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>Maliki’s Campaign Promises May Be Unrealistic

>Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently went on a short tour of southern Iraq to drum up support in anticipation of the January 2010 parliamentary elections.

During his visits Maliki gave speeches and talked with local officials about one of his main campaign themes, the provision of services. In Basra he berated the governor and provincial council for not improving water and electricity. Back in June the head of Basra’s reconstruction committee said that the province was short 97 billion Iraqi dinars to pay for projects. The province is also currently suffering from the effects of the drought with seawater from the Persian Gulf encroaching into fresh water areas. So far 5,000 villagers have left their homes because of the water crisis. In response, the day before Maliki arrived in Basra City, Baghdad transferred 208 billion dinars to the province to help with expenses, promised a $20 million water pipeline project to deliver fresh water, and announced $25 million to develop the area’s marshes. While in Dhi Qar he promised that the province would get its fair share of the budget, and said with improvements in the economy they could expect more money as well.

When Maliki’s State of Law list ran in the 2009 provincial elections they promised better governance and services, and are doing the same for the 2010 national ballot. This completely ignores the financial situation in Iraq. With the world recession the country’s main source of revenue, oil, took a precipitous drop in value. The 2009 budget saw large cuts as a result, with Iraq’s 18 provinces receiving a $1,748.2 million decrease in their capital budgets that pays for infrastructure and investment, while operational costs that go towards salaries, pensions, etc. ate up 80% of the overall budget. Oil prices have begun to creep back up, but so far, not enough to make a large increase in the 2010 budget. Maliki therefore, can talk to governors and provincial councils all he wants about better services, but there is simply no money to make that a reality right now.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Al-Maliki pays surprise visit to Thi-Qar,” 9/14/09
- “Minister says govt. unable to cover projects, eyes private sector,” 9/3/09
- “New financial amounts allocated for Basra,” 9/9/09
- “PM arrives in Basra,” 9/10/09

Chon, Gina, “Biden, on Iraq Trip, Will Meet Maliki,” Wall Street Journal, 9/16/09

Chulov, Martin, “Surge of seawater drives Iraqis from their homes in the south,” Guardian, 9/11/09

IraqSlogger.com, “Basra: Moritorium on New Development Projects,” 6/3/09

News Network Nasiriyah, “During a meeting with the masses of Dhi Qar,” 9/14/09

>Iraq’s Lack Of Budget Execution

>In April 2009 Iraq passed its latest budget. It is larger than the 2008 one, but not as big as originally planned. The increases that individual ministries have received are largely for operational costs that go towards things like salaries and pensions, rather than for investing in the future. Another problem is that the major ministries responsible for revenues and services are still incapable of spending most of their capital budgets. This comes at a time when Iraq desperately needs to boost its growth.

Iraq’s 2009 budget is for $58.6 billion. That’s a 25.8% cut from the original amount of $79.8 billion, but still a 17% increase from the 2008 budget of $49.9 billion. Both Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Finance Minister Bayan Jabr were against the cuts saying that it would hamper services and the development of the economy, which is still mostly state run. It would have been impossible for Iraq to cover that original amount however. Even with the lower figure, Iraq is still expected to have a $20 billion deficit.

Most of the 2009 budget is for operational costs, with a cut in capital spending. The operational budget is for $45.9 billion, 78% of the total. The capital budget went down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion in 2009, a 3% cut. In 2008 oil revenues were so large that a supplemental budget was passed, which increased the overall capital budget to $21.1 billion.

With U.S. reconstruction funding coming to an end, Iraq’s capital spending is the largest source of funding for rebuilding the country. Appropriately than, most of this year’s money will go to the Oil, Electricity, Finance, Water, and Industry and Minerals Ministries. Iraq’s Oil Ministry’s capital budget went up slightly from $2 billion in 2008 to $2.2 billion in 2009. The Electricity Ministry on the other hand, will face a 17% decrease in its capital spending from $1.3 billion in 2008 to $1.08 billion in 2009. The Ministry is worried that it won’t be able to increase capacity with that amount, as they originally asked for $7 billion. The Health Ministry will have the largest capital increase at +489%, going from $83.3 million to $408.1 million.

The problem is that Iraq has rarely been able to spend its capital budget. In 2005, when Iraq formally got its sovereignty back from the United States, it only spent 23% of its capital budget. That went down to 19% in 2006, and then up to 28% in 2007. In 2008 Baghdad made a huge leap when it expended 39% of its capital budget. Iraq’s main revenue, budget, and services ministries did worse however. The Oil, Water, and Electricity Ministries for example, appropriated $11.9 billion for capital spending from 2005 to 2007, but only spent $985 million of it. In 2007 Oil and Electricity only expended $1 million each from their capital budgets.

What are skyrocketing instead are the operational budgets. Nearly every ministry will see an increase in that department. The Oil Ministry for example will see a jump from $103.7 million in 2008 to $954.4 million this year in its operational account. The Electricity Ministry’s operational budget will go from $89.1 million in 2008 to $2.31 billion in 2009. The Health Ministry’s will increase from $1.872 billion in 2008 to $3.095 billion in 2009. Most of this money will be spent if Iraq follows its past trends. From 2005 to 2007 it spent $67 billion, 90% of which went to operating costs.

Iraq’s poor budget execution has led to massive surpluses. In 2005 Iraq had a $6.5 billion surplus. That went up to $29 billion leftover from the 2008 budget. The GAO estimated that Iraq built up a $47.3 billion surplus from 2005 to 2008. When parliament was drafting the 2009 budget they believed that they could tap into this money to pay for the expected deficit, but after the bill was passed the Finance Ministry and Central Bank of Iraq let them know that they were not obligated to use the surplus to cover the budget. Baghdad has had to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund instead to cover the difference.

Each year Iraq has passed a larger budget, and each year it has been able to spend more of its money. The major ministries however, are still only spending a measly portion of their budgets, and most of that is going towards salaries and pensions, rather than investing in Iraq’s future. The 2009 budget will pose an additional problem for Iraq, as it still has not earned enough from oil to pay its bills. Many ministries did not get the money they requested either, and each still needs billions. The Ministry of Oil said it requires $25 to $75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. The Electricity Ministry estimated that it needs $27 billion over the next 6 to 10 years to meet all of the country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks the actual amount might be twice as high. The World Bank believes that Iraq has to have $14.4 billion to fix its water system. These amounts will largely have to come from Baghdad from now on as foreign investors are still largely staying away, while U.S. and international donations are coming to an end. The inability to spend its capital budget, while operational costs are skyrocketing do not point to meeting these goals anytime soon in Iraq.

Major Revenue And Service Ministries’ Budgets 2008-2009

Oil Ministry
2008: $103.7 mil operational, $2 bil capital. TOTAL $2.103 bil, 16% spent
2009: $954.4 mil operational, $2.2 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.160 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +920% operational, +10% capital

Electricity Ministry
2008: $89.1 mil operational, $1.3 bil capital. TOTAL: $1.389 bil, 12% spent
2009: $2.31 bil operational, $1.08 bil capital. TOTAL: $3.39 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +259% operational, -16% capital

Water Ministry
2008: $109.6 mil operational, $375 mil capital. TOTAL: $484. mil. 48% spent
2009: $168.6 mil operational, $563.5 mil capital. TOTAL: $732.1 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +53% operational, +50% capital

Municipalities and Public Works Ministry
2008: $42.6 mil operational, $416.7 mil capital. TOTAL: $459.3 mil, 22% spent
2009: $479.6 mil operational, $468.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $947.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +1125% operational, +12% capital

Transportation Ministry
2008: $121.6 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $371.6 mil, 29% spent
2009: $209.7 mil operational, $324.2 mil capital. TOTAL: $533.8 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +72% operational, +29% capital

Communications Ministry
2008: $14.4 mil operational, $250 mil capital. TOTAL: $264.4 mil, 30% spent
2009: $88.2 mil operational, $216.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $304.3 mil
2008-2009 Changes: +612% operational, -15% capital

Health Ministry
2008: $1.872 bil operational, $83.3 mil capital. TOTAL: $1.956 bil
2009: $3.095 bil operational, $408.1 mil capital. TOTAL: $3.503 bil
2008-2009 Changes: +65% operational, +489% capital

Budget Expenditures 2005-2007

Iraqi Budget Expenditures 2005-2007
2005: $16.151 bil operational, $1.432 bil capital. TOTAL: $17.583 bil
2006: $21.173 bil operational, $1.615 bil capital. TOTAL: $22.788 bil
2007: $23.164 bil operational, $3.434 bil capital. TOTAL: $26.599 bil

Oil, Water, Electricity Ministries’ Capital Appropriations Versus Spending
2005: $3,482 mil appropriated, $373 mil spent
2006: $4,473 mil appropriated, $502 mil spent
2007: $4.034 mil appropriated, $110 mil spent
TOTAL: $11,990 mil appropriated, $985 mil spent

Oil Ministry Spending
2005: $160 mil spent, $49 mil operational, $111 mil capital
2006: $191 mil spent, $48 mil operational, $143 mil capital
2007: $36 mil spent, $35 mil operational, $1 mil capital

Water Ministry Spending
2005: $163 mil spent, $42 mil operational, $120 mil capital
2006: $145 mil spent, $54 mil operational, $91 mil capital
2007: $236 mil spent, $128 mil operational, $109 mil capital

Electricity Ministry Spending
2005: $147 mil spent, $5 mil operational, $142 mil capital
2006: $281 mil spent, $13 mil operational, $268 mil capital
2007: $78 mil spent, $77 mil operational, $1 mil capital

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq presidency approves slashed budget,” 4/3/09

Cordesman, Anthony, “The Changing Situation in Iraq: A Progress Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4/1/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009
- “Iraqi Revenues, Expenditures, and Surplus,” August 2008

>May 2009 International Organization for Migration Report On Iraq’s Displaced

>

At the end of May 2009 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its latest report on Iraq’s displaced. They specifically are worried about the fate of the two million plus Iraqis that have not returned home yet. They note that while thousands of displaced have gone back to their original provinces, the vast majority have not. Both groups continue to face problems such as finding work and housing, and gaining access to services and assistance. The IOM is concerned that many of these Iraqis will become permanent refugees.

Since 2007 the IOM has noted that Iraqis displaced after the February 2006 Samarra bombing, which triggered the sectarian war, have begun to return. The IOM has counted 49,464 of these families, or 296,598 people, that have come back. Only 7%, of those, 3,443 families, were refugees. That is a small fraction of the estimated 1.6 million that lost their homes after the 2006 attack. They have gone back to 765 different locations in Iraq. 90% of the post-Samarra displaced came from Baghdad, Diyala and Ninewa, so it should be no surprise that those three provinces, plus Anbar have seen the most returns. Qadisiyah, Muthanna, and Dhi Qar had the least with 44, 64, and 108 families respectively. 61% of displaced families surveyed said they wanted to go home.

Post-Feb. 2006 Displaced And Refugee Family Returns (Not Including Kurdistan)

Province

Returning Families

% That Are Refugee Families

Iraq

49,464

7%

Baghdad

31,497

4%

Diyala

8,779

1%

Anbar

4,536

27%

Ninewa

1,602

1%

Maysan

626

49%

Tamim

620

37%

Basra

500

0%

Karbala

298

21%

Babil

258

9%

Najaf

215

55%

Salahaddin

191

35%

Dhi Qar

108

31%

Muthanna

64

88%

Qadisiyah

44

23%

A major factor in returning is the proximity of the displaced to their original homes. 68% of the families that came back resided within their home province. That compared to 21% that were in another province, and 11% that came back from another country. That varied however across each province. In Muthanna and Najaf for example, 100% of the returnees were refugees, while none of those that came back to Basra and Ninewa were in foreign nation beforehand.

Origins Of Returnees By Province

Location

Refugees

Displaced Within Same Province

Displaced In Another Province

TOTAL

11%

68%

21%

Anbar

36%

52%

12%

Babil

15%

52%

33%

Baghdad

6%

71%

23%

Basra

0%

0%

100%

Diyala

6%

61%

33%

Karbala

92%

0%

8%

Maysan

0%

0%

100%

Muthanna

100%

0%

0%

Najaf

100%

0%

0%

Ninewa

0%

100%

0%

Salahaddin

88%

13%

0%

Tamim

58%

11%

31%

Wasit

50%

0%

50%

Conditions in Iraq appeared to be another major reason why families come back. 36.7% of returnees interviewed by the IOM said that better security was the top cause for returning. That was followed by 35.7% that believed a combination of improved security and difficult conditions where they lived was the major factor. Only 15.5% felt that they left because of the hardships they were going through.

Reasons For Return

Reasons for Return

%

Improved security in home area

36.7%

Improved security in home area and difficult conditions

35.7%

Very difficult conditions

15.5%

Other

5.8%

Government returnee payments

4.2%

Improved security in home area, difficult conditions, returnee payments

1.8%

Very difficult conditions and returnee payments

0.3%

The majority of families feel safe after their returns, but there are still some troubling incidents. 59.6% of those polled by the IOM said they felt safe all of the time after going back, while 39.4% said they only felt safe some of the time. There are various anecdotal stories of attacks and threats against displaced. In the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad an IED targeted displaced. Eighteen families in Abu Ghraib came back, but couldn’t stay in their homes and became displaced again. Two families from Diyala went back, but were attacked by a militia, which led to the death of two family members. They left the province again as a result. According to IraqSlogger, in Adhamiya, Baghdad, the Sons of Iraq put “X”s on the houses of Shiites that had been displaced telling them not to come back in April 2009. The state of their property is another issue for returnees. 49.1% said that their houses were in good condition, but 38.7% found some damage to them.

The government has also been actively encouraging Iraqis to come back. Baghdad offered $851 for families that did. The authorities have recently announced that they were no longer registering people anymore, which was a prerequisite to receive the money. Not many returnees signed up for this program in the first place, and the government paid even fewer. The IOM found that only 44% of those surveyed had applied for the money, and of those, only 36% said they got it.

For those still displaced, finding work, services, and aid are major problems. 50.4% of male-headed households were out of work, and 97.3% of female-led ones were. Overall, 35% of those surveyed said they could work, but couldn’t find a job. Salahaddin, 75%, Muthanna 70%, and Babil, 64%, had the highest responses in that category. In total, 56% of the displaced are unemployed. 64.2% of those surveyed claimed they had six hours or less of electricity. 83.8% did say they had access to the national water system, but that doesn’t mean that it is potable. Almost all of the displaced, 98%, said they had their food ration card, but their access varied. 32% said they regularly got their rations, 60% said it was irregular, and 8% said they never got them. Ninewa was the worst with 99% saying they got their rations infrequently. Getting health care also varied greatly from province to province. 90% or more in Anbar, Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Ninewa and Salahaddin said they had adequate access, while 57% of returnees in Baghdad, 65% in Basra, and 78% in Tamim claimed they had none. When asked what their greatest needs were, displaced families said food, 63%, fuel, 51%, and health care, 40% were the top priorities. 88% also said they had received no aid outside of the government.

Unemployment

Total: 44% employed, 56% unemployed

Male-headed household: 49.6% employed, 50.4% unemployed

Female-headed household: 2.7% employed, 97.3% unemployed

Overall the IOM is worried about what will happen to the millions of Iraqis that have lost their homes because of the war. Only a small fraction has returned, and those that haven’t face a plethora of problems, most importantly finding work and food. Those that have come back also face a similar set of problems. Neither the government, nor non-government organizations such as the IOM have the resources to deal with such a large population. The fear is that many of them will simply have to fend for themselves, perhaps creating a permanent class of displaced both within and without of Iraq for the foreseeable future.

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “IOM Emergency Needs Assessments; Post February 2006 Displacement In Iraq, Monthly Report,” 4/1/09

- “IOM Monitoring And Needs Assessments of Iraqi Return, May 2009,” May 2009

Smith, Daniel and al-Timimi, Yousif, “Residents: Some Sahwa Still Keeping Shi’a Out,” IraqSlogger.com, 4/21/09

>U.S. Reconstruction In Iraq Coming To An End

>U.S. reconstruction in Iraq is coming to an end. The effort to rebuild the country following the 2003 invasion was the largest in American history, with the U.S. budgeting $51 billion for the project. That amount has almost all been spent, and no new large outlays are expected in the future, especially with the U.S. planning on withdrawing. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) believes that most of this money failed to achieve its goals. While the Iraqi security forces were successfully reconstituted, the larger goal of boosting services and the economy of Iraq failed.

Since March 2003 the U.S. has promised $51.0 billion for reconstruction in Iraq. $24.43 billion was for security, and $26.57 for the economy, government, and services. $42.16 billion of the total amount has been obligated for projects, while $37.89 billion was actually spent. Of the remaining $3.01 billion in unspent funds, $2.82 billion is for the Iraqi armed forces and police. The new Obama administration has asked for an additional $700 million, $449 million of which is supposed to go to reconstruction. The White House did not ask for any new money for the Iraqi security forces. Instead, the President wants to extend $1 billion in bridge funds left over from 2008 for that purpose.

The American program was originally aimed at rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure and building a democracy, but as violence rose in the country, more and more money was appropriated for security. By April 2009 the Iraqi security forces took almost half of the funding at $24.43 billion compared to $11.82 billion for infrastructure like electricity, oil, gas, water, sanitation, transportation, and communications. The SIGIR reported that the rise in attacks in Iraq derailed much of the reconstruction program, delaying projects and adding additional costs.

The U.S. program has not been without success. The one area that the SIGIR believes has seen the best effort is the rebuilding of the Iraqi security forces. They now stand at over 700,000 strong. The Americans have also added 1.2 million cubic meters of sewage treatment capacity, brought up water production to 2.4 million cubic meters of potable water per day, and for three straight quarters electricity production has gone up. Power output is now higher than pre-invasion levels. The problem is since the overthrow of Saddam, demand for services has skyrocketed amongst Iraqis, and the U.S.-funded increases have not kept up. Only around 25% of Iraqis polled say they were satisfied with the sewage system for example.

Today, U.S.-reconstruction is coming to an end, leaving Iraq increasingly in charge. There are no current oil projects on-line for example. There is still $224.39 million going to be spent on electricity however. Now the Iraqi government is the largest source of funding for rebuilding. Its capital budget used for investment has recently gone down from $13.1 billion in 2008 to $12.7 billion this year. Iraq has also never been able to spend all of its money, like the Electricity Ministry that only spent 12% of its budget last year.

Now that Iraqis are taking control, transferring projects is becoming an issue. An April 26, 2009 SIGIR audit found that the U.S. had been turning over projects to Iraqis with no unified plan or process. Many are given to the Iraqi government whether they can handle them or not. Most transfers are also done at the local level, and the information is not passed up to Baghdad or Washington. Of $13.5 billion in projects studied by SIGIR, 72% were handed over to local authorities, and only 13% to the central government. That means neither government has a real idea on what has been done so far. Some of these projects were not even wanted by the Iraqis, and were left unused or were not maintained. The Iraqis in general also don’t have the experience or training in much of the equipment installed by the Americans. For instance, examinations of Iraqi health care facilities found that gear wasn’t always installed and Iraqis didn’t always know how to operate them. The SIGIR is worried that this will mean much of the U.S. investment will be wasted. The U.S. is trying to address this by spending $313.7 million on training and spare parts. That still doesn’t address the larger issue of how the Iraqis will take control of the thousands of projects built by the Americans.

In its review of the U.S. reconstruction effort, the SIGIR believes that much of the U.S. reconstruction project has failed. Iraqis are largely unhappy with the state of the economy, services, and government. Production of many services such as electricity is higher than under Saddam, but it’s only meeting a fraction of demand. The main problem was the lack of security, which was not planned for. That derailed and delayed much of the work. Violence also shifted the focus of the Americans to the point that the security forces received just as much money as building up the economy and government combined. The U.S. also tended to impose their views of what Iraq should have, rather than asking Iraqis what they wanted. Many of the large infrastructure projects therefore were not used properly, left to break down, or were never wanted. Some of the $51 billion budgeted for Iraq has gone to good work, especially the money appropriated by U.S. commanders to local Iraqis. The larger projects however are more of a mixed bag.

Total Outlays By U.S.

Security – $24.43 billion
$21.18 billion obligated
$18.58 billion expended
$3.24 billion unspent
$6.84 billion for equipment and transportation
$5.79 billion for infrastructure
$5.67 billion for training and operations
$2.42 billion for sustainment
$1.72 billion for rule of law
$1.0 billion for other

Infrastructure – $11.82 billion
$11.41 billion obligated
$10.86 billion expended
$553 million unspent

Infrastructure – Electricity – $5.09 billion
$4.98 billion obligated
$4.75 billion spent

Infrastructure – Water and Sanitation – $2.25 billion
$2.17 billion obligated
$2.01 billion spent

Infrastructure – Oil and Gas – $2.05 billion
$1.93 billion obligated
$1.88 billion spent

Infrastructure – Other – $1.31 billion

Infrastructure – Transportation and Communication – $1.12 billion
$1.09 billion obligated
$965 million spent

Governance – $7.02 billion
$5.64 billion spent
$2.38 billion obligated for capacity development
$1.92 billion obligated for democracy and civil society
$1.88 billion obligated for public services
$0.81 billion obligated for humanitarian relief

Economy – $1.47 billion
$1.25 billion spent

SOURCES

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Asset-Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability,” 4/26/09
- “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/09

>Falling Oil Revenues, and Uneven Production

>

Iraq is facing the worst of two worlds. The price for Iraqi oil has dropped dramatically, while it has not become a steady producer. The Oil Ministry recently announced that oil revenues were down over 50% in the first three months of 2009 compared to the same time period in 2008. At the same time petroleum production and exports have continued to fluctuate up and down.

At the beginning of April 2009 the Oil Ministry announced a dramatic drop in oil profits. In the first three months of 2009 it made $6.57 billion. That was a 57.6% decrease from the same period in 2008 when the country earned $15.49 billion. Iraq did make more in March than it did the previous months. In January 2009 Iraq made $2.15 billion, followed by $1.7 billion in February, and $2.5 billion in March. The average price of Iraqi crude has also inched up from $34.57 in December 2008 to $38.06 in February. That’s still far from the highest price of $113.81 reached in July 2008, and not even up to the November 2008 price of $43.54.

Iraq Oil Revenues

March 09

$2.5 bil

Feb. 09

$1.7 bil

Jan. 09

$2.15

Dec. 08

$1.9 bil

Nov. 08

$2.2 bil

Oct. 08

$3.11 bil

An additional problem is that Iraq is still not a consistent oil producer or exporter. While yearly averages of production and exports have grown since 2005, the monthly numbers are still up and down. In January 2009 for example, Iraq produced an average of 2.15 million barrels per day (mbd) and exported 1.89 mbd. The next month production went up to 2.32 mbd, but exports dropped to 1.69 mpd. In March production, 2.38 mbd, and exports, 1.93 mbd, increased. In comparison, Iraq exported 1.93 mbd for the first three months of 2008, and went as high as 1.96 mpd in May and June of that year. The other months’ exports were lower. Production and exports have stayed within the same range since the fall of 2007. These fluctuations have contributed to the changing revenues.

Monthly Averages of Iraqi Oil Production/Exports in Millions of Barrels Per Day

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Jan.

2.44/1.537

2.1/1.367

1.73/1.05

1.66/1.3

2.24/1.93

2.15/1.89

Feb.

2.276/1.382

2.1/1.431

1.83/1.47

2.08/1.5

2.39/1.93

2.32/1.69

March

2.435/1.825

2.09/1.394

2.1/1.32

2.08/1.58

2.38/1.93

2.38/1.93

April

2.384/1.804

2.14/1.398

2.14/1.6

2.14/1.5

2.4/1.88

May

0.3/0.0

1.887/1.38

2.1/1.308

2.13/1.51

2.03/1.64

2.6/1.96

June

0.675/0.2

2.295/1.1488

2.17/1.377

2.3/1.67

2.0/1.47

2.52/1.96

July

0.925/0.322

2.2/1.406

2.17/1.55

2.22/1.68

2.07/1.71

2.54/1.85

Aug.

1.445/0.646

2.122/1.114

2.16/1.504

2.24/1.68

1.91/1.69

2.5/1.7

Sep.

1.722/0.983

2.514/1.703

2.11/1.6

2.234/1.65

2.3/1.9

2.37/1.65

Oct.

2.055/1.149

2.45/1.542

1.91/1.239

2.26/1.55

2.34/1.91

2.37/1.69

Nov.

2.1/1.524

1.95/1.32

1.98/1.168

2.1/1.44

2.38/1.88

2.4/1.88

Dec.

2.3/1.541

2.16/1.52

1.92/1.071

2.15/1.45

2.42/1.93

2.35/1.73

Yr. Avg.

1.44/0.795

2.25/1.47

2.079/1.36

2.11/1.5

2.11/1.66

2.42/1.84

2.28/1.83

As reported before, the Oil Ministry is desperately trying to boost production to keep money flowing. This includes issuing tenders for 100 new wells and installations. Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani is hoping those will increase output by 300,000-500,000 barrels per day by the end of the year. At the same time, the Ministry is moving ahead with its long-term contracts as well. That still would not bring Iraq up to pre-invasion levels. In 2001 Iraq was producing 2.6 million barrels a day. Production at the North Oil Company is about 600,000 barrels per day, 2/3 of the production before 2003, while the South Oil Company’s output has declined by around 200,000 barrels per day over the last several months.

Iraq’s budget and ministries are feeling the immediate effects of both declining oil prices and inconsistent production. The Electricity Ministry asked for $1 billion in the 2009 budget, but only got $400 million. As a result its had to cut $600 million in contracts with General Electric, France’s Alstom, Germany’s MAN AG, and South Korea’s Hyndai. It had plans to boost power production by 2,000 megawatts this year, but that has been drawn back to only 600 megawatts. Iraq’s cities were due to get $5 billion for development, but that has been cut 60%. Baghdad was going to get $600 million for that, but now will only get $340 million. It had planned two sewage projects in 2009 and two in 2010, but now is only going to go through with one this year, and two next. The Water Ministry is also canceling work to dredge canals. All government ministries are having a hiring freeze. The Interior Ministry stopped adding new police in December 2008. That’s put a halt to integrating the Sons of Iraq. The Defense Ministry will also not be able to buy new weapons systems and other equipment.

From 2007-2008 Iraq was flowing in oil money. Those huge profits have now largely disappeared. The country’s growing, but still inconsistent exports is now a larger issue, as every barrel is needed to keep up revenues. The Oil Ministry wants to boost exports to 2 million barrels a day this year, but has not been able to achieve that since 2005. With better security that might now be a possibility, but that still won’t bring in enough to meet the government’s needs with crude prices still low. That puts Baghdad in a precarious situation as it has rising expectations, especially after the January 2009 provincial elections, but will have to now cut some services.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Iraq Reports Increase in Oil Exports in December, but Revenues Drop,” 1/26/09

- “Iraq’s oil revenues fall 25%,” 12/23/08

Ali Fathi, Saadallah, “Major bottlenecks in Iraq’s oil refinery sector,” Gulf News, 4/5/09

Gamel, Kim, “Iraqi budget woes force security hiring freeze,” Associated Press, 3/20/09

Kamal, Fatima, “Nine foreign firms win service contracts to develop 11 oil fields in Iraq,” Azzaman, 4/7/09

Lando, Ben, “Iraq oil exports drop in February,” Iraq Oil Report, 3/25/09

O’Hanlon, Michael Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 4/2/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Water Projects Affected By Budget Cuts,” 4/2/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s Faltering Oil Revenues Hurt Public Services,” 3/31/09

Salaheddin, Sinan, “OIl Ministry: Iraq’s oil revenues drop,” Associated Press, 4/5/09

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

>Baghdad Failing To Invest In Its Future

>Iraq’s Presidential Council just vetoed the 2009 budget, and then passed it. Each year spending has increased, and Baghdad has been able to expend about the same percentage, but almost all of this is on operational costs like salaries, pensions, goods and services. The capital budget, which includes investing in infrastructure, vehicles, etc., is hardly spent at all. After decades of war, sanctions, and the U.S. invasion, Iraq needs billions to rebuild and move forward. The government has largely failed at this task, and cannot expect American or foreign funds to make up for their lack of diligence anymore.

Each year since 2005 when Iraq was given back its official sovereignty its revenues and spending have increased. In 2005 Iraq earned $24.1 billion and spent $17.6 billion of it. By 2008 income had increased to $67.8 billion thanks to the skyrocketing price of oil, while expenditures had gone up to $49.5 billion. The 2009 budget is at $58.5 billion.

Iraq Revenues, Spending And Surpluses 2005-2008

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total 2005-2008

Total Revenues

$24.1 bil

$32 bil

$39.9 bil

$67.8 bil

$163.7 bil

Expenditures

$17.6 bil

$22.8 bil

$26.6 bil

$49.5 bil

$116.5 bil

Surplus

$6.5 bil

$9.2 bil

$13.3 bil

$29.0 bil

$47.3 bil

From 2005-2007 90% of Iraq’s spending has been on its operational budget, and only 10% on capital projects. In 2007 for example, Baghdad spent 80% of its $29 billion operational budget, but only 28% of its $12 billion capital one. This is the major reason why Iraq has ended up with large surpluses, which by 2008 stood at around $29 billion. The situation is even worse when broken down by ministry. The main ministries that bring in revenues and provide services such as oil, electricity, and water, only spent 11% of their $8 billion capital budget in 2007. In 2008 they were able to more than double their spending to 23%, but that’s still a miniscule amount. The major causes are lack of trained staff, a weak procurement process, the inability to plan and carry out strategies, and violence.

Capital Spending By Iraq 2005-2007

Appropriated

Spent

% of Total

2005

$6.3 bil

$1.4 bil

23%

2006

$8.3 bil

$1.6 bil

19%

2007

$12.1 bil

$3.4 bil

28%

The U.S. has also far outspent Iraq in reconstruction. The Americans have expended 87% of the money it has allocated for rebuilding Iraq, totaling about $9.5 billion of $10.9 billion since 2003. Iraq on the other hand has only spent 12%, approximately $2 billion, of $17.2 billion. Iraq has also not maintained projects the Americans have built and turned over to them.

Comparing U.S. and Iraqi Allocations and Spending For Reconstruction

U.S. Fiscal Years 2003-2008

U.S. Fiscal Years 2003-June 2008

Iraqi
2005-2008

Iraqi
2005-2008

Sectors

Allocated

Spent

Allocated

Spent

Oil

$2.7 bil

$2.5 bil

$10.8 bil

$700,000

Electricity

$5.3 bil

$4.8 bil

$5.2 bil

$800,000

Water resources

$2.9 bil

$2.2 bil

$1.3 bil

$600,000

Totals

$10.9 bil

$9.5 bil

$17.2 bil

$2.0 bil

The reason why Iraq’s inability to invest in its infrastructure is important is because the country desperately needs billions of dollars to develop. Oil is Iraq’s main source of revenue. In 2008 it earned $68 billion, $62 billion of which came from petroleum. According to the State and Defense Departments not enough money is being spent on the industry to sustain output. In March 2009 Iraq produced 2.36 million barrels per day, but that’s still below the estimated 2.5 million barrels per day average before the U.S. invasion. Production has also fluctuated up and down each month. According to the Oil Ministry it needs $25-$75 billion to reach its target of 6 million barrels per day. Last year the Ministry only spent $421 million of its capital budget, a mere 19% of the total. Electricity production only meets 52% of demand. There are still blackouts and access to power varies greatly from city to city, neighborhood to neighborhood. Like oil, electricity production is up overall, but the Electricity Ministry estimates it needs $27 billion to meet the entire country’s demand by 2015. The U.S. thinks it may need twice that much. The same goes for the water system. 8.1 million Iraqis have access to potable water, but that’s short of the American goal of 8.5 million. The U.N. says that 40% of children do not have safe drinking water. The country’s treatment plants are also only operating at 17% of capacity. The lack of clean water led to cholera outbreaks in 2007 and 2008. The World Bank estimates that Iraq needs $14.4 billion to fix the water system. In total, that amounts to $66.4-$143.4 billion in investments.

Iraq’s ability to spend its overall budget has improved each year, but its capital expenditures remain anemic. Almost all of the government’s money has gone towards salaries, pensions, and services. It has spent more and more of its capital budget, but it’s still a small percentage of the total. This comes at a time when the U.S. is almost finished transferring reconstruction to Iraqi control. No more major American or foreign aid is expected for Iraq in the future. The billions of dollars needed to improve the oil business and improve services will have to be largely self-generated, borrowed from international financial institutions, or gained from foreign companies. This will pose serious barriers to raising the standard of living for the average Iraqi as it will probably take several years for the government to ever learn how to spend its capital budget and work out successful deals with international corporations.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “PB turns down federal budget,” 3/26/09

O’Hanlon, Michael and Campbell, Jason, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, 2/26/09

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” March 2009

United States Government Accountability Office, “IRAQ Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” March 2009

The State Of Ninewa Province

As reported here before, Ninewa is about to go through an important political transition as the provincial council will pass from the hands of the Kurds to the new Al-Hadbaa List. The leader of Al-Hadbaa has said that he wants to develop the economy of the province by encouraging the private sector. He believes that there are ample resources that could make Ninewa prosper. Whether that’s possible or not is yet to be seen. What is known is that Ninewa rates worse in education, health, and a number of other fields when compared to the Iraqi average, and it is the second most violent province in the country.

Population and Territory

Ninewa is the third largest province in Iraq in area, and the second most populated. It has 2,811,091 people, 9% of the country’s total. Only Baghdad has more. The province is divided into eight districts, Baaj, Hamdaniya, Hatra, Mosul, Shikhan, Sinjar, Tel Afar, and Tilkaif. Mosul, the provincial capital is the third largest city in Iraq behind Baghdad and Basra. The population is also a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Christians, and other smaller religious minorities. Sinjar, Tilkaif, and Shikhan are also disputed territories that have parts that the Kurds claim. This is the source of one of the major disputes between Arabs and Kurds in the province, and country.

Ninewa’s Population
Total: 2,811,091
Shikhan: 49,396
Hatra: 55,157
Baaj: 133,291
Hamdaniya: 143,462
Tilkaif: 190,403
Sinjar: 237,073
Tel Afar: 382,050
Mosul: 1,620,259

Security

Security was worse in Ninewa in the second half of 2007 before improving in 2008. By June 2008 there were approximately 300 security incidents. That jumped to 375 in September, but then declined afterwards, leveling off at around 225 incidents by November. Deaths have had a slow and steady decline during that same time period. In June there were around 130 deaths. That increased to 150 in July, and was at 100 by the end of 2008. In October Christians were also attacked in Mosul, which led almost 2,000 families to flee. 80% of those have now returned. In total, Ninewa still has around 19,100 families that were displaced during the violence there.

Education

Ninewa province rates worse in education, especially amongst women, compared to the rest of the country. In Iraq, 24% of women are illiterate. In Ninewa it ranges from 23% in Hamdaniya to a high of 60% in Hatra. That’s mainly because so few women attend school. Overall, 47% of women over ten years old have less than a primary education in Iraq. Only the Hamdaniya district at 44% beats that national average. Otherwise the rate goes from 52% of women with less than a primary education in Mosul up to 90% in Hatra. The men of Ninewa only do slightly better. In Iraq 11% of males are illiterate, compared to 12% in Ninewa. Sinjar and Hatra have the most illiteracy for men at 25% and 37% respectively. 31% of men over 10 years old have less than a primary education in the country, but in Ninewa it’s at 41%. Hamdaniya does the best at 27%, but the other eight districts range from 37%-68%.

Women Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 47%
Hamdaniya: 44%
Mosul: 52%
Baaj: 53%
Ninewa: 58%
Tel Afar: 66%
Sinjar: 72%
Shikhan: 74%
Tilkaif: 76%
Hatra: 90%

Illiterate Women:
Iraq: 24%
Hamdaniya: 23%
Mosul: 24%
Ninewa: 30%
Baaj: 30%
Tilkaif: 31%
Tel Afar: 32%
Shikhan: 48%
Sinjar: 57%
Hatra: 60%

Men Over 10 Years Old With Less Than Primary Education
Iraq: 31%
Hamdaniya: 27%
Mosul: 37%
Tel Afar: 45%
Baaj: 45%
Sinjar: 46%
Shikhan: 49%
Tilkaif: 54%
Hatra: 68%

Illiterate Men
Iraq: 11%
Mosul: 8%
Hamdaniya: 9%
Tilkaif: 10%
Tel Afar: 15%
Baaj: 19%
Shikhan: 19%
Sinjar: 25%
Hatra: 37%

Employment

Similarly women do far worse than men in finding employment in Ninewa and in the country. In Iraq only 18% of women are employed or looking for a job. In only one district, Hatra at 30%, does Ninewa do better than that. Otherwise anywhere from 3% of women are in the labor force in Baaj and Tilkaif to up to 10% in Mosul and Hamdaniya. Female unemployment is also much higher in Ninewa, 35%, compared to the rest of the country, 13%. Tilkaif has the lowest unemployment rate for women at 9%, and Tel Afar matches the country’s rate at 13%. The remaining six districts however have unemployment for women ranging from 14% in Hamdaniya up to 62% in Hatra. Even for men, there is high unemployment in areas, even though more males are involved in the labor force than in Iraq overall. 81% of Iraqi men participate in the labor force, compared to 85% in Ninewa. Baaj 90% and Hatra 91% have the high numbers. Unemployment is still slightly higher in Ninewa, 13%, than the national average, 12%. Tel Afar, 21%, Shikhan, 23%, and Hatra, 33%, have the most jobless men.

Female Labor Force Participation 15-64 Years Old
Iraq: 18%
Ninewa: 8%
Baaj: 3%
Tilkaif: 3%
Tel Afar: 5%
Shikhan: 6%
Sinjar: 6%
Mosul: 10%
Hamdaniya: 10%
Hatra: 30%

Female Unemployment
Iraq: 13%
Ninewa: 35%
Tilkaif: 9%
Tel Afar: 13%
Hamdaniya: 14%
Sinjar: 14%
Shikhan: 30%
Baaj: 36%
Mosul: 40%
Hatra: 62%

Male Labor Force Participation 15-64
Iraq: 81%
Ninewa: 85%
Sinjar: 78%
Tel Afar: 81%
Hamdaniya: 82%
Mosul: 86%
Shikhan: 86%
Tilkaif: 87%
Baaj: 90%
Hatra: 91%

Male Unemployment
Iraq: 12%
Ninewa: 13%
Baaj: 3%
Hamdaniya: 8%
Sinjar: 9%
Mosul: 12%
Tilkaif: 13%
Tel Afar: 21%
Shikhan: 23%
Hatra: 33%

Poverty

The lack of jobs has resulted in high rates of poverty in the province. 22% of Iraqis are in the lowest per capita income quintile. In Ninewa that ranges from 57% in Tel Afar down to 25% in Mosul.

% In Lowest Per Capita Income Quintile
Iraq: 22%
Mosul: 25
Sinjar: 27%
Hamdaniya: 36%
Baaj: 37%
Tilkaif: 40%
Shikhan: 49%
Hatra: 54%
Tel Afar: 57%

Services

Services like electricity and water, are also limited in Ninewa. 52% of Iraq has more than eleven hours of power cuts or are not connected to the national network. In Sinjar and Baaj 100% of the residents have more than 11-hour electricity outages, followed by Hamdaniya 93%, Tilkaif 80%, and Shikhan 76%. Many Iraqis rely upon private generators or buy electricity for those that do to supplement the national power grid. 21% of Iraqis however have no alternative source of power, compared to 57% in Ninewa. Access to the water network is also limited in some parts of the province. Only in Tilkaif is the entire district connected to the water system. Otherwise anywhere from 7% in Mosul and Shikhan up to 83% in Sinjar, 86% in Hatra, and 100% in Baaj do not have access.

More Than 11 Hours Power Cut Or No Connection To Network
Iraq: 52%
Hatra: 15%
Tel Afar: 26%
Mosul: 50%
Shikhan: 76%
Tilkaif: 80%
Hamdaniya: 93%
Sinjar: 100%
Baaj: 100%

No Alternative Electricity Source
Iraq: 21%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 17%
Tilkaif: 32%
Baaj: 37%
Sinjar: 49%
Hamdaniya: 59%
Hatra: 81%
Tel Afar: 90%

Not Connected to Water Network
Iraq: 26%
Tilkaif: 0%
Mosul: 7%
Shikhan: 7%
Hamdaniya: 20%
Tel Afar: 53%
Sinjar: 83%
Hatra: 86%
Baaj: 100%

Food

The majority of Iraqis depend upon the government’s food ration system, which is the largest in the world. There is still malnutrition in Iraq however. 22% of Iraqis face chronic malnutrition. Shikhan does the best in this department with only 11% affected, followed by Hatra 20%, and Hamdaniya 22%, while Baaj 42%, Sinjar and Tel Afar at 48% each do the worst.

Chronic Malnutrition
Iraq: 22%
Shikhan: 11%
Hatra: 20%
Hamdaniya: 22%
Tilkaif: 26%
Mosul: 27%
Baaj: 42%
Sinjar: 48%
Tel Afar: 48%

SOURCES

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Ninewa Governorate Profile,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, February 2009

Kamal, Adel, “new ninawa governor: no possibility of Kurdish alliance,” Niqash, 2/24/09

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Christians Returning To Mosul,” 3/5/09

Reuters, “UN Says 1 Million Iraqis Lack Food,” 11/12/08

>How Are The Current Provincial Councils Doing?

>The early results for the provincial elections have been released. It will probably take several weeks for the winners to work out deals with some of the other Lists to form new coalitions to rule. While that is going on it might be a good time to review how the soon to be outgoing provincial councils did in 2008. These are numbers based upon the latest quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). The paper includes some of the latest statistics on Iraq’s eighteen provinces.

Budget

Budget execution has been an on-going problem for the Iraqi provinces. Ninewa which is currently ruled by the Kurds did the worst in that regards spending only 7% of its budget largely due to the security situation. They were followed by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in Baghdad with 12%, and the Dawa-SIIC controlled Diyala with 18%. The Supreme Council did a much better job in Najaf with 95%. The Sadrist were second in Maysan with 79%, and the Islamic Party third in Anbar with 69%. Those aggregate numbers however may not mean that the councils actually accomplished much. First Iraq’s government at all levels has always spent a large amount of its operational budget that pays for wages, bills and benefits, but always lagged on its capital budget that includes investing in infrastructure and reconstruction. Second, even if a province spent most of the latter, it may not have been spent well. The Sadrists of Maysan for example, might have expended 79% of their budget, but as reported before they only finished 41 of 241 development projects in 2008.

Who Currently Rules Province And % of 2008 Budget Spent:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): Kurds – N/A
Ninewa: Kurds – 7%
Baghdad: SIIC – 12%
Diyala: SIIC – 18%
Qadisiyah: SIIC – 25%
Karbala: SIIC – 33%
Muthanna: SIIC – 36%
Basra: Fadhila – 37%
Dhi Qar: SIIC – 38%
Salahaddin: Kurds – 49%
Wasit: 50%
Tamim: 54%
Babil: SIIC – 58%
Anbar: Iraqi Islamic Party – 69%
Maysan: Sadrists – 79%
Najaf: SIIC – 95%

Electricity

One of the major issues in the January 2009 election was the provision of services, which are still sorely lacking in many parts of the country. Demand for electricity still outweighs supply. Wasit had the worst performance meeting only 48.1% of demand. Maysan 50.4%, Babil 51.0%, and Najaf 51.5% were almost as bad. The three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya did the best job at 83.9%, followed by Diyala 83.0%, and Tamim 82.6%.

Average Electricity Supply & Demand Per Day (Megawatts/Hour) – % Demand Met
Wasit: 2,724/5,655 – 48.1%
Maysan: 2,566/5,090 – 50.4%
Babil: 4,039/7,915 – 51.0%
Najaf: 3,594/6,973 – 51.5%
Karbala: 2,883/5,092 – 56.6%
Qadisiyah: 3,077/4,711 – 65.3%
Baghdad: 31,714/48,420 – 65.4%
Ninewa: 10,587/15,972 – 66.2%
Muthanna: 2,532/3,770 – 67.1%
Basra: 12,032/17,148 – 70.1%
Dhi Qar: 5,404/7,536 – 71.7%
Anbar: 4,589/6,206 – 73.9%
Salahaddin: 5,459/7,186 – 75.9%
Tamim: 5,094/6,162 – 82.6%
Diyala: 3,623/4,362 – 83.0%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 14,627/17,426 – 83.9%

Water

Access to potable water is greatly improving in many provinces, with a few still in bad shape. Kurdistan had the worst water supply at 40%, followed by Diyala 54%, and Muthanna 65%. Tamim, Basra, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Maysan all did the best job providing their residents with water 90% of more of the time. Again, these aggregate numbers hide wide disparities within provinces.

Access To Potable Water:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 40%
Diyala: 54%
Muthanna: 65%
Karbala: 71%
Ninewa: 71%
Salahaddin: 71%
Qadisiyah: 76%
Najaf: 83%
Anbar: 84%
Baghdad: 89%
Wasit: 89%
Maysan: 91%
Dhi Qar: 94%
Babil: 97%
Basra: 98%
Tamim: 98%

Poverty

Along with a lack of services, poverty is another major issue that Iraqis face. The SIGIR used numbers based upon a United Nations World Food Program report from November 2008 discussed here before. The UN broke Iraq’s population up into five income groups, and found large swaths of the country lived in the bottom two. The poorest provinces were Qadisiyah and Karbala, while the best off were Baghdad and Basra. The latter two are both the economic and political hubs of the country, which could account for their relative lack of poverty compared to the rest of the country.

% Of Families In The Poorest Of Five Income Groups
Baghdad: 5%
Basra: 11%
Najaf: 13%
Salahaddin: 14%
Maysan: 16%
Diyala: 18%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 19%
Wasit: 20%
Anbar: 24%
Dhi Qar: 27%
Babil: 28%
Muthanna: 28%
Ninewa: 31%
Tamim: 31%
Karbala: 36%
Qadisiyah: 37%

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08

Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09The early results for the provincial elections have been released. It will probably take several weeks for the winners to work out deals with some of the other Lists to form new coalitions to rule. While that is going on it might be a good time to review how the soon to be outgoing provincial councils did in 2008. These are numbers based upon the latest quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). The paper includes some of the latest statistics on Iraq’s eighteen provinces.

Budget

Budget execution has been an on-going problem for the Iraqi provinces. Ninewa which is currently ruled by the Kurds did the worst in that regards spending only 7% of its budget largely due to the security situation. They were followed by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in Baghdad with 12%, and the Dawa-SIIC controlled Diyala with 18%. The Supreme Council did a much better job in Najaf with 95%. The Sadrist were second in Maysan with 79%, and the Islamic Party third in Anbar with 69%. Those aggregate numbers however may not mean that the councils actually accomplished much. First Iraq’s government at all levels has always spent a large amount of its operational budget that pays for wages, bills and benefits, but always lagged on its capital budget that includes investing in infrastructure and reconstruction. Second, even if a province spent most of the latter, it may not have been spent well. The Sadrists of Maysan for example, might have expended 79% of their budget, but as reported before they only finished 41 of 241 development projects in 2008.

Who Currently Rules Province And % of 2008 Budget Spent:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): Kurds – N/A
Ninewa: Kurds – 7%
Baghdad: SIIC – 12%
Diyala: SIIC – 18%
Qadisiyah: SIIC – 25%
Karbala: SIIC – 33%
Muthanna: SIIC – 36%
Basra: Fadhila – 37%
Dhi Qar: SIIC – 38%
Salahaddin: Kurds – 49%
Wasit: 50%
Tamim: 54%
Babil: SIIC – 58%
Anbar: Iraqi Islamic Party – 69%
Maysan: Sadrists – 79%
Najaf: SIIC – 95%

Electricity

One of the major issues in the January 2009 election was the provision of services, which are still sorely lacking in many parts of the country. Demand for electricity still outweighs supply. Wasit had the worst performance meeting only 48.1% of demand. Maysan 50.4%, Babil 51.0%, and Najaf 51.5% were almost as bad. The three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya did the best job at 83.9%, followed by Diyala 83.0%, and Tamim 82.6%.

Average Electricity Supply & Demand Per Day (Megawatts/Hour) – % Demand Met
Wasit: 2,724/5,655 – 48.1%
Maysan: 2,566/5,090 – 50.4%
Babil: 4,039/7,915 – 51.0%
Najaf: 3,594/6,973 – 51.5%
Karbala: 2,883/5,092 – 56.6%
Qadisiyah: 3,077/4,711 – 65.3%
Baghdad: 31,714/48,420 – 65.4%
Ninewa: 10,587/15,972 – 66.2%
Muthanna: 2,532/3,770 – 67.1%
Basra: 12,032/17,148 – 70.1%
Dhi Qar: 5,404/7,536 – 71.7%
Anbar: 4,589/6,206 – 73.9%
Salahaddin: 5,459/7,186 – 75.9%
Tamim: 5,094/6,162 – 82.6%
Diyala: 3,623/4,362 – 83.0%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 14,627/17,426 – 83.9%

Water

Access to potable water is greatly improving in many provinces, with a few still in bad shape. Kurdistan had the worst water supply at 40%, followed by Diyala 54%, and Muthanna 65%. Tamim, Basra, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Maysan all did the best job providing their residents with water 90% of more of the time. Again, these aggregate numbers hide wide disparities within provinces.

Access To Potable Water:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 40%
Diyala: 54%
Muthanna: 65%
Karbala: 71%
Ninewa: 71%
Salahaddin: 71%
Qadisiyah: 76%
Najaf: 83%
Anbar: 84%
Baghdad: 89%
Wasit: 89%
Maysan: 91%
Dhi Qar: 94%
Babil: 97%
Basra: 98%
Tamim: 98%

Poverty

Along with a lack of services, poverty is another major issue that Iraqis face. The SIGIR used numbers based upon a United Nations World Food Program report from November 2008 discussed here before. The UN broke Iraq’s population up into five income groups, and found large swaths of the country lived in the bottom two. The poorest provinces were Qadisiyah and Karbala, while the best off were Baghdad and Basra. The latter two are both the economic and political hubs of the country, which could account for their relative lack of poverty compared to the rest of the country.

% Of Families In The Poorest Of Five Income Groups
Baghdad: 5%
Basra: 11%
Najaf: 13%
Salahaddin: 14%
Maysan: 16%
Diyala: 18%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 19%
Wasit: 20%
Anbar: 24%
Dhi Qar: 27%
Babil: 28%
Muthanna: 28%
Ninewa: 31%
Tamim: 31%
Karbala: 36%
Qadisiyah: 37%

SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09

>Iraq’s 2008 Cholera Outbreak Appears To Be Over

>Cholera outbreaks are an almost annual event in Iraq. In August 2008 the latest one began. The first case was found in Baghdad, but it soon spread to southern Iraq, which was hit the hardest. Incompetence by local officials made the situation worse. By November 2008 900 people were affected. That month the government stopped reporting on cases, fearing the bad publicity. The latest report by the United Nations’ World Health Organization however found that the outbreak is largely over.

On August 18, 2008 the first confirmed case of cholera was found in Baghdad. Later that month Babil and Maysan reported cases. The outbreak then spread to Diyala, Wasit, Anbar, Basra, Najaf, Karbala, and Qadisiyah the next month. Eventually thirteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces were affected, including Dhi Qar, Irbil, and Muthanna. On September 22 the most cases were detected in one day at 79. The numbers then declined until October 14 when a second wave was detected. Most of these new cases were found in Qadisiyah that has received 33% of the total. This new outbreak seemed to scare Baghdad. In November, the Health Ministry said that they would no longer report on the epidemic because of concern over the media, and families affected. After October 22 however, the number of cases tapered off. The last seven incidents have all been in Babil, which has had 32% of the cases overall.

Total Cases By Province as of December 21, 2008
Diyala 1 case
Dhi Qar 1 case
Irbil 2 cases
Wasit 3 cases
Maysan 3 cases
Anbar 8 cases
Muthanna 21 cases
Najaf 41 cases
Karbala 61 cases
Basra 64 cases
Baghdad 109 cases
Babil 294 cases
Qadisiyah 317 cases

Compared to the last cholera incident, this one has been rather mild. Since August there have been a total of 925 cases. 476, 53%, were children five years or younger. In August 2007 an outbreak began in Tamim, and spread to nine other provinces. There were over 3,000 cases that year, and 14 deaths. In 2008 eleven have died so far.

The main cause of the cholera outbreak in 2008 was the decrepit water system, and incompetence by officials in Babil. According to Iraq’s Health Ministry 17% of the country’s water pipes are in bad condition. The International Red Cross reported in October 2008 that 40% of the population does not have access to clean water. Many Iraqis, especially the poor, displaced, and those in the country rely upon untreated water from rivers and wells, which greatly increases the likelihood of diseases like cholera spreading. In the summer, a drought hit Iraq, which made the water situation even worse. In Babil members of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council also used chlorine that they knew had passed its expiration date to clean the water supply. Until December Babil was the center of the cholera outbreak as a result.

Like almost everything else, Iraq’s infrastructure has been degraded by three wars, international sanctions, looting after the U.S. invasion, along with the fighting caused by the insurgency and sectarian war. The country still needs billions of dollars in reconstruction. The problem is that the U.S. led effort is ending, while Baghdad is facing budget cuts because of the declining price of oil. Together this has left Iraq a rather poor and broken country despite its huge petroleum reserves. The yearly cholera outbreaks are just one sign of the depleted situation Iraq finds itself in.

SOURCES

Balarkrishnan, Angela, “Millions of Iraqis at risk from contaminated water, says Red Cross,” Guardian, 10/29/08

Cockburn, Patrick, “Corruption blamed as cholera rips through Iraq,” Independent, 10/10/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Health Ministry Stops Releasing Cholera Numbers,” 11/18/08

IRIN, “Health threat posed by aging water supply networks,” 10/23/08

World Health Organization, “Ministry of Health Iraq and the WHO Representative’s Office Iraq,” 1/2/09

>International Organization for Migration Report on Internally Displaced In Tamim, Ninewa and Salahaddin

>In December 2008 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) released its year-end reports on the displaced in Iraq’s eighteen provinces. One report covered Tamim, Ninewa and Salahaddin. Outside of Baghdad these are the most violent governorates in the country, and have deep seated ethnic tensions in two major cities, Mosul and Kirkuk, between Arabs and Kurds that are nowhere near being reconciled. This means there were will continue to be conflict there and displacement as was recently seen when thousands of Christians fled Mosul in October 2008. Because of these on-going disputes only a few thousand families have returned to the region. Those still displaced face a variety of problems from lack of basic services and food to jobs. As long as the three provinces remain unstable it is unlikely that the displaced will be coming back in large numbers any time soon.

The Displaced In Ninewa

Ninewa is one of Iraq’s northern most provinces located next to Anbar, Salahaddin, Dohuk and Irbil. It is rich in oil, and contains the third largest city in the country, Mosul, behind Baghdad and Basra. The city has a mix of Arabs, Kurds, Shabaks, Assyrians, Turkomen and Armenians. Security got worse in the second half of 2008 with an increase in kidnappings, assassinations, militia attacks, and general violence. Ethnic tensions also heated up when Christians were attacked in Mosul leading to almost 2,000 families fleeing. While some have come back, the majority have not and are still afraid of what might happen to them if they do. There are still military operations going on in Ninewa, specifically in Mosul. Until this situation is settled, the displaced problem will not be resolved.

Ninewa received two waves of displaced. The first came after the invasion, and consisted mostly of former Baathists and government officials from Baghdad and the south who were afraid of retribution. That would account for the large number of Iraqis from Basra 6.33% who now reside in Ninewa. There were also another group that fled military operations in the province such as a large number of Turkomen who left Telafar because of the fighting there. The second wave came in 2006 during the sectarian war. That’s shown by the fact that major reason why families fled was violence, 79.6% and fear 65.5%.

In the beginning of 2006 there were only about 100 displaced a month entering the province. After April however, it took off to around 1,400 coming in June. Displacement slowed afterwards, only to spike to its highest level of 2,000 in September. It then dropped to 250 in October, then went up against to 1,600 in November. Since then the number of refugees in the province has dropped consistently to 100 in April 2007. It has gone down to almost 0 since then with slight increases in January and October 2008.

Overall, 50% of the internal refugees in Ninewa came from Baghdad, but there were others that fled because of the Arab-Kurdish conflict. There are also a large number of displaced from within the province itself. Unlike the rest of the country, the largest displaced group is not Arab Muslims, but Assyrian Christians.

The province has no restrictions on the entry of displaced. To get food rations, families have to have their IDs, rations cards and documents, and register with the local office of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. While the displaced have been generally welcomed in the province, resentment is growing against them as they are blamed for rising costs, especially rents, while some have joined armed groups. 59.8% say they want to go back to the original homes, while 6.4% said they want to be integrated into Ninewa.

Like the displaced in the rest of the country, those in Ninewa face a whole series of problems receiving basic services, along with finding housing and jobs. Next to legal help for retrieving their lost property, jobs was the second most important issue to displaced at 88%. In the Makhmoor and Hawiga districts there is high unemployment. Out of those surveyed by the IOM 81.1% said they had no family members working. Arabs and Turkomen especially find it hard to find work. The government is suppose to provide food rations to every Iraqi, but 56.6% of those polled said they received no rations at all. The water system in Ninewa is also in great disrepair. In the Mosul district there are villages that have no sewage system and the pipe system has been damaged by constant traffic by military vehicles. There was also maintenance done on the district’s electrical system, which reduced the number of hours per day with power to 4-6. 41.8% of displaced polled said they only got 1-3 ours of power per day on average.

A majority of the displaced said that they had received some type of aid to assist them with their predicament. 75% said they had received help. The largest provider was the Ministry of Displacement and Migration that served 43.2%. All government agencies combined provided for 45.1% of the displaced. Humanitarian groups in total helped 50.1%. That still left out a large number of people. 30.0% for example said they had no food aid. This is common throughout most of the country, and is made worse by the lack of security in the province.

Statistics On Displaced In Ninewa

Overall:
Population: 2,811,091
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 6,572 families, approx. 39,432 people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 12,546 families, approx. 75,276 people
Number of returnees: 605 families, approx 3,630 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: All 605 were internally displaced
Sect Of Displaced: Christian Assyrian 39.0%, Sunni Arab 26.0%, Sunni Turkomen 12.4%, Sunni Kurd 12.4%, Other 3.3%, Sunni Kurd 3.2%, Shiite Turkomen 2.2%, Shiite Arab 0.8%, Yazidi Arab 0.3%, Christian Armenian 0.2%
Origin Of Displaced: Baghdad 49.63%, Basra 6.33%, Diyala 1.12%, Tamim 0.90%, Salahaddin 0.59%, Anbar 0.55%, Babil 0.45%, Wasit 0.18%, Qadisiyah 0.12%, Dhi Qar 0.06%, Irbil 0.03%, Karbala 0.01%

Reason for Displacement:
General violence 79.6%
Fear 65.5%
Direct threat to life 42.8%
Armed conflict 4.2%
Other 2.5%
Forced from home 1.7%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 85.7%
Don’t think targeted 12.7%
Ethnic group 1.9%
Social group 1.7%
Political views 0.5%

Security Situation:
Checkpoints 24.8%
Death or injury in family 21.9%
Missing family member 7.0%
Need authorization to move 5.4%
Other restrictions on movement 0.0%

Type of Housing:
Renting 78.2%
Living with host family or relatives 14.7%
Other 4.7%
Collective settlement 1.1%
Public building 0.8%
Tent near house of host family 0.6%
Former military base 0.1%
Tent in camp 0.0%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 79.1%
Not at all 8.4%
Always 12.4%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 92.0%
Water tanks/trucks 51.5%
Wells 11.4%
Broken pipes 9.3%
Rivers 7.8%
Others 1.5%

Electricity Supply:
No power 4.9%
1-3 hours per day 41.8%
Four or more hours per day 51.8%

Fuel Access:
No access 75.2%
Propane 13.3%
Benzene 21.5%
Kerosene 12.7%
Diesel 9.9%
Other 0.0%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 18.9%
No one works 81.1%

Type Of Property Left Behind:
Other 64.9%
Land for farming 17.3%
Land for housing 5.3%
House 11.9%
Shop/business 0.0%
Apartment or room 0.5%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 61.5%
Accessible 12.9%
Occupied 4.6%
Destroyed 3.7%
Used by military 0.8%
Taken over by Government 0.4%

Source of Assistance:
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 43.2%
Iraqi Red Crescent 31.6%
Religious group 29.8%
Host community 29.5%
Relatives 26.6%
No aid received 24.3%
Humanitarian group 18.5%
Other 6.8%
Other government agency 1.9%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 67.8%
Non-food items 60.2%
Other 15.5%
Health 8.5%

Food Aid Source:
Humanitarian group 34.8%
Religious charity 30.3%
No aid 30.0%
Others 21.6%
Federal government 10.5%
Provincial government 6.0%

Needs:
Legal Help 89%
Jobs 88%
Shelter 63%
Food 28%
Other 12%
Health 7%
Water 5%
Hygiene 4%
School 2%
Sanitation 1%

The Displaced In Salahaddin Ninewa

Salahaddin province is just north of Baghdad. It is mostly Arab with some Turkomen and Kurds. The city of Tikrit was a Baathist stronghold and the birthplace of Saddam Hussein. Because of this there was a lot of fighting between the Coalition and insurgents there. Although there is still violence in Salahaddin, the security situation is relatively stable. Militias and insurgents are losing influence.

Many people in Salahaddin were displaced because of the intense fighting there. The majority however, came during the sectarian war. 49.5% come from Baghdad, then Tamim 15% and Basra 12%. Most of those from the south fled to Salahaddin because they were Baathist and government officials, and were afraid of reprisals. 60.6% left their homes because of direct threats on their lives, while 47.5% gave their reason as general violence. The increase in displaced began in January 2006, with a big spike in June to 2,000. The rate declined until September 2006, and then took off again to 1,500 by December. The rate of displacement then steadily dropped until it was almost at zero by August 2007 with a few bumps up since then.

The province has no restrictions on displaced. Most have been welcomed, and received aid from the local communities. The Ministry of Interior is now telling families from Anbar and Diyala to go home because security has been established there, but the order is not being enforced. 50.1% of the displaced said they want to return to their homes, while 12.7% prefer to stay in Salahddin and resettle there. Because of the continued instability in the province, only 96 families have come back. 56 were internally displaced, while 40 came back from other countries. All of the latter are former Baathists and government officials, and are keeping low because they don’t want to face persecution for their past lives.

The displaced in Salahaddin face problems with food, jobs, and shelter. 88% said they needed food, followed by jobs 75%, and shelter 66%. Children of the displaced often have to work to support their families. Even then, only 71.7% of the displaced said they had anyone in their family working. Most displaced there have registered with the local authorities and receive their food rations, although 23.0% said they hadn’t received any yet. Salahaddin also suffered from the country’s drought during the summer. Water is still scarce in some sections of the province. In Tikrit the displaced have access to water 20 hours per day. In Samarra its 18 hours, but in other areas it goes down to only 5-6 hours. In parts of the Al-Daur district it gets as low as only 1-3 hours of water a day. Salahaddin is home to one of the country’s major power stations at Beiji. Despite this electricity is extremely scare for the displaced. 45% said they only get 1-3 hours of electricity per day. There are parts of Tikrit that receive no power at all. The province also lacks hospital staff. Only 34% of the displaced that were surveyed said they had access to the medications they need, while only 29% had been visited by a health worker in the last 30 days. The education system is also poor with many schools made out of mud, and others that need repairs.

A little under half of Salahaddin’s displaced are not being served by any organization. 47.6% said they had received no aid at all. Of those that had, local communities was the largest provider. The government on the other hand had only helped 5.8%. Humanitarian groups did a much better job reaching 50.1%. With food being their greatest need, 57.3% said they had received no food assistance. Government agencies only provided food to 1.7% of those surveyed. Even with security improving in Salahaddin, things have not improved much for the displaced there.

Statistics On Displaced In Salahaddin

Overall:
Population: 1,191,403
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 7,790 families, approx. 45, 614people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 15,795 families, approx. 94,770people
Number of returnees: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: 56 internally displaced, 40 international refugees
Sect of Displaced: Sunni Arab 95.8%, Shiite Arab 2.5%, Sunni Kurd 0.5%, Shiite Turkomen 1.0%, Sunni Turkomen 0.1%, Other 0.1%
Origin of Displaced: Baghdad 49.5%, Tamim 14.94%, Basra 12.22%, Diyala 10.36%, Anbar 1.90%, Ninewa 1.89%, Irbil 1.72%, Wasit 0.7%, Babil 0.68%, Dhi Qar 0.65%, Qadisiyah 0.10%, Karbala 0.04%

Reason for Displacement:
Direct threat to life 60.6%
General violence 47.5%
Fear 29.5%
Forced from home 15.4%
Armed conflict 2.2%
Other 0.8%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 55.0%
Ethnic group 21.3%
Social group 22.2%
Political views 5.1%
Don’t think targeted 0.7%

Security Situation:
Checkpoints 9.9%
Death or injury in family 8.3%
Need authorization to move 6.3%
Missing family member 3.5%
Other restrictions on movement 1.0%

Type of Housing:
Renting 67.9%
Living with host family or relatives 11.9%
Other 7.9%
Public building 6.8%
Collective settlement 3.9%
Former military base 1.0%
Tent near house of host family 0.4%
Tent in camp 0.1%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 41.2%
Not at all 23.0%
Always 34.6%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 85.9%
Water tanks/trucks 28.0%
Wells 22.6%
Broken pipes 1.3%
Rivers 10.3%
Others 2.0%

Electricity Supply:
No power 2.1%
1-3 hours per day 45.0%
Four or more hours per day 52.3%

Fuel Access:
Propane 56.7%
No access 40.8%
Benzene 22.8%
Other 8.8%
Kerosene 4.1%
Diesel 1.1%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 28.3%
No one works 71.7%

Types of Property Left Behind:
Other 93.7%
Shop/business 4.0%
Land for housing 1.3%
Apartment or room 0.4%
House 0.4%
Land for farming 0.0%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 61.6%
Occupied 13.8%
Accessible 7.2%
Destroyed 2.9%
Used by military 1.1%
Taken over by Government 0.0%

Source of Assistance:
No aid received 47.6%
Host community 33.4%
Iraqi Red Crescent 23.0%
Relatives 11.1%
Religious group 9.7%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 4.4%
Other government agency 1.4%
Other 0.8%
Humanitarian group 0.3%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 52.1%
Non-food items 30.8%
Health 16.8%
Other 2.5%

Food Aid Source:
No aid 57.3%
Others 21.7%
Humanitarian group 12.4%
Religious charity 11.0%
Federal government 1.3%
Provincial government 0.4%

Needs:
Food 88%
Jobs 75%
Shelter 66%
Other 25%
Health 18%
Water 12%
Hygiene 7%
School 4%
Legal Help 2%
Sanitation 2%

The Displaced In Tamim

Tamim was once known as Kirkuk province. Its name was changed in 1972. It is home to large oil reserves and ethnic tensions. The city of Kirkuk is one of the most contested pieces of territory in the country. Because of these divisions security worsened in the second half of 2008. Assassinations, kidnappings, attacks and explosions were al up. Violence and sexual assault against the displaced is also common.

Like Ninewa and Salahaddin, Tamim saw two waves of displacement. The first came during the Saddam years when he carried out his Arabization policy forcing out Kurds. Many of these families have since returned, but that has led to Arabs being pushed out. Then the sectarian war began, and vast more lost their homes or moved to Tamim as a result. 75% said they fled because of direct threats to their lives. Unlike other provinces in Iraq, most of the displaced in Tamim come from Diyala rather than Baghdad. The number of displaced saw a slow increase with a few ups and down until it hit its highest point in May 2007 at 1,700. It then dropped to almost zero, but with a few increases in October 2007, February 2008, and May 2008.

Tamim does have restriction on displaced entering the country. In order to register and receive food rations, families need to go to the local city council and the local branch of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and then go to Kirkuk for more paperwork. Many times families get rejected because of their ethnicity. There are many unregistered families living on the outskirts of Kirkuk as a result. If families don’t register they can be evicted as well. These strict rules have led many displaced to live with relatives because they can’t legally rent a place. If a family has had a member killed, kidnapped, or an orphaned child however, they can receive an exception from the Ministry of Displacement and Migration. The displaced are also treated differently depending upon whom they live with. If they are not of the same sect than they are often discriminated against. There are even reports of threats and harassment that have led some to move away.

79.0% of the displaced in Tamim say they want to return to their original homes, while 17.0% said they want to stay in their new communities. Families have begun to return to Al-Jamasa and Al-Shaheria villages in Al-Hawiga district after a Sons of Iraq unit was set up there and stabilized the area. Families that came back to Gareeb Sofla nearby found their homes destroyed, and are living without electricity, water, medical services, schools, and jobs. Some are living in mud huts. The rate of return has been limited with under 1000 individuals coming back so far. Unlike the rest of the country, they are split evenly between internally displaced and refugees who came back from other countries. The latter have been concentrated in the Daqduq district.

Displaced women are facing a number of difficulties in Tamim. Prostitution has grown in the province because of lack of jobs and poverty faced by the displaced. Families sometimes force their wives and children into the industry. In the Abo Al Shees village in Hawiga district there are pregnant women doing hard labor with little health care. Girls don’t go to school their either because they have to work, and there is a high level of child labor.

Besides jobs the major needs of displaced in Tamim are food, 96% and shelter 93%, along with a number of other issues. A whopping 98.8% of the displaced in the IOM survey said they had no one in their family working. In Kirkuk and Hawiga districts there are over 50 families facing evictions for squatting or because they can’t afford to pay their rents. In total, about 12% of the displaced said they were facing the los of their residences. Over 80% of the displaced have no to limited access to government food rations. Families in Daqduq and Dibis districts say they are regularly missing items in their packages. The major reason why the province is having such trouble delivering these goods is because of lack of security. Only 49% of the displaced in the province have access to water. In Daquq distrit there is a village with no access to water, which leads them to use a local river that increases the risk of disease. 41% say they use a broken pipe for this need. 71.6% of the displaced have access to four or more hours of electricity per day, but 16.5% had no power at all, and 11.3% said they only got it for 1 to 3 hours per day. Only 31% had access to health care, and 70% said they couldn’t get the medications they need. Just 9% were visited by a health worker in 30 days.

Government and humanitarian groups are largely failing the displaced in the province. 77% said they received no aid at all. The largest provider were unnamed groups at 16.9%. The government only helped 17.9%, while non-government organizations did worse at 11.5%. 77% received no food aid, with the government only assisting 9.8%. Like Ninewa, the lack of security there and continued instability will hamper efforts to help the displaced in this part of Iraq.

Statistics On Displaced In Tamim

Overall:
Population: 902,019
Total pre-February 2006 internally displaced: 1,252 families, approx. 7,512 people
Total post-February 2006 internally displaced: 7,911 families, approx. 43,623 people
Number of returnees: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Internally Displaced vs Refugees Amongst Returns: 82 internally displaced, 83 international refugees
Sect of Displaced: Sunni Arab 51.5%, Sunni Kurd 18.8%, Shiite Turkomen 18.0%, Sunni Turkomen 3.2%, Shiite Arab 3.0%, Christian Assyrian 2.0%, Sunni Kurd 0.9%, Other 0.3%, Christian Aremnian 0.2%, Yazidi Arab 0.1%
Origin of Displaced: Diyala 26.11%, Baghdad 16.27%, Ninewa 15.94%, Salahaddin 15.35%, Anbar 3.99%, Irbil 1.28%, Sulaymaniyah 0.15%, Basra 0.34%, Babil 0.12%
Dhi Qar 0.04%, Najaf 0.03%

Reason for Displacement:
Direct threat to life 75.0%%
General violence 17.9%
Forced from home 16.0%
Fear 13.5%
Armed conflict 11.4%
Other 1.6%

Reasons for Being Targeted:
Sect 59.4%
Don’t think targeted 38.3%
Ethnic group 2.0%
Political views 1.1%
Social group 0.6%

Security Situation:
Death or injury in family 57.9%
Checkpoints 30.3%
Other restrictions on movement 25.3%
Missing family member 24.1%
Need authorization to move 21.4%

Type of Housing:
Living with host family or relatives 28.1%
Other 27.2%
Renting 22.7%
Public building 9.5%
Tent near house of host family 8.3%
Collective settlement 3.8%
Former military base 0.3%
Tent in camp 0.1%

Access To Food Rations:
Sometimes 24.9%
Not at all 56.6%
Always 18.1%

Water Sources:
Municipal water 55.8%
Water tanks/trucks 51.8%
Wells 43.4%
Broken pipes 41.9%
Rivers 17.4%
Others 0.6%

Electricity Supply:
No power 16.5%
1-3 hours per day 11.3%
Four or more hours per day 71.6%

Fuel Access:
No access 78.5%
Benzene 18.8%
Propane 12.6%
Diesel 11.9%
Kerosene 6.1%
Other 0.1%

Employment:
At least one member in family works 1.2%
No one works 98.8%

Type Of Property Left Behind:
Other 68.3%
Land for housing 16.6%
Shop/business 9.7%
Apartment or room 2.5%
House 1.6%
Land for farming 1.3%

Status of Property Left Behind:
Don’t know 76.1%
Accessible 8.1%
Occupied 6.8%
Destroyed 3.8%
Used by military 0.4%
Taken over by Government 0.2%

Source of Assistance:
No aid received 60.0%
Other 16.9%
Ministry of Displacement and Migration 16.4%
Relatives 13.2%
Humanitarian group 7.9%
Host community 5.7%
Religious group 5.1%
Iraqi Red Crescent 3.6%
Other government agency 1.5%

Type of Aid Received:
Food 33.6%
Non-food items 28.8%
Health 8.6%
Other 5.2%

Food Aid Source:
No aid 77.0%
Others 8.4%
Provincial government 7.2%
Humanitarian group 4.7%
Federal government 2.6%
Religious charity 1.4%

Needs:
Food 96%
Shelter 93%
Jobs 51%
Legal Help 24%
Water 11%
Health 9%
Other 5%
Sanitation 5%
School 3%
Hygiene 0%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Kirkuk, Ninewa & Salah al-Din, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008