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>Iraq’s Displaced Forgotten In Debate Over Election Law

>Iraq’s parliament has spent months debating and negotiating over the 2010 election law. While it has discussed several issues such as the status of Kirkuk and voting for overseas Iraqis, nothing has really been said about Iraq’s internally displaced. The result is that many will likely be disenfranchised as happened in the 2009 balloting.

Recently, hundreds of displaced families protested in Diyala against the planned parliamentary vote. They said they would not participate because the voting rules were rigged against them. In the current election bill, Article IV says that displaced families can vote, but only in their original home district they were forced out of, and are ineligible if they transferred their food ration cards to another district. The Iraqi Election Commission has said that around 1 million displaced can vote under these regulations. The latest United Nations figures record around 1.6 million displaced, which means 600,000 people may be disenfranchised.

Another problem is that even those that can vote still have to register, and few have done so. In October 2009 the Iraqi Election Commission reported that only 20,000 displaced voters had signed up by then. The Commission said that it was setting up special teams to try to get more to participate. The same thing occurred in the 2009 provincial elections when the displaced were confused about the voter rules, and few registered. The result was that tens of thousands didn’t get to vote. That led to several protests.

Since there has been no real debate by Iraq’s politicians to correct these problems the same scenario is likely to play out in 2010. Iraq’s displaced are already facing a plethora of problems from findings jobs, housing, to getting services, now a sizeable number are probably going to be shut out of voting for their representatives for a second time.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/1/09

Naji, Zaineb, “Voter Apathy Among Iraq Displaced,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 9/24/08

Niqash, “election law text,” 11/9/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Election Commission Urges Vote Law’s Approval,” 10/7/09

Al Sabah, “Many displaced families in Diyala boycott elections,” 11/17/09

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009

>Columbia University Charts Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad

>Dr. Michael Izady of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs recently

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The next map skips ahead to 2006. The February bombing of the Shiite shrine at Samarra in Salahaddin province north of Baghdad in that year is credited as beginning of the sectarian war, and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army is largely blamed for carrying out most of the ethnic cleansing. In actuality, in 2005 the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Badr Brigade militia took over the Interior Ministry under the government of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The third map covers early 2007. At that time the sectarian war was still going full throttle. For example,

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The fourth map is from late 2007. The only real change was along the west bank of the Tigris. There, the southern section of Adhamiya became Shiite, while Resaca and Gaitanis became Sunni majority. During that period, the sectarian fighting was petering out. The Iraq Index counted 1,100 deaths in September 2007; the last time it would record over one thousand deaths in a single month. After that there were 950 killed in October, and 750 in November and December each. The Surge had also led to blast walls being erected around many of the Sunni neighborhoods and the creation of the Sons of Iraq program where the majority of the Sunni insurgency gave up and switched sides to align with the Americans rather than face annihilation at the hands of the Shiite militias, Al Qaeda in Iraq, or the United States. Both of those policies solidified the segregation of Baghdad.

Baghdad Late 2007

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

The last map is from mid-2008. There were very few changes by that time. The only noticeable ones were around the Riyad area that went from mixed to Shiite on the western bank of the Tigris across from the Green Zone. By 2008 the sectarian war was over, the insurgency was reduced to largely carrying out terrorist bombings and hit and run attacks, and deaths were dropping.

Baghdad Mid 2008

Green – Shiite majority
Red – Sunni majority
Blue – Christian majority
Yellow – Mixed Sunni-Shiite

Izady believes that the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad by the Shiite militias and the Sons of Iraq movement were the major reasons why the civil war ended. The Badr Brigade and Mahdi Army effectively removed most of the Sunnis to a western strip of the capital, while the Sons of Iraq signaled the collapse of the insurgency. The Surge didn’t fully get underway until mid-2007, and facilitated the reduction of violence and segregation that was already underway. Izady thinks much of the same for Sadr’s August 2007 cease-fire. Again, the fighting was already winding down by then, and Sadr never told his followers to disarm, and many factions had broken away or become Special Groups that were no longer following Sadr’s direction, so there were plenty of militiamen still active. There were just fewer Sunnis to target, and many militia cells turned to exploiting their own Shiite communities instead.

The BBC did a similar set of maps comparing pre-2006 Baghdad to 2007 based upon information from the International Medical Corps. It found a very similar pattern of Shiite expansion in the east and northwest, the vast reduction of mixed neighborhoods, and the concentration of Sunnis in the west. Many other students of the Surge attribute these same factors for the end of the civil war, but just put different emphasis on each point.

The one disputable point that Izady made in his interview with the International Relations and Security Network was when he said he believed that Sunnis were reduced to 12% of Iraq’s population because of the fighting. He said many became refugees in Syria and Jordan. While the exact percentage Sunnis made up of Iraq and Baghdad are disputed, a general number used in sources such as the CIA Factbook is around 30%. How much they made up of Baghdad before the U.S. invasion is an even harder figure to calculate. In the December 2005 national elections however, the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and Iraqi National Dialogue Front pulled 22.9% of the vote in the capital, while the Iraqi National List, even though led by a Shiite, former Prime Minister Ilyad Allawi, also draws strongly from Sunnis, got 13.4%. That’s roughly 30% of Baghdad as well. If Izady is to be believed than just over half of the Sunnis fled the country. In 2003 Iraq had a population of around 26 million, if 30% were Sunnis that would be roughly 7.8 million, half of which would be 3.9 million people. The United Nations estimates that there are only 2.5 million refugees however, not all of which are Sunnis. There are other sources that think that Sunnis were only 15-20% of all Iraqis, which would be approximately 3.9million-5.2 million. That would match the refugee numbers much more closely.

Izady’s maps are a valuable resource in charting the changes that Baghdad witnessed after the U.S. invasion. It was and remains the center of power and conflict in the country to this day. The Shiite militias undertook a concerted effort to push Sunnis out of parts of the city beginning in 2005, and largely succeeded as Izady’s graphics show. When the insurgency largely gave up and joined the Sons of Iraq, and the U.S. put up blast walls around many communities, those marked the effective end of the sectarian war. The result is a segregated and Shiite dominated capital, that in a way is symbolic of post-Saddam Iraq as there was displacement across the country, and the Shiite parties are now in firm control of the government, with no real threat from other sects.

SOURCES

BBC, “Baghdad: Mapping the violence,” 2007

CIA, Factbook

Guler, Claudio, “Baghdad Divided,” International Relations and Security Network, 11/9/09

Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, “Legislation Election of 15 December 2005,” 2006

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Matthews, Dylan and Klein, Ezra, “How Important Was the Surge?” American Prospects, 7/28/08

Murphy, Dan, “New Iraqi leader seeks unity,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/24/06

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 8/20/09

Otterman, Sharon, “IRAQ: The Sunnis,” Council on Foreign Relations, 12/12/03

Wong, Edward, “U.S. Splits With Iraqi Official Over Prisoner Abuse,” New York Times, 11/17/05

>Number of Displaced Returning Likely To Increase, Will Iraq Be Ready?

>The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the premier relief group working with Iraq’s displaced. They focus upon those who have lost their homes since the February 2006 Samarra bombing that is credited with starting the sectarian war. The IOM’s latest report notes that Iraq’s displaced still face many problems, and that the country’s provinces, especially Baghdad will face an increasing number of returns, which they may not be ready for.

The IOM believes that around 282,251 families, approximately 1.6 mill people, have been displaced since February 2006, with another 250,000 families becoming refugees. The IOM’s numbers mirror closely those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). They recorded 202,018 families displaced before 2006, equaling 1,212,108 people, and 265,499 families losing their homes afterward, totaling 1,552,003 individuals. (2) Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa saw almost 90% of the displacement after the Samarra bombing.

The IOM has recorded about 58,110 post-Samarra families that have gone back so far, amounting to 348,660 people. That’s 10.9% of the families that have lost their homes. Of the returnees 6% were refugees, 3,659 families, and 94% were displaced, 54,451 families. According to the UNHCR’s figures, overall 40% of the displaced have returned since the beginning of the war in 2003. The two heaviest periods of returns were immediately after the invasion when 55,429 came back in 2003 and 291,997 did so in 2004, and then from 2008 to the present. 221,260 people returned in 2008, and 154,850 have from January to September 2009 as well. Like the post-Samarra families, the majority of those coming back have been internally displaced. In total, 703,190 have been internal refugees, compared to 426,156 who arrived from other countries.

The mix of displaced and refugees coming back varies from province to province. In Irbil, 103 families returned, and 100% of them were refugees. Muthanna was very similar with 64 families coming back, 88% of which were from abroad. In comparison Basra has seen 500 families return, 100% of which were displaced. In Ninewa 1,732 families have come back, along with 110,843 to Diyala, 99-98% of which were displaced. Baghdad has seen the most returns, 33,521 families. Of those, 69% came from within Baghdad province, 24% were from other provinces, and 6% were from abroad.

Post-Feb. 2006 Families Returning To Iraq – IOM
Baghdad: 33,521
Diyala: 10,843
Anbar: 5,553
Tamim: 3,873
Ninewa: 1,732
Maysan: 626
Basra: 500
Babil: 306
Karbala: 298
Najaf: 221
Salahaddin: 189
Wasit: 123
Dhi Qar: 108
Irbil: 103
Muthanna: 64
Qadisiyah: 44
Dohuk: 6

The reasons for displacement and return follow some broad trends. First, 58.1% have been displaced for one year or more. The major reasons for leaving their homes were being forced from their property, 23.6%, general violence, 14.3%, and armed conflict, 13.6%. Conversely, improvement in security is the main reason for families coming back. 43.17% said it was better security in their area of origin, 32.48% said it was a combination of better security and difficult conditions where they were, and just 12.98% said it was only problems with where they currently lived. Those difficulties include high rent, poor shelter, and lack of jobs and services. Those going back to Baghdad cite getting their old jobs back, help with transportation, repair to their homes and property, access to services, and wanting to put their kids in school as their main motivations. Of those that have gone back 61% said they feel safe all of the time. Almost half, 49%, said they had good housing conditions, while 34% said they were bad. In Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Anbar, 42.5% said their homes were partially or completely destroyed.

The returnees also face a variety of problems. One is lack of jobs. 44.5% said they were able and employed, compared to 33.5% who said they were able and unemployed, and 22.0% who claimed they were unfit to work. While 98% say they had their ration cards, only 40% said they had regular access to the system, 54% said they had intermittent access, and 6% said they had no access at all. The government is also offering $840 for families that return. Only 44% of returnees have registered for the money however, and of those only 39% have gotten it. Other issues mentioned to the IOM were fuel, 44%, and health care, 42%.

Of those families that are still displaced, the majority say that they want to return. 52.7% said they wanted to go back to their homes, 25.1% said they would integrate where they were, and 19.7% said they would settle somewhere else. The problem the IOM pointed out was if conditions stayed the same or got better than Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces could receive a lot more returning families. The question is what will happen then? The government does not have the capacity to deal with all the property claims that arise with large-scale returns. They have not been able to provide for those families that have come back, and have no real policy to deal with them overall. That could start a whole new crisis with thousands of families coming back, but not finding the support and housing they require, and not being able to provide for themselves.

UNHCR Numbers On Displacement And Returns

Displaced 2003-2009
Pre-2006: 202,018 families, 1,212,108 individuals
Post-2006: 265,499 families, 1,552,003 individuals
TOTAL: 467,517 families, 2,764,111 individuals

Returns 2003-2009
2003: 9,237 families, 55,429 individuals
2004: 48,655 families, 291,997 individuals
2005: 25,689 families, 154,155 individuals
2006: 28,355 families, 170,235 individuals
2007: 13,541 families, 81,420 individuals
2008: 39,280 families, 221,260 individuals
Jan.-Sep. 2009: 28,630 families, 154,850 individuals
TOTAL: 193,387 families, 1,129,346, 40% of total displaced

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Assessment of Return to Iraq,” 11/3/09

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Return Update Iraq September 2009,” November 2009

>Iraq’s President and Vice President Want Election Law Revised

>In the days after parliament finally passed the 2010 parliamentary election bill, both President Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, formerly of the Iraqi Sunni Party, and now part of the new Iraqi National Movement, have called for it to be revised. They are both requesting that the number of seats set aside for refugees and minorities be increased.

As the election bill now stands, eight seats are set aside for minorities and eight seats are compensatory seats for refugees and political parties that don’t do well locally in the provinces, but do well nationally. Talabani and Hashemi are both asking that the quota be increased to 48 seats out of 323.

Talabani called for an amendment after the Kurdish parliament requested one. Many of Iraq’s minorities have fled to Kurdistan or live in the disputed territories in northern Iraq, so an increase in the quota would probably help the ruling Kurdish parties like Talabani’s PUK. This is a change for the President as he, and Iraq’s other Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi, already ratified the bill.

An adviser to Vice President Hashemi said that refugees need more representation since most are Sunnis, which is Hashemi’s constituency. Hashemi’s coalition partner Parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has called for 30 seats for refugees. The Vice President went on TV saying that he will veto the bill unless it is changed by Tuesday, November 17, 2009.

The ball is now back in parliament’s court to either increase the quota or see whether Hashemi is bluffing about a veto. This is just the latest delay after many, as the law was supposed to be passed in October.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq’s January vote placed in doubt by presidency,” 11/16/09

Alsumaria, “Talabani and Abdul Mehdi ratify election law,” 11/14/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “URGENT/VP says won’t endorse election law come what may,”” 11/15/09

Najm, Hayder, “election law faces new challenges,” Niqash, 11/13/09

Reuters, “Iraq VP Threatens To Veto Vote Law Over Refugees,” 11/15/09

Iraq’s Parliament Finally Does Its Job – Passes Election Law

On the night of November 8, 2009, Iraq’s parliament finally passed the 2010 election law. 195 of the 175 members were present, with 141 voting for the bill. As mentioned before, the law was originally supposed to be passed on October 16, but disputes over how to conduct voting in Tamim, home to the disputed city of Kirkuk, and whether to use an open or closed list voting system, delayed the proceedings. From reports, it seems that the legislature was able to break the deadlock when the major parties, including Prime Minister Maliki’s Dawa, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Sadrists, decided to drop their arguments over Tamim, so that the bill could move forward. U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill was also seen at the parliament on Sunday desperately trying to bring lawmakers together so that a vote could happen.

The 2010 Election Law is actually a revision of the 2005 legislation with three major changes. First, there will be open instead of closed list voting. This allows the public to choose from individuals, parties or lists, instead of just coalitions. Second, elections in Tamim will be provisional for one year as a committee goes through the voter roles looking for any irregularities. This arises from claims by Arabs and Turkmen in the province that say Kurds have moved in thousands of their people into Kirkuk to shift the demographics in their favor to assure their victory in any vote, and eventually annex it. If the committee finds a difference of 5% or more in the vote, than the election can be invalidated there. To assuage the Kurds, the law says that other provinces can also have their voter roles scrutinized at the request of more than 50 lawmakers. The Kurdish Alliance currently has 53 seats. It also dropped the proposal to give two compensatory seats each to Arabs and Turkmen in Tamim to make up for the expected Kurdish victory there. Third, the number of seats up for grabs will increase from the current 275 to 323. This is based upon statistics from the Ministry of Trade that administers the food ration system, and a requirement that there be one seat in parliament for every 100,000 people.

After that, the bill is pretty much like the 2005 one. Iraqis living overseas will be allowed to vote. There will also be quotas for women, and minorities. Christians will get one seat each in Tamim, Ninewa, Baghdad, Irbil, and Dohuk, Yazidis and Shabaks will get one seat each in Ninewa, and Mandean Christians will get one seat in Baghdad. Women are also supposed to be 25% of the politicians elected to office.

The bill now goes to the Presidential Council for final approval, which is expected shortly. The Election Commission, however, says that because of the delays, Iraq cannot hold balloting on the original date, which was January 16, 2010. Instead they have proposed January 21 as the new deadline.

It was important that the parliament put aside its differences over the future of Kirkuk to get the election bill passed. If they had not, the debate over it could’ve dragged on for months as happened with the provincial election law that was originally planned for October 2008, but got delayed until January 2009, and had the original version vetoed as a result. At the same time, the law is definitely a victory for the Kurds. They got all of their major demands met, and their expected victory in Tamim in 2010 will create more facts on the ground to support their argument that the Kurdistan Regional Government should annex Kirkuk. That will have to wait for another day however as the technical issue of holding elections is finally moving forward.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq ends impasse of elections law,” 11/9/09
- “Kirkuk included in Iraqi elections,” 11/9/09

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq passes new election law, smoothing way for January elections,” Christian Science Monitor, 11/8/09

Associated Press, “Election Law Passes In Iraq, Setting Up National Vote,” 11/8/09
- “Iraq Election Panel Seeks Jan. 21 Vote,” 11/9/09

Aswat al-Iraq, “After stormy, wrangling session, election law passed,” 11/8/09

BBC, “Iraq MPs approve election reform,” 11/8/09

Chon, Gina, “Iraq Passes Key Election Law and Prepares for January Vote,” Wall Street Journal, 11/9/09

Chulov, Martin, “Deal on Kirkuk sets stage for Iraqi elections,” Guardian, 11/8/09

CNN, “Iraqi parliament passes key voting law,” 11/8/09

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi MPs pass delayed election law,” 11/9/09

Londono, Ernesto, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law, paving way for January vote,” Washington Post, 11/8/09

Reuters, “Iraqi lawmakers pass election law,” 11/8/09

Roads To Iraq, “Election law, a first view,” 11/9/09

Strobel, Warren, Issa, Sahar, “Iraqis pass election law crucial to U.S. withdrawal plans,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09
- “Iraqis set elections for Jan. 23 after weeks of rancor,” McClatchy Newspapers, 11/8/09

Visser, Reidar, “The Election Law Is Passed: Open Lists, Kirkuk Recognised as a Governorate with “Dubious” Registers,” Historiae.org, 11/8/09

Williams, Timothy and Izzi, Sa’ad, “Iraq Passes Crucial Election Law,” New York Times, 11/9/09

>Latest Return Statistics For Iraqi Refugees/Displaced

>

The latest report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the number of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced that have returned is now available. Like the last report, 2009 has continued to see a number of Iraqis come back, but varying by month. In June, 2009 14,750 displaced and 3,490 refugees for a total of 18,410 Iraqis made the trip back. That compared to a total of 15,330 in May. March saw the largest number of returns this year with 26,540. Since 2005 displaced returns, 61% of the total, have far outweighed the refugees coming back, 39%. In the first six months of 2009 roughly 101,490 Iraqis have returned. That would put this year roughly on track to match last year’s total of 221,260. 2004 has seen the most returns since the U.S. invasion with 291,997 making the trip. That year 193,997 were refugees coming back to see the new Iraq. In total, the UNHCR estimates that approximately 3,195,899 lost their homes, and about 1,075,986, 33.6%, have returned so far. The number of displaced and the percent that have returned is definitely incomplete because the UNHCR counts no refugees before 2006 when there were tens of thousands of them under Saddam.

Total displaced

Time

Displaced

Refugees

Total

Pre-2006

1,212,108

1,212,108

After 2006

1,695,899

1,500,000

3,195,899

Number of Returns 2003-June 2009

Time

Displaced

Refugees

Total

2003

0

55,429

55,429

2004

98,000

193,997

291,997

2005

98,000

56,155

154,155

2006

150,000

20.235

170,235

2008

195,890

25,370

221,260

Jan. 09

6,390

1,130

7,520

Feb. 09

15,810

2,970

18,780

Mar. 09

20,690

4,860

26,540

Apr. 09

11,020

3,890

14,910

May 09

10,540

2,990

15,330

Jun. 09

14,750

3,490

18,410

2009

79,200

18,970

101,490

Total

657,090

183,727

1,075,986

61%

39%

100%

The vast majority of Iraqis are going back to six of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf, Karbala, and Babil. Baghdad has been at the center of the fighting since the U.S. invasion, so it should be no surprise then that the capital has seen the most displaced, and the most returns. 54% of the displaced and 52% of refugees have gone back to that province. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the premier aid group working with Iraq’s displaced, has extensively surveyed this community and found that 26.6% were forced from their property in Baghdad, 20.6% did so because of the fighting, 20.1% because of direct threats to their life, 15.8% fled the general violence, and 15.7% left out of fear. Those figures are signs of the death and destruction that were wrought in the capital, especially after the 2006 Amarra bombing when the Shiites began ethnically cleansing Sunnis. Overall, the major reason why the displaced have come back is the improved security according to the IOM, followed by a mix of better security and difficulties in their current locals. Those are probably the same reasons for refugees, although far fewer of them, 12.2% of the total, have come back so far.

Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Sulaymaniya

140

0%

Muthanna

180

0%

Irbil

190

0%

Salahaddin

440

0%

Dhi Qar

440

0%

Dohuk

510

1%

Qadisiyah

510

1%

Maysan

510

1%

Anbar

520

1%

Tamim

740

1%

Basra

1,250

1%

Wasit

1,130

1%

Karbala

1,350

1%

Babil

1,680

2%

Najaf

2,170

2%

Ninewa

2,920

3%

Diyala

31,770

31%

Baghdad

55,040

54%

TOTAL

101,490

100%

Refugee Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Ninewa

20

0%

Anbar

60

0%

Sulaymaniya

140

1%

Irbil

160

1%

Salahaddin

160

1%

Muthanna

180

1%

Dhi Qar

430

2%

Maysan

440

2%

Wasit

450

2%

Dohuk

510

2%

Qadisiyah

510

2%

Basra

680

3%

Tamim

690

3%

Babil

1,030

5%

Karbala

1,320

6%

Diyala

1,660

7%

Najaf

2,170

10%

Baghdad

11,680

52%

TOTAL

22,290

100%

Displaced Returns by Province Jan.-June 2009

Dohuk

0

0%

Qadisiyah

0

0%

Muthanna

0

0%

Najaf

0

0%

Sulaymaniya

0

0%

Dhi Qar

10

0%

Irbil

30

0%

Karbala

30

0%

Tamim

50

0%

Maysan

70

0%

Salahaddin

280

0%

Anbar

460

1%

Basra

570

1%

Babil

650

1%

Wasit

680

1%

Ninewa

2,900

4%

Diyala

30,110

38%

Baghdad

43,360

55%

TOTAL

79,200

100%

The government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is still encouraging the return of Iraq’s displaced. The UNHCR does not think it’s time, and the latest Pentagon report to Congress on Iraq said Baghdad has no serious plan to assist the process. The new plan is to try to get them to come back to violent areas in Abu Ghraib outside of Baghdad and Diyala. The authorities have plans to move in 3,000 mostly Shiite families into Abu Ghraib, and to begin evictions of squatters in Diyala. The governor of that province also hopes that families will come back, and has set up six committees in various regions of Diyala to look into damages and pay compensation to returning families. The displaced are worried about insurgent attacks.

Baghdad is trying to close the refugee file this year in an attempt to improve the image of the country, and to help Maliki in the 2010 parliamentary elections. Already, in February 2009 the Ministry of Displacement and Migration ordered a stop to registering new displaced claiming that most families have gone back to their homes. This is an important development because not only is the claim not true, but no Iraqis can receive government aid without registering. The authorities have also promised rewards for those that go back to Baghdad, but very few have received any payments.

The process of return has begun, but the majority of Iraq’s refugees are still without their homes. The displaced are coming back in much larger numbers than refugees, mostly because of the improved security situation in the country. The major concern is what they will find when they come home. The government has promised help, but it has not come through in many cases. Prime Minister Maliki seems more concerned about the reports on returns to improve his standing, than actually bettering conditions for when families come back. International organizations have only been able to assist a small fraction of this community, which means many are likely to have to fend for themselves whether they decide to go back or stay where they are.

SOURCES


Abdullah, Muhammed, “displaced fear new al-qaeda violence,” Niqash, 6/24/09

Alsumaria, “UNHCR: Iraq not prepared for refugees return,” 6/3/09

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq’s Government Orders Barriers Removed,” New York Times, 8/6/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” June 2009

International Organization for Migration, “Baghdad Governorate Profile July 2009 IOM IDP and Returnee Assessment,” July 2009
- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments Assessment of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Nespapers, 5/22/09

UNHCR, “Monthly Statistical Update on Return – June 2009,” 8/3/09

>Kurdistan Lacks Services And Employment

>

Kurdistan recently held parliamentary elections on July 25, 2009. The main topics in the vote were the rule of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and corruption. Just as important could be the economy. While there are many who tout the relative stability in Kurdistan and its foreign investment, the region actually lags behind in almost all humanitarian and economic indicators compared to the rest of the country.

The Kurdistan Region is made up of three provinces, Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya. Irbil and Sulaymaniya have over one million inhabitants each, while Dohuk only has around 500,000. Dohuk is also home to over 100,000 internally displaced Iraqis.

Population

Dohuk 505,491

Irbil 1,542,421

Sulaymaniya 1,893,617

Internally Displaced In Kurdistan

Sulaymaniya 36,000

Ibril 62,034

Dohuk 112,392

The relative stability and security in Kurdistan has not provided the population there the opportunities or services one would expect. The employment situation in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is mixed. In Iraq overall 12% of men and 13% of women are without jobs. Men in Irbil and Sulaymaniya do better at 9% and 10% respectively, but in Dohuk 13% of men are lacking employment. Women do far worse however. In Irbil the unemployment rate for them is 16%, followed by 26% in Sulaymaniya and 30% in Dohuk. The percentage of men and women involved in the labor force are also lower in Kurdistan compared to Iraq. In the rest of the country 18% of women and 81% of men are either employed or looking for work. The labor force participation in Dohuk is only 7% for women and 76% for women. Irbil at 12% of women, 77% of men, and Sulaymaniya at 15% of women and 78% of men, only do slightly better.

Unemployment

Iraq: 13% women, 12% men

Irbil: 16% women, 9% men

Sulaymaniya: 26% women, 10% men

Dohuk: 30% women, 13% men

Labor Force Participation

Iraq: 18% women, 81% men

Dohuk: 7% women, 76% men

Irbil: 12% women, 77% men

Sulaymaniya: 15% women, 78% men

In terms of poverty Kurdistan actually does better than Iraq in general. 22% of Iraqis live in the lowest per capita income quintile. Irbil at 15% and Sulaymaniya at 18% do better, although in Dohuk 33% of the population is in the bottom group.

Poverty – % Living In The Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile

Iraq: 22%

Irbil: 15%

Sulaymaniya: 18%

Dohuk: 33%

Where the KRG lags behind is in education. Kurdistan has higher illiteracy rates, with 43% of women and 21% of men in Dohuk, 40% of women and 20% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 44% of women and 18% of men in Irbil in this situation, compared to 24% of women and 11% of men nationally. This is due to lower education levels. In Iraq 47% of women and 31% of men have less than a primary education. In Dohuk the rate is 65% of women and 49% of men, followed by 64% of women and 49% of men in Sulaymaniya, and 64% of women and 42% of men in Irbil.

Illiteracy

Iraq: 24% women, 11% men

Irbil: 44% women, 18% men

Sulaymaniya: 43% women, 20% men

Dohuk: 43% women, 21% men

% With Less Than A Primary Education

Iraq: 47% women, 31% men

Irbil: 64% women, 42% men

Sulaymaniya: 64% women, 49% men

Dohuk: 65% women, 49% men

Services are also worse in the KRG. Kurds receive much less electricity than the rest of the country. 55% of Iraqis have more than 11 hours of power cuts per day or are not connected to the power network at all. In Kurdistan more than 80% of the population in all three provinces experience these difficulties. Kurdistan is also lacking in sanitation. 26% of Iraqis are not connected to the sanitation system. Dohuk is close to the national average at 28% not being connected, but Sulaymaniya at 38% and Irbil at 48% don’t do as well.

Electricity – More Than 11 Hours of Power Cuts Or No Connection To Network

Iraq: 55%

Irbil: 84%

Sulaymaniya: 88%

Dohuk: 85%

Not Connected To the Sanitation Network

Iraq: 26%

Dohuk: 28%

Sulaymaniya: 38%

Irbil: 48%

Since 2003, Kurdistan has been one of the most stable parts of Iraq due to its tight security, limits on migration, and domination by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). These two ruling parties however, have not been able to take advantage of that to provide jobs, education, or services to the population. Instead the PUK and KDP have been more interested in maintaining their control, and building up their two major strongholds, the cities of Irbil and Sulaymaniya. Outside of those urban areas the rest of the KRG has been left underdeveloped. This was the first year that this became an issue when Kurds went to the polls. Even then, the PUK and KDP seem to have maintained their control of the KRG. If the elections lead to an actual opposition however, those two parties may finally begin serving the population rather than themselves because now they actually have to compete for the loyalties of the people.

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “Strong Showing Seen for Kurdish Challengers,” New York Times, 7/26/09

Danly, James, “The 2009 Kurdish Elections,” Institute for the Study of War, 7/23/09

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Dahuk Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, April 2009

- “Erbil Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

- “Sulyamaniyah Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, July 2009

Denmark Begins Deporting Iraqi Refugees

On June 25, 2009 Denmark deported six Iraqis back to Baghdad that had failed to gain asylum there. The Danish government has plans to deport 244 more. This follows an agreement signed in May 2009 between Iraq and Denmark to repatriate Iraqis who had their asylum requests rejected. The Danes are concerned about the flow of Iraqis to their country, and have been working on limiting their arrival since the beginning of the year. The Danish immigration service claims that Iraqis are traveling back and forth between the two countries, which proves that they are not refugees fleeing violence. The Danish National Police has been monitoring the movement of Iraqis since 2000, and claimed 370 visited Iraq since 2003. On Baghdad’s side, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is hoping to get Iraqi refugees to return, and close the file on the issue by the end of 2009. Maliki’s main motivation seems to be improving the image of Iraq, rather than the plight of the displaced.

Various human rights groups, the United Nations High Commission on Refugees, and the Iraqi Minister of Displacement and Migration are all against this policy. The Displacement Minister said that Iraq’s Foreign Minister signed this deal with Denmark without consulting him. As a sign of protest Baghdad International Airport and Kurdistan originally said that they would not accept any flight that included Iraqis forced to return to the country.

The amount of refugees in Denmark seems like an infinitesimal amount when considering the fact that Iraq has 2 million refugees. Iraqis however have been the largest group seeking asylum in other countries for the last two years. Most of them have tried to go to either Europe or the United States. None of these states have been enthusiastic about receiving them. As early as 2007 some European countries began deporting Iraqis as a result. The Iraqi government has also been pushing for their countrymen to come home for political purposes. Together this led to the Norwegian agreement. Despite the improved security very few of Iraq’s refugees have gone back, and the United Nations says it is still not time for them to return. It seems that forcing Iraqis home at this point is premature as so much is still unresolved right now. No one powerful seems to care about Iraq’s displaced however, so other countries may follow Denmark’s example in the future.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Denmark, Iraq reach deal to repatriate Iraqi refugees,” 5/14/09

Alsumaria, “Iraqi Minister urges Denmark not to rush Iraqis refugees return,” 6/19/09

DPA, “Denmark begins forced deportation of Iraqis,” 6/25/09

Ferris, Elizabeth, “The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq,” Brookings Institution, August 2008

Middle East Online, “Iraqi refugees scoff at boasts of improved security,” 3/19/08

RC News, “Ministry to investigate refugee trips to Iraq,” 6/11/09

Reilly, Corinne, “Prospects are dismal for returning Iraqi refugees,” McClatchy Newspapers, 5/22/09

>Intentions Of Iraq’s Displaced

>

On June 1, 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released a report on the intentions of Iraq’s internal refugees. The IOM is the main non-governmental organization working with Iraq’s displaced. They work as partners with the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and have done extensive polling of Iraqis. Their main focus is upon the estimated 1.6 million people who lost their homes after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which set off the sectarian war. While this report finds that the majority of Iraqis wish to return to their homes, they are finding problems doing so.

The majority of displacement in Iraq happened after February 2006. Of those surveyed, only 4.5% said they had lost their homes before 2006. In contrast, 67.8% were displaced in 2006, followed by 25.6% in 2007. Only 2.0% reported that they were displaced in 2008. Sulaymaniya and Tamim were the only two provinces that broke that pattern with the 49% or more being displaced in 2007 instead of 2006.

Date of Displacement

Province

Before 2006

2006

2007

2008

Iraq

4.5%

67.8%

25.6%

2.0%

Anbar

0.5%

87.2%

9.9%

1.9%

Babil

7.4%

85.0%

7.3%

0.3%

Baghdad

1.4%

75.4%

22.5%

0.7%

Basra

1.1%

70.9%

27.9%

0.0%

Diyala

1.9%

54.1%

42.7%

1.1%

Dohuk

5.5%

53.5%

35.4%

5.7%

Dhi Qar

2.1%

90.6%

6.7%

0.1%

Irbil

9.3%

49.0%

39.8%

1.3%

Karbala

0%

85.2%

14.5%

0.0%

Maysan

1.0%

94.8%

4.0%

0.1%

Muthanna

19.5%

46.3%

33.8%

0.1%

Najaf

23.0%

63.1%

13.9%

0%

Ninewa

1.0%

67.5%

23.7%

7.7%

Qadisiyah

1.6%

92.9%

5.6%

0%

Salahaddin

18.2%

56.0%

25.6%

0.1%

Sulaymaniya

4.5%

41.7%

50.1%

3.2%

Tamim

8.6%

22.9%

49.3%

19.2%

Wasit

1.3%

50.5%

48.1%

0.1%

63.2% of the internal refugees came from Baghdad, which was ground zero for the sectarian war. Central, western, and northern Iraq were the other violent areas where people were forced to leave. Southern Iraq was a distant third since it was mostly Shiite. The fighting there largely revolved around disputes between Shiite militias, such as the Badr Brigade and the Mahdi Army.

Origins of Displacement By Province

Baghdad

63.2%

Diyala

18.7%

Ninewa

6.0%

Salahaddin

3.3%

Tamim

3.0%

Anbar

2.6%

Basra

1.6%

Babil

1.0%

Irbil

0.2%

Wasit

0.2%

Dhi Qar

0.1%

Ethnicity/Religion of Displaced

Shiite Arab

56.8%

Sunni Arab

30.8%

Sunni Kurd

4.1%

Assyrian Christian

2.9%

Chaldean Christian

1.8%

Shiite Turkmen

1.2%

Sunni Turkmen

0.9%

Shiite Kurd

0.6%

Armenian Christian

0.1%

Arab Yazidi

0.1%

Kurd Yazidi

0.1%

Displacement in Iraq followed a broad pattern. 56.8% of Iraq’s internal refugees are Shiite. The majority of them were displaced either within Baghdad or moved south to Babil, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi Qar, or Wasit. 34.9% of the displaced are Sunni, either Arab or Kurd. They tended to move west to Anbar or north to Irbil, Salahaddin, Sulaymaniya, or Tamim. Finally, the northern provinces of Diyala, Dohuk, and Ninewa have a mixed population of Iraqi refugees. In Diyala, the majority, 57.9%, are Sunni Arabs, but almost a third of the rest, 31.7% are Shiite Arabs. 50% of Dohuk’s displaced are either Sunni Kurds, 39.3%, or Chaldean Christians, 30.6%. Finally Ninewa was one of only two provinces where the largest displaced group was not Arab. There 40.4% were Assyrian Christians, followed by Sunni Arabs, 24.4%, Sunni Turkmen, 12.3%, and Chaldean Christians, 11.2%. That province is known for its large minority population.

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Shiites

Babil

94.8% Shiite Arab, 81.5% from Baghdad

Baghdad

72.4% Shiite Arab, 83.2% from Baghdad

Basra

99.7% Shiite Arab, 52.4% from Baghdad, 26.0% from Salahaddin

Dhi Qar

99.5% Shiite Arab, 65.5% from Baghdad, 14.0% from Salahaddin

Karbala

98.5% Shiite Arab, 57.0% from Baghdad, 27.6% from Diyala

Maysan

99.9% Shiite Arab, 83.4% from Baghdad

Muthanna

99.5% Shiite Arab, 69.6% from Baghdad, 13.6% from Diyala

Najaf

97.8% Shiite Arab, 84.1% from Baghdad

Qadisiyah

99.6% Shiite Arab, 77.7% from Baghdad

Wasit

98.3% Shiite Arab, 66.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Predominately Displaced Sunnis

Anbar

98.4% Sunni Arab, 74.9% from Baghdad

Irbil

39.4% Sunni Kurd, 34.4% Sunni Arab, 15.3% Chaldean Christian, 50.3% from Baghdad, 43.1% from Ninewa

Salahaddin

96.7% Sunni Arab, 50.1% from Baghdad, 14.6% from Tamim, 11.9% from Basra, 10.6% from Diyala

Sulaymaniya

60.1% Sunni Arab, 24.7% Sunni Kurd, 46.9% from Baghdad, 44.9% from Diyala

Tamim

53.5% Sunni Arab, 19.5% Sunni Kurd, 16.0% Shiite Turkmen, 24.4% from Diyala, 23.7% from Tamim, 15.8% from Salahaddin, 15.4% from Ninewa, 14.8% from Baghdad

Provinces With Mixed Displaced Populations

Diyala

57.9% Sunni Arab, 31.7% Shiite Arab, 92.8% form Diyala, 16.1% from Baghdad

Dohuk

39.3% Sunni Kurd, 30.6% Chaldean Christian, 52.5% from Baghdad, 46.0% from Ninewa

Ninewa

40.4% Assyrian Christian, 24.4% Sunni Arab, 12.3% Sunni Turkmen, 11.2% Chaldean Christian, 47.5% from Baghdad, 42.5% from Ninewa

The major point of the June 2009 IOM report was to note the intentions of Iraq’s displaced. 58.0% said they wanted to return to their place of origin. 21.4% said they wanted to stay where they were, 19.1% wanted to settle in some new location, either within Iraq or in another country, while 1.4% said they didn’t know yet. This varied across the country however. Najaf, 94.1%, Diyala, 81.7%, and Anbar 81.3%, had the most responses for people that wanted to go back to their homes. Basra, 5.5%, and Wasit, 5.8%, had the least. 82.9% of the displaced in Basra said they wanted to stay there, while only 2.3% of the people in Anbar wanted to do so.

Intentions Of The Displaced

Province

Integrate into Location of Displacement

Settle in New Location

Return to Place of Origin

Waiting to Make Decision

Iraq

21.4%

19.1%

58.0%

1.4%

Anbar

2.3%

13.8%

81.3%

2.0%

Babil

26.2%

28.6%

44.5%

0.6%

Baghdad

8.2%

11.3%

79.1%

1.2%

Basra

82.9%

11.1%

5.5%

0.3%

Dhi Qar

57.6%

11.3%

30.7%

0.2%

Diyala

7.3%

10.9%

81.7%

0.0%

Dohuk

57.0%

23.1%

19.7%

0.2%

Irbil

18.3%

13.5%

67.4%

0.1%

Karbala

26.3%

26.6%

46.4%

0.6%

Maysan

28.1%

28.0%

40.7%

3.1%

Muthanna

34.8%

18.1%

45.1%

1.9%

Najaf

4.5%

0.1%

94.1%

1.0%

Ninewa

7.0%

33.0%

59.2%

0.7%

Qadisiyah

40.9%

35.3%

23.7%

0.1%

Salahaddin

12.5%

39.0%

43.5%

4.7%

Sulaymaniya

27.1%

8.3%

64.4%

0.2%

Tamim

22.2%

3.5%

71.3%

3.0%

Wasit

54.4%

37.8%

5.8%

2.0%

While 58.0% of displaced Iraqis want to return to their homes, the previous May 2009 report by the IOM worried that many of them may never have this opportunity. According to the United Nations’ latest estimates, only 600,830 displaced Iraqis have gone back so far from 2003 to 2008. Almost 200,000 of these were Iraqis that had lost their homes during Saddam, the U.S. invasion, or subsequent fighting in places like Fallujah. That would mean only about 400,000 of the 1.6 million that lost their homes after the Samarra bombing have returned so far. The plight of the displaced in Iraq is an important indicator of the general situation within the country. So few displaced coming back, shows that Iraq is still an unstable country. There is still violence, although at much lower levels than before. The 2009 Iraqi elections did not settle much politically, but instead marked a new struggle for power between Maliki, his former allies, and independents. The government is still unable to provide many basic services, and the economy is especially bad for young people and women. All together this has given only a small fraction of Iraq’s displaced a reason to go back home, even though a majority want to. The IOM and other groups are increasingly fearful that Iraq’s refugees may become a permanent class of displaced people if things do not progress inside Iraq.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq 1 June 2009 Monthly Report,” 6/1/09

- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

United Nations High Commission for Refugees, “UNHCR Iraq Operation Monthly Statistical Update on Return – March 2009,” UNHCR, March 2009