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>How Did Kirkuk Become Such A Divisive Issue? A Portrait of The City In 2003

>The Pre-War Situation

As recent events have shown, Kirkuk remains one of the outstanding issues in Iraqi politics. Not only does it have a national dynamic between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad, but a local one between Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians who live there and are all arguing over who has the right to control it. How did it get that way? A portrait of Kirkuk and Tamim province immediately after the U.S. invasion helps explain at least a part of the story.

In the weeks just before the war began in March 2003 hundreds of Kurds were being driven out of Kirkuk by Saddam’s forces. The goal was to prepare for the American invasion and suppress the Kurds who were expected to help them. This followed a long trend of Baghdad trying to change the demographics of the area. Saddam’s Anfal campaign that started in the 1980s, and his Arabization policy that displaced around 150,000 Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrian Christians were the most famous examples, but the Iraqi government had been trying to move Arabs into Tamim since at least the 1950s. It’s believed that up to 350,000 Kurds and Turkmen were forced to leave as a result. The population was also changed by the fact that Kirkuk was the hub of the northern oil industry that attracted workers from around the country.

This has led to all kinds of claims to the city by each of the three major ethnicities there. For example, the Kurds say they were and are presently the majority, while the Turkmen point to the 1947 census that showed they were the largest group. A reporter from PBS’ Frontline that entered Kirkuk right after the invasion said that at that time the Kurds were 45% of city, Turkmen 25%, and the remaining 30% were split between Arabs and Christians.

Human Rights Watch warned in late March 2003 that Kirkuk was a disaster waiting to happen. They said unless the U.S. made plans for all of the people that were expected to return to the province after being pushed out by Saddam there would be a crisis. U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi opposition officials actually did meet that month, and said they would set up a committee to deal with northern Iraq, but it never materialized. This was no different from the rest of Iraq, where the U.S. also failed to adequately plan for the post-war situation.

Kirkuk During The U.S. Invasion

As soon as the U.S. war began in March 2003 Iraqi forces began abandoning their positions along the border with Kurdistan. This opened the road to Kirkuk, which the Kurds had promised the Americans they would not enter. The melting away of Saddam’s army was too tempting however, and the Kurdish peshmerga rushed to fill the vacuum. Looting was immediately reported in northern Tamim as the Kurds took out their anger at the Iraqi government. The situation was completely fluid and under Kurdish control, as there were only 2,000 U.S. paratroops in all of northern Iraq, and 50 Green Berets with the frontline peshmerga.

On April 10, the Iraqi forces withdrew from Kirkuk after heavy U.S. bombing, and Kurdish militiamen and civilians moved in. This set off alarm bells in Turkey that was afraid of Kurdish independence. Ankara warned that they would send in their troops if necessary to prevent that from happening, and the Turkish Foreign Minister demanded that observers be sent in at the minimum. He later talked to Secretary of State Colin Powell to get assurances that the Kurds would not be in control of Kirkuk.

Pillaging began in the city as well. There were lines of trucks and cars going back and forth from Irbil and Sulaymaniya to Kirkuk, full of looted goods. While most of the stealing appeared to be happening in Kurdish and government areas, the Turkmen claimed that they were being victimized by the Kurds as well. A day after Kirkuk fell, the Turkmen even held a demonstration against the looting. U.S. soldiers said they were powerless to stop it because they did not have control of the situation, very similar to what happened in other Iraqi cities after the fall of the government. The U.S. commander in Tamim later said that his unit had no plans for dealing with Kirkuk when they went into the country. They were originally tasked with just protecting the oil fields in the province, and were to stay out of the city. They were compelled to break those orders when Kirkuk descended into chaos.

Because of pressure from Washington and Turkey, the Kurdish leadership announced that the peshmerga would withdraw from Kirkuk. At the same time though, Kurdish police from Sulaymaniya were entering the city to assert law and order, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was attempting to take over the administration. A contingent from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade also arrived, and Ankara sent in a small group of Turkish Special Forces as observers.

As the looting was being brought under control, there were the first reports of Arabs being expelled from the city and surrounding rural areas. Divas, a middle class neighborhood in Kirkuk that was built for Iraqi army officers was found largely abandoned after Kurds told them they had 24 hours to leave or be shot. On orders from local PUK officials, 2,000 members of the Shamar tribe who had been moved into Tamim in 1973 with the promise of free land by the government were also forced out of four villages. A PUK official in a neighboring town said this was part of his party’s policy to remove all the Arabs that moved into the province under Saddam. Senior PUK leaders denied this claim however.

Most Arabs actually fled before the U.S. invasion even began. According to interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch, the main reasons why they left were to escape the U.S. bombings and fighting, fear of the Kurds’ revenge, and a belief that much of the property they occupied actually belonged to the Kurds. Many relocated to Kirkuk at first, but then moved south. There were already refugee camps full of Arabs just a week after the fall of the city, and those who tried to return to their homes said Kurdish civilians and peshmerga stopped them.

The Turkmen were also singled out. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) gave an eviction notice to the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s headquarters in Kirkuk on April 13. The party said that the KDP warned them that there would be trouble if they didn’t leave.

Post-War Kirkuk

By May there were sporadic outbursts of violence between the different ethnic groups in Tamim. In that month, around 500 Arabs from the town of Hawija attacked the Kurdish part of Kirkuk, starting 36 hours of fighting. Five people were killed in the process. The cause was Kurdish harassment of some Arabs at a market and a bridge in the city two days beforehand. The Kurdish police also reported that Arabs had killed four Kurds in another neighborhood, and 40 people had been wounded since the fall of the city. American troops were later shot at in Hawija, showing that some elements were also mad at the U.S. for how things were going.

That anger increased when the Americans put together a governing council in Tamim. On May 25, a 300-member assembly of local leaders elected 30 delegates to the council. The Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and Christians got six delegates each, plus there were six independent members. That council went on to pick a governor. The day the council was seated the U.S. arrested five Arab members saying that they were Baathists. Two days before American forces arrested two other Arab leaders on the same charges. The Kurds ended up winning the mayor of Kirkuk, and got the majority of seats on the council when the Americans gave them five of the six independent positions.

In August 2003 violence flared up between Turkmen and Kurds. On August 22, Turkmen held a parade for a rebuilt Shiite shrine in the town of Tuz Khumato, south of Kirkuk. They got into an argument with Kurdish residents, who then tried to destroy the shrine with rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkmen rioted, burning down a police station. Eight Turkmen were killed as a result, two by U.S. forces. The Turkmen were mad at the Kurds and the Americans beforehand because they had appointed a Kurdish mayor and chief of police, even though the Turkmen were a majority there. The next day, Turkmen held a protest in Kirkuk that also led to rioting. Three Turkmen were killed, 15-20 demonstrators and police were wounded, and Kurds set about attacking Turkmen statues in the city. There the Turkmen were accusing the Kurds of flooding the city to create a majority to take it over, while Kurdish officials accused the Turkmen of being manipulated by Turkey.

These bursts of violence continued for the rest of the year, with no one willing to back down. On November 20, the PUK headquarters in Kirkuk was bombed and the Islamist Ansar al-Islam was suspected of being responsible. A month later demonstrations and counter-demonstrations by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen for and against federalism in Kirkuk led to a shootout on December 31 leaving five dead. U.S. raids were also turning up illegal weapons in all of the major political parties’ offices including those of the KDP, PUK and Turkmen Front, as all sides seemed to be gearing up for a fight.

The Kurdish parties were also trying to create facts on the ground to support their call for Kirkuk to be annexed by Kurdistan. They encouraged people to move back to Kirkuk, and even offered money to each family that did. Once there, these returnees tended to live in tent camps or squatted on government property. By March 2004, there were around 25,000 Kurds living in these conditions. None of them said they’d gotten any money from the Kurdish parties however, and they were desperate to find work, and were relying upon the government food ration system. There were thousands more still in Kurdistan who said they would not go back unless they knew they had housing and jobs. Others said they were simply too poor to make the trip. While many of these people had a legitimate desire to return to Kirkuk, the Kurdish parties were also manipulating them in their attempt to rest control of the city for themselves.

There were Turkmen and Arabs in a very similar situation. Turkmen were also attempting to return to Kirkuk, and were forced to live in tent camps too, as well as Arabs that had fled the city before the invasion. By 2004 the Mahdi Army was organizing Shiite Arabs and Turkmen in the city against the Kurdish claims, and threatening people to not leave.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was very worried about the situation. Paul Bremer, the head of the CPA, was so concerned that he talked twice with Kurdish leaders asking them to drop their claims to Kirkuk, but to no avail. In September 2003 for example, the Kurdish President and head of the KDP Massoud Barzani said that all Arabs who had moved to Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas since 1961 had to leave. The CPA was panicking as a result, and did not offer any assistance to any of the Kurds that returned to Tamim, fearing that it would legitimize the Kurdish strategy.

By early 2004 the situation in Kirkuk and Tamim province were quickly deteriorating just as Human Rights Watch had warned about before the opening of hostilities. Reports of Arabs being expelled by Kurds after the fall of Kirkuk didn’t capture the fact that the majority had fled even before the war started. By June 2003 the Kurdish parties had cracked down on many of their members and there were no more stories of displacement. Much more important were the occasional flashes of violence, and the growing dispute over the governance of Kirkuk and Tamim. A year after the invasion, Kirkuk had grown from a local and regional problem to a national one as insurgents and the Mahdi Army were operating in the city, and the CPA was being drawn in. It seems that the divide and conquer strategy of Saddam Hussein was so effective that it continued to play out even after he was disposed. The Kurds, Turkmen, and Arabs were so tied up in their conflicting claims to Kirkuk that cooperation was nearly impossible. The lack of U.S. forces in the north also created a security vacuum that left every group to fend for itself, and the absence of U.S. planning for post-war Iraq allowed the PUK and KDP to become the de facto sovereigns of Kirkuk and many surrounding areas through their police and control of the administration. The subsequent years have only increased these divisions in the city, just as it has become more of an issue in Iraqi politics.

SOURCES

Badkhen, Anna, “Kurds evicting Arabs in north Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/19/03

Baker, Luke, “Ancient Rivalries Vie for Dominance of Iraq’s Kirkuk,” Reuters, 2/5/04

BBC, “Kurds flee Iraqi town,” 3/15/03

Bruni, Frank, “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Turkey Sending Military Observers to Watch Kurds; U.S. Warns Against Further Moves,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Chivers, C.J., “A Nation At War: In The Field – Kirkuk; Iraqis Abandon Post And Kurds Advance,” New York Times, 3/28/03
- “A Nation At War: In The Field l Northern Iraq; Kirkuk on the Horizon, and a Falcon and Shells Nearby,” New York Times, 4/2/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Front; Attention Now Shifts to the Role of the Kurds,” New York Times, 4/10/03
- “A Nation At War: Northern Iraq; Paratroopers Find Suspicious Warheads and Rocket Parts in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 4/13/03
- “A Nation At War: The Kurds; Kirkuk’s Swift Collapse Leaves a City in Chaos,” New York Times, 4/11/03

CNN, “U.S. reinforcements arrive in Kirkuk,” 4/10/03

Fleishman, Jeffrey, “Kirkuk Rises to Uneasy Freedom,” Los Angeles Times, 4/12/03

Human Rights Watch, “Claims in Conflict,” 8/2/04
- “Iraq: Impending Inter-Ethnic Violence in Kirkuk,” 3/27/03
- “Iraq: Killings, Expulsions on the Rise in Kirkuk,” 4/14/03

Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “IDP News Alert: 16 April 2003,” 4/16/03
- “IDP News Alert: 23 April 2003,” 4/23/03

IRIN, “IRAQ: Focus on IDPs in Kirkuk living in poor conditions,” 3/1/04

Kiley, Sam, “IRAQ: The Road to Kirkuk,” Frontline, May 2003

Mite, Valentinas, “Turkomans Say Kirkuk’s Growing Kurdish Population A Threat,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11/13/03

Mufti, Hania, Stover, Eric, “Troubles in Kirkuk,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/30/03

Oppel, Richard with MacFarquhar, Neil, “After the War: Southern Iraq; 3 British Soldiers Are Killed in Basra Attack,” New York Times, 8/24/03

PBS Frontline, “Interview Col. William Mayville,” Beyond Baghdad, 2/12/04

Rhode, David, “A Nation At War: The North; As Kurds Move Into Kirkuk, Arabs Fear Revenge,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Sachs, Susan, “A Region Inflamed: Attacks; Truck Bomb Kills 5 in a Pro-U.S. Kurdish Stronghold in Northern Iraq,” New York Times, 11/21/03

Travernise, Sabrina, “After The War: The North; Kurds Celebrate Election of Mayor in Kirkuk,” New York Times, 5/29/03
- “After The War: Northern Iraq; U.S. Detains 5 Suspected Baath Loyalists at Kirkuk Elections,” New York Times, 5/25/03
- “Aftereffects: The North; Arabs and Kurds Clash in Kirkuk, and at Least 5 Are Killed,” New York Times, 5/18/03

Tyler, Patrick, “A Nation At War: Combat; Allies Widen Hold on Iraq; Civil Strife on Rise,” New York Times, 4/11/03

Voice of America, “Iraqi Kurds Return to Kirkuk,” 5/29/03

Washington Times, “Insurgents stir up strife in Kirkuk,” 5/17/04

Wong, Edward, “The Struggle for Iraq: Northern Iraq; Back From Exile, Kurds Demand Political Power and Reparations for Seized Property,” New York Times, 1/19/04

>Is The U.S. Committed To Resolving The Kirkuk Controversy In Iraq?

>The recent delay of the passage of the 2010 election law showed that Kirkuk remains one of the major unresolved issues in Iraq. There is now talk that the United States will try to deal with the city before it withdraws its troops by the end of 2011.

Joost Hilterman of the International Crisis Group recently wrote a piece in the New York Review of Books where he said that the U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill and commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno will attempt to work out a deal over the future of Kirkuk after the Iraqi elections, which are set for January 2010. Odierno is especially worried that Kirkuk could be a flashpoint for renewed violence, this time between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government. He has successfully pushed the two sides to create a joint command center to coordinate the work of the local Iraqi forces and the Kurdish peshmerga in Kirkuk, but plans to expand that to surrounding areas has stalled because of politically differences. The local Arabs and Turkmen for example, think that the idea will legitimize the presence of the peshmerga, which they hope will someday leave.

U.S. forces have also returned to the streets of Kirkuk to conduct joint patrols, the first since the June 30, 2009 withdrawal from Iraqi cities. The chief of police in Kirkuk publicly said that the Iraqis could do their jobs without assistance, but privately told the BBC that he still calls the Americans for help with operations. This is another step by the U.S. meant to keep a lid on tensions in Kirkuk.

Iraqis desperately need some outside mediation to deal with Kirkuk. Left to their own devices, Iraq’s politicians could go on for months and months debating the issue. It has already been responsible for delaying two election laws, and Article 140 of the Constitution that called for a census and then referendum on the issue has been all but given up on. The United Nations has been trying to work on the issue since early 2007, but to no avail. The U.S. might be the best and last chance to make forward movement on Kirkuk. While their influence with Baghdad is declining, they still have many friends in Kurdistan, and can act as an honest broker since they have taken no position on the city, other than wanting it resolved. It’s definitely something that needs to be kept an eye on in the coming months.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Iraq-US joint patrols tour Kirkuk City,” 10/22/09

Gatehouse, Gabriel, “US presence remains in divided Kirkuk,” BBC, 10/20/09

Hilterman, Joost, “Iraq on the Edge,” New York Review of Books,” 11/19/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraq’s Parliament Finally Does Its Job – Passes Election Law

On the night of November 8, 2009, Iraq’s parliament finally passed the 2010 election law. 195 of the 175 members were present, with 141 voting for the bill. As mentioned before, the law was originally supposed to be passed on October 16, but disputes over how to conduct voting in Tamim, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list voting system, delayed the proceedings. From reports, it seems that the legislature was able to break the deadlock when the major parties, including Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Sadrists, decided to drop their arguments over Tamim, so that the bill could move forward. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill was also seen at the parliament on Sunday desperately trying to bring lawmakers together so that a vote could happen.

The 2010 Election Law is actually a revision of the 2005 legislation with three major changes. First, there will be open instead of closed list voting. This allows the public to choose from individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions. Second, elections in Tamim will be provisional for one year as a committee goes through the voter roles looking for any irregularities. This arises from claims by Arabs and Turkmen in the province that say Kurds have moved in thousands of their people into Kirkuk to shift the demographics in their favor to assure their victory in any vote, and eventually annex it. If the committee finds a difference of 5% or more in the vote, than the election can be invalidated there. To assuage the Kurds, the law says that other provinces can also have their voter roles scrutinized at the request of more than 50 lawmakers. The Kurdish Alliance currently has 53 seats. It also dropped the proposal to give two compensatory seats each to Arabs and Turkmen in Tamim to make up for the expected Kurdish victory there. Third, the number of seats up for grabs will increase from the current 275 to 323. This is based upon statistics from the Ministry of Trade that administers the food ration system, and a requirement that there be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people.

After that, the bill is pretty much like the 2005 one. Iraqis living overseas will be allowed to vote. There will also be quotas for women, and minorities. Christians will get one seat each in Tamim, Ninewa, Baghdad, Irbil, and Dohuk, Yazidis and Shabaks will get one seat each in Ninewa, and Mandean Christians will get one seat in Baghdad. Women are also supposed to be 25% of the politicians elected to office.

The bill now goes to the Presidential Council for final approval, which is expected shortly. The Election Commission, however, says that because of the delays, Iraq cannot hold balloting on the original date, which was January 16, 2010. Instead they have proposed January 21 as the new deadline.

It was important that the parliament put aside its differences over the future of Kirkuk to get the election bill passed. If they had not, the debate over it could’ve dragged on for months as happened with the provincial election law that was originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009, and had the original version vetoed as a result. At the same time, the law is definitely a victory for the Kurds. They got all of their major demands met, and their expected victory in Tamim in 2010 will create more facts on the ground to support their argument that the Kurdistan Regional Government should annex Kirkuk. That will have to wait for another day however as the technical issue of holding elections is finally moving forward.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq ends impasse of elections law,” 11/9/09
- “Kirkuk included in Iraqi elections,” 11/9/09

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq passes new election law, smoothing way for January elections,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/09

Associated Press, “Election Law Passes In Iraq, Setting Up National Vote,” 11/8/09
- “Iraq Election Panel Seeks Jan. 21 Vote,” 11/9/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “After stormy, wrangling session, election law passed,” 11/8/09

BBC, “Iraq MPs approve election reform,” 11/8/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Passes Key Election Law and Prepares for January Vote,” Wall Street Journal, 11/9/09

Chulov, Martin, “Deal on Kirkuk sets stage for Iraqi elections,” Guardian, 11/8/09

CNN, “Iraqi parliament passes key voting law,” 11/8/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi MPs pass delayed election law,” 11/9/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law, paving way for January vote,” Washington Post, 11/8/09

Reuters, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law,” 11/8/09

Roads To Iraq, “Election law, a first view,” 11/9/09

Strobel, Warren, Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis pass election law crucial to U.S. withdrawal plans,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
- “Iraqis set elections for Jan. 23 after weeks of rancor,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Election Law Is Passed: Open Lists, Kirkuk Recognised as a Governorate with “Dubious” Registers,” Historiae.org, 11/8/09

Williams, Timothy and Izzi, Sa’ad, “Iraq Passes Crucial Election Law,” New York Times, 11/9/09

>Kirkuk And The 2010 Election Law

>Kirkuk is again the leading issue in Iraq’s parliament as it discusses a new election law. Parliamentarians have agreed upon all the major points in the bill except for voting in Tamim province, the home of Kirkuk. The Kurdish Alliance is pushing for Tamim to vote as a regular governorate. Others, like the Iraqi Islamic Party, are suggesting creating quotas for the four major groups in Tamim, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians. There are other factions who are calling for a delay in voting in Kirkuk altogether.

In July 2008 when parliament was discussing the 2009 provincial vote, Kirkuk led to a walkout and veto of the original election law. The 2009 bill called for a delay in balloting in Tamim as a power sharing agreement was implemented. The Kurdish bloc walked out over it, and eventually President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council vetoed it. The final version of law also postponed voting in Tamim until a special committee could come up with a deal between the major groups in the province. The committee did nothing, and provincial voting has never happened there yet.

National elections are much more important, so it’s unlikely that Kirkuk will hold up the vote. If parliament can’t pass a new bill by October 15, 2009, Iraq will simply revert to the old 2005 law. The major difference is that the proposed legislation includes an open list that allows voters to pick either lists or individual candidates, while the old one is a closed list where the public can only vote for lists, and the parties pick the politicians.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Kurds call not to adjourn elections in Kirkuk,” 9/25/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Kurdish Alliance rejects proposal to divide the Islamic Party of Kirkuk into four electoral districts,” 9/24/09
- “Kurdish lawmaker attributes hindering elections bill to ‘illegal demands,’” 9/24/09

Iraqi Pres Agency, “Delay adoption of the Law of the Iraqi elections may lead to delayed,” 9/29/09

Salloum, Sa’ad, “election committee head explains changes in new draft law,” Niqash, 9/28/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Elections Law: Who Will Stand Up for Kirkuk?” Iraq and Gulf Analysis, 9/28/09

>Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols In Disputed Areas Remains A Political Football

>In mid-August 2009, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno proposed joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Americans made the proposal after a series of mass casualty bombings rocked the province. The offer was later extended to all of the disputed territories in northern Iraq. The idea originated from a joint military command set up outside of Kirkuk to coordinate security operations between American, Iraqi, and Kurdish peshmerga forces. The purpose of the patrols is to increase cooperation and communication between Iraqi and Kurdish forces, which have often been at odds with each other, and close the security gaps that the insurgents have been able to exploit between them to carry out attacks.

General Odierno met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani about the plan. The Kurdish authorities immediately welcomed the idea, as did the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List. The main opponents of the plan have been Sunni Arab and Turkmen parties and politicians. Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, expressed concerns about the idea when he met with Vice President Joe Biden in mid-September 2009 during his trip to Iraq. A few days before on September 12 a group of Turkmen demonstrated against the U.S. plan in Kirkuk. Earlier on September 1 Arab and Turkmen marched together in opposition to the idea as well. The Arab bloc in the Tamim provincial council also threatened a boycott if the patrols were implemented, and the al-Hadbaa controlled provincial council in Ninewa was also critical of the concept in August. The most inflammatory statement however, came from the al-Hadbaa governor of Ninewa Atheel al-Najafi who said that joint patrols in his province would influence the 2010 parliamentary elections in favor of the Kurds, and that therefore voting in Kurdish areas of Ninewa should be cancelled.

With the joint patrol concept creating that many divisive opinions, they’re unlikely to be implemented for now. There may be specific towns where local officials might be able to work something out, but otherwise the issue is becoming a political football between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. With parliamentary elections coming up in January 2010 as well, politicians are likely to take up the issue one way or the other to promote their own agendas further complicating the matter.

SOURCES

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09
- “Kurdish areas in Nineveh spark sharp disputes,” 9/17/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Hashemi voices reservations about joint forces presence in Kirkuk, Ninewa,” 9/16/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/18/09

Radio Sawa, “A demonstration in Kirkuk against the proposed deployment of a joint disputed areas,” 9/12/09

Visser, Reidar, “Maliki’s Northern Headache, and How General Odierno Is Compounding It,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 9/9/09

>Joint U.S.-Iraq-Kurdish Patrols Okayed In Ninewa Objected To In Kirkuk

>August 2009 saw a sharp increase in mass casualty bombings across Iraq. After Baghdad, Ninewa was the hardest hit. On August 9 a suicide bomber struck a mosque in Mosul killing 23 and wounding 130. The next day two truck bombs hit the village of Khazna in eastern Ninewa killing 20 and wounding 110. Finally, on August 13 a suicide truck bomber attacked a café in Sinjar killing 20 and wounding 35.

Tensions were already high in the province due to the divide between the Kurdish Ninewa Fraternal List and the ruling al-Hadbaa party, and the two sides blamed each other for the violence. In response the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno suggested creating joint U.S.-Iraqi-Kurdish patrols in Ninewa. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the head of the Fraternal List initially welcomed the idea, and on September 1, 2009 it was announced that the joint operations would go ahead in the Mosul suburbs, the capital of Ninewa. The Americans have already set up similar patrols outside of Kirkuk in Tamim province, and are seen as a way to foster cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, so they could be a positive move in Ninewa as well since things have only gotten worse there politically since the January 2009 provincial elections.

In neighboring Tamim however, Arabs have protested against expanding the program to Kirkuk itself and other parts of the province. On September 3, the Arab bloc on the provincial council said they would conduct a boycott if joint patrols were created within the city of Kirkuk. Then on September 5, 500 people in the town of Huweija demonstrated against the patrols being formed across the rest of the province. The Arabs are probably afraid that the policy will give the Kurds a larger presence in Tamim and Kirkuk then before, and thus upset the delicate balance between groups.

The joint patrols when implemented have apparently helped relieve tensions, but they are only a band-aid. American troops are drawing down so the operations can only last for a set amount of time. The bigger problem is the growing divide between the Fraternal List and al-Hadbaa, Baghdad and Kurdistan, and Arabs and Kurds. This needs U.S. mediation, but Washington doesn’t seem to be giving it much priority. Only the American military seems to be taking the initiative, and that’s not enough.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Humdreds protest against proposed US-Iraq-Kurd force,” 9/5/09

AK News, “Kurds welcome Americans Kirkuk proposal,” 8/20/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “Arab bloc in Kirkuk threatens to boycott council,” 9/3/09
- “Demonstrations in Huweija against tripartite force,” 9/5/09
- “Iraqi-Kurdish-U.S. security teams in Mosul-source,” 9/1/09
- “Mosul mosque blast death toll up to 38, wounded 90,” 8/7/09
- “Mosul truck bombs casualties rise to 153,” 8/10/09
- “Sinjar suicide blast casualties up to 55,” 8/13/09
- “Truck bombs kill 20, wound 110 in Mosul,” 8/10/09

Graeber, Daniel, “arab-kurdish divide dominating u.s. agenda,” Niqash, 9/1/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Juhi, Bushra, “Iraqi Arabs protest US plan for Kurdish patrols,” Associated Press, 9/5/09

Nordland, Rod and Dagher, Sam, “U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Militia,” New York Times, 8/17/09

>Kirkuk Looks To Be Voting In The 2010 Elections

>There was some controversy as to whether Tamim province, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, would be allowed to participate in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Tamim has still not voted for a new provincial government even though the balloting was held in January 2009 in fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen governorates. One of the big hold ups was over the voter rolls. The four major groups in Kirkuk, the Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and Christians can not agree on who should be able to register. The Kurds asked that displaced families that had been kicked out by Saddam and since returned should be allowed to vote, while Arabs and Turkmen call them squatters who have been moved in by the Kurdish authorities to gerrymander the demographics of the city in their favor. The dispute has been not resolved. A proposed national census was also supposed to help with the voting lists, but that was indefinitely postponed in mid-August 2009 out of fear that it would create more divisions. Tamim has not held provincial elections as a result.

The Iraqi Election Commission is moving forward with preparations for the parliamentary vote in the province anyway. The Commission said that anyone that had a food ration card by July 15, 2009 would be eligible to register to vote. The centers to do this will be open until September 20, and the election is scheduled for January 16, 2010. The national vote is less controversial in Tamim than the local one, because it will not disturb the delicate and disputed balance of power within the province.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “IHEC in Kirkuk stipulates ration card before mid July,” 8/27/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Reuters, “Citing Tensions, Iraq Abandons Census Plans,” 8/16/09

>International Crisis Group Report On Baghdad-Kurdish Divide

>In early July 2009 the International Crisis Group issued its latest report on Iraq covering the simmering Baghdad-Kurdish dispute entitled “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line.” This has been one of the biggest problems in Iraq over the last two years, and has replaced the sectarian war as the major dividing line in the country. The U.S. is especially worried that it might blow up and lead to new violence as the administration is trying to draw down forces. Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill, have all talked recently about this issue needing to be resolved. There may not be enough of a commitment on the part of Washington, Baghdad, and Kurdistan however to fix this problem anytime soon.

The split between the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began in the summer of 2008. Previous to that Baghdad was relatively weak, especially in the years immediately following the U.S. invasion. That allowed the Kurds to win a number of large concessions to protect their autonomy, while their peshmerga forces swept south into areas they claimed to be historically Kurdish. By 2008 however, Maliki and the central government were stronger, and the Prime Minister began trying to assert federal authority and limit the Kurds to Kurdistan. This led to a number of confrontations, some of which are still playing out today. In August 2008 Maliki confronted the Kurds in the disputed district of Khanaqin in Diyala province. That same month the Prime Minister began talking about the need for a strong central government, that the constitution should be changed, that ethnosectarian quotas should be done away with, that there was no need to find consensus on every law between the different groups in the country, and that majority rule should replace it. In September 2008 Maliki followed that up by moving the 12th Iraqi Army Division into Tamim, home of Kirkuk. These were all steps meant to improve Maliki’s image as a nationalist leader before the 2009 provincial elections. He could very use the same tactics in the run-up to the 2010 parliamentary vote.

As would be expected, Maliki’s actions set off alarm bells in Kurdistan. The Kurdish leadership began condemning the Prime Minister, and claiming he was acting like the new dictator of Iraq. The Kurds were also becoming increasingly frustrated that nothing was being done about Kirkuk, and began holding up major legislation in parliament as a result. The Kurds even flirted with having a no confidence vote against Maliki in December 2008, but a lack of a successor ended the idea. By 2009 then, the two sides had hardened their positions, and neither seemed willing to back down.

The Crisis Group points to five on-going issues that are contributing to the conflict between Baghdad and the KRG. First is Kirkuk, which remains in political limbo as none of the parties can agree upon how to resolves its future or hold elections there. Second is the Green Line, the former border between Iraq and Kurdistan established in 1991. That line disappeared after 2003 when the peshmerga moved south into the disputed areas. Even though the constitution says they should not be there, the Kurds claim that part of the constitution should be revised. Third is the United Nations’ attempt to mediate the disputed areas. In April 2009 the U.N. presented its findings on the territories, and in mid-June the first meeting was held to work out the details, but shortly afterwards the Kurds passed a draft of a regional constitution, which laid claim to Kirkuk and other the other areas the Kurds consider theirs. Fourth, is the increasing confrontation between the peshmerga and Iraqi security forces. This began in Khanaqin in August 2008, spread to Tamim, and then Ninewa. The U.S. has increased its presence in the north to try to mediate, and set up a joint committee of Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Kirkuk, but has been unsuccessful in creating similar groups in the rest of the conflicted areas. The Kurds and Baghdad are both apprehensive about what will happen after the U.S. withdrawal, and are thinking in terms of worst-case scenarios of a possible armed confrontation. Last is the control of Iraq’s oil and natural gas. This involves the constitution and who has the authority to issue contracts, Baghdad or Kurdistan. The two sides have held up work on fields in disputed areas, and even when there is an apparent break through like the recent okay for the Kurds to export some of their oil, there are major hindrances as well. The Kurds are looking for major oil companies to move into the region, and create stronger ties with Turkey and the European Union to pressure Baghdad into allowing the KRG to follow its own, autonomous resource development plan.

The International Crisis Group, the United Nations, and the U.S. all say that this is the major divide in Iraq today. The problem is that the dispute involves so many different issues, federalism, the constitution, the security forces, the disputed territories, and natural resources, that any negotiations will be long and difficult. The Crisis Group calls for a grand bargain between the two sides that would include all of these issues. In October 2008 they proposed just such a deal for Kirkuk, but there were so many steps that it seemed impossible to implement. There is also the added issue that this is an election year for Iraq with parliamentary elections due in January 2010, which leads politicians to harden their stances rather than seek compromise. U.S. influence is also weakening as Maliki is limiting their freedom of operation under the Status of Forces Agreement, and U.S. troops are set to withdraw in the coming months. All of these factors do not point to a breakthrough in this dispute. Unless the Americans make a major push to put all of these sides in a room together to talk out their differences, it seems like the Baghdad-KRG dispute could last for years. Despite recent trips and comments by leading administration officials, there does not appear to be this level of commitment by the White House. Instead they seem to be working at the local level to try to stop the peshmerga and Iraqi Army from shooting at each other, while standing behind the United Nations’ talk at the national level, rather than being in the forefront and being the initiator. Perhaps only Maliki being replaced as Prime Minister could change things in the short-term, and this will definitely be a goal of the Kurds after the 2010 elections.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Khalil, Lydia, “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” Brookings Institution, June 2009

Kurdistan Regional Government, “Full Text of the KRG Response to Iraqi Prime Minister’s Accusations,” 12/1/08

Mahmoud, Amer, “controversy over Kurdish constitution,” Niqash, 7/6/09

Malazada, Hemin, “kurds dismiss talk of centralization,” Niqash, 11/24/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08

Reuters, “Shi’ite Maliki calls for majority rule in Iraq,” 5/15/09

>The Constitutional Conundrum Of The Kurds

>Officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) consistently claim that the Constitution and its Article 140 need to be followed when it comes to resolving Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Most recently KRG President Massoud Barzani said at the end of July 2009 that

The problem is the 2005 Iraqi constitution says that this presence is illegal. The 2004 Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) that was drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority to govern Iraq until it drew up its own constitution included Article 53(A). It said that the Kurds only had authority over areas that they controlled before the 2003 U.S. invasion. This area was established in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War when Iraqi forces withdrew and the U.S. and England established a northern no fly zone. The border between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq became known as the Green Line. Article 53(A) was later incorporated into the 2005 constitution.

Since 2007 Kurdish officials have said they no longer recognize the Green Line since they have de facto control of these disputed territories. In late 2007 for example, the KRG Natural Resources Minister said the Green Line was passé. The KRG also told oil and security companies working in Kurdistan to remove any maps that included the Green Line. In early 2009 Masrour Barzani, son of KRG President Massoud Barzani, and head of the KRG’s security forces, stated that the Green Line was a relic of Saddam’s time and that the KRG refused to abide by it. In May he told the International Crisis Group that everything in the constitution should be negotiated to resolve the fate of these areas.

This is the conundrum the Kurds now find themselves in. On the one hand, they demand that Article 140 and the constitution be followed when it comes to Kirkuk, and the disputed territories. At the same time the constitution says they have no right to be in those areas as they now are. The Kurds have increasingly rejected this part of the constitution, and said that everything in it needs to be discussed. They can’t have it both ways. They can’t insist on the constitution being followed when they are breaking it and demanding revisions of it. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved any time soon, especially with U.S. forces withdrawing. Even though Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently traveled to Kurdistan to meet with top KRG officials, positions will probably harden as the 2010 parliamentary elections near.

SOURCES

Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq’s Fracture Lines: Recidivism or Reassertion,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7/28/09

Dagher, Sam, “Arrests in Bank Robbery Create a Rift Between Iraqi Officials,” New York Times, 8/3/09
- “New Kurdish Leader Asserts Agenda,” New York Times, 7/29/09

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09
- “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Iraqi Constitution

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Mohammed, Shwan, “Kurdish forces refuse to quit Iraq battlefield province,” Agence France Presse, 8/13/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

>The New Dispute In Kirkuk – The National Census

>On October 24, 2009 Iraq is set to conduct a national census. This will be the first one held since the overthrow of Saddam. Its results will have the largest effect upon the disputed area of Kirkuk in Tamim province. Article 140 of the constitution called for a census in Tamim before a referendum on the future of Kirkuk could be conducted no later than December 31, 2007. Neither happened. The Kurds want the census to occur because they are the majority in the province, and it would create facts on the ground to support their claim to the area. Arabs and Kurds in Tamim are therefore opposed to it. They claim that the Kurdish parties moved in thousands of their followers into the province after the U.S. invasion, sometimes by force, thus gerrymandering the demographics in their favor. The Kurds dispute this, claiming that the returns were simply people who were forcibly displaced by Saddam’s Arabization policy. Neither side appears willing to compromise.

The government survey will also be of importance because it will determine the voting rolls for the province. Tamim has still not had provincial elections, which were held in January 2009, and unless the census happens there, may not participate in the January 2010 parliamentary elections either.

As usual, Iraq’s political leaders are unable to deal with this dilemma. Some Turkmen political parties say they want Baghdad to delay the census until it can figure out how many Kurds moved to Tamim after 2003. They have threatened a boycott of the census if this doesn’t happen, and the Arabs may join them. In parliament, one proposal is to simply drop Tamim from the national census. Another is to push ahead with a referendum and parliamentary elections in Kirkuk without one. A major sticking point is that the presidential committee, which includes Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, will veto any law devised by parliament unfavorable to the Kurds. The most likely scenario then, is that parliament will do nothing, and Tamim will be excluded from the census, and participation in voting again.

SOURCES

Gibbs, Nancy, “Unfinished Business,” Time, 4/28/03

International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line,” 7/8/09

Iraqi Constitution

Nordland, Rod, “Now It’s A Census That Could Rip Iraq Apart,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Williams, Timothy, “Turkmens in Contested Oil-Rich Province Vow to Boycott Iraq’s National Census,” New York Times, 7/24/09