive view of the situation, showing that not only have Iraqis been coming back since the U.S. invasion, but that there were displaced before and after the war. It’s often overlooked that Saddam created large displacements especially in the south amongst Shiites and in the north with Kurds. Many of those returned in the immediate months after the invasion. The sectarian war then set off another wave of mass evacuations that have created much of the current crisis. The UNHCR also shows that these returns have gone up and down, and that refugees and internally displaced have followed different patterns. While the process appears to be increasing in recent months, the government and international organizations still lack the resources and in Baghdad’s case, the will, do deal with them.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “Iraqi Refugee Assistance Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan,” April 2009

United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009,” UNHCR, March 2009

>Refugees International Report On Iraq’s Refugees and Displaced

>In early April 2009, Refugees International released its latest position paper on Iraq’s refugees and internally displaced entitled, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return.” There are still several million Iraqis that have lost their homes. Many do not want to go back yet because they have concerns about security, and the lack of services provided by the government. Most will have to return at some point so the government, the U.S., and the U.N. need to work together to ensure that they can, and will want to come back. That means Baghdad needs to improve health care, education, and jobs. The U.S., U.N., and international community also need to step up their assistance and funding for humanitarian programs to help out this population. Overall, Refugees International does not believe that the time is right for Iraqis to return since there is little aid to accommodate them, and that Baghdad is doing a disservice by asking them to come back.

Since late 2007, Baghdad has been encouraging refugees to return. This came in two waves. First, in November 2007 the government set up special buses from Syria for Iraqis to come back, and offered each family $800 if they did. Then in the summer of 2008 Iraq began offering plane rides to refugees in Egypt. Baghdad didn’t consider the conditions in Iraq when they began asking Iraqis to come back. It even went as far as to ask Syria to close its borders to Iraqis in late 2007. Instead, Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki’s government felt that large numbers of returns would make Baghdad look better and increase international and domestic support. Refugees International believes that this policy was a political move meant to improve the image of the government, rather than actually help people.

In fact, Baghdad has shown little sympathy for Iraq’s refugees. Syria and Jordan claim that they are home to almost 2 million Iraqis, but Baghdad says there are only 400,000 there. A U.N. diplomat told Refugees International that Maliki thinks the refugees are traitors, filled with Baathists, who don’t want to help Iraq. Refugee International believes that this bias is largely due to the fact that most of the refugees are Sunnis.

The government has also been offering cash rewards to internally displaced families that return. Refugees International found fault with this program as well. First the payment was only offered to those that lost their homes between January 2006 and December 2007. That favors Shiites who were mostly displaced during the sectarian war. According to the International Organization for Migration’s April 2009 report, 56.8% of Iraq’s displaced are Shiites, compared to 30.8% who are Sunnis. Refugees International ignores the fact that more than 50% of Iraq’s displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra, which set off the civil war.

Refugees International also talked with Iraqi officials who say they want the whole issue of refugees and the displaced to be over with by the end of 2009. The government officers claimed that there are no more reasons for Iraqis to be displaced. The February 2009 U.N. Humanitarian Report even said that some officials claimed that most of the displaced had gone home. Because of this, the government has stopped registering internal refugees, which is a prerequisite to receive assistance. Refugees International believes that the combination of encouraging refugees and the displaced to come back without providing adequate support for them will only lead to more problems. In fact, the government is making things worse because they are more concerned about making themselves look better than actually dealing with the causes and consequences of the country’s refugee crisis.

The fact that the majority of Iraq’s displaced have not gone back puts the lie to the officials’ claims. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), only around 50,000 families, approximately 250,000 individuals, have gone back. Most are internal refugees. Only 8% have been refugees from other countries. According to IOM surveys, 61% of Iraq’s displaced want to return, but don’t think they can yet. 39% said they want to stay where they are or be resettled somewhere else. Refugees International is concerned that if these families don’t return, it will solidify the ethnic cleansing that occurred from 2006-2007.

Baghdad needs to improve services, aid, and rule of law before there is a safe and stable environment for Iraq’s refugees and displaced to come back according to Refugees International. The improved security situation has not led to better services. The government needs to provide health care, education, and jobs, as well as offer more aid to those that are coming back. Right now Baghdad doesn’t have this capacity, nor any laws or regulations to deal with property disputes, which could take years to resolve. There is still the issue of sectarian biases within the administration. The government has set up assistance centers in the capital, and Maliki has ordered the security forces to deal with squatters, but the amount of money offered isn’t large enough, and the expulsion of squatters has just added more displaced. Iraq’s budget problems probably mean that these aid programs are in jeopardy. There are also stories of returnees being attacked and intimidated, and many have not been able to go back to their original homes. Refugees International warns that the potential for renewed violence still exists.

Refugees International has four recommendations on how to move forward on Iraq’s refugee crisis. First the U.N. should provide more aid to Iraq to help the displaced and its causes. The U.N. has had a limited presence in Iraq since its compound was bombed in 2003. Refugees International believes that improved security should allow the U.N. to create offices in each of Iraq’s eighteen provinces. Right now few displaced in Iraq receive any aid from the government or non-governmental organizations. Second, the U.S. should pay for 50% of the U.N.’s programs. Third, the government, with the assistance of the U.S. and U.N., needs to improve services and provide jobs. That is something that may prove impossible however as American and international reconstruction aid is coming to an end. Iraq has already received $125 billion, and services are still largely below pre-invasion levels. Fourth the U.S. should work with countries where Iraqi refugees are residing. That includes providing money, and helping those Iraqis that don’t wish to return.

This report by Refugee International is an important advocacy paper for Iraq’s refugees. They provide a good overview of some of the problems facing the country’s displaced, and why it’s still not the right time for them to return. The major issue now is that international assistance to Iraq is winding down, and Baghdad is facing a budget crisis so there is little hope that more money will be spent on Iraq’s refugees. That will probably mean that Iraq’s displaced will have to exist off of the meager help provided by non-government organizations and the U.N., and act on their own. Ironically, that may mean that Baghdad’s wish to put the refugee crisis behind them may come true as no new effort on their behalf can be expected in the immediate future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

Kaplow, Larry, Nordland, Rod, and Spring, Silvia, “There’s No Place Like … Iraq?” Newsweek, 11/24/07

Refugees International, “Iraq: Preventing the Point of No Return,” 4/9/09

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

>January 2009 U.N. Report On Iraq Refugee Returns

>In January 2009 the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees released a report detailing the latest numbers it had on Iraq’s displacement and refugee crisis. There are still Iraqis losing their homes, but at a much lower rate. The big issue now is the plight of those that have left, and those that are returning.

There are approximately 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis and 2 million that have fled to other countries. There were 1.2 million internal refugees in the country before 2006. After the bombing of the Shiite Samarra shrine in February 2006 that started the sectarian war, 1.6 million more were forced into internal exile. Only 1% of that number was displaced in 2008 however, showing the improved security situation. Most of those displaced after Samarra came from Baghdad, 64%, and Diyala, 19%. Central Iraq accounted for 58% of displacement, compared to 15% for the north and 27% for the south, whereas those two regions had the most internal refugees before the U.S. invasion due to Saddam’s policies.

Region

2003

2003-2005

Post Feb. 2006

Totals

North

633,714

798

237,766

872,278

Center

44,394

129,966

938,566

1,112,926

South

343,854

59,382

454,051

857,287

Grand Total

1,021,962

190,146

1,630,383

2,842,491

Displacement within and out of Iraq followed certain patterns. Sunnis moved from the Shiite south to central and western provinces, while Shiites left Sunnis areas in central and western Iraq for the south. Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds, and Christians have all tried to enter Kurdistan because it offered more stability and less violence. There are also trends in Iraq’s refugees. 55% of those registered by the United Nations are Sunnis. Another 18-20% are minority groups such as Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Turkmen, and Shabaks, even though they only make up 3-4% of Iraq’s population.

Iraq’s internal refugees face a number of problems. They lack access to food, shelter, water, sanitation, health, and jobs. The International Organization for Migration has conducted detailed surveys of these needs. Women that have lost their homes have been hit especially hard. Even with the lessoning of violence, many families have not been able to go back to their homes. The government is also threatening Iraqis that are squatting with evictions. The UNHCR believes that there are up to 250,000 Iraqis living illegally in public buildings.

The biggest change in Iraq’s refugee crisis is that some have begun to return. This began in the summer of 2007 when it was reported that Iraqi refugees from Syria were coming back. So far only a small percentage of the 4.8 million have made this decision, but the rate is increasing. The government has been encouraging this process, and passed Executive Orders 101 and 262 in 2008 that offered money to return. This process may now be ending however as the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has stopped registering Iraqis that have gone back, which was necessary to receive any payments.

The number of displaced coming back has changed month to month. In 2008, August and September saw the highest rates with around 39,950 and 42,610 returns respectively, but that then dropped off to 11,260 in November and 11,910 in December. Almost eight times as many internally displaced have come back compared to refugees. For all of 2008 195,240 displaced returned, compared to 25,370 refugees, for a total of 220,610. Baghdad and Diyala, which saw the most displacement, has seen the most returnees.

U.N.’s Refugee/Displaced Return Estimates 2008

Month

Internally Displaced

Refugees

Total

Jan.-June

66,340

9,000

75,340

July

22,390

2,310

24,700

August

38,380

1,570

39,950

September

38,390

4,220

42,610

October

12,300

2,540

14,840

November

7,620

3,640

11,260

December

9,820

2,090

11,910

2008 TOTALS

195,240

25,370

220,610

Iraq is also home to 39,811 refugees from other countries. There are 12,567 Palestinians living in Baghdad and the Al Waleed Refugee Camp, 15,755 Kurds displaced from neighboring countries, 10,904 Iranians, many of which are in Kurdistan and do not want to go back, 580 Syrians that are afraid of being arrested if they return, and five Egyptians who are married to Palestinians. 2,405 have asked for asylum in Iraq, 1,022 Iranians, 1,001 Syrian Kurds, 380 Turkish Kurds, and two Ethiopians.

The bombing of the Samarra shrine in 2006 made a bad refugee problem turn into a crisis. Iraq already had several thousand Shiites and Kurds who were displaced due to Saddam’s policies even before the U.S. invaded. The war and subsequent sectarian fighting added another three million displaced. While over 200,000 have returned, that is still a small amount compared to the total. Those that have gone back face further problems as not all have access to their homes, or jobs and basic services, and some have become displaced again. The U.N. and other humanitarian groups have been overwhelmed by this predicament, and the government has appeared more concerned about its image than really helping these people. That means this humanitarian catastrophe is likely to continue for several more years.

SOURCES

Human Rights First, “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis,” December 2008

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq February 2009,” 2/28/09

UNHCR, “UNHCR Iraq Operation At A Glance – January 2009,”1/9/09

>February 2008 UNICEF Report on Iraq

>UNICEF recently released a report on Iraq. It not only focused upon the country’s children, but health, education, poverty, and the displaced. The organization said that with the reduction in violence there was greater access to Iraq’s communities. That was revealing more examples of poverty and deprivation than anyone knew about previously.

The biggest issue UNICEF reported on was a developing measles threat. It said that nine provinces had reported measles affecting 6,000 people since early 2008. The Iraqi Ministry of Health is worried that it could spread. Najaf, Sulamaniya, Irbil, Maysan, and Dohuk were endangered by this disease, while a more recent report from the United Nations’ IRIN news agency said that Salahaddin, Tamim, Anbar, Diyala, Baghdad, Babil and Dhi Qar were hit the hardest. Most victims were small children under the age of six. Government officials said that the main cause of the spread of measles was the lack of security, which kept health workers out of many areas.

The United Nations agency also went to a few schools in the northern provinces of Diyala, Irbil, and Dohuk. All of them were lacking basic services, especially access to clean water. In Dohuk the schools lacked bathrooms, while children in two villages in Irbil were suffering from water born diseases.

The displaced was another issue the report dealt with. In Tamim, 900 children were found begging on the streets of Kirkuk. 100 of them were orphans. Around half were internal refugees. All of them were trying to support their impoverished families. Internal refugees that were returning to the province lacked shelter, and access to water and sanitation. In Basra 250 squatters in an old navy had no sanitation, health care, or clean water. On the positive side 1,325 displaced families returned to the city of Mosul in Ninewa.

In 2008 Iraq suffered a sever drought. The worst hit areas were in the north. UNICEF traveled to Irbil and Ninewa and saw the drought’s lingering effects. In two areas of Irbil there was high poverty exacerbated by the lack of water that destroyed their farms, which were also their main source of food.

Examples of impoverishment were also found in Anbar. The outskirts of the province had deep poverty. Two areas by Ramadi that suffered because of the violence are now improving because the government has started programs for children. They still lack adequate health, sanitation and other basic services however.

The last part of the report detailed the various projects UNICEF was working on in Iraq. So far, the organization has committed $8 million for humanitarian projects in 59 communities. Those have mainly focused upon water, schools, and health campaigns. The major problem is that United Nations can hardly meet its obligations. UNICEF is short 89% of the money it needs for its various programs.

UNICEF is hoping that the provincial elections will lead to more responsible local governments that will address the needs of the country’s children. They are afraid about the spread of measles. The lack of services is also a large problem across the country. Iraq’s infrastructure has not been kept up because of the violence. Even as that has declined, there is still large-scale neglect. Finally poverty is another major issue. It has led to children begging, and kept them from going to school. More and more of these cases are being discovered as attacks have declined. The lack of money for both the United Nations and the Iraqi government after the fall in oil prices will probably mean these issues will not be solved any time soon however.

SOURCES

IRIN, “IRAQ: Measles emerges in violence-hit regions,” 2/24/09

UNICEF, “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update Iraq,” 2/17/09

>Iraq Revises Down Budget Once Again

>Iraq has again cut its planned 2009 budget. This is at least the third time it has been revised. Originally, the budget was set at $78.8 billion, the largest in the country’s history, and a 13% increase from the 2008 budget. Now it is estimated to be at $53.7 billion, a $25.1 billion reduction. The new budget is based upon a $50 a barrel price of oil. The original one was based upon $80 a barrel. Oil accounts for over 90% of Iraq’s revenue as there are few taxes or tariffs. Baghdad is hoping for a rebound in world crude prices, but the world economic slowdown could go into 2010 meaning continuing low prices, and a drag on Iraq’s revenues. In mid-January for example, a barrel dropped to $34 before going up to $44. This compares to the highest price of $147 during the summer of 2008.

There appears to be little relief in the near future. The government says they have $32 billion in the Central Bank from money not spent in previous budgets to cover some of the difference. Officials have been calling for a boost in oil exports to help alleviate the issue. The problem is Iraq has no flexibility in its petroleum production. Output has gone up and down. Despite government hopes to boost exports to 2 million barrels a day in 2009, the World Bank doubts that will happen because the infrastructure is so old and run down.

To deal with this crisis the Ministry of Finance says that the government will have to have massive budget cuts, and even then will still run a deficit. They will hold off on buying new cars, equipment, hiring, and benefits. There is also a push to cut wages, which were increased in 2008, but the Deputy Minister of Finance Dr. Fazil Nabi said they are trying to put that off. More importantly, Baghdad will cut its reconstruction budget 40% from $21 billion to $12.54 billion. This has already had concrete effects as the Ministry of Displacement and Migration announced in early January 2009 that they will postpone building housing projects and integrated living areas for Iraq’s displaced. There is also pressure to cut the nation’s food rations program by relegating it only to the poor. The Kurdistan Regional Government has also cut its budget 20%. The Planning Ministry announced a 50% cut for the provinces overall. Even with these reductions, Iraq might still run a $19 billion deficit.

These budget problems come at a time when U.S. development aid is coming to an end, and Iraq’s economy is full of trouble. In September 2008, the U.S. appropriated its last large reconstruction package for Iraq. After that money is spent Iraq will be largely responsible for its own development. As reported before, oil is the only thing keeping Iraq’s economy afloat. The rest of the country’s industries are suffering from cheap imports, little to no protection, a lack of credit and banks, fuel and electricity shortages, and security issues that have put many out of business, increased costs for the rest, and led to high unemployment and underemployment. It hasn’t helped that many of the large U.S. and Iraqi projects have not trickled down to the average Iraqi who still faces high rates of poverty as well. Government jobs and food rations are some of the few things that actually provide relief to people, and both of those are now under pressure due to the budget deficit. There is little that can be done but to ride out the storm as Iraq is more dependent upon oil than its Arab neighbors, and there’s little hope for a rebound in the rest of the economy in the short to mid-term.

SOURCES
Abbas, Mohammed and Ibrahim, Waleed, “Iraq fears budget crisis, urges oil export boost,” Reuters, 12/3/08
Aswat al-Iraq, “Austerity could save 20 trillion dinars for 2009 budget – expert,” 12/9/08
- “KRG cuts ministries’ operational costs by 20%,” 1/1/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
Chon, Gina, “As Crude Falls, Iraqi Leaders Scramble to Plan Budget,” Wall Street Journal, 10/22/08
IRIN, “IRAQ: Budget cuts threaten IDP housing projects,” 1/6/09
- “IRAQ: Iraqis want free food programme to continue, finds survey,” 1/4/09
Karouny, Mariam, “Iraq reviews 2009 budget due to falling oil price,” Reuters, 10/23/08
Mawloodi, Aiyob, “Iraqi government sharply cuts its expenditures,” Kurdish Globe, 1/22/09
Reid, Robert, “AP: Iraq forced to cut spending as oil price falls,” Associated Press, 1/22/09
Reuters, “Basra Oil Exports Nearly Double to 1.03m Bpd After Earlier Drop,” 12/30/08
- “Iraq earns $60 billion from 2008 crude exports,” 1/5/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

>United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Dec. 08 Report on Iraq

>The attacks on Christians in Mosul in October 2008 seemed to spur interest by a variety of different groups on Iraq’s minorities. As reported earlier, the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern released a study on the subject noting that all of Iraq’s small ethnic and religious groups were disenfranchised, displaced, and victims of attacks. They are also caught in the power struggle between Arabs and Kurds in the northern section of the country. At the same time, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom released a report on religious tensions overall in Iraq that largely focused upon minorities. Their findings were that while fighting between Shiites and Sunnis has largely subsided, violence against minorities such as Christians, Mandeans, and Yazidis is on going. All of Iraq’s smaller religious groups have been targeted, and the government has failed to protect them. Many have fled the country as a result, and they are not coming back. The Commission concluded by saying they are fearful for the future of Iraq’s minorities, and believes their continued existence is at risk.

The victimization of Iraq’s minorities begun under Saddam Hussein, but was greatly exasperated by the U.S. invasion. Saddam discriminated against Iraq’s smaller religious groups. His Arabization program of the south not only forced out Kurds, but Turkomen and Christians as well. After 2003 tensions increased. The 2005 Iraqi elections, while touted at the time as a step towards democracy and reconciliation, actually increased divisions, which turned into the sectarian war in 2006. Minorities proved to be the most vulnerable during this time. They continue to face attacks today, especially in the northern section of the country where they are concentrated in cities like Mosul and Ninewa province. Most minorities have fled Iraq except for the Ninewa Plains and Kurdistan.

The government has done little to help them. Services and reconstruction aid have not been distributed to them evenly. The Kurds have tried to exploit them, and also mistreated them. During the 2005 elections for example, Kurds worked to exclude minorities from voting through threats and denying them ballot boxes in their areas. The 2008 Provincial Election law originally dropped Article 50 that set up quotas for minorities. When this was later re-instated, the quotas were much lower than before. Minorities were supposed to have twelve seats, but ended up with six instead. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has tried to address the concerns of minorities by created a committee to deal with their issues, but it has been largely rejected as not being representative since the Prime Minister picked all of its members.

Christians

Iraq is home to a variety of Christian groups including Chaldeans, Assyrian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East, Syriac Orthodox, Armenians, Protestants, and Evangelicals. In 2003 there were approximately 1.4 million Christians in Iraq, today there is around 500,000-700,000. Their victimization since the U.S. invasion is shown by the fact that before 2003 they were 3% of Iraq’s population, but make 15-20% of the registered refugees in Jordan and Syria, and 35-64% of the refugees in Lebanon and Turkey.

The most recent attacks against Christians occurred in Mosul in October 2008. Fourteen Christians were killed in the city, which led 13,000 to flee. 400 families went to Syria. The United Nations believes that was half of the city’s Christian population. By early November some had come back to Mosul, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent extra police to help with security. However on November 11, two Christian sisters were killed in their home, keeping the fear level high and deterring most families from returning.

Violence against Christians was widespread before Mosul, beginning in 2004. Since that year 40 churches and Christian buildings have been destroyed. On January 8, 2008 six churches in Mosul and Baghdad were bombed in a single day. From January to June 2008, the U.N. reported 17 attacks and kidnappings, including the murders of ten Christians. Community leaders have been murdered, tortured, and kidnapped. In February 2008, the Chaldean Bishop of Mosul, Paulos Faraj Raho was kidnapped and later found dead. In April 2008 an Assyrian Orthodox priest was killed in Baghdad. Many churches have closed as a result. Shiite and Sunni extremists have also tried to impose Islamic codes on Christians. Businesses such as alcohol shops, beauty salons, movie theaters, and video stores owned by Christians have been attacked. Christians also suffered during the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad during the sectarian war. There use to be 2,000 Christian families living in the Dora section of Baghdad, but by the summer of 2007 there were only 300 left due to concerted efforts by Sunni insurgents. There have been small signs of change however as in 2007 and 2008 Christians were able to celebrate Christmas in the capital, and 45 families did return to Dora.

Mandeans

Sabean Mandeans are followers of John the Baptist. 90% have either fled the country of been killed. There are only 3,500-5,000 left in Iraq. Of the 28 religious leaders that were in the country during the Saddam era, only five are left. The community’s top religious leader fled to Syria after he was threatened. The Mandean Human Rights Group said that from April 2003 to March 2007 144 Mandeans were killed, 254 kidnapped, 238 threatened or attacked, 11 raped, and 35 forced to convert to Islam. From January 2007 to February 2008 42 were killed, 46 kidnapped, 10 threatened, and 21 attacked.

Mandeans are faced with the added difficulty of being pacifists, which means they can’t protect themselves. They are also afraid of extinction because one can only be born into the religion, and the displacement may make it harder and harder for them to find marriage partners. Mandean refugees also do not want to go back to Iraq, and wish to be repatriated to a third country.

Yazidis

Most Yazidis are concentrated in the north of Iraq in Dohuk and Ninewa provinces. Like Mandeans, they can only be born into the religion. Some believe that they originate from Zoroastrianism. Muslims do not consider them “People of the Book,” and have persecuted them as a result. On April 22, 2007 gunmen killed 23 Yazidis in the Kurdish town of Bashika after stopping a bus and only taking the Yazidis off of it. On August 14, 2007 four suicide bombings in the towns of Qahtaniya and Jazeera killed 786 Yazidis and wounded 1,562. Around 1,000 families became homeless as a result. Attacks on the community have continued into 2008 with 2 killed in a liquor store in Mosul on December 7, and seven were killed in Sinjar. Many are now afraid to leave their own communities. Many have stopped practicing their religion openly in fear that it will bring attention and attacks. Many farmers have either gone out of business or now rely upon middlemen to sell their products because Muslims refuse to work for them.

Other Minorities

There are around 2,000 Bahais in Iraq. They face legal repression as a 1970 law prohibits their religion. In April 2007 the Interior Ministry cancelled Regulation 358 from 1975, which said identity cards could not be given to Bahais, but now that they can receive them they are listed as Muslims instead of their own faith.

Iraq also used to have a small Jewish community. Now there are ten or less left. Those that have stayed in the country are hiding their religion. Like most of the Arab world, anti-Semitism is alive in Iraq.

Internally Displaced

Most of the displaced minorities have moved to the north, specifically Kurdistan and Ninewa. According to the International Organization for Migration 52.2% of the displaced in that province are Christians. This is because 53% of Ninewa are minorities. The Ninewa Plains for example, have been the historical homeland of Iraq’s Christians. The problem is that the north is one of the most violent areas of Iraq, especially Mosul, which remains the last major insurgent redoubt left in the country. Kurdistan has also been a popular destination. 24.6% of the displaced there are Christians. They have an easier time than Muslims to gain entry because they are not considered suspicious by the authorities. Kurdistan is also more secure than the rest of the country, which also makes it a draw. Yazidis are historically from Ninewa and Dohuk. Christians, Mandeans, and Yazidis all told the Commission that they are free to practice their religion in Kurdistan, and can set up their own private schools as well.

Political Pressure

Their residence in the north has placed minorities in the center of the increasing battle between Arabs and Kurds for political power. The United Nations reported that political parties in Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa are attempting to pressure minorities to vote for them in the 2009 elections. The U.N. also reports that minorities are being forced from their houses, and their farms are being confiscated as part of this intimidation campaign. Many are pressured to identify themselves as either Kurds or Arabs. One of the major reasons why the number of seats set aside for minorities was reduced was because Arabs were afraid the minorities would vote with the Kurds for annexation of disputed territories in the north, while Kurds did not want them listed as minorities fearing that they would dilute the Kurdish vote.

Kurds have also been intimidating and pressuring minorities. They have set up an extensive patronage system that hands out money for churches and relief to win over loyalties. At the same time the Kurdish militia the Peshmerga have gone into disputed territories, taken land from minorities, only given them services if they agree to back the Kurds, stopped minorities from forming their own local security forces, and joining the police to protect themselves.

Christians have been one of the main focuses of this carrot and stick approach by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). In 2006, the deputy governor of Ninewa stopped Baghdad from using Christian police in the Ninewa Plains. Instead they were sent to Mosul. The Chaldean Syrian Syriac Council of America said that the Ninewa council attempted to deny jobs to Christians in the provincial police. Those that have been able to join say they have been marginalized within the force. By mid-2008 there were reports that there was some progress on this situation with 269 Christians being hired. The Kurds have also only allowed the Christians to form their own security forces if they are funded by the KRG. The Kurdish Minister of Finance Sarkis Aghajan Mamendu is a Christian, and is in charge of funding for Christians by the Kurds. Christians have also been pressured to sign forms supporting the annexation of their areas into Kurdistan, and the Kurds have cut off water to certain Christian villages.

The Yazidis have also come under similar pressure. They claim that the Kurds are trying to Kurdify them. In 2008 the State Department said that the Kurds confiscated Yazidi land and started to build settlements on them illegally. The Kurdish Finance Minister said that the Kurds would return that land, but it would take up to two years. Yazidis have also said that their villages are the last to receive aid from the KRG. In March 2008, the Kurdish Interior Ministry told the Commission that they were working on forming a Yazidi police force.

Refugees

Because of all the violence and political pressure, a disproportionate number of minorities have fled the country. Minorities are only 3% of Iraq’s population, but are 15% of the U.N. registered refugees in Jordan and 20% of those in Syria. Christians are 64% of the registered refugees in Turkey, and 35% of those in Lebanon. The Ministry of Migration and Displacement believes that 50% of the country’s minorities have left since 2003. Many will probably never come back because they do not believe they have a future in Iraq, and are seeking asylum in other countries.

Iraqi refugees in general are finding it harder and harder to live in neighboring countries, and minorities have it especially difficult. Iraqis are facing stricter controls on their entry, and many are running out of money. They are increasingly feeling that they will be kicked out or imprisoned for staying illegally. Access to services is extremely limited. In all of the countries except for Lebanon, Iraqis are not permitted to work. There are reports of women turning to prostitution, and children not going to school to support their families. Mandeans report that they are discriminated against in Jordan, and are hiding their religion as a result.

Because of these hardships, Iraqis have begun returning to their country. This is not true of its minorities. The Ministry of Displacement and Migration counted 3,657 families registered as returnees in Baghdad, and an additional 6,000 wanted to at the end of 2007, but there are no reports of minorities going back however.

The Commission ended with some recommendations. First Baghdad needs to ensure free and fair elections that will include the selection of at least six new minority representatives in the provinces due to the quotas. The government also needs to provide security for everyone, and set up police for minority communities. Iraqi identity cards should also not state religion or ethnicity, and the lingering sectarianism needs to be eliminated from the government and security forces. Baghdad also needs to work with minorities to ensure their needs are being met. The Kurds need to respect minority rights. Finally, the U.S. should provide aid to minorities, and help their refugees. Few of these suggestions are likely to happen as the government is increasingly divided between Arabs and Kurds who see minorities as a pawn between them in the north. This will only increase as elections near, and both sides are looking for votes.

Conclusion

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom did a good job detailing the situation of Iraq’s major minority groups. All of them have been singled out for attacks because of their beliefs and being different. This has threatened the existence of some, and forced members of all groups to leave. These fissures in Iraq are unlikely to be overcome any time soon. The divisions between the major groups in the country still exist. To expect the smallest groups to be treated equally and be given representation before the larger problems are overcome is hard to believe. Until then, Iraq’s minorities will continue to be attacked, and will be the focus of political manipulation between Arabs and Kurds, which threatens their ability to maintain their religion and communities.

SOURCES

Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly, “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future,” Brookings Institution-University of Bern, December 2008

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Iraq Report – 2008,” December 2008

>International Organization for Migration’s Report On Displaced In Kurdistan

>The situation of the displaced in the three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniya, are different from the rest of the country. The stability of Kurdistan has been a draw for displaced from across the country. Professionals and manual labors alike have found jobs there. A large number of Iraqi minorities fled there. Most of the displaced in the three provinces also left their homes before the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. At the same time Kurdistan has strict restrictions on the entry of non-Kurds, and there are fears amongst officials that these refugees will upset the demographics of the region. In December 2008, the International Organization for Migration released its latest report on the displaced in Kurdistan.

The relative security of Kurdistan has led many displaced Iraqis to try to move there, but at the same time it is the hardest part of the country to gain entry into. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is worried about Arab insurgents entering, as well as non-Kurds disrupting the Kurdish majority. The KRG also doesn’t want to take care of so many displaced families. As a result, Kurdish security forces tightly control the border. People that don’t originally come form Kurdistan must have sponsors to enter. The Kurds are especially suspicious of Arabs, but requirements are looser for minorities who are seen as victims of terrorism. Once a family has entered Kurdistan they have to go through a complicated series of offices and requirements to stay. Every three months they have to renew their residency permit. For individuals, they have to renew it every month. If they don’t they are considered illegal residents. These tight restrictions have led many displaced to hide their movements outside the region, for example to collect their food rations from their home province, out of fear that they will be caught by the authorities and expelled.

Most of Iraq’s minorities live in the north. As reported before, they have been singled out for attack since the U.S. invasion. Many have fled to Kurdistan as a result because of its safety and proximity. 22.8% of the displaced in the region are Christians for example, compared to 5% in the rest of the country.

Kurdistan also has the largest amount of pre-2006 displaced. Most of these are Kurds, Turkomen, and Christians forced out by Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy and Anfal campaign. Over 600,000 people came to Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniya before 2006 as a result.

The displaced have caused both problems, and been welcomed in the region. The refugees can strain a community by increasing demand for services, and competing for jobs. In Khabat in the Irbil district there are more than 2,000 displaced families causing problems with the health facilities and schools. There are also reports of women turning to prostitution for money, and child labor. In Dohuk there are stories of women being raped to keep their jobs. Another problem is that the displaced have to know Kurdish to get jobs. Those that have stayed longer, usually have developed some language skills, and are thus better suited to find work. At the same time, because of the better security situation there are more jobs in Kurdistan than the rest of the country. The displaced have added both skilled and unskilled labor to the regional economy. This is seen in the fact that 56.6% of the displaced surveyed had at least one family member working compared to 34.8% in the rest of the country.

The ability to receive services and assistance by the displaced has been mixed. There is little coordination between the KRG and the Ministry of Trade that runs the food rations system. In a survey 74.6% of the displaced said they don’t get any food rations at all. Less then 3% said they received food aid, compared to the 43% national average. In Irbil no displaced received any food assistance. Only 23% said they received any aid period, compared to 63% in the rest of the country. Dohuk was the exception with 57% saying they had gotten some form of aid. 66% of the displaced said they also had no access to fuel, higher than the 33% average in the rest of Iraq. People in Kurdistan also pay higher prices for fuel, which adds more strain to the displaced that often have financial difficulties. Schools are a special problem for the displaced because classes are conducted in Kurdish. Some displaced Kurds are not use to the written form of the language either. Even so, there is a very high percentage of the displaced attending schools. 62.3% of families said all their girls were going, and 73.9% said their boys were as well. Water supply and access to health care however, are better than the rest of the country for internal refugees.

Dohuk

Dohuk has the least amount of pre-2006 displaced, and the most post-2006 refugees of the three Kurdish provinces. The majority came from Baghdad 52% and Ninewa 47%. The largest amount of people came during the summer of 2006, and has since declined. There are concerns that because of economic hardships some families are turning to crime to support themselves. Services and aid are mixed there. Electricity is available for an average of six hours per day, leaving many to turn to private generators or buying power from private businesses to make up the difference. 99.1% say they have no access to fuel, higher than the 65.9% average for the region and 32.7% rate for the country. Dohuk also has the least amount of displaced people working. Only 33.5% said they had at least one family member working compared to 56.6% in Kurdistan. Refugee families do have the best access to humanitarian aid out of the region.

Statistics On The Displaced In Dohuk

Overall:
Population: 954,087
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 22,474 families, approx. 138,844 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 17,390 families, approx 104,824 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Kurd 39.7%
Chaldean Christian 29.0%
Assyrian Christian 19.8%
Armenian Christian 3.4%
Sunni Arab 2.1%
Shiite Arab 2.0%
Turkomen Shiite 0.7%
Shiite Kurd 0.3%
Christian Kurd 0.2%
Other 0.1%

Place of origin:
Baghdad 51.79%
Ninewa 46.65%
Tamim 0.58%
Basra 0.48%
Anbar 0.32%
Muthanna 0.05%
Salahaddin 0.05%
Babil 0.03%
Diyala 0.03%
Irbil 0.03%

Reasons For Displacement:
Fear 92.8%
Violence 88.1%
Direct Threat 71.2%
Armed Conflict 33.7%
Forced From Home 7.3%
Other 0.4%

Reason For Being Targeted:
Sect 68.20%
Ethnicity 22.84%
Political opinion 18.29%
Social group 14.57%
Don’t think targeted 7.42%

Intentions of Displaced:
Integrate locally 60.2%
Return to place of origin 22.0%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 2.7%
Sometimes 4.3%
Never 92.9%

Water source:
Municipal water 89.8%
Water tanks/trucks 31.9%
Others 4.7%
Wells 6.8%
Rivers, streaks, lakes 5.1%
Broken pipes 0.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 86.4%
1-3 hours per day 8.9%
No electricity 4.7%

Fuel access:
No access 99.1%
Propane 0.6%
Benzene 0.0%
Kerosene 0.5%
Diesel 0.1%
Other 0.0%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 31.1%
Yes 68.5%

Employment:
At least one family member working 33.5%
No one working 66.5%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 42.7%
Iraqi Red Crescent 23.6%
Religious group 21.0%
Relatives 19.7%
Humanitarian group 6.3%
Other government agency 14.6%
Host community 4.1%
Other 3.0%

Food aid source:
No aid 98.6%
Federal government 0.0%
Humanitarian group 0.0%
Regional government 0.0%
Religious group 0.9%
Others 0.3%

Needs:
Jobs 95%
Housing 60%
Food 50%
Other 50%
Health 20%
School 10%
Water 5%
Sanitation 1%
Legal aid 1%
Hygiene 0%

Irbil

Most of the displaced in Irbil come from Baghdad 47% and Ninewa 45%. The largest amount of people came in the beginning of 2007. Around 150 Christian families have recently fled to the Ainkawa district after they were attacked in Mosul at the end of 2008. Electricity has improved over the last six months. Families average four hours a day with three extra hours every other day. Displaced in Irbil have the worst access to humanitarian aid in the region with 92.4% saying they received no assistance compared to 76.5% in Kurdistan and 36.7% in Iraq.

Statistics On The Displaced In Dohuk

Overall: Population: 1,392,093
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 32,813 families, approx 196,878 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 6,599 families, approx 52,007 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Kurd 39.9%
Sunni Arab 29.4%
Chaldean Christian 19.3%
Assyrian Christian 4.9%
Shiite Arab 1.4%
Armenian Christian 0.9%
Other 0.4%
Christian Kurd 0.2%
Sabean Mandean 0.1%
Christian Arab 0.1%

Place of origin:
Baghdad 47.11%
Ninewa 45.12%
Tamim 2.4%
Diyala 2.08%
Anbar 0.93%
Salahaddin 0.63%
Basra 0.26%
Babil 0.15%
Muthanna 0.07%
Qadisiyah 0.07%
Karbala 0.06%
Najaf 0.04%
Maysan 0.04%

Reasons for displacement:
Fear 97.6%
Violence 53.4%
Direct Threat 9.9%
Armed Conflict 0.3%
Other 0.1%

Reason for being targeted:
Sect 59.98%
Don’t think targeted 22.84%
Ethnicity 17.27%
Social group 3.98%
Political opinion 0.13%

Intentions of displaced:
Integrate locally 18.3%
Return to place of origin 62.5%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 14.5%
Sometimes 27.2%
Never 57.6%

Water source:
Municipal water 97.7%
Water tanks/trucks 1.3%
Others 0.2%
Wells 6.80.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 98.8%
1-3 hours per day 0.0%
No electricity 0.1%

Fuel Access:
No access 68.1%
Propane 29.4%
Benzene 23.2%
Kerosene 4.5%
Diesel 0.2%
Other 0.0%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 73.1%
Yes 25.3%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 92.4%
Iraqi Red Crescent 0.1%
Religious group 4.00%
Relatives 0.1%
Humanitarian group 2.2%
Other government agency 0.0%
Host community 0.0%
Other 0.0%

Food aid source:
No aid 98.9%
Federal government 0.0%
Humanitarian group 0.0%
Regional government 0.0%
Religious group 0.0%
Others 0.0%

Needs:
Jobs 90.9%
Housing 97.9%
Food 2.8%
Other 0.7%
Health 0.1%
School 28.2%
Water 0.0%
Sanitation 0.0%
Legal aid 25%
Hygiene 0%

Sulaymaniya

Most displaced in Sulaymaniya come from Baghdad 46% and Diyala 45%. The biggest surge in families to the province came during the summer of 2007. Of the three Kurdish provinces, Sulaymaniya averages the most electricity at 9 to 10 hours per day. That’s expected to go up to twelve hours when a new power station opens. It also has the best access to fuel in the region with 60% of the displaced saying they could obtain one form or another, but it is still below the national average.

Statistics For the Displaced In Sulaymaniya

Overall:
Population: 1,715,585
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 50,465 families, approx. 302,790 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 14,585 families, approx. 80,935 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Arab 62.7%
Sunni Kurd 22.4%
Shiite Arab 10.5%
Shiite Kurd 2.7%
Sabean Mandean 0.3%
Chaldean Christian 0.2%
Assyrian Christian 0.1%
Other 0.1%
Christian Arab 0.1%

Origin of origin:
Baghdad 46.12%
Diyala 45.92%
Anbar 2.88%
Ninewa 1.88%
Salahaddin 0.95%
Tamim 0.67%
Basra 0.51%
Babil 0.40%
Wasit 0.24%
Dhi Qar 0.11%
Sulaymaniyah 0.11%
Karbala 0.07%
Muthanna 0.04%

Reasons for displacement:
Fear 90.0%
Violence 88.0%
Armed Conflict 52.7%
Direct Threat 46.2%
Other 6.3%
Forced From Home 3.8%

Reason for being targeted:
Sect 78.53%
Don’t think targeted 18.85%
Ethnicity 10.46%
Political opinion 6.28%
Social group 3.96%

Intentions of displaced:
Integrate locally 25.9%
Return to place of origin 65.7%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 11.8%
Sometimes 9.7%
Never 78.5%

Water source:
Municipal water 77.0%
Water tanks/trucks 5.1%
Others 19.3%
Wells 3.2%
Rivers, streaks, lakes 0.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 60.4%
1-3 hours per day 35.2%
No electricity 4.4%

Fuel access:
No access 41.3%
Propane 58.6%
Benzene 1.0%
Kerosene 15.6%
Diesel 0.7%
Other 0.2%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 79.8%
Yes 19.8%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 84.0%
Iraqi Red Crescent 7.5%
Religious group 1.1%
Relatives 0.1%
Humanitarian group 5.5%
Other government agency 1.7%
Host community 4.3%
Other 0.4%

Food aid source:
No aid 94.7%
Federal government 2.8%
Humanitarian group 1.5%
Regional government 1.1%
Religious group 0.5%
Others 0.9%

Needs:
Jobs 44%
Housing 16.7%
Food 85.8%
Other 81.2%
Health 1.3%
School 32.3%
Water 0.7%
Sanitation 1.0%
Legal aid 2.2%
Hygiene 0.5%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah, Governorate Profiles Post-February 2006 IDP Needs Assessments,” December 2008

>Human Rights First Report On What To Do About Iraq’s Refugees

>At the end of December 2008 Human Rights First released an excellent report on Iraq’s refugees entitled “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis.” It noted that the refugee crisis is still on going. The United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR for example, recorded 12,500 Iraqis entering Syria in 2008. Surveys show that one-third of Iraqis fled the general violence in the country, while the other two-third left because they felt directly targeted. Most of the displacement occurred after the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. This can be seen in the fact that Sunnis were only about 20% of the population, but represent 55% of the U.N. registered refugees. Iraq’s minorities such as Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Turkomen, Shabaks, and others have also greatly suffered, comprising 18-20% of the U.N. refugees, but only 3-4% of Iraq. The result has been a less diverse country and more homogenous neighborhoods, especially in Baghdad, which has seen the most displacement. The UNHCR, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, and the State Department all believe that Iraq’s refugees still need help. The Human Rights First report was notable for its up to date numbers, and analysis of the current situation in Iraq. It not only went through the current refugee crisis, but also made suggestions for the in coming Obama administration as well.

The forces directly responsible for Iraq’s displacement are many. Insurgents, terrorist groups, and militias all took part in violence aimed at the country’s population. What is often overlooked is that the Iraqi government was also directly involved. The media usually talks about how militias had infiltrated the security forces during this period, but refugees told Human Rights Watch that they believed the ruling parties had a plan to force out certain groups. The police, National Police, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Health all took part in sectarian attacks. As reported before, Shiite parties like the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its Badr Brigade and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army were directly enrolled into the security forces, and took control of specific ministries. They carried out a systematic campaign to cleanse certain areas of Sunnis. Iraq’s minorities were caught in the middle of this bloodbath. This has repercussions today, as many displaced still do not trust their government.

Iraq’s refugees have been both greeted and rejected in the countries they have moved to. Most can’t work legally, which leads to exploitation. Children are not going to school because they need to support their families, while some Iraqi women have gone into prostitution to make money. Many have run through their savings, while their cost of living expenses have risen. That has led to increasing dependence upon U.N. aid. Syria and Jordan are increasingly growing weary of the large number of Iraqis in their country. This is problematic since many Iraqis don’t seem to want to return anytime soon. Many who register with the UNHCR hope to be repatriated to a third country. 64,500 have applied for asylum in 2007 and the first six months of 2008, the highest amount in the world. Most want to go to Sweden, Germany, Greece or the United States.

Iraq’s internally displaced are facing tougher conditions as well. Many provinces have stopped movement of the displaced into their areas. Some want them to leave. Lack of jobs, access to services, and assistance from either the government or non-government organizations is chronic. The International Organization for Migration in its monthly reports have recorded dozens of cases of displaced families living in mud huts with no access to jobs, clean water, and sewage systems.

All of these hardships and the improvement in security have begun the process of return. By September 2008 the International Organization for Migration and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration counted 38,401 families who had come back, amounting to approximately 230,406 people. That was around 5% of the displaced. Most of these were internal refugees moving within Baghdad. Surveys say that 80% of the displaced in their own provinces want to go back to their homes while only around 50% of the displaced in other provinces want to. Many still feel their original areas are unsafe. Very few refugees have come back from other countries however.

Baghdad has also been pushing for Iraqis to return, but Human Rights First believes it actually might be detrimental. In late 2007 the government began to encourage Iraqis to come back. In 2008 they created a national policy on refugees and the displaced written with the help of the United Nations, and conforming to international norms. They called on Iraqis to return because the country was safe, and they could be protected. The plan allows the displaced to vote in elections, provides aid, and includes the eviction of squatters to resolve property issues. At the same time, Baghdad also tried to force refugees to come back from other countries. In 2007 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told Syria and Jordan to tighten their visa requirements to stem the flow of Iraqis to those two countries. In early 2008 the government talked Germany out of taking in minorities. Iraqi, Syrian and U.N. sources told Human Rights First that the Iraqi leadership was against helping the displaced because they believe the displacement crisis made the country look bad. They also thought that refugees who refused to go back were traitors.

Human Rights First also found that the refugee policy was not being applied evenly. In August 2008 the International Organization for Migration reported that militias were selling houses illegally that they had seized from people in Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa with the help of local security forces. Some refugees said they believed the government was still sectarian. The government for example, was supposed to create two centers to assist returns in Baghdad, one in the Shiite east and one in the Sunni west. Only the center in the Shiite area was opened. Other refugees thought the return program was part of campaigning for the upcoming elections. In general, many did not trust the government.

This was why Human Rights First did not think that Baghdad’s refugee program was good. It thought that it was important that the government began an eviction process, but dealing with property issues was not the only thing that would help the displaced. It believes that Baghdad needs to provide the rule of law, punish those that carry out attacks and abuses, get rid of sectarianism, protect minorities, expel militias, and deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Minorities especially, are still being targeted, while violence against women is increasing. Some refugees have also been attacked and intimidated after their returns. None of this is helping with the situation. Overall, Human Rights First believed that the Maliki government lacked earnestness when dealing with the plight of refugees.

The U.S. has also not had a real strategy to deal with this problem. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice hardly talk about the issue. The 2008 and 2009 budgets for example, had no funds for Iraq’s refugees. It was because of Congress that $500 million was set aside for fiscal year 2008 and $350 million in 2008 for Iraq’s displaced. This has meant a dramatic increase in aid and programs. The U.S. has also taken in more Iraqis. In 2006 202 Iraqis were admitted, followed by 1,608 in 2007 and 13,823 in 2008. There is still no real U.S. leadership however. The Bush White House has argued that returns are the solution, and this will happen when security improves.

Human Rights First believes that the Obama administration needs to make a real commitment to this crisis. They need to help those that want to go back, and those that don’t. It recommended setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet. If they are not met, the U.S. should withdraw support form the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and focus upon non-government organizations and direct aid to Iraqis. The U.S. should also encourage Prime Minister Maliki to provide accurate information on the situation within Iraq to refugees so that their returns are voluntary. The Americans also have to provide aid to host countries like Syria and Jordan, convince them to ease their visa restrictions on Iraqis, as well as facilitate the immigration of those Iraqis that have no plans to go home. Finally, a property claims/compensation program needs to be started even if the families never return. In order to ensure that this will be carried out, Human Rights First calls for a high level official to be appointed by the incoming president solely to focus upon Iraq’s refugees.

“How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis” provides not only a good synopsis of the causes and effects of Iraq’s displacement, but analysis as well, in a short and to the point report. It shows that Iraqi refugees outside the country and displaced within it are still suffering major problems providing for themselves and obtaining support. Although some Iraqis have begun to return, Baghdad is not doing a good job dealing with them, and in fact, may be making the situation worse because it is more interested in image than implementation. Those that are coming back are mostly the displaced, with Iraq’s two million refugees staying in their new homes. This is probably due to the fact that they are largely Sunni and minorities who have been the victims of the Shiite parties and militias that now run Iraq. Until there is more trust and effective government it is unlikely that large numbers of refugees will ever return to Iraq. That places a large onus on the U.S. and international community to provide for these people, and the countries where they reside. That is the main point of the report, Iraq’s refugee crisis is an on-going event that is getting worse for many Iraqis, and needs the full attention of the new American administration.

SOURCES

Ferris, Elizabeth, “The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future,” Brookings Institution, 12/6/07

Human Rights First, “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis,” December 2008
Overview

International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

>Brookings-University of Bern report on Iraq’s Minorities

>In late December 2008 the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern, Germany released a report on Iraq’s minorities and refugees entitled “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future.” Although the paper was meant to be about all of Iraq’s minority groups, it largely focused upon the country’s Christians. It’s major findings were that Iraq’s small religious and ethnic groups have been targeted and attacked relentlessly since the U.S. invasion, driving a disproportionate amount from their homes, and out of the country. Unless these groups are re-integrated Iraq will be less diverse and tolerant, and a largely segregated country due to the sectarian war.

Estimates On Iraq’s Minorities:
Christians: 2003: 1-1.4 million, Today, 600,000-800,000
Jews: 2003: a few hundred, Today: 10-15
Mandeans: 2003: 30,000, Today: Fewer than 13,000
Palestinians: 2003: 35,000, Today: 15,000
Turkomen: 2003: 800,000 claimed, Today: as few as 200,000
Yazidis: 2003: No known, Today: around 550,000

The Brookings Institution and the University of Bern defined Iraq’s minorities as the country’s smallest religious and ethnic groups. These consist of the Armenian, Syriac, and Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, Bahai, Jewish, Mandean, and Yazidi religions, along with the Faili Kurds, Palestinians, Shabaks, and Turkomen. Many of these groups have lived in Iraq for over 1,000 years. All of them were treated differently under the Saddam Hussein regime. The Bahais and Fayli Kurds were persecuted, while the Palestinians were given special treatment. Since the U.S. invasion they have all faced similar situations. These include a lack of power, persecution, and attacks. The country’s Jews for example have mostly disappeared, having fled Iraq, while the Palestinians are trapped with nowhere to go.

The religious and ethnic parties studied in the report are different from the Sunnis and Kurds who each are numerical minorities. The Sunnis ran the country under Saddam, have large numbers of politicians, and are a junior partner in the ruling coalition behind Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They have also conducted a bloody insurgency that still continues in parts of Iraq. The Kurds on the other hand, were attacked and persecuted under Saddam, but since the Gulf War have gained more and more autonomy. Under the old regime, Kurds faced Saddam’s Arabization program and Operation Anfal that pushed out over 100,000 from northern Iraq, and killed around the same amount. After 2003, the Kurds were able to form the Kurdistan Regional Government incorporating the provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulamaniyah. The Kurds were also one of the major groups that drafted the constitution, and got Article 140 included that provides a mechanism for them to annex disputed areas such as Kirkuk. They are also the second largest bloc in parliament after the Shiites. Most of the Kurdish refugees have also resettled in Kurdistan rather than in other countries. Only 1% of Iraqis living in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey are Kurds. Many have also been able to resettle in areas of northern Iraq where Saddam forced them out. None of these experiences are the same as the minorities looked at by Brookings and the University of Bern.

All of Iraq’s minorities have been singled out for discrimination and attacks. Christians and Yazidis were prominent in the alcohol industry, which has brought on attacks by both Shiite and Sunni Islamists. Christians were seen as a symbol of the West, and killed by both Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army. In October 2008, Christians in Mosul were attacked riving out over 2,000 families. Only one-third has returned since then. As a result of this violence, a large number of each group has been displaced or fled to other countries. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration estimates that about half of Iraq’s minorities have left the country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes 30% of Iraqi refugees are minorities. The Mandeans fear that this displacement might mean their end because they won’t be able to find marriage partners. You can only be a member of their religion by being born into it.

Because many of Iraq’s minorities live in the north, they are also caught in the middle of the political battle between the Arabs and Kurds. This is especially true in places like Mosul and Kirkuk. In those areas and others Kurds have aspirations to annex large swaths of territory, which Arabs generally oppose. Many feel pressed to assimilate to one of the larger groups for protection and patronage. The minorities lack tribal affiliations, large numbers of politicians, and some are pacifists. The smaller minorities then either have to align with a larger group or leave because of the relentless pressure upon them.

The Kurds especially in places like Ninewa province have been playing on these fears. They provide aid, security, housing and funding for churches to Christians, but many believe this is to win over their votes and form a patronage system with them so that they become dependent upon the Kurds.There are reports that Christians can’t get jobs unless they join one of the major Kurdish parties for example. Their policy has apparently worked as the Christian community is split over the future of Ninewa. The largest Assyrian Christian Party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, has supported the central government against the Kurds, but the three smaller Christian parties have joined with the Kurds and called for the annexation of northern sections of Ninewa to Kurdistan believing that they would be safer with the Kurds than with Baghdad.

The Provincial Election Law shows how minorities are caught up in this larger power struggle between Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. When the act was finally passed it dropped a provision to provide quotas for minority seats on provincial councils. Later, an amendment was added, but it only gave six out of 440 seats for minorities when the United Nations had asked for 12. Christians got one seat each in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basra, Yazidis got one seat in Ninewa, the Sabeans one in Baghdad, and the Shabaks a seat in Ninewa. Minorities can run for other seats, but Iraqis have tended to vote along sectarian lines. The law was heralded as another step towards reconciliation, but not for the country’s minorities. They felt slighted, and believed this was another way to keep them marginalized and powerless.

The reason why their numbers were reduced in the final election amendment was because of the conflict between Arabs and Kurds. The Arabs believed that most of these minorities would vote with the Kurds, and support their plans for expansion. The Kurds on the other hand did not want many of these groups designated as minorities because they consider them Kurds. With minority quotas they were afraid they would not get as many votes. Many Yazidis for example do consider themselves Kurds. Both sides also believed that with no quota minorities would be more dependent upon them to get government assistance.

In order to resolve this issue the Brookings Institution and the Bern University say that the thousands of minorities that have fled the country need to return, be re-integrated, and be protected. A small portion of Iraq’s four million plus refugees have begun going back to their homes and provinces. The UNHCR has recorded no minorities coming back however. In order for this to happen, they have to be assured of their safety first. This has not happened for those still in the country. The government also needs to deal with property disputes. Baghdad has started some policies on evicting squatters, but they are not being applied evenly. There is also not enough evidence yet that this is having any influence on whether Iraqis come back or not. The election law was also not something that would encourage minorities. If they don’t come back, then Iraq will be a less diverse and tolerant country the paper warns. When minorities leave, those left behind are often victimized making the whole situation worse.

If minorities do come back they need to be able to return to their original communities as well. This would be part of the process of reversing the sectarian cleansing that occurred from 2006 to 2007. If minorities, along with all the Sunnis and Shiites can’t return to their neighborhoods than Iraq will be a segregated nation. Families will be internally displaced living with friends or relatives where their group is the majority. Iraq could end up like Bosnia where international effort has led to a country that still has hundreds of thousands of displaced thirteen years after the Dayton Peace Accords.

Finally, the report ends with six suggestions to help relieve this problem. First, Baghdad needs to prevent future displacement, which is the basic job of any government to protect its citizens. This also includes providing jobs and services. Second, Brookings and Bern believe the government and the international community shouldn’t focus just upon specific groups, but all minorities in general. This will make for more equitable policies. Third, a property resolution system needs to be created. Fourth, the international community needs to consult with the minorities about their needs. Fifth, the host countries where many of these minorities have fled need to receive aid to help support them. Last, because some people may never go back to Iraq they need to be repatriated to Europe and the United States.

The Brookings Institution and the University of Bern provide a general overview of the problems facing Iraq’s minorities. All of the country’s small religious and ethnic groups have been victimized since the U.S. invasion. Thousands have fled their homes, and the country as a result. This has placed entire communities in jeopardy. In fact, some of the smaller groups like the Mandeans fear that they will go extinct if this continues. Many of those still in the country are concentrated in the north where they are trapped in the rivalry between the Arabs and Kurds. As the Provincial Election Law amendment on quotas shows, without strong representation minorities are open to political manipulation, which again does not bode well for their future in Iraq as the larger and more powerful groups can largely determine their future. The major problem with the report is that it only really gives evidence of the Christians, without really telling what’s happening to the other groups in any detail. Providing the larger structural problems is not all bad however. In the end, given their position, it doesn’t appear that Iraq’s minorities will have a safe future in Iraq any time soon. Iraq has to overcome all of its major divisions first, before it can even deal with the smaller groups. Until then, the country’s minorities will most likely continue to be pawns in the larger struggles between Arabs and Kurds, while still being attacked for being different.

SOURCES
Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly, “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future,” Brookings Institution-University of Bern, December 2008
Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Through the cracks,” The National, 12/19/08
Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08
Timmerman, Kenneth, “Christians Face Extinction in Northern Iraq,” Newsmax.com, 4/24/08

>International Organization for Migration Report on Internally Displaced In Tamim, Ninewa and Salahaddin

>In December 2008 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its year-end reports on the displaced in Iraq’s eighteen provinces. One report covered Tamim, Ninewa and Salahaddin. Outside of Baghdad these are the most violent governorates in the country, and have deep seated ethnic tensions in two major cities, Mosul and Kirkuk, between Arabs and Kurds that are nowhere near being reconciled. This means there were will continue to be conflict there and displacement as was recently seen when thousands of Christians fled Mosul in October 2008. Because of these on-going disputes only a few thousand families have returned to the region. Those still displaced face a variety of problems from lack of basic services and food to jobs. As long as the three provinces remain unstable it is unlikely that the displaced will be coming back in large numbers any time soon.

The Displaced In Ninewa

Ninewa is one of Iraq’s northern most provinces located next to Anbar, Salahaddin, Dohuk and Irbil. It is rich in oil, and contains the third largest city in the country, Mosul, behind Baghdad and Basra. The city has a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkomen and Armenians. Security got worse in the second half of 2008 with an increase in kidnappings, assassinations, militia attacks, and general violence. Ethnic tensions also heated up when Christians were attacked in Mosul leading to almost 2,000 families fleeing. While some have come back, the majority have not and are still afraid of what might happen to them if they do. There are still military operations going on in Ninewa, specifically in Mosul. Until this situation is settled, the displaced problem will not be resolved.

Ninewa received two waves of displaced. The first came after the invasion, and consisted mostly of former Baathists and government officials from Baghdad and the south who were afraid of retribution. That would account for the large number of Iraqis from Basra 6.33% who now reside in Ninewa. There were also another group that fled military operations in the province such as a large number of Turkomen who left Telafar because of the fighting there. The second wave came in 2006 during the sectarian war. That’s shown by the fact that major reason why families fled was violence, 79.6% and fear 65.5%.

In the beginning of 2006 there were only about 100 displaced a month entering the province. After April however, it took off to around 1,400 coming in June. Displacement slowed afterwards, only to spike to its highest level of 2,000 in September. It then dropped to 250 in October, then went up against to 1,600 in November. Since then the number of refugees in the province has dropped consistently to 100 in April 2007. It has gone down to almost 0 since then with slight increases in January and October 2008.

Overall, 50% of the internal refugees in Ninewa came from Baghdad, but there were others that fled because of the Arab-Kurdish conflict. There are also a large number of displaced from within the province itself. Unlike the rest of the country, the largest displaced group is not Arab Muslims, but Assyrian Christians.

The province has no restrictions on the entry of displaced. To get food rations, families have to have their IDs, rations cards and documents, and register with the local office of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. While the displaced have been generally welcomed in the province, resentment is growing against them as they are blamed for rising costs, especially rents, while some have joined armed groups. 59.8% say they want to go back to the original homes, while 6.4% said they want to be integrated into Ninewa.

Like the displaced in the rest of the country, those in Ninewa face a whole series of problems receiving basic services, along with finding housing and jobs. Next to legal help for retrieving their lost property, jobs was the second most important issue to displaced at 88%. In the Makhmoor and Hawiga districts there is high unemployment. Out of those surveyed by the IOM 81.1% said they had no family members working. Arabs and Turkomen especially find it hard to find work. The government is suppose to provide food rations to every Iraqi, but 56.6% of those polled said they received no rations at all. The water system in Ninewa is also in great disrepair. In the Mosul district there are villages that have no sewage system and the pipe system has been damaged by constant traffic by military vehicles. There was also maintenance done on the district’s electrical system, which reduced the number of hours per day with power to 4-6. 41.8% of displaced polled said they only got 1-3 ours of power per day on average.

A majority of the displaced said that they had received some type of aid to assist them with their predicament. 75% said they had received help. The largest provider was the Ministry of Displacement and Migration that served 43.2%. All government agencies combined provided for 45.1% of the displaced. Humanitarian groups in total helped 50.1%. That still left out a large number of people. 30.0% for example said they had no food aid. This is common throughout most of the country, and is made worse by the lack of security in the province.

Statistics On Displaced In Ninewa

Overall:
Population: 2,811,091
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 6,572 families, approx. 39,432 people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 12,546 families, approx. 75,276 people
Number of returnees: 605 families, approx 3,630 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: All 605 were internally displaced
Sect Of Displaced: Christian Assyrian 39.0%, Sunni Arab 26.0%, Sunni Turkomen 12.4%, Sunni Kurd 12.4%, Other 3.3%, Sunni Kurd 3.2%, Shiite Turkomen 2.2%, Shiite Arab 0.8%, Yazidi Arab 0.3%, Christian Armenian 0.2%
Origin Of Displaced: Baghdad 49.63%, Basra 6.33%, Diyala 1.12%, Tamim 0.90%, Salahaddin 0.59%, Anbar 0.55%, Babil 0.45%, Wasit 0.18%, Qadisiyah 0.12%, Dhi Qar 0.06%, Irbil 0.03%, Karbala 0.01%

Reason for Displacement:
General violence 79.6%
Fear 65.5%
Direct threat to life 42.8%
Armed conflict 4.2%
Other 2.5%
Forced from home 1.7%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 85.7%
Don’t think targeted 12.7%
Ethnic group 1.9%
Social group 1.7%
Political views 0.5%

Security Situation:
Checkpoints 24.8%
Death or injury in family 21.9%
Missing family member 7.0%
Need authorization to move 5.4%
Other restrictions on movement 0.0%

Type of Housing:
Renting 78.2%
Living with host family or relatives 14.7%
Other 4.7%
Collective settlement 1.1%
Public building 0.8%
Tent near house of host family 0.6%
Former military base 0.1%
Tent in camp 0.0%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 79.1%
Not at all 8.4%
Always 12.4%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 92.0%
Water tanks/trucks 51.5%
Wells 11.4%
Broken pipes 9.3%
Rivers 7.8%
Others 1.5%

Electricity Supply:
No power 4.9%
1-3 hours per day 41.8%
Four or more hours per day 51.8%

Fuel Access:
No access 75.2%
Propane 13.3%
Benzene 21.5%
Kerosene 12.7%
Diesel 9.9%
Other 0.0%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 18.9%
No one works 81.1%

Type Of Property Left Behind:
Other 64.9%
Land for farming 17.3%
Land for housing 5.3%
House 11.9%
Shop/business 0.0%
Apartment or room 0.5%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 61.5%
Accessible 12.9%
Occupied 4.6%
Destroyed 3.7%
Used by military 0.8%
Taken over by Government 0.4%

Source of Assistance:
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 43.2%
Iraqi Red Crescent 31.6%
Religious group 29.8%
Host community 29.5%
Relatives 26.6%
No aid received 24.3%
Humanitarian group 18.5%
Other 6.8%
Other government agency 1.9%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 67.8%
Non-food items 60.2%
Other 15.5%
Health 8.5%

Food Aid Source:
Humanitarian group 34.8%
Religious charity 30.3%
No aid 30.0%
Others 21.6%
Federal government 10.5%
Provincial government 6.0%

Needs:
Legal Help 89%
Jobs 88%
Shelter 63%
Food 28%
Other 12%
Health 7%
Water 5%
Hygiene 4%
School 2%
Sanitation 1%

The Displaced In Salahaddin Ninewa

Salahaddin province is just north of Baghdad. It is mostly Arab with some Turkomen and Kurds. The city of Tikrit was a Baathist stronghold and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. Because of this there was a lot of fighting between the Coalition and insurgents there. Although there is still violence in Salahaddin, the security situation is relatively stable. Militias and insurgents are losing influence.

Many people in Salahaddin were displaced because of the intense fighting there. The majority however, came during the sectarian war. 49.5% come from Baghdad, then Tamim 15% and Basra 12%. Most of those from the south fled to Salahaddin because they were Baathist and government officials, and were afraid of reprisals. 60.6% left their homes because of direct threats on their lives, while 47.5% gave their reason as general violence. The increase in displaced began in January 2006, with a big spike in June to 2,000. The rate declined until September 2006, and then took off again to 1,500 by December. The rate of displacement then steadily dropped until it was almost at zero by August 2007 with a few bumps up since then.

The province has no restrictions on displaced. Most have been welcomed, and received aid from the local communities. The Ministry of Interior is now telling families from Anbar and Diyala to go home because security has been established there, but the order is not being enforced. 50.1% of the displaced said they want to return to their homes, while 12.7% prefer to stay in Salahddin and resettle there. Because of the continued instability in the province, only 96 families have come back. 56 were internally displaced, while 40 came back from other countries. All of the latter are former Baathists and government officials, and are keeping low because they don’t want to face persecution for their past lives.

The displaced in Salahaddin face problems with food, jobs, and shelter. 88% said they needed food, followed by jobs 75%, and shelter 66%. Children of the displaced often have to work to support their families. Even then, only 71.7% of the displaced said they had anyone in their family working. Most displaced there have registered with the local authorities and receive their food rations, although 23.0% said they hadn’t received any yet. Salahaddin also suffered from the country’s drought during the summer. Water is still scarce in some sections of the province. In Tikrit the displaced have access to water 20 hours per day. In Samarra its 18 hours, but in other areas it goes down to only 5-6 hours. In parts of the Al-Daur district it gets as low as only 1-3 hours of water a day. Salahaddin is home to one of the country’s major power stations at Beiji. Despite this electricity is extremely scare for the displaced. 45% said they only get 1-3 hours of electricity per day. There are parts of Tikrit that receive no power at all. The province also lacks hospital staff. Only 34% of the displaced that were surveyed said they had access to the medications they need, while only 29% had been visited by a health worker in the last 30 days. The education system is also poor with many schools made out of mud, and others that need repairs.

A little under half of Salahaddin’s displaced are not being served by any organization. 47.6% said they had received no aid at all. Of those that had, local communities was the largest provider. The government on the other hand had only helped 5.8%. Humanitarian groups did a much better job reaching 50.1%. With food being their greatest need, 57.3% said they had received no food assistance. Government agencies only provided food to 1.7% of those surveyed. Even with security improving in Salahaddin, things have not improved much for the displaced there.

Statistics On Displaced In Salahaddin

Overall:
Population: 1,191,403
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 7,790 families, approx. 45, 614people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 15,795 families, approx. 94,770people
Number of returnees: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: 56 internally displaced, 40 international refugees
Sect of Displaced: Sunni Arab 95.8%, Shiite Arab 2.5%, Sunni Kurd 0.5%, Shiite Turkomen 1.0%, Sunni Turkomen 0.1%, Other 0.1%
Origin of Displaced: Baghdad 49.5%, Tamim 14.94%, Basra 12.22%, Diyala 10.36%, Anbar 1.90%, Ninewa 1.89%, Irbil 1.72%, Wasit 0.7%, Babil 0.68%, Dhi Qar 0.65%, Qadisiyah 0.10%, Karbala 0.04%

Reason for Displacement:
Direct threat to life 60.6%
General violence 47.5%
Fear 29.5%
Forced from home 15.4%
Armed conflict 2.2%
Other 0.8%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 55.0%
Ethnic group 21.3%
Social group 22.2%
Political views 5.1%
Don’t think targeted 0.7%

Security Situation:
Checkpoints 9.9%
Death or injury in family 8.3%
Need authorization to move 6.3%
Missing family member 3.5%
Other restrictions on movement 1.0%

Type of Housing:
Renting 67.9%
Living with host family or relatives 11.9%
Other 7.9%
Public building 6.8%
Collective settlement 3.9%
Former military base 1.0%
Tent near house of host family 0.4%
Tent in camp 0.1%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 41.2%
Not at all 23.0%
Always 34.6%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 85.9%
Water tanks/trucks 28.0%
Wells 22.6%
Broken pipes 1.3%
Rivers 10.3%
Others 2.0%

Electricity Supply:
No power 2.1%
1-3 hours per day 45.0%
Four or more hours per day 52.3%

Fuel Access:
Propane 56.7%
No access 40.8%
Benzene 22.8%
Other 8.8%
Kerosene 4.1%
Diesel 1.1%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 28.3%
No one works 71.7%

Types of Property Left Behind:
Other 93.7%
Shop/business 4.0%
Land for housing 1.3%
Apartment or room 0.4%
House 0.4%
Land for farming 0.0%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 61.6%
Occupied 13.8%
Accessible 7.2%
Destroyed 2.9%
Used by military 1.1%
Taken over by Government 0.0%

Source of Assistance:
No aid received 47.6%
Host community 33.4%
Iraqi Red Crescent 23.0%
Relatives 11.1%
Religious group 9.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 4.4%
Other government agency 1.4%
Other 0.8%
Humanitarian group 0.3%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 52.1%
Non-food items 30.8%
Health 16.8%
Other 2.5%

Food Aid Source:
No aid 57.3%
Others 21.7%
Humanitarian group 12.4%
Religious charity 11.0%
Federal government 1.3%
Provincial government 0.4%

Needs:
Food 88%
Jobs 75%
Shelter 66%
Other 25%
Health 18%
Water 12%
Hygiene 7%
School 4%
Legal Help 2%
Sanitation 2%

The Displaced In Tamim

Tamim was once known as Kirkuk province. Its name was changed in 1972. It is home to large oil reserves and ethnic tensions. The city of Kirkuk is one of the most contested pieces of territory in the country. Because of these divisions security worsened in the second half of 2008. Assassinations, kidnappings, attacks and explosions were al up. Violence and sexual assault against the displaced is also common.

Like Ninewa and Salahaddin, Tamim saw two waves of displacement. The first came during the Saddam years when he carried out his Arabization policy forcing out Kurds. Many of these families have since returned, but that has led to Arabs being pushed out. Then the sectarian war began, and vast more lost their homes or moved to Tamim as a result. 75% said they fled because of direct threats to their lives. Unlike other provinces in Iraq, most of the displaced in Tamim come from Diyala rather than Baghdad. The number of displaced saw a slow increase with a few ups and down until it hit its highest point in May 2007 at 1,700. It then dropped to almost zero, but with a few increases in October 2007, February 2008, and May 2008.

Tamim does have restriction on displaced entering the country. In order to register and receive food rations, families need to go to the local city council and the local branch of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and then go to Kirkuk for more paperwork. Many times families get rejected because of their ethnicity. There are many unregistered families living on the outskirts of Kirkuk as a result. If families don’t register they can be evicted as well. These strict rules have led many displaced to live with relatives because they can’t legally rent a place. If a family has had a member killed, kidnapped, or an orphaned child however, they can receive an exception from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. The displaced are also treated differently depending upon whom they live with. If they are not of the same sect than they are often discriminated against. There are even reports of threats and harassment that have led some to move away.

79.0% of the displaced in Tamim say they want to return to their original homes, while 17.0% said they want to stay in their new communities. Families have begun to return to Al-Jamasa and Al-Shaheria villages in Al-Hawiga district after a Sons of Iraq unit was set up there and stabilized the area. Families that came back to Gareeb Sofla nearby found their homes destroyed, and are living without electricity, water, medical services, schools, and jobs. Some are living in mud huts. The rate of return has been limited with under 1000 individuals coming back so far. Unlike the rest of the country, they are split evenly between internally displaced and refugees who came back from other countries. The latter have been concentrated in the Daqduq district.

Displaced women are facing a number of difficulties in Tamim. Prostitution has grown in the province because of lack of jobs and poverty faced by the displaced. Families sometimes force their wives and children into the industry. In the Abo Al Shees village in Hawiga district there are pregnant women doing hard labor with little health care. Girls don’t go to school their either because they have to work, and there is a high level of child labor.

Besides jobs the major needs of displaced in Tamim are food, 96% and shelter 93%, along with a number of other issues. A whopping 98.8% of the displaced in the IOM survey said they had no one in their family working. In Kirkuk and Hawiga districts there are over 50 families facing evictions for squatting or because they can’t afford to pay their rents. In total, about 12% of the displaced said they were facing the los of their residences. Over 80% of the displaced have no to limited access to government food rations. Families in Daqduq and Dibis districts say they are regularly missing items in their packages. The major reason why the province is having such trouble delivering these goods is because of lack of security. Only 49% of the displaced in the province have access to water. In Daquq distrit there is a village with no access to water, which leads them to use a local river that increases the risk of disease. 41% say they use a broken pipe for this need. 71.6% of the displaced have access to four or more hours of electricity per day, but 16.5% had no power at all, and 11.3% said they only got it for 1 to 3 hours per day. Only 31% had access to health care, and 70% said they couldn’t get the medications they need. Just 9% were visited by a health worker in 30 days.

Government and humanitarian groups are largely failing the displaced in the province. 77% said they received no aid at all. The largest provider were unnamed groups at 16.9%. The government only helped 17.9%, while non-government organizations did worse at 11.5%. 77% received no food aid, with the government only assisting 9.8%. Like Ninewa, the lack of security there and continued instability will hamper efforts to help the displaced in this part of Iraq.

Statistics On Displaced In Tamim

Overall:
Population: 902,019
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 1,252 families, approx. 7,512 people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 7,911 families, approx. 43,623 people
Number of returnees: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: 82 internally displaced, 83 international refugees
Sect of Displaced: Sunni Arab 51.5%, Sunni Kurd 18.8%, Shiite Turkomen 18.0%, Sunni Turkomen 3.2%, Shiite Arab 3.0%, Christian Assyrian 2.0%, Sunni Kurd 0.9%, Other 0.3%, Christian Aremnian 0.2%, Yazidi Arab 0.1%
Origin of Displaced: Diyala 26.11%, Baghdad 16.27%, Ninewa 15.94%, Salahaddin 15.35%, Anbar 3.99%, Irbil 1.28%, Sulaymaniyah 0.15%, Basra 0.34%, Babil 0.12%
Dhi Qar 0.04%, Najaf 0.03%

Reason for Displacement:
Direct threat to life 75.0%%
General violence 17.9%
Forced from home 16.0%
Fear 13.5%
Armed conflict 11.4%
Other 1.6%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 59.4%
Don’t think targeted 38.3%
Ethnic group 2.0%
Political views 1.1%
Social group 0.6%

Security Situation:
Death or injury in family 57.9%
Checkpoints 30.3%
Other restrictions on movement 25.3%
Missing family member 24.1%
Need authorization to move 21.4%

Type of Housing:
Living with host family or relatives 28.1%
Other 27.2%
Renting 22.7%
Public building 9.5%
Tent near house of host family 8.3%
Collective settlement 3.8%
Former military base 0.3%
Tent in camp 0.1%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 24.9%
Not at all 56.6%
Always 18.1%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 55.8%
Water tanks/trucks 51.8%
Wells 43.4%
Broken pipes 41.9%
Rivers 17.4%
Others 0.6%

Electricity Supply:
No power 16.5%
1-3 hours per day 11.3%
Four or more hours per day 71.6%

Fuel Access:
No access 78.5%
Benzene 18.8%
Propane 12.6%
Diesel 11.9%
Kerosene 6.1%
Other 0.1%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 1.2%
No one works 98.8%

Type Of Property Left Behind:
Other 68.3%
Land for housing 16.6%
Shop/business 9.7%
Apartment or room 2.5%
House 1.6%
Land for farming 1.3%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 76.1%
Accessible 8.1%
Occupied 6.8%
Destroyed 3.8%
Used by military 0.4%
Taken over by Government 0.2%

Source of Assistance:
No aid received 60.0%
Other 16.9%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 16.4%
Relatives 13.2%
Humanitarian group 7.9%
Host community 5.7%
Religious group 5.1%
Iraqi Red Crescent 3.6%
Other government agency 1.5%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 33.6%
Non-food items 28.8%
Health 8.6%
Other 5.2%

Food Aid Source:
No aid 77.0%
Others 8.4%
Provincial government 7.2%
Humanitarian group 4.7%
Federal government 2.6%
Religious charity 1.4%

Needs:
Food 96%
Shelter 93%
Jobs 51%
Legal Help 24%
Water 11%
Health 9%
Other 5%
Sanitation 5%
School 3%
Hygiene 0%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Kirkuk, Ninewa & Salah al-Din, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008