>Iraq recently completed the second round of bidding on its oil fields, which will hopefully usher in the return of international petroleum companies to Iraq that will bring in much needed investment and know how. This round went much better than the first with deals for seven of the ten fields up for auction. Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussain Shahristani believes that Iraq could reach 12 million barrels a day in capacity in six years as a result, which would make it a rival to the world’s largest producer Saudi Arabia. With such high expectations, many Iraqis, especially in southern Iraq where most of the oil resides, are hoping that this wealth will trickle down in the form of jobs and better services.
Currently southern Iraq has some of the poorest sections of the country despite the huge petroleum reserves. A recent report by the government’s Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology, found that 49% of the population in Muthanna and 41% in Babil lived in poverty, the highest rates in Iraq. Residents of Dhi Qar told Agence France Presse that they didn’t expect much from the new oil deals, feeling that the best jobs would go to those that had political connections or paid bribes. In contrast, the Italian head of Dhi Qar’s Provincial Reconstruction Team, U.S.-funded groups that are aimed at improving the political and economic development of Iraq at the local level, believed that there would be plenty of job opportunities, and the complaints about corruption were overblown. Provincial officials in Basra also expressed similar optimism.
If jobs do appear, they will have to be from spin-offs such as construction and services, because its estimated that Iraq will only need 40,000 new oil workers by 2015. That’s a drop in the bucket when compared to the 250,000 young Iraqis who enter the job market each year. In Wasit for example, the sole foreign petroleum company currently operating in Iraq, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), only hired 450 Iraqis since it started working there in late-2008. They have also been accused of damaging farmland that has set off a wave of protests and small-scale sabotage against the corporation.
The problem as ever is that petroleum is not a labor-intensive industry. There will be a flurry of construction early on to improve the oil fields, which could offer opportunities to Iraqis. After that, probably in the best case, the increased revenues from higher exports will give Baghdad the necessary funds to improve services to placate the public. Otherwise the new oil deals will just give people another excuse to complain about their government.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Southern Iraq town hopes for jobs boom after oil auction,” 12/17/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “COSIT: Unemployment, poverty drop in Iraq,” 12/13/09
Despite the recent October 2009 Baghdad bombing, and the previous one in August, attacks in Iraq are at their lowest level since the 2003 invasion. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction recorded drops in weekly attacks in eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces from May to October 2009. The three governorates in Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya had the least amount of incidents at 0.5 or less for the last six months, followed by the southern provinces of Karbala, Qadisiyah, Najaf, and Muthanna that also saw fewer than one attack per week from August to October. Babil was the one exception in that region, as it had in increase in attacks going from 3.9 in the 2nd quarter of 2009 to 5.1 in the third. Much of that is due to sticky and roadside bombs planted by a mix of Sunni and Shiite militants, and gangs.
The five most violent areas were Diyala, Tamim, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Baghdad in that order. Out of those however, only Salahaddin saw a very small increase from the second quarter of 2009 to the third, going from 25.2 per week to 25.8. Those provinces along with Anbar however, hold roughly 70% of Iraq’s population. All remain violent because Baghdad is the seat of power, while Diyala, Tamim, Salahaddin, and Ninewa are at the center of the ethnosectarian struggle in the country.
These numbers, along with the fluctuating monthly death counts show that Iraq is a much changed place. Violence is still at unacceptable levels, but the number of attacks and casualties have seen a steady decline over the last two years. Not only that, but the nature of the conflict has drastically changed. Almost all of the incidents consist of bombings, mortar and rocket attacks, and assassinations. There are hardly any armed clashes between militants and the security forces anymore. This is due to the fact that Sunnis are attempting to join the political process, and the Shiite Special Groups and militias are hardly active anymore. This is not captured in the media, which hardly mentions Iraq anymore, and when it does, it’s almost always about violence. That creates a distorted picture of the situation there, and makes Iraq seem like it is in a perpetual state of chaos, when in fact, many there are attempting to return to their normal lives.
Weekly Average Attack Statistics In Iraq – May to October 2009
Province
May-July 09
Aug.-Oct. 09
% Change
Baghdad
74.8
63.1
-16%
Ninewa
65.5
53.1
-19%
Salahaddin
25.2
25.8
+3%
Tamim
20.9
19.8
-5%
Diyala
24.7
17.8
-28%
Anbar
14.9
9.2
-37%
Babil
3.9
5.1
+29%
Basra
5.2
4.1
-21%
Maysan
3.4
2.4
-30%
Dhi Qar
1.6
1.6
0%
Wasit
1.5
1.1
-32%
Qadisiyah
0.4
0.9
+128%
Najaf
1.2
0.4
-70%
Karbala
0.3
0.4
+14%
Muthanna
0.3
0.4
+14%
Irbil
0.2
0.4
+90%
Dohuk
0.5
0.2
-68%
Sulaymaniya
0.3
0.0
-100%
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “12 civilians wounded by roadside bomb blast in Babel,” 10/21/09 - “Sticky bomb kills 2 women, injures 12 persons in Babel,” 10/21/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Recent Trends in the Iraq War: Maps and Graphs,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/1/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/09
One of the major problems with the Iraqi government is its inability to spend its budget effectively. The country’s eighteen provinces do much worse than the central government in Baghdad. The new Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s quarterly report to Congress has the latest numbers on how Iraq’s governorates have done up to October 13, 2009.
As reported before, these aggregate numbers show only part of the picture. Almost all of these expenditures are going towards old projects initiated by the previous governments, before the 2009 elections when Iraq was flush with money. Almost every province, has reported a budget deficit this year as a result. Some councils have also not been good at spending their money, such as Maysan that expended 79% its money in 2008, but which went to only 41 of 241 projects. With security improving, Iraqis are increasingly calling for better services, which require that the governorates do a much better job with their finances. A top down, Soviet style management system, a paper based bureaucracy, corruption, and other factors are all reasons why the provinces have not been able to do a better job so far.
The latest report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced that have returned is now available. Like the last report, 2009 has continued to see a number of Iraqis come back, but varying by month. In June, 2009 14,750 displaced and 3,490 refugees for a total of 18,410 Iraqis made the trip back. That compared to a total of 15,330 in May. March saw the largest number of returns this year with 26,540. Since 2005 displaced returns, 61% of the total, have far outweighed the refugees coming back, 39%. In the first six months of 2009 roughly 101,490 Iraqis have returned. That would put this year roughly on track to match last year’s total of 221,260. 2004 has seen the most returns since the U.S. invasion with 291,997 making the trip. That year 193,997 were refugees coming back to see the new Iraq. In total, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,195,899 lost their homes, and about 1,075,986, 33.6%, have returned so far. The number of displaced and the percent that have returned is definitely incomplete because the UNHCR counts no refugees before 2006 when there were tens of thousands of them under Saddam.
Total displaced
Time
Displaced
Refugees
Total
Pre-2006
1,212,108
1,212,108
After 2006
1,695,899
1,500,000
3,195,899
Number of Returns 2003-June 2009
Time
Displaced
Refugees
Total
2003
0
55,429
55,429
2004
98,000
193,997
291,997
2005
98,000
56,155
154,155
2006
150,000
20.235
170,235
2008
195,890
25,370
221,260
Jan. 09
6,390
1,130
7,520
Feb. 09
15,810
2,970
18,780
Mar. 09
20,690
4,860
26,540
Apr. 09
11,020
3,890
14,910
May 09
10,540
2,990
15,330
Jun. 09
14,750
3,490
18,410
2009
79,200
18,970
101,490
Total
657,090
183,727
1,075,986
61%
39%
100%
The vast majority of Iraqis are going back to six of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting since the U.S. invasion, so it should be no surprise then that the capital has seen the most displaced, and the most returns. 54% of the displaced and 52% of refugees have gone back to that province. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the premier aid group working with Iraq’s displaced, has extensively surveyed this community and found that 26.6% were forced from their property in Baghdad, 20.6% did so because of the fighting, 20.1% because of direct threats to their life, 15.8% fled the general violence, and 15.7% left out of fear. Those figures are signs of the death and destruction that were wrought in the capital, especially after the 2006 Amarra bombing when the Shiites began ethnically cleansing Sunnis. Overall, the major reason why the displaced have come back is the improved security according to the IOM, followed by a mix of better security and difficulties in their current locals. Those are probably the same reasons for refugees, although far fewer of them, 12.2% of the total, have come back so far.
Baghdad is trying to close the refugee file this year in an attempt to improve the image of the country, and to help Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Already, in February 2009 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration ordered a stop to registering new displaced claiming that most families have gone back to their homes. This is an important development because not only is the claim not true, but no Iraqis can receive government aid without registering. The authorities have also promised rewards for those that go back to Baghdad, but very few have received any payments.
The process of return has begun, but the majority of Iraq’s refugees are still without their homes. The displaced are coming back in much larger numbers than refugees, mostly because of the improved security situation in the country. The major concern is what they will find when they come home. The government has promised help, but it has not come through in many cases. Prime Minister Maliki seems more concerned about the reports on returns to improve his standing, than actually bettering conditions for when families come back. International organizations have only been able to assist a small fraction of this community, which means many are likely to have to fend for themselves whether they decide to go back or stay where they are.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced fear new al-qaeda violence,” Niqash, 6/24/09
Alsumaria, “UNHCR: Iraq not prepared for refugees return,” 6/3/09
Dagher, Sam, “Iraq’s Government Orders Barriers Removed,” New York Times, 8/6/09
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009
International Organization for Migration, “Baghdad Governorate Profile July 2009 IOM IDP and Returnee Assessment,” July 2009 - “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments Assessment of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009
Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Nespapers, 5/22/09
UNHCR, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – June 2009,” 8/3/09
>More information is now available on the ruling coalitions that took power after the 2009 provincial elections. Here’s a rundown of governors and heads of councils, (and where possible their deputies), the parties that are now in control of the fourteen provinces that held balloting in January 2009, and the election results. After each is a short note about the motivations behind the coalitions. At the end is a comparison with the 2005 balloting. The three provinces of Kurdistan will not have provincial voting until the new Kurdish parliament drafts their own election law, while balloting in Tamim is indefinitely postponed because of political disputes.
The 2009 voting dramatically changed the face of provincial politics. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law List displaced the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council across most of southern Iraq and Baghdad. New parties also emerged such as the Awakening of Iraq and Independents led by Sheikh Abu Risha in Anbar and the Al-Hadbaa List in Ninewa. They represented the return of Sunnis to local politics after they largely boycotted the 2005 elections. Despite the fact that nationalist and local parties did better than those based upon ethnosectarian identity/politics, Shiites still largely voted for Shiites, Sunnis for Sunnis, and Kurds for Kurds. The 2009 results are also setting the stage for the 2010 parliamentary balloting as everyone is strategizing in relation to Maliki, the big winner. Some want to run with him to ride his coattails into power, while others are hoping to unseat him.
The numbers before each province refer to the numbers on the map above
13. Anbar Governor Qaseem Muhammad – Independent – Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha Head of Council Jassem Mohammed Hamad – Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq Ruling Coalition Awakening of Iraq and Independents Iraqi National Project 4 other parties Election Results – 29 seats 1. Awakening of Iraq and Independents – Sheikh Abu Risha: 8 seats 2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats 2. Alliance of Intellectuals and Tribes – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 6 seats 4. National Movement for Development and Reform – Jamal al-Karbouli: 3 seats 5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats 5. Iraqi Tribes List – Sheikh al-Hayes: 2 seats 5. Iraqi National Unity: 2 seats Notes: Formed to kick the Iraqi Islamic Party out of office
10. Babil Governor Salman Hassan al-Zarkani – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists 1st Deputy Governor Iskander Wattout – Civil Society List 2nd Deputy Governor Sadeq al-Mhanna – National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari Head of Council Kadum Majid Tuman – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists Ruling Coalition State of Law Civil Society List Independent Trend of the Noble Ones Iraqi National List National Reform Party Election Results – 30 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats 2. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats 3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats 3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats 3. Civil Society List: 3 seats 3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats 3. Independent Justice Association: 3 seats 8. Independent Ansar List: 2 seats Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law
1. Baghdad Governor Salah Abd al-Razzaq – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki 2nd Deputy Governor Kamil Saeed al-Saeedi – State of Law Head of Council Kamil al-Zaydi – State of Law Deputy Head of Council Thamir Riyad al-Addad – State of Law Ruling Coalition State of Law Election Results – 57 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 28 seats 2. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 7 seats 3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 5 seats 3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats 5. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 4 seats 6. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 3 seats 7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats 8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota 8. Mandeans: 1 seat – through quota Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners
6. Basra Governor Shitagh Abbud – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki Deputy Governor Nizar al-Jabiri – State of Law Head of Council Jabbar Amin – State of Law Ruling Coalition State of Law Election Results – 35 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 20 seats 2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats 3. Gathering of Justice and Unity: 2 seats 3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats 5. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats 5. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats 7. Fadhila Party: 1 seat 8. Christians: 1 seat – through quota Notes: With a majority State of Law needed no coalition partners
7. Dhi Qar Governor Taleb Kazem Abdulkarim al-Hassan – State of Law- Prime Minister Maliki Deputy Governor Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law 2nd Deputy Governor Haydar Bunyan – ? Head of Council Qusai al-Ibadi – National Reform Trend – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari Deputy Head of Council Abdulhadi Mohan – State of Law Ruling Coalition State of Law Independent Trend of the Noble Ones National Reform Trend Election Results – 31 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats 2. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats 3. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 5 seats 4. National Reform Trend: Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats 5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law
3. Diyala Governor Abdulnasir al-Muntasirbillah – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi Deputy Governor Furat Mohammed – Diyala Coalition – SIIC Head of Council Taleb Mohammed Hassan – Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK Ruling Coalition Iraqi Accordance Front Kurdish Alliance Diyala Coalition Election Results – 29 seats 1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 9 seats 2. Iraqi National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 6 seats 2. Kurdish Alliance – KDP-PUK: 6 seats 4. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats 5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats 5. Diyala Coalition – SIIC: 2 seats 7. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat Notes: Puts together coalition partners from parliament that shut out State of Law
11. Karbala Governor Amaleddin Majeed Hameed Kadhem – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki Deputy Governor Abbas al-Musawai – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists Deputy Governor Youssef Majid al-Habboubi –Independent Head of Council Hamid al-Musawi – Independent Trend of the Noble Ones Ruling Coalition State of Law Hope of Rafidain Independent Trend of the Noble Ones Youssef Majid al-Habboubi Election Results – 27 seats 1. Youssef Majid al-Habboubi – Independent: 1 seat 2. Hope of Rafidain – Parliamentarian Yunadam Kanna – Christians: 9 seats 2. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 9 seats 4. Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC: 4 seats 4. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 4 seats Notes: Habboubi won the most votes in the election, but because he ran independently and not part of a list, he only got 1 seat on the council. Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law
5. Maysan Governor Muhammed al-Sudani – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki Head of Council Hashim al-Shawki – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC Ruling Coalition State of Law Al-Mihrab Martyr List Election Results – 27 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 8 seats 1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 8 seats 3. Independent Trends of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 7 seats 4. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats Notes: State of Law could’ve formed another anti-SIIC coalition here but instead decided to join with them
8. Muthanna Governor Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali – Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC Head of Council Abd al-Latyif Abbas al-Hasani – Al-Mihrab Martyr List Ruling Coalition Al-Mihrab Martyr List Local lists Election Results – 26 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 5 seats 1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats 3. The People’s List: 3 seats 3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats 4. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats 4. Gathering of Muthanna: 2 seats 4. Independent National List: 2 seats 4. Gathering of Iraqi Professionals: 2 seats 4. Gathering of Middle Euphrates: 2 seats Notes: Muthanna’s council was split between the State of Law and the SIIC, but Dawa member Ibrahim Salman al-Mayali switched sides at the last minute to give the Al-Mihrab Marty List the majority. Al-Mayali became governor as a result, and State of Law walked out on the council
12. Najaf Governor Adnan al-Zurfi – Independent – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki Head of Council Fayad al-Shamari – State of Law Ruling Coalition State of Law Locals Election Results – 28 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 7 seats 1. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 7 seats 3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 6 seats 4. Loyalty to Najaf: 4 seats 5. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 2 seats 5. Union of Independent Najaf: 2 seats Notes: State of Law dropped possible coalitions with the Sadrists and SIIC and joined with local lists to take this council. The Supreme Council and Sadrists sued in response
14. Ninewa Governor Atheel al-Najafi – Al-Hadbaa List 2nd Deputy Governor Hassan Mahmoud Ali – Independent – Al-Hadbaa List Head of Council Faisal Abdullah al-Yawir – Al Hadbaa List Deputy Head of Council Wild-dar Zebari – Al Hadbaa List Ruling Coalition Al-Hadbaa List Iraqi Islamic Party Election Results – 37 seats 1. Al-Hadbaa List: 19 seats 2. Ninewa Brotherhood List – PUK-KDP: 12 seats 3. Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 3 seats 4. Shabaks: 1 seat – through quota 4. Christians: 1 seat – through quota 4. Yazidis: 1 seat – through quota Notes: Al-Hadbaa is a new Sunni party that emerged in the voting, running on Iraqi nationalism and anti-Kurdish sentiments. The Kurdish parties are boycotting the council as a result
9. Qadisiyah Governor Salim Husayn – State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki Head of Council Jubeir al-Juburi – State of Law Ruling Coalition State of Law Iraqi National List Election Results – 28 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 11 seats 2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 5 seats 3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats 3. National Reform Party – Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats 5. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 2 seats 5. Islamic Loyalty Party: 2 seats 5. Fadhila Party: 2 seats Notes: Babil, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah are all anti-Supreme Council coalitions put together by State of Law
2. Salahaddin Governor Mutashar al-Aliwi – Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi Head of Council ? – Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi Ruling Coalition Iraqi Accordance Front Iraqi National List Election Results – 28 seats 1. Iraqi Accordance Front – Vice President Hashemi: 5 seats 1. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 5 seats 3. Iraq National Project – Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq: 3 seats 3. National Project of Iraq: 3 seats 5. Group of Intellectuals and Scientists: 2 seats 5. Iraqi Turkmen Front: 2 seats 5. Front of Liberation and Building: 2 seats 5. Salahaddin Patriotic List: 2 seats 5. Brotherhood and Peaceful Coexistence: 2 seats 5. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 2 seats Notes: Province went to Sunnis after the Kurds ran it before because of the 2005 boycott, and shut out State of Law
4. Wasit Governor Lateef Hamad al-Tarfa – Independent Head of Council Mahmoud Abdulrida Talal – Al-Mihrab Marty List – SIIC Ruling Coalition State of Law Al-Mihrab Martyr List Election Results – 28 seats 1. State of Law – Prime Minister Maliki: 13 seats 2. Al-Mihrab Martyr List – SIIC: 6 seats 3. Independent Trend of the Noble Ones – Sadrists: 3 seats 3. Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats 3. Iraqi Constitutional Party – Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani Notes: Another province where State of Law gave up an anti-SIIC coalition to work with them 2009 1st Place Finishes – Provinces State of Law (Maliki) – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Wasit Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin (tied) Iraqi National List (Allawi) – Salahaddin (tied) Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar Al-Hadbaa List - Ninewa Youssef Majid al-Habboubi - Karbala
2009 Governors By Parties – Provinces State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Maysan, Najaf, Qadisiyah Iraqi Accordance Front (Hashemi) – Diyala, Salahaddin Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Muthanna Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil Awakening of Iraq and Independents (Sheikh Abu Risha) – Anbar Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa
2009 Heads of Councils By Parties – Provinces State of Law (Maliki) – Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Qadisiyah Al-Mihrab Martyr List (SIIC) – Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit Independent Trend of the Noble Ones (Sadrists) – Babil, Karbala Kurdish Alliance (KDP-PUK) – Diyala National Reform Trend (Jaafari) – Dhi Qar Iraqi National List (Allaqi) – Salahaddin Iraqi National Project (Parliamentarian al-Mutlaq) – Anbar Al-Hadbaa List: Ninewa
2005 1st Place Finishes – Provinces Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar (tied), Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah Kurdistan Democratic Party – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Ninewa, Salahaddin Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council & Dawa – Diyala Patriotic Union of Kurdistan – Sulaymaniya Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit Fadhila Party – Dhi Qar (tied) Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) – Anbar
2005 Governors By Parties – Provinces Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council – Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Diyala, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish President Barzani) – Dohuk, Irbil, Tamim Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (President Talabani) – Sulaymaniya Kurdish Alliance (Barzani and Talabani) – Salahaddin Independent (Backed by Kurdish Alliance) – Ninewa Sadrists – Maysan, Wasit Iraqi Islamic Party (Vice President Hashemi) – Anbar Fadhila Party – Basra
2005 Provincial Election Results
Anbar – 41 seats Governor Mamoun Sami Rashi al-Awani – Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi Iraqi Islamic Party: 29 seats Independent Iraqi Group: 8 seats Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc: 4 seats
Baghdad – 51 seats Governor Hussein al-Tahan – SIIC Baghdad Nation – SIIC: 28 seats Baghdad Peace – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 11 seats Fadhila Party: 6 seats National Democratic Alliance: 2 seats Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats National Independent Cadres and Elites – Sadrists: 1 seat Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering: 1 seat
Basra – 41 seats Governor Muhammad al-Waili – Fadhila Party Islamic Basra – SIIC: 20 seats Fadhila Party: 12 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 4 seats Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats Iraqi Independent List: 2 seats
Dhi Qar – 41 seats Governor Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli – SIIC Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 11 seats Fadhila Party: 11 seats Dawa – Iraq Organization: 10 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 2 seats Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban: 2 seats Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats Iraqi Independent Gathering: 2 seats Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy: 1 seat
Diyala – 41 seats Governor Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi – SIIC Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala – SIIC & Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 20 seats Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 14 seats Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate – KDP-PUK: 7 seats
Dohuk – 41 seats Governor Tamar Ramadan – Kurdistan Democratic Party Kurdistan Democratic Party: 33 seats Kurdistan Islamic Union: 4 seats Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 4 seats
Irbil – 41 seats Governor Ali Nikzad – Kurdistan Democratic Party Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List – KDP: 23 seats Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 16 seats Kurdistan Islamic Union: 1 seat Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 1 seat
Karbala – 41 seats Governor Uqeil al-Khazaali – SIIC Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 21 seats Fadhila Party: 5 seats Shiite Political Council: 2 seats Democratic Progressive Gathering: 2 seats Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate: 2 seats Iraqi Democratic Current: 2 seats Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala: 2 seats Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala: 2 seats Independent Intellectuals Gathering: 2 seats Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi: 1 seat
Maysan – 41 seats Governor Adil Mahwadar Radi – Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists Al-Hussayni Thought Forum – Sadrists: 15 seats Islamic Unified Front – SIIC: 6 seats Dawa – Iraq Organization: 5 seats Fadhila Party: 4 seats Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance: 3 seats Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan: 2 seats Iraqi Republican Group: 2 seats Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 1 seat Maysan Democratic Coalition: 1 seat Shiite Political Council: 1 seat Independent National Islamic Congregation: 1 seat
Muthanna – 41 seats Governor Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani – SIIC – Killed August 2007 Governor Ahmad Marzouq Salal – Dawa – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 8 seats Fadhila Party: 6 seats Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly: 6 seats Islamic Independent Society: 5 seats Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 4 seats Gathering for al-Muthanna: 4 seats Allegiance Coalition: 3 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats
Najaf – 41 seats Governor Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie – SIIC Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 19 seats Loyalty to Al-Najaf: 9 seats Banner of the Independents: 4 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats Fadhila Party: 2 seats Allegiance Coalition: 2 seats Iraq Future Gathering: 2 seats
Ninewa – 41 seats Governor Usama Yousif Kashmula – Independent – Killed July 2004 Governor Duraid Kashmoula – Independent Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan – KDP-PUK: 31 seats Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council: 5 seats Iraqi Islamic Party – Vice President Hashemi: 2 seats Council of the United Clans of Mosul: 2 seats
Qadisiyah – 41 seats Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza – SIIC – Killed August 2007 Governor Hamid al-Khodari – SIIC Martyr Of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim – SIIC: 20 seats Shiite Political Council: 5 seats Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats Fadhila Party: 3 seats Independent Brotherhood – Sadrists: 3 seats Dawa – Islamic Organization: 2 seats Loyalty to Iraq Coalition – Sadrists: 2 seats
Salahaddin – 41 seats Governor Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi – List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate – KDP-PUK: 8 seats Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering: 6 seats Iraqi Turkmen Front: 5 seats Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity: 5 seats Unified List: 4 seats Iraqi National List – Ex-Interim Prime Minister Allawi: 3 seats Dawa Party – Prime Minister Maliki/Ex-Prime Minister Jaafari: 3 seats National Iraqi Gathering: 3 seats National al-Resalyoon List – pro-Sadrist: 2 seats Gathering of Independents in Salahaddin: 2 seats
Sulaymaniya – 41 seats Governor Dana Ahmed Majid – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Patriotic Union of Kurdistan: 28 seats Kurdistan Islamic Union: 5 seats Islamic Group of Kurdistan: 5 seats Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq: 3 seats
Tamim – 41 seats Governor Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah – Kurdistan Democratic Party List of Kurdistan Brotherhood – KDP: 26 seats Iraqi Turkmen Front: 8 seats Iraqi Republican Group: 5 seats Islamic Turkmen Coalition: 1 seat National Iraq Union: 1 seat
Wasit – 41 seats Governor Latif Hamid Turfa – Sadrists Iraqi Elites Gathering – Sadrists: 31 seats Shiite Political Council – SIIC-Dawa: 4 seats Gathering of the Independent in Wasit: 3 seats Iraqi Communist Party: 2 seats Democratic Iraq Gathering: 1 seat
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muhammed, “sectarian polarization in diyala,” Niqash, 4/20/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Meyerson, Thomas, “Provincial Governments in Southern Iraq,” Institute for the Study of War, 5/28/09
Reilly, Corinne and Abbas, Ali, “Kurdish-Arab tensions continue to grow in northern Iraq,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/14/09
Al-Sa’dawi, Ahmad, “post-election analysis: real change or more of the same?” Niqash, 2/19/09
Shadid, Anthony, “New Alliance In Iraq Cross Sectarian Lines,” Washington Post, 3/20/09
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/09
Visser, Reidar, “After Compromise on Kirkuk, Finally an Elections Law for Iraq’s Governorates,” Historiae.org, 9/24/08 - “Iraq’s New Provincial Councils: A Mixed Picture North of Baghdad, Unexpected Complications in the Centre and the South,” Historiae.org, 4/13/09 - “Maliki Suffers Setbacks as Samarrai is Confirmed as New Speaker and More Governors Are Elected South of Baghdad,” Historiae.org, 4/19/09 - “Mixed Outcome for Maliki as Muthanna and Najaf Elect New Governors,” Historiae.org, 5/1/09
Special Groups was a term coined by the U.S. during the Surge to identify Shiite militants that were supported by Iran and/or were not following Muqtada al-Sadr’s cease-fire decree. After Baghdad’s crackdown on militias in southern Iraq beginning with Basra in 2008, many of these Special Groups were scattered, arrested, or fled to Iran. Now they seem to be making their return. In a July 18 article in the Washington Post U.S. officials warned of a new spate of attacks on American forces by these armed groups. An official named three main culprits, the League of the Righteous, Khataib Hezbollah, and the Promised Day Brigades.
A review of English-language press reports shows that there has been a steady increase in incidents from March to July 2009. 1st these are only articles from southern Iraq. It’s difficult to determine who is behind many of the attacks in Baghdad. The southern section of the country however has been relatively peaceful, and has been a base of Special Groups and Mahdi Army activities in the past, so any attacks that occur there on the Americans are most likely done by one of these organizations.
In March 2009 there were only a few incidents involving the British in Basra and none with the United States, but since April there have been several attacks aimed at Americans across a variety of southern provinces. In March there were no attacks against American forces in the region. There were two rocketattacks on the English in the Basra airport however. In April things changed when five incidents were reported, and all involving U.S. troops in Maysan, Qadisiyah, Wasit, and Basra. Attacks went up in May to seven and were all concentrated in Basra, Babil, and Wasit. In June incidents went down to four, but again were spread out over the region in Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Basra, and Wasit. From July 1 to 28 there have been eight attacks on Americans occurring in Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Karbala, and Basra. The most dramatic was a roadside bomb that went off against U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill’s convoy in Dhi Qar on July 13. In four and a half months there were a total of 26 attacks on U.S. forces, and only a few casualties. While that is not a large amount compared to the more violent areas of the country, it does constitute an increase from earlier in the year.
Iran has conducted a multi-layered political, military, economic, and cultural strategy in Iraq since 2003. Supporting Shiite militiamen is only one part of this, and is aimed at tying down U.S. forces so they don’t attack Iran, and making the Americans pay a price for invading. In the past, when important events came up in Iraq such as the 2009 provincial elections, Iran has limited the amount of weapons and money that it provides to dampen violence so that it might focus upon its more important political goals. Afterwards Special Group attacks and activities have traditionally gone up. That appears to be what is occurring now. This could be a message from Iran that they are still capable of fomenting instability in Iraq and challenging Coalition Forces. Iraqi domestic issues may also play a part in some of these attacks. The League of the Righteous for example, has said that it wishes to participate in the 2010 parliamentary vote, so a few of these incidents may be a way to show that it is still relevant. Others may be conducted by violent gangs, which are active in places like Basra. Whatever the ultimate motivation, the last few months have shown that there are still militants in southern Iraq capable of attacking U.S. forces.
Attacks Against U.S. Forces In Southern Iraq
March 2009 – 0 Total
April 2009 – 5 Total
4/6/09 Rocket attack on U.S. base in Amarah, Maysan
On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq’s internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq’s displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.
The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.
Date of Displacement
Province
Before 2006
2006
2007
2008
Iraq
4.5%
67.8%
25.6%
2.0%
Anbar
0.5%
87.2%
9.9%
1.9%
Babil
7.4%
85.0%
7.3%
0.3%
Baghdad
1.4%
75.4%
22.5%
0.7%
Basra
1.1%
70.9%
27.9%
0.0%
Diyala
1.9%
54.1%
42.7%
1.1%
Dohuk
5.5%
53.5%
35.4%
5.7%
Dhi Qar
2.1%
90.6%
6.7%
0.1%
Irbil
9.3%
49.0%
39.8%
1.3%
Karbala
0%
85.2%
14.5%
0.0%
Maysan
1.0%
94.8%
4.0%
0.1%
Muthanna
19.5%
46.3%
33.8%
0.1%
Najaf
23.0%
63.1%
13.9%
0%
Ninewa
1.0%
67.5%
23.7%
7.7%
Qadisiyah
1.6%
92.9%
5.6%
0%
Salahaddin
18.2%
56.0%
25.6%
0.1%
Sulaymaniya
4.5%
41.7%
50.1%
3.2%
Tamim
8.6%
22.9%
49.3%
19.2%
Wasit
1.3%
50.5%
48.1%
0.1%
63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.
Origins of Displacement By Province
Baghdad
63.2%
Diyala
18.7%
Ninewa
6.0%
Salahaddin
3.3%
Tamim
3.0%
Anbar
2.6%
Basra
1.6%
Babil
1.0%
Irbil
0.2%
Wasit
0.2%
Dhi Qar
0.1%
Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced
Shiite Arab
56.8%
Sunni Arab
30.8%
Sunni Kurd
4.1%
Assyrian Christian
2.9%
Chaldean Christian
1.8%
Shiite Turkmen
1.2%
Sunni Turkmen
0.9%
Shiite Kurd
0.6%
Armenian Christian
0.1%
Arab Yazidi
0.1%
Kurd Yazidi
0.1%
Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq’s internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk’s displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites
Babil
94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad
Baghdad
72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad
Basra
99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin
Dhi Qar
99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin
Karbala
98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala
Maysan
99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad
Muthanna
99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala
Najaf
97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad
Qadisiyah
99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad
Wasit
98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad
Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis
Anbar
98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad
Irbil
39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa
Salahaddin
96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala
Sulaymaniya
60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala
Tamim
53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad
Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations
Diyala
57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad
Dohuk
39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa
Ninewa
40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa
The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq’s displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn’t know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.
Intentions Of The Displaced
Province
Integrate into Location of Displacement
Settle in New Location
Return to Place of Origin
Waiting to Make Decision
Iraq
21.4%
19.1%
58.0%
1.4%
Anbar
2.3%
13.8%
81.3%
2.0%
Babil
26.2%
28.6%
44.5%
0.6%
Baghdad
8.2%
11.3%
79.1%
1.2%
Basra
82.9%
11.1%
5.5%
0.3%
Dhi Qar
57.6%
11.3%
30.7%
0.2%
Diyala
7.3%
10.9%
81.7%
0.0%
Dohuk
57.0%
23.1%
19.7%
0.2%
Irbil
18.3%
13.5%
67.4%
0.1%
Karbala
26.3%
26.6%
46.4%
0.6%
Maysan
28.1%
28.0%
40.7%
3.1%
Muthanna
34.8%
18.1%
45.1%
1.9%
Najaf
4.5%
0.1%
94.1%
1.0%
Ninewa
7.0%
33.0%
59.2%
0.7%
Qadisiyah
40.9%
35.3%
23.7%
0.1%
Salahaddin
12.5%
39.0%
43.5%
4.7%
Sulaymaniya
27.1%
8.3%
64.4%
0.2%
Tamim
22.2%
3.5%
71.3%
3.0%
Wasit
54.4%
37.8%
5.8%
2.0%
While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations’ latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq’s displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq’s refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report,” 6/1/09
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009,” UNHCR, March 2009
At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq’s displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.
Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.
Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)
Province
Returning Families
% That Are Refugee Families
Iraq
49,464
7%
Baghdad
31,497
4%
Diyala
8,779
1%
Anbar
4,536
27%
Ninewa
1,602
1%
Maysan
626
49%
Tamim
620
37%
Basra
500
0%
Karbala
298
21%
Babil
258
9%
Najaf
215
55%
Salahaddin
191
35%
Dhi Qar
108
31%
Muthanna
64
88%
Qadisiyah
44
23%
A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.
Origins Of Returnees By Province
Location
Refugees
Displaced Within Same Province
Displaced In Another Province
TOTAL
11%
68%
21%
Anbar
36%
52%
12%
Babil
15%
52%
33%
Baghdad
6%
71%
23%
Basra
0%
0%
100%
Diyala
6%
61%
33%
Karbala
92%
0%
8%
Maysan
0%
0%
100%
Muthanna
100%
0%
0%
Najaf
100%
0%
0%
Ninewa
0%
100%
0%
Salahaddin
88%
13%
0%
Tamim
58%
11%
31%
Wasit
50%
0%
50%
Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.
Reasons For Return
Reasons for Return
%
Improved security in home area
36.7%
Improved security in home area and difficult conditions
35.7%
Very difficult conditions
15.5%
Other
5.8%
Government returnee payments
4.2%
Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments
1.8%
Very difficult conditions and returnee payments
0.3%
The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn’t stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put “X”s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.
The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.
For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn’t find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn’t mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.
Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven’t face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.
SOURCES
International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009
Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, “Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi’a Out,” IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09
The spate of bombings that hit Iraq in April 2009 had people worrying that the country might be falling back into chaos. A series of new reports however show that the number of overall attacks is still far below the levels seen in 2008, but casualties are climbing back up to what they were at the end of last year. Recently the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released its latest quarterly report, which included new statistics on attacks in Iraq from the U.S. military. Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies also released a report at the end of April on violence in Iraq. Finally, the news services and Iraqi ministries released their monthly totals for deaths in Iraq at the beginning of May. Together all of this information paints a picture of a nation that is much improved from the peak of the war, but still lacks stability and peace.
Throughout 2008 the number of overall attacks took a steady drop across all areas of the country, reaching a plateau in early 2009. A chart provided by the Defense Department on security incidents shows that from November 2007 to March 2008 there were around 550 incidents a week. The security crackdown on the Sadrists in Basra and then Sadr City led to a brief jump in attacks, only to see a steady decline from May to November when incidents went down to about 200-300 per week. From November to April 2009 Iraq saw a new low of approximately 150 incidents per week, the fewest since the U.S. invasion. Most of these attacks were concentrated in just six provinces, Anbar, Tamim, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa and Baghdad.
In terms of raw numbers, attacks recorded by the U.S. military went from an average of 1,772.6 per month from April 1 to July 1, to 1,715.5 per month from July 1 to September 30, then down to 1,169.0 from October 1 to December 31, and then finally taking a huge drop to 323.0 from January 1 to March 20, 2009. The main cause for this decline was the January 2009 provincial elections. In 2005 the Sunnis largely boycotted, and were now eager to gain power. The provinces that had large Sunni populations saw some of the highest turnouts as a result. Since those were also the areas with the most violence, the insurgents seemed to have taken a hiatus to allow the locals to organize and vote, thus accounting for the sharp decline in security incidents.
Total Number of Attacks In Iraq From April 1, 2008-March 20, 2009 From U.S. Military From Least To Most Violent
The drop in attacks obviously had an impact on casualties. All the major sources of information on deaths in Iraq, Iraq Body Count.org, icasualties.org, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index, Iraqi ministries, and the Associated Press, all saw a steady decline in deaths from the middle of 2008 to January 2009. ABC News also received statistics from an Iraqi official that Anthony Cordesman published, which showed the same trend. Iraq Body Count for example recorded an average of 538.1 deaths a month from July to December 2008. In January 2009 that dropped to 275. The Iraqi Defense, Interior and Health Ministries found an average of 353.2 deaths per month from September to December 2008, which then dropped to 191 in January. Since the beginning of January however, all the organizations and the Iraqi official found a steady increase in deaths. Icasualties.org and the Iraqi ministries reported that the number of deaths in April 2009 even eclipsed December 2008. Since the voting ended on January 31 and the provincial councils have now all been formed, casualties have gone back up as the insurgents have no reason to hold back anymore. The mass casualty bombings that hit Baghdad in April were a sign of their return.
The Iraqi official mentioned in Cordesman’s report also provided numbers on attacks and casualties in Baghdad, the most violent area in the nation. They showed that there were an average of 158.8 attacks per month in the capital from July to December 2008. For the first four months of 2009 that went down to 114.5. The official’s statistics also covered wounded and deaths. Those revealed that there is not a direct correlation between the number of security incidents and casualties. For example, in November 2008 there were 159 attacks in Baghdad, one less than the previous month. However those resulted in 621 wounded and 208 deaths in November compared to 419 wounded and 183 fatalities in October. That goes to show that a few bombings can have a dramatic affect on people, while not changing the attack statistics.
Types Of Attacks By Month & Casualties In Baghdad July 08-April 09 (Iraqi Official)
July 08
Aug 08
Sep 08
Oct 08
Nov 08
Dec 08
Jan 09
Feb 09
Mar 09
Apr 09
RPG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Hand grenade
5
1
5
0
0
0
2
1
0
6
Katyshua
1
2
0
0
2
0
3
0
10
3
Mortar
34
54
46
37
21
29
21
21
30
32
Assassinations
17
17
16
17
19
5
0
13
9
11
Car bombs
6
7
15
5
7
5
0
4
3
13
Suicide bombings
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
0
2
3
Bicycle bombs
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
IEDs
94
92
113
98
80
54
64
71
48
49
Magnetic IEDs
0
0
0
0
28
9
5
5
17
9
Total Attacks
160
174
197
160
159
103
97
115
119
127
Security forces wounded
43
73
95
83
90
39
62
37
34
64
Civilians wounded
324
274
525
336
531
273
392
269
281
558
Total wounded
367
347
620
419
621
312
454
306
315
622
Bodies found
67
61
60
46
38
24
14
12
11
16
Security forces killed
19
18
23
19
22
16
15
9
15
37
Civilians killed
91
97
156
118
148
97
113
71
115
228
Total killed
177
176
239
183
208
137
142
92
211
281
While violence may be down to record lows since the 2003 invasion, that does not mean that Iraq has escaped its troubles. Anthony Cordesman made an important point when he said that there were many Americans who took the drop in casualties in Iraq after the Surge as victory. What the change in strategy created was a new status quo, not an end to the conflict. There are still plenty of political divisions, millions of displaced and refugees, and casualties. The commanding U.S. General Ray Odierno recently said that Iraq could see violence for the next five to fifteen years. That’s the long-range timeframe people need to think about, not the recent decline in deaths, or the recent series of bombings.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraq Hails Lowest Monthly Death Toll in Three Years,” 1/2/09
- “March violence claims 252 Iraqi lives,” 4/1/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq death toll lowest since five years,” 2/2/09
- “Iraq violence kills 320 people in October,” 11/1/08
Associated Press, “April Ends As Deadly Month For U.S. Troops,” 5/1/09
Bumiller, Elisabeth, “General Sees a Longer Stay in Iraq Cities for U.S. Troops,” New York Times, 5/9/09
Cordesman, Anthony, “Iraq: USCENTCOM and Iraqi Government Estimates of the Trends in the Patterns in Violence and Casualties,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5/1/09
Gamel, Kim, “Iraq forces gain more control, but loseWeight Exercise more lives,” Associated Press, 9/30/08
icasualties.org
Iraq Body Count.org
Londono, Ernesto, “U.S. Says Iraq Is Withholding Key Detainee,” Washington Post, 5/2/09
O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 4/30/09
Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Deaths of Iraqis in July Lower Than in May, June,” Washington Post, 8/2/08
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09
- “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Update Iraq, March 2009″ United Nations, 4/27/09
