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>Will Iraq Ever Have Reconciliation?

>As Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited the United States in July 2009 President Obama repeated the common refrain that he hoped that there would eventually be reconciliation in Iraq. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued a report on this very topic on July 17 entitled, “How This Ends: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation.” In it, authors Michael Eisenstadt and Ahmed Ali document the steps that the American and Iraqi governments have followed to try to achieve this goal, and find their efforts lacking, and the prospects of making amends unlikely.

Reconciliation is important in countries that have recently gone through armed conflict. It provides greater stability and lessons the chances of a return to chaos. Successful reconciliation processes in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Mozambique, South Africa, and Uruguay all shared the following steps:

1. Some form of truth telling
2. Recognition that all groups in the country are fellow citizens
3. Compensation programs and trials for some
4. Public peace events

Iraq has had some of these, but also gone against others. A major problem is that the United States and various Iraqi groups do not have a shared vision of what reconciliation means.

America’s policies have changed over time, and been a mixed bag. At first, U.S. efforts were focused upon making up for their own early mistakes. This included integrating Sunnis into the security forces and politics after the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army and initiated deBaathification, and paying compensation to families that were harmed by the military. The U.S. has also stressed ethnosectarian power sharing through the passage of laws, and mediation between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Norwegian Iraq expert Reidar Visser has argued that this is a misreading of Iraqi politics and maintains differences in the country rather than helps heal them. Not only that, but the results of these early strategies were very poor. Few laws pushed by the U.S. have been passed for example, and the ones that were have not been implemented as planned. During the Surge, the American forces began working with insurgents and militiamen that were willing to give up fighting in a bottom-up approach. This was much more successful, and directly led to the decrease in violence. At the same time, the U.S. has not been able to link many of the groups they worked with to the Iraqi government such as the Sons of Iraq.

Many of Baghdad’s policies on the other hand, have been interpreted as retribution or done for political gain. Examples of the former were deBaathification and the trial and execution of Saddam Hussein, and cases of the latter were the moves by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. In June 2006 Maliki announced a 24-point plan that included amnesty, conferences, changes in deBaathification and the constitution, compensation, punishment for war criminals and terrorists, and the creation of a national dialogue council. Baghdad did compensate victims of the former regime, and passed an Amnesty Law and Accountability and Justice Act, which replaced the old deBaathification process created by the Americans. The Amnesty Law has only freed a few thousand prisoners, and has mostly been used for public relations purposes, while the Accountability Act has never been implemented. Baghdad created the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation, which works with tribes, civil groups, political parties and religious leaders, but it has no staff, and parliament cancelled its funding. There is also the much more important Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation that vets former officials and soldiers to be re-integrated, and works with the Sons of Iraq, Tribal Support Councils, and the displaced. Both are headed by Maliki confidants, and have been accused of supporting the Prime Minister’s personal agenda. Sunnis in parliament also set up the National Reconciliation Committee to follow their vision. It mostly works to free Sunni prisoners. The government has integrated several thousand former soldiers and officers into the security forces or pays them pensions. There have also been examples of local reconciliation. The rest of Baghdad’s goals have been largely unmet, and led to accusations about the government’s intentions rather than helped heal wounds.

Eisenstadt and Ali finish by saying that reconciliation in Iraq will take years, and may never occur in a meaningful fashion. The problems are large and many. First, the major Iraqi political parties are based upon ethnosectarian politics, and could loseWeight Exercise power if they give that up. Second, there is still fighting in Iraq, and a World Bank study on conflicts found that almost 50% of countries coming out of civil wars fall back into them within five years. Third, there is little consensus in Baghdad on major issues such as oil, and politics are fragmented, which makes it hard to conduct negotiations or find partners. Fourth, there is a lack of accountability as many militants are involved in politics and security with no regret for their past deeds. Fifth, many conflicts and fighting took place within communities, not just between them, which has never been resolved. Sixth, many groups still talk about revenge, and see things in zero-sum terms. Seventh Iraq has been in the throes of elections since 2008, which makes compromising more difficult. Last, Iraq’s neighbors have all interfered in its internal affairs, and continue to do so to this day such as Iran. These problems may never be overcome, which is why the authors are so pessimistic about the country’s future. Iraq’s government will continue, but without resolving some of these large and pressing concerns, it’s unlikely that major changes or legislation will be implemented, which are a necessity to pull the country out of its current predicament.

SOURCES

Biddle, Stephen, “Reversal in Iraq,” Center for Preventative Action Council on Foreign Relations, May 2009

DeYoung, Karen, “Obama Calls on Iraq to Foster National Unity,” Washington Post, 7/23/09

Eisenstadt, Michael and Ali, Ahmed, “’How This Ends’: Iraq’s Uncertain Path toward National Reconciliation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 7/17/09

Visser, Reidar, “Biden, US Policy in Iraq and the Concept of Muhasasa,” Historiae.org, 7/6/09

>Center for a New American Security – Maintain The Status Quo In Iraq

>In June 2009 the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a position paper on what U.S. policy towards Iraq should be under the new administration entitled, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq.” The two authors, John Nagl, a famous former Army officer, and Brian Burton argue that the U.S. should foster Iraq as a long-term ally in the Middle East. The problem is that the U.S. is pulling out, the American public has grown tired of the war, and there is a recession. The CNAS paper worries that short-term thinking will outweigh the long-term goal of the U.S. to have stability in the Middle East. Almost all of the paper’s recommendations however are already being implemented, so what it’s really about is asking for the status quo to be maintained in Iraq past the U.S. withdrawal.

The paper sees four major challenges for the U.S. in Iraq. First, is the increasing divide between Arabs and Kurds. As reported before, a recent journal piece in Middle East Policy argued that this dispute could lead to the fall of the government, become a new source of violence, and even break up the country. Second, is integration of the Sunnis, who still need to find their place in the new political order. Third, is whether Iraq will slide back to authoritarianism. As a paper by two United States Institute of Peace officials recently noted, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is now at the center of Iraqi politics. His opponents are worried that he may become an autocrat. Finally, Iraq’s future is threatened by its over reliance upon oil, which provides almost all of its revenue. The economic downturn has affected Baghdad’s hopes for development, jobs, services, and maintaining the security forces to name just a few.

To meet these challenges and ensure that Iraq is a long-term ally, the CNAS paper suggests five strategies Washington should follow. To deal with the Arab-Kurd divide, the U.S. should act as mediators, and support the United Nations effort to resolve the disputed territories, especially Kirkuk. The U.S. is already trying to help talks between the two sides across northern Iraq, and has stepped in to stop military confrontations. The U.S. also backs the U.N.’s plans for the disputed territories. With regards to the integration of the Sunnis, the writers believe supporting elections is the best course of action. The U.S. has been largely unsuccessful pushing Baghdad to reconcile with the Sunnis, so backing free and open voting where Sunni parties can gain power is the best alternative. This is something Washington has done since 2005. The U.S. also needs to help Iraq diversify its economy. CNAS suggests agriculture should be cultivated. The last few Defense Department quarterly reports to Congress have said the same thing. The problem is that Iraq’s farm sector faces so many institutional barriers such as a lack of tariffs and government support, inadequate irrigation, etc. that it could take over a decade for it to recover. To prevent the return of an autocratic leader in Iraq, the two writers suggest supporting institutions and professionalism. The U.S. already has advisers throughout the Iraqi military and ministries. Washington should also emphasize that it stands behind the Iraqi government, and not just Maliki, something that the Obama administration has already done as well. Finally, to encourage Iraq as a long-term ally the U.S. needs to re-integrate it into the region, and foster more ties between Washington and Baghdad. Getting Iraq’s neighbors to accept the Shiite led government in Baghdad has proven more difficult than expected. Countries like Saudi Arabia have given Iraq a cold shoulder since the invasion. Turkey on the other hand has changed its policy and become much closer recently. Other steps could be bringing more Iraqi military officers and students for training and education in the United States. The authors also believe that the U.S. needs to keep both civilian and military advisers in Iraq past the 2011 deadline for a U.S. withdrawal of combat troops.

Almost everything that the CNAS paper advocates is already being done by the U.S. administration. It is working with the Iraqi government and military, it is trying to mediate internal disputes, it is helping with the economy, it is trying to bring its allies in the region to open up to Baghdad, etc. The only question is whether President Obama will be open to keeping up this support for Iraq after 2011. That’s what “After the Fire” is really about, trying to ensure that all of these programs are maintained into 2012 and beyond.

SOURCES

Anatolia News Agency, “Turkish general says MoU between Turkey and Iraq to contribute to peace,” Today’s Zaman, 6/12/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

Al-Hayat, “US ambassador to Iraq offers to mediate between Kurds, Arabs in Mosul – paper,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 6/4/09

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Kazimi, Nibras, “Iraq: Trouble for Maliki,” Hudson New York, 4/24/09

Nagl, John and Burton, Brian, “After the Fire: Shaping the Future U.S. Relationship with Iraq,” Center for a New American Security, June 2009

Serwer, Daniel and Parker, Sam, “Maliki’s Iraq between Two Elections,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2009

Stansfield, Gareth Anderson, Liam, “Kurds in Iraq: the struggle between Baghdad and Erbil,” Middle East Policy, Spring 2009

Williams, Timothy and al-Salhy, Saudad, “Allotting of Iraqi Oil Rights May Stoke Hostility,” New York Times, 5/29/09

Grassroots Reconciliation At The Samarra Shrine

In February 2006 the Shiite shrine at Samarra was bombed. In subsequent months Shiite militias responded with a wave of attacks that eventually led to Iraq descending into a sectarian civil war. Civilian deaths went from 2,165 in February according to the United Nations to eventually shooting up to 3,590 by July. Over 1.6 million were displaced as a result. On March 6, 2009 however a remarkable event happened. Over one million Shiite pilgrims returned to the Samarra shrine in an example of grassroots reconciliation.

Samarra, a Sunni city, is the burial place for two revered Shiite Imams. Those are the Imam Hasan Askari and his father Imam Ali Hadi. Both are descendents of the Prophet Mohammad. The death of the Imam Askari is usually celebrated with a pilgrimage to Samarra. On March 6 over one million Shiites from across the country made this trip, the first time since the 2006 bombing. Moqtada al-Sadr also called for his followers to join in the procession.

The city was heavily guarded by the Iraqi security forces, which erected blast walls along the path of the pilgrims. Even though some Shiites complained that they were not able to interact with the local Sunni population that much, there were still tents and food vendors set up to greet the visitors. 5,000 Sunnis and Shiites even went to a joint prayer service at a Sunni mosque, and then marched down the streets chanting anti-violence slogans.

While there are anecdotal reports of Iraqis being tired of the sectarian war, the events at Samarra are a specific example of that new status quo. The symbolism was strong as it took place at the starting place of the civil war. There are still many problems in Iraq, but it appears that at least for the people that made the pilgrimage to Samarra, and those that greeted them wanted to put part of Iraq’s bloody past behind them.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Three Years Of Post-Samarra Displacement In Iraq,” 2/22/09

O’Hanlon, Michael, Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 1/30/09

Rasheed, Hamid, “Sow of Sunni-Shiite unity in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 3/7/09

Schofield, Matthew, “Iraqi pilgrims visit Samarra’s bombed mosque once again,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/6/09

>Human Rights Watch Report On Lack Of Due Process In Iraqi Justice System

>In December 2008 Human Rights Watch released its review of Iraq’s justice system entitled, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court.” The Americans largely created Iraq’s justice system from scratch after the U.S. invasion. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) said that it wanted to create a court system that would follow international and Western norms, and give the Iraqi public confidence in their new government. After having observed several court cases, and interviewed Iraqi and American officials, Human Rights Watch reported that Iraq and the U.S. had failed to achieve these goals. It found abuses of detainees were common, and that the country lacked due process and fair trials.

The Central Criminal Court of Iraq is the highest in the country. The CPA created the Central Court after the U.S. invasion in July 2003. The Court is meant to deal with the most serious criminal cases. It has jurisdiction over the entire country, and priority over all other courts. It has two branches, one is the Karkh Branch in the Green Zone, and the other is the Rusafa Branch in the Rule of Law Complex, both in Baghdad. The Court and the rest of the justice system is based upon old Saddam era legislation, as well as international law and treaties Iraq signed in the past including agreements on human rights, due process, and bans on torture. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution also guarantees a number of rights such as protection from torture, innocence until proven guilty, a hearing within 24 hours of arrest, a fair trial, legal defense, etc. While Iraq has all the fixings of a Western style justice system, in practice, the courts do not follow the rule of law.

One example is the fact that detainees are held for months, sometimes years before they ever have a hearing. In Iraq, detainees have a hearing before a judge to decide whether their case should go to trial or not. Iraqi law says that people can only be held for 24 hours, with a one-day extension, after their arrest. During the Surge, the number of prisoners dramatically shot up. The amount of people held went from 17,000 at the end of March 2007 to 23,000 by the end of the year, not including Kurdistan. This overwhelmed the already fragile system. There are simply not enough judges to deal with the number of cases, which causes a huge delay in hearings. At the Karkh Branch for example, 10 trial judges, 25 investigative judges, and 15 investigators had to deal with 32,084 cases in 2007. The backlog of cases will take years to get through. Despite the huge reduction in violence, new arrests are still being added to the system as well.

In February 2008, Iraq’s parliament passed an Amnesty Law, partially aimed at relieving the crowded prisons. The law applies to anyone that has been held for six months without having seen a judge. The Iraqi Justice Ministry has routinely made claims that tens of thousands have been affected by this act. On December 14, 2008 for instance, the Iraqi Chief Justice Abdelsattar al-Berqadar said that 125,000 people had been given amnesty. Neither the United Nations nor Human Rights Watch however, has noted any real change in the number of detainees since the law was passed. Human Rights watch found that the vast majority of those affected have been suspects on wanted lists or those on bail, rather than people being held or incarcerated. In September 2008 Human Rights Watch noted that only 5,000-8,000 actual prisoners had been released. A member of the Iraqi Islamic Party said that 17,000 had been freed by December. Again, there are not enough judges to review the cases under the Amnesty Law. Iraqi officials have also asked for bribes from families to release prisoners. Like many of the country’s reconciliation acts, the government has simply not implemented the Amnesty Law the way it was supposed to.

Number Of Detainees Held By Iraq (Including Kurdistan) Before And After The Amnesty Law: January to June 2008

January: 26,676
February: 26,854 – Month Amnesty Law Was Passed
March: 32,458
April 28,283
May: 28,028
June 27,366

A second problem is the routine abuse of prisoners in Iraqi jails. Suspects are usually beaten to gain confessions. Iraqi criminal code and international obligations makes this illegal. Human Rights Watch did observe cases where judges dismissed cases because the defendant had been tortured, but it hasn’t stopped the practice.

An added difficulty is the fact that no one has ever been held responsible for this mistreatment. Under Article 136 if torture happens during the line of duty, the minister in charge of the official who committed the act has to permit the case to go to trial. This has never happened. Attempts to overturn Article 136, and create new legislation against torture have all failed.

Human Rights Watch also believes that prisoners don’t get a real defense at their hearings and trials. The Iraqi Constitution says that defendants have the right to legal representation. Most cases that Human Rights Watch observed did have a lawyer present. However this was usually the first and only time that they met their clients. There were also cases where there were no defense lawyers. Prisoners also often don’t get the same lawyer at their trial as they had at their hearing. At both of those proceedings there is also an utter lack of witnesses and evidence. Forensic evidence and investigation is almost unknown in Iraq. Many cases relied upon confessions, often gained from beatings, or secret informants. There are times when this testimony has been dismissed, but one court investigator estimated that 40% of all cases relied upon informants. A judge said that although this allowed abuses, it had to happen due to the security situation in the country. Human Rights Watch believes these two issues severely limits the rights of defendants because they are unable to challenge the claims against them.

Despite the U.S. creating the Iraqi legal system, it has refused to follow it itself. The U.S. has repeatedly said that it will not follow Iraqi laws or court rulings that deal with prisoners they hold. From 2003 to 2007 there were 367 cases in which the Criminal Court either dismissed the charges against a person held by the U.S. or found them innocent, but the Americans refused to let them go. The U.S. does claim that they review cases to see if they can be turned over to Iraqi courts, but that only happens 10% of the time. This undermines the Iraqi justice system as a foreign country holds Iraqis, yet refuses to follow Iraqi law. As reported earlier, this is due to change in February 2009 as the United States begins handing over the roughly 15,000 prisoners it holds to Iraqi authorities. While an important step for Iraqi sovereignty, it will also add thousands more cases to the Iraqi system that already can’t handle what they have.

In conclusion, the U.S. set up the Central Criminal Court and the Iraqi justice system to help create a new Iraqi society based upon the rule of law. While officially, the country has many of the same rights as western countries, it follows few of them. After being arrested, Iraqis wait months or years to have a hearing, at which time they usually see a lawyer for the first time, and can be presented with a confession they gave under duress, or are accused by a secret witness. Until Iraq has enough judges to deal with the high number of cases, this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Iraq’s politicians are also unwilling to act on torture or Article 136, because it protects their party members in the government. Implementing laws is also important for reconciliation, but as the Amnesty Act shows, that’s a long way off. Overall, Iraq’s legal system barley works. It lacks personnel, a commitment to the law, and is open to political interference, a series of problems any country would find hard to overcome.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “17,000 prisoners freed under amnesty law – MP,” 12/15/08

Human Rights Watch, “The Quality of Justice, Failings of Iraq’s Central Criminal Court,” December 2008

Leinwand, Donna, “Wheels of justice slowly returning to Iraqi court,” USA Today, 2/26/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” December 2008

>Iraq Needs Real Governance Center for Strategic and International Studies Report Says

>Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies is one of the leading military analysts on Iraq and the Middle East. In September 2008 he wrote a report on transferring Iraq’s provinces to Baghdad’s control, and its consequences. He notes that while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has been able to wield the hammer recently in security operations, the Iraqi government still has not proven that it can carry out the more difficult build and hold aspects of a successful counterinsurgency program. That includes reconciliation, and real governance at all levels; something hindered by the deep divisions between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.

Iraq’s political system is still developing. The three main groups in Iraq, the Sunnis, the Shiites, and Kurds still have deep disagreements over the future of the country, which hinders the development of the government. Reconciliation is an important and necessary step to overcome these problems. Iraq has passed several reconciliation laws as part of this process, but it is always the implementation that matters.

The Accountability and Justice Law for example, was passed to replace the old Debaathification act from the American Coalition Provisional Authority. As reported earlier, no officials have been appointed to the Supreme National Commission on Accountability and Justice that is suppose to administer it. The government has been using this as an excuse not to follow it, except for the Interior Ministry, which has accepted former officers into the security forces. This is happening despite the fact that the new law says that no ex-Baathists can work for the ministry. It says a lot about Iraqis inability to follow through on legislation it passes when most of the government is ignoring the Accountability and Justice act, but the one ministry that is forbidden from doing so, is. It is no wonder then that this law and others like it have not ameliorated the distrust of the Sunnis.

In early 2009, Iraq is scheduled to have provincial elections, which could also change the country’s political make-up. Cordesman points out, that simply having a vote, doesn’t add authority or legitimacy. What is important is the type of governance that happens afterwards. In Iraq’s case, three elections since the invasion have done little to solve the nation’s divisions.

Voting has not fixed other problems such as the government’s inability to spend its budget and provide basic services. Cordesman doesn’t mention it, but Prime Minister Maliki’s announcements to rebuild Basra, Sadr City, Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala provinces provide perfect examples of the government’s inability to build after security operations have cleared. After each military offensive in those five areas, the Prime Minister said that Baghdad would spend $100 million to help with reconstruction. So far those have been empty promises. In Basra, the governor argued over spending the money. Similarly, in Sadr City, the local council couldn’t agree on contracts. In Mosul, Maysan, and Diyala, nothing has happened. In fact, the U.S. and England are doing whatever reconstruction is happening in Basra and Sadr City because Baghdad has not proven to be up to the task.

On October 3, 2008 Iraq received control of the 12th province, Babil in the south, from the United States. All of Iraq’s provinces are suppose to be turned over to Baghdad by early 2009. These are important steps towards Iraq receiving full sovereignty. However, the provinces are turned over when the number of attacks in each province decreases, not whether the provincial governments are working or whether there is any reconciliation. Cordesman argues that this happens many times whether the Iraqis are ready or not. In the March 2008 quarterly report to Congress, the Pentagon said that the turnover of Basra had been successful, there was less violence, and that the Army and police were in control. That month Maliki launched an offensive against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army that led to bloody fighting in the city of Basra and across the south.

Cordesman’s conclusion is that while there has been military progress in Iraq, the more important political and economic development has lagged behind. Baghdad has not been able to carry out meaningful reconciliation. The central government and provinces are barely able to provide basic service and spend their budgets. Iraqi elections in 2009 have the opportunity to shuffle the seats of power in the governorates, but they will still be sitting at the same broken table. The U.S. has put too much emphasis on security as a benchmark. Now that that is improving, it is time for Washington and Baghdad to step up their efforts to build Iraq’s infrastructure and government so that it can hold the country together.

For more on Anthony Cordesman’s writings on Iraq see:

Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Report on Iraqi Forces

Cordesman Interview: U.S. Needs To Stay For The Long Haul In Iraq

SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki allocates $100 million for Mosul projects,” 5/18/08
- “Over 7,500 police members sacked this year – official,” 5/29/08
- “Parl’t forms accountability & justice panel next term – MP,” 9/8/08
- “SIIC head, Babel governor take up security,” 10/22/08
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “Transferring Provinces To Iraqi Control: The Reality And The Risks,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9/2/08
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
International Center for Transitional Justice, “Briefing Paper: Iraq’s New ‘Accountability and Justice’ Law,” 1/22/08
Rubin, Alissa and Goode, Erica, “Iraq Struggle Unfolds in Peaceful Protest and Violent Attacks in Sadr City,” New York Times, 4/28/08
Al-Sabaah, “Cabinet allocates $ 100 mln to Diyala province,” 8/7/08
Senanayake, Sumedha, “Iraq: Will Passage Of New Law Appease Sunnis?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1/15/08
Tavernise, Sabrina, “Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb,” New York Times, 7/27/08

>The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq

>

This morning I attended The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) panel concerning The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq. It featured Kimberly Kagan of The Institute for the Study of War, Colin Kahl of The Center for a New American Security, Charles Knight of The Project on Defense Alternatives at the Commonwealth Institute, and Rend al-Rahim of the USIP. The panel was moderated by Daniel Serwer, also of USIP. Also in attendance was Marc Lynch, better known as the author of Abu Aardvark. Lynch reports:

To very briefly summarize, Kimberly Kagan laid out the familiar argument for the surge’s success and the great progress being made, with more nuance and caveats than in some of her op-eds (but still drawing this from Colin Kahl: “I guess I see the glass half-empty, and Kim sees the glass as… overflowing”). Charles Knight gave a highly cogent presentation of the Commonwealth Institute’s “Quickly, Carefully, Generously” report, arguing passionately that there will be no real political reconciliation until American military forces leave. Colin Kahl presented the Center for a New American Security’s “Shaping the Iraqi Inheritance” report calling for “conditional engagement”, arguing for the need to move away from ‘Iraq centrism’ (strategic interests actually exist beyond Iraq’s borders, if you can believe it) and ‘Iraq maximalism’ (holding our policies hostage to outcomes manifestly beyond our capabilities to produce). Finally, Rend al-Rahim laid out a devastating depiction of Iraq’s current situation, and – perhaps surprisingly – offered a wholehearted endorsement of Kahl’s description of Iraq and policy recommendations.

Charles Knight spoke about the impact of the refugee crisis in Iraq: “The price we and others are paying for these blunders is not measured in blood and treasure alone – although these costs are already terribly high.” He pointed to the Task Force report, which addresses one example of the extraordinary costs of the war:

There are now millions of refugees and millions of internally displaced persons, totally nearly 15% of the Iraq population. The displacement of a proportional number of Americans would mean: 45 million forced from their homes, the equivalent of emptying out the population of America’s ten largest cities. This happened under the American watch in Iraq. It is an immense failure for an occupying power; one we still respond to in the most “care less” of ways.

I noted that only two of the four panelists, Colin Kahl and Rend al-Rahim, used the phrase “sustainable security” in regard to the future of Iraq. In all my shaky earnestness, I got up to the microphone and pointed out this fact, and then proceeded to ask the first question in Q&A session:

“My question pertains to the ongoing process of securing peace in Iraq. In the opinion of the panelists, how is the future of peace in Iraq effected by the ticking time-bomb of 4.7 million displaced Iraqis, and what are the potential future effects of this deepening crisis, such as the unmet needs of those with no access to livelihoods?”

Rend al-Rahim replied that the dire conditions in which large numbers of refugees in Syria and Jordan live could breed radicalization, and therefore make refugees prone to taking extremist positions. Colin Kahl emphasized that clear and well-enforced property rights laws for returning internally displaced persons and refugees will be very important in securing a peaceful transition to regular life once refugees are resettled, but this will be a difficult task. Kahl also suggested that the IDPs be allowed to vote in the upcoming elections.

I applaud their recognition of the huge role that vulnerable refugees will play in the future and for understanding that the reactions of the displaced will have a huge impact on the future of Iraq and therefore should be considered when discussing America’s role in the conflict.

Photo Caption: Panelists speak about the future of the U.S. military in Iraq at a forum hosted by the United States Institute of Peace

>Talk Instead of Kill: Shia and Sunni Peacebuilders Reach Out

>Two weeks ago, I wrote about Morton Kondracke’s disturbing Roll Call piece in which he calls for a U.S.-sponsored Shia elimination of Sunnis within Iraq. I argued that even aside from the fact that such action would be morally unpardonable, it isn’t necessary. The potential for peace in Iraq exists in the form of an internationally-mediated reconciliation between Sunnis and Shias, modeled upon the Dayton Accords which ended warfare in Bosnia.

An article in Sunday’s Washington Post entitled “Iraq’s Sadr Overhauls His Tactics,” by Sudarsan Raghavan, provides further evidence that such reconciliation is possible. Despite the deep trenches of their differences, peacebuilders on both sides are reaching out for dialogue and an end to violence in Iraq.

Moqtada al-Sadr is a prominent Shia cleric known for sewing dischord and encouraging violence towards Sunnis. His Mahdi Army – the second largest armed force in Iraq, after the U.S. military – has been blamed for horrific atrocities, including torturing and mutilating civilians. But recently, Sadr has begun purging his movement of violent radicals in favor of popular moderates, and recasting himself as a Nationalist in the middle of the Iraqi political spectrum. Although Shia-initiated aggression continues, “at least 600 fighters have been forced out of the militia over the past three months” for violent acts.

Can a leopard change its spots? Maybe not. But a good politician such as Sadr is more akin to a chameleon, savvy enough to adapt his colors to changes around him.

The changes are apparent. While many Iraqis accepted Shia-led violence after the bombing of Al-Askari Mosque in February 2006, the Raghavan article sites increasing popular frustration with violent insurgent tactics as part of the reason for Sadr’s change. The populist message carrying the most Lose Weight Exercise these days is summed up by Sadr’s moderate senior aide Salah al-Obaidi: “No, no, to sectarianism,” and indeed Sunnis and Shias are largely united against creating autonomous regions.

The sects remain divided on the U.S. timetable for troop withdrawal and other issues, and Sunnis remain understandably distrustful of Sadr’s peacebuilding efforts and inability to reign in violent splinter groups. But the prognosis for peace improves every time a Sunni or Shia puts down a weapon in favor of dialogue. Explains Mithal al-Alusi, a Sunni legislator EPIC applauds for reaching across sectarian lines: “The Sadrists believe they have political problems, and they are trying new tactics to serve their own interests. But anyway, we welcome any political group who wants to talk instead of kill.”

The fact that leaders on both sides are making an effort to talk instead of kill is a step, albeit a small one, in the right direction.

>Reconciliation IS Possible – A Political Solution for Iraq

>I read a disturbing article in last Thursday’s Roll Call (a DC publication read mostly by Hill staffers; sorry, you have to sign up to read it online) arguing the Iraqi civil war can only end by Shias brutally suppressing Sunnis, and the U.S. has no choice but to back the Shias and hope the genocide isn’t too bad. The author, Morton Kondracke, believes that otherwise the violence will be worse and might result in a regime unfriendly to U.S. interests. At least if we support the Shias now, he argues, we can take some credit when they inevitably win, and continue playing a role in the country.

Setting aside the obvious fact that supporting genocide or brutal repression on ANY scale is morally unpardonable, I still think Kondracke is wrong. First, his solution would only further antagonize and radicalize Sunni Jihadis, resulting in more violence against the U.S. and its allies. Second, there is an alternative. Reconciliation between Sunnis and Shias IS possible, and it’s up to the international community to facilitate it.

I pointed out in my entry Radicalization Spillover last week that Sunnis and Shias do live in peace in some countries, and the Michigan example – however far removed from the realities of the Middle East – at least sets a precedent for a formal peace agreement between the sects in the wake of violence. But commenters questioned just how realistic such a solution was, and who could possibly implement it.

To answer those questions, I highly recommend an article in last Thursday’s Washington Post called “A Dayton Process for Iraq,” by EPIC friend and peacebuilder Rend Al-Rahim. We haven’t always seen eye-to-eye with Rend on every issue, but on this one, we feel she got it spot on. Rend’s extensive knowledge of her native country as the founding director of the Iraq Foundation and Iraq’s representative to the U.S. from 2003 to 2004 should not be taken lightly. This woman knows what she’s talking about.
Rend proposes a peace process modeled upon the Dayton Accords, which effectively ended major violence in Bosnia even after a brutal ethnic war leaving hundreds of thousands dead. Although important differences exist in the two cases, Rend argues they should not deter us from using this model, which – if properly implemented – could result in an Iraqi reconciliation.

Rend’s solution includes seven elements:

  1. A strong and credible driving force behind the process. The U.S. is in the best position to play this role, but need not do so alone.
  2. A credible sponsor. The United Nations or another organization with high-profile, skilled facilitators must be involved.
  3. The single objective of producing a Sunni-Shiite agreement. No questions of international troops, oil, regional conflicts or other concerns should be involved.
  4. Representation of Iraqi groups at the highest level of decision-making. Nobody can make peace for Iraq. We can help, but if the Iraqis don’t see it as their own, it will be doomed from the start.
  5. Sustained discussions until compromise is reached. There need not be a time-table; if the final solution is to be truly final, it must be thorough and agreed upon by all.
  6. Implementation mechanisms and a timetable. While we can’t put a timer on the process, we can upon its implementation. The how and when of enforcement must be spelled out.
  7. Ratification by concerned countries, including Iraq’s neighbors. The final agreement will only be credible if it is linked to other agreements and accords, and agreed upon and respected by all with concerns in the nation.

“The attention the United States pays to legal aspects of national reconciliation puts the cart before the horse: Laws and constitutional revision must be outcomes of a national agreement, not conditions for one,” Rend states. This ties in well to Erik’s argument that “reconciliation is not something that ends wars, but rather helps societies heal after wars.”

Although we have a moral obligation to help the vulnerable Iraqi people in the meantime and do what we can to build economic and political infrastructure, an agreement must be forged between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias before we can hope for real, sustainable peace.

With Rend’s plan, we have that hope.

>Radicalization Spillover

>The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, estimates 50,000 refugees flee from Iraq to Jordan each month. But some cross the border in the other direction as well.

The Jordanian city of Zarqa, for example, has become a breeding ground for Sunni Islamic militants seeking Jihad in Iraq. A May 4th article in the New York Times, “In Jihadist Haven, a Goal: To Kill and Die in Iraq,” describes six men, all under 25 years old, who represent a growing shift towards radicalism in Zarqa.

Their teenage years might be considered typical even in the United States; they enjoyed pop music and sports, and considered careers in physics and professional soccer. But these activities were interrupted and dreams decimated soon after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. A young woman from Narqa sums up the change: “Religion was something we just got from our parents. But after the war started, we decided we have to show the world we are Muslims.”

Abu Ibrahim (who spoke on the condition of anonymity) and his five friends, each driven by his own circumstances and radicalized by one another, hired a smuggler to get them across the border from Syria. But while the other young men killed themselves in suicide bombings and shootings, Ibrahim was detained in a Syrian prison and eventually sent back to Jordan where he continues to dream of “fulfilling the rules of God”: “It is our duty. If we don’t defend our religion who should do it?”

Perhaps even more disturbing than the increasing numbers of young Sunni men seeking Jihad in the wake of the Iraq war is their intensifying anger towards Shiite Muslims. Ibrahim listed his targets as “first, the Shiites. Second, the Americans. Third, anywhere in the world where Islam is threatened.” With videos of Shiite militias torturing and killing Sunnis circulating on the internet, more and more Sunni radicals echo Ibrahim’s priorities.

The rift between the religious sects is deepening not only in the Middle East, but is also spilling over into the rest of the world. In my home state of Michigan, for example, vandals targeted Shiite-owned businesses and mosques earlier this year, and the Muslim Student Association at my own University of Michigan adopted rules preventing Shiites from leading prayers.

But even as this violence and discrimination pales in comparison to recent events in Iraq and just beyond its borders, perhaps Michigan’s experience provides a small ray of hope. Today, May 10th, Muslim leaders from across Michigan will come together in Dearborn to sign a Unity Agreement. Imam Mohammad Ali Elahi of the Islamic House of Wisdom in Dearborn Heights wrote this in Tuesday’s Detroit News:


Let us behave like the prophet with compassion, courtesy, sincerity, humbleness, patience, dignity, fairness and understanding, recalling that our prophet created the bond of brotherhood among citizens and immigrants in Medina. Despite their differences, he took serious steps against prejudice based on nationality, race and culture.

Differences in opinion are not only allowed in Islam, but critical thinking is vital in dealing with new developments. When thinkers disagree with piety and sincerity, and if the goal is solving problems, variation in thinking leads every side of a debate closer to the truth.

Peacebuilding measures, grassroots movements and economic aid towards Iraqi reconstruction should likewise focus on the common ground between Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups. Reconciliation may be, as Erik points out, extremely difficult – but at least the Sunni/Shiite honor code in Michigan provides some evidence that it is not impossible.

>Is Reconciliation possible during Civil War?

>Responding to my May 2 post Where are the Benchmarks for U.S. Progress? Bruce Wallace (aka PT Witte in Second Life) asks…

Where is the reconciliation benchmark? How long are the Iraqis going to wait before they get a strong reconciliation program going? It’s not like we don’t know how to do this. Great work in connecting divided people has already been done in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Rwanda. It’s time for the Iraqis to stand up to the forces that seek to divide.

Bruce is right. More ought to be done to promote conflict resolution, peacebuilding and national reconciliation in Iraq. I also share his view about the utility of increased pressure on Iraqi parliamentarians and Prime Minister Nuri Kamal Maliki’s government to achieve political benchmarks. However, I disagree with the popular notion that deadlines will magically compel Iraqis to act. While deadlines might help, other factors, such as the small matter of Iraq’s civil war, present major stumbling blocks.

Thus, my answer to Bruce’s question “how long are Iraqis going to wait before they get a strong reconciliation program going?” is simple: they will wait until they feel secure enough to do so.

As long as Iraq’s civil war continues, national reconciliation will be difficult if not impossible. But Iraqi leaders (and the U.S.) have no option but to try, and plenty of Iraqis can’t be blamed for not trying. I think of an Iraqi colleague killed by an unknown gunmen last year. His crime? He was trying to advance peace and reconciliation between Sunni and Shia neighbors in the midst of rising sectarian violence.

Reconciliation is not something that ends wars, but rather helps societies heal after wars. South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process did not begin until after apartheid came to an end. Rwanda, on the other hand, is relatively stable, yet far from national reconciliation. The Tutsi-dominated government is still holding countless Rwandans in prison camps, including many denied due process. Rwandans expressing human rights concerns are often accused of “genocidal thinking.” Meanwhile, 10,000s of Rwandan refugees and remnants of the Interahamwe, informal Hutu-dominated militias that participated in the genocide, remain just across the border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. To heal Rwanda’s divided society, a lot of reconciliation work remains.

So if national reconciliation doesn’t end civil wars, how do they really end? According to the literature, civil wars end when either one side wins outright or when combatants reach a stalemate, realizing no side is strong enough to prevail and hold onto power.

Returning to Bruce (aka PT Witte), his choice of countries — Rwanda, Northern Ireland and South Africa — offers an interesting range of case studies. In Rwanda, the civil war ended with one side (the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front) winning outright. Northern Ireland’s long civil war between Protestant Unionists and Catholic Nationalists ended in stalemate, making the 1998 Good Friday Agreement possible and leading to the formation of a power-sharing government. In the case of South Africa, decades of violent apartheid ended when the ruling National Party began negotiating itself out of power and the African National Congress (ANC) won the country’s first multi-racial elections in 1994. When the ANC came to power, the government was not purged of civil servants from the previous regime (an example one would wish L. Paul Bremer and Iraqi expatriates had followed back in 2003).

Unfortunately, the combatants of Iraq’s civil war appear to be far from both stalemate and a decisive victory by any one side. Based on their rhetoric, factions among the various insurgent groups and militias clearly believe they can seize power through force of arms –- at least, once the Americans are out of the way.

In his recent Foreign Affairs essay, James Fearon writes:

Even if an increase in the number of U.S. combat troops reduces violence in Baghdad and so buys time for negotiations on power sharing in the current Iraqi government, there is no good reason to expect that subsequent reductions would not revive the violent power struggle. Civil wars are rarely ended by stable power-sharing agreements. When they are, it typically takes combatants who are not highly factionalized and years of fighting to clarify the balance of power. Neither condition is satisfied by Iraq at present.

In other words, barring a massive outside intervention that only Sen. McCain seems to support, it’s far more likely that Iraq’s civil war will get much worse before it can get better.
Pro-withdrawal Democrats like Rep. Murtha seem to recognize this. Rather than pull U.S. forces from the Middle East, he advocates “strategic redeployment” to “contain” Iraq’s civil war. Likewise, less talk in recent months has centered on “ending the war.” Instead, Congressional leaders talk about “ending U.S. military involvement in Iraq’s civil war.”

In their January report When Things Fall Apart, Kenneth Pollack and Daniel Byman of Brookings put it this way:

President George W. Bush has staked everything on one last-chance effort to quell the fighting and jumpstart a process of political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Should this last effort fail, the United States is likely to very quickly have to determine how best to handle an Iraq that will be erupting into Bosnia- or Lebanon-style all-out civil war. The history of such wars is that they are disastrous for all parties, but the United States will have little choice but to try to stave off disaster as best it can.

Until a lasting peace can be negotiated between Iraq’s warring factions, we have an obligation to do what we can to protect innocent civilians, assist war victims, and help refugees and internally displaced persons, especially those who are most vulnerable. We also have a responsibility to work with our Iraqi and international partners to prevent the conflict from escalating beyond Iraq’s borders into a full scale regional war. That ought to be something the Bush administration and both parties in Congress can agree on –- regardless of differences over military surges and troop withdrawals.

This is definitely a case where “united we stand, divided we fall.” While it has become fashionable and in some cases accurate to blame the Iraqis for zero-sum politics and not moving quickly enough, there is plenty of room for improvement on those accounts here in Washington as well.

Meanwhile in the field throughout Iraq, Americans and Iraqis — civilian and military — are risking their lives to do what they can with what they have. Many have little choice in the matter. If efforts at the national level with Prime Minister Maliki’s government stall, much can still be done at the local level. For readers interested in local conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies for Iraq, I recommend this resource (PDF) from our friends at the 3D Security Initiative.

Thanks for the great questions Bruce, and for giving EPIC a Second Life among PT Witte and friends.